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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE,

BY
THOMAS KEIGHTLEY,

AUTHOR OF THE MYTHOLOGY OF GREECE AND ITALY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND,
HISTORY OF ROME, OUTLINES OF HISTORY, ETC. ETC.

FIFTH EDITION.

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HISTORY OF GREECE

THOMAS KIGHTLEY

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PREFACE.

THE present work is intended to supply the want of a good History of Greece for schools. It claims, however, to be regarded as somewhat more than a mere school-book. The idea of a popular epitome, which I have sought to realize in it, is, that while by clear, animated and graphic narrative it should interest the young, the views of society and of political measures and characters should be such as not to be disdained even by the statesman.

In a country like this, where almost every one is called upon to take a part in politics, no species of knowledge is more indispensable than history. Under the guidance of sound sense, without which knowledge is of little avail, it is our surest protection against wild political theory, and enables us to think and act with confidence and security in public emergencies. Few, therefore, will deny that it is of importance that correct ideas on this subject should be instilled into the minds of youth, and that histories intended for their use should be something better than mere compilations. But the young are not alone to be considered; there is a very numerous class of grown persons who feel the want of sound historic knowledge, but have not time for reading voluminous works, and have a

just contempt for the common school histories. To such also the present volume is offered. It has been written directly from the best original authorities; and the works of the ablest modern writers on Grecian history and antiquities have been diligently studied and used. It may suffice to mention the names of Müller, Heeren, Boeckh and Wachsmuth among the Germans, and of Arnold and Clinton among ourselves, to inspire confidence. The limits to which I deemed it prudent to confine myself have precluded me from making references; but whenever I coincide with these writers in sentiment or expression, it will of course be inferred that I am their debtor.

I can hardly conceive it possible to write a history like that of Greece, in which nearly all the forms of political existence display themselves, without letting one's political bias appear. I moreover consider it but justice to the reader to apprise him of that of the author, and therefore freely acknowledge that my natural feelings are aristocratic, and that my historic studies have given strength to them; and I should consider that country most likely to enjoy political happiness and prosperity in which the chief functions of government and legislation (the very highest excepted) were in the hands of an open, extensive, well-instructed aristocracy, under the influence and control of the people, but still free to act according to their own judgement. By an aristocracy I mean one of birth and hereditary wealth: I like not that of mere wealth; and that of virtue and talent, enjoying the political pre-eminence of which some enthusiasts dream, is, as far as I know, to be found only in Utopia and similar ideal regions; for it appears not in real history, and what has been will be, I fear, to the end. At the same time I am fully aware of and lament the *contemptor animus et superbia, commune nobilitatis malum*, which is so offensive, and in the eye of reason so absurd; but good can never be had without its attendant evil.

Justice and impartiality should inspire the historian, and he should view all with an equal eye. Here I trust I shall be found not to fail. Despotism, oligarchy and democracy are equally objects of my dislike, but it will be difficult to prove that in a single instance I have been wilfully unjust toward any one of them. Though I brand, in a Cleôn, the selfish unprincipled demagogue, I discern and admire real dignity and elevation of soul in a Demosthenes. In this respect I stand in contrast to Mitford, who transferred to the history of times long past the political prejudices and acrimony of his own day.

It may be that in reading the following pages some persons will feel disappointed at not meeting "Plutarch's men," as they are called by De Retz. The reason they do not is, that I am a historian, not a panegyrist; that the Greeks were no demigods, but men like ourselves, with all our vices and infirmities; and that history, to be useful, should be true.

There may be others who think that Grecian history, because it is ancient, can be of little use at the present day. But, as Dr. Arnold finely observes, history knows not this distinction of ancient and modern with respect to utility. Man has always been the same, and no portion of his story can be quite devoid of use and interest. That of ancient Greece and Rome is even far more useful than the greater part of modern history; for they were free, and theirs is that of the people, not of the rulers. The most important and instructive history at least to *us* is that of England; next, that of Greece and Rome; and then I would say, not that of the great kingdoms and empires, but of the Italian republics of the Middle Ages. Why is Oriental history, in general, so barren of instruction? Simply because it is the history of Khalifs, Shahs and Sultans, not of the people.

London, Jan. 1, 1835.

This history, since its first publication, has received many additions and improvements. For as I wrote each of my histories some improvement suggested itself, which I then transferred to its predecessors when they came to a new edition. Of most of these an account will be found in the Preface to the Fourth Edition of my History of Rome. Here I shall only notice one improvement.

The references to authorities in the first edition were rare; not that I was not fully aware of their great importance, but the necessity of keeping the book of a limited size in order that it might be sold at a moderate price, and an idea that those who would use it might care little about authorities, led me to neglect them except in some important cases. I was soon however induced to change my plan by receiving a letter from the late Dr. Arnold of Rugby, in which, when speaking of the work, he said, "I lost no time in directing the introduction of your History into this school, where I think it will be found both agreeable and useful. In another edition I think that I would in your case put the authorities at the bottom of the page. Without them the book can only be a boy's book, with them it would be an admirable summary of Grecian history for any one. And I have found by experience in writing history, that I like to have the references even as a check upon my own accuracy. I think one is apt otherwise to write a little beyond the warrant of one's authority. But this is a matter of opinion on which many I dare say will differ. There can be no doubt, I think, as to the general merits of your book."

Before I proceed to tell how I acted on this judicious advice, I feel myself called on by justice to the memory of this excellent man to inform the reader, that if he has derived either pleasure or profit from this or any other of my Histories, it is to *him* he is in a great measure indebted for it; as without the assurance of support which he gave me I should hardly have ven-

tured to undertake them. In a letter dated Feb. 14th, 1833, he thus expressed himself: "If you will write a good and picturesque History of Greece I shall feel highly obliged to you, and will introduce it into the school immediately. As for Rome, I have been thinking of doing the thing myself, and am now at work on an abridgement of what I wrote some years ago for the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*. But I begin only with the Punic Wars, and I fear that it will be but a heavy work for boys after all. I would most gladly turn my own history overboard, as far as the school is concerned, if you will give us one which shall be livelier, while it is at the same time correct and free from folly. I think that you narrate well and with great spirit; perhaps, if I may be allowed to say it, the feeling of *ειρωνεία*, so inevitable while we are detailing mere fables, will require to be restrained—nay exchanged, for an entire abandonment to the great interests of truth and goodness when you touch upon real history." I need hardly inform the reader that this last allusion is to the narratives of the adventures of Gods and Dwarfs and Trolls and such like beings which occur in my mythologic writings. Dr. Arnold was afterwards gratified to observe that I had the power of adapting my style to my subject.

It being impossible to give references at the bottom of every page without increasing too much the size and consequently the price of my volumes, I adopted the following plan. At the commencement of each chapter I mention the authorities and the portions of them from which its contents have been derived, placing them in the order of their importance. Whenever any fact or observation has come from a different source, or from some other part of one of the general authorities, a special reference is made. By this means, as appears to me, every advantage is secured; for as the general authorities are consecutive and run parallel with my narration, reference to

them is easy. The only objection is, that the reader may at times have to consult a second, or even a third or fourth authority. This however is a very slight one, for most readers are quite content with having it in their power to compare a writer with his authorities whenever they please.

I have only further to observe, that in the account of the authorities given in the Appendices of my *Histories*, the names in Italics are those of the authors whose works are extant; names of offices, institutions, etc. are distinguished in a similar way in the Index. The reader, when he meets with any of these words in the text, will, by referring to the Index, be directed to the place where it is explained.

T. K.

Binfield, Berks, March 27, 1845.

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Synchronous Table of Olympiads, Years of Rome, and Years before Christ.

To find the year of Rome or the year B.C. answering to an Olympic year,—in the former case add, in the latter subtract, the number of the Olympic year *minus* 1, to or from that answering to the first year of the given Olympiad: *ex. gr.* as Ol. 37, 1. is A.U. 120, B.C. 632, Ol. 37, 3. will be A.U. 122, B.C. 630.

Ol.	A.U.	B.C.	Ol.	A.U.	B.C.	Ol.	A.U.	B.C.	Ol.	A.U.	B.C.
1		776	29	88	664	58	204	548	87	320	432
2		772	30	92	660	59	208	544	88	324	428
3		768	31	96	656	60	212	540	89	328	424
4		764	32	100	652	61	216	536	90	332	420
5		760	33	104	648	62	220	532	91	336	416
6		756	34	108	644	63	224	528	92	340	412
7		752	35	112	640	64	228	524	93	344	408
7	1*	751	36	116	636	65	232	520	94	348	404
8	4	748	37	120	632	66	236	516	95	352	400
9	8	744	38	124	628	67	240	512	96	356	396
10	12	740	39	128	624	68	244	508	97	360	392
11	16	736	40	132	620	69	248	504	98	364	388
12	20	732	41	136	616	70	252	500	99	368	384
13	24	728	42	140	612	71	256	496	100	372	380
14	28	724	43	144	608	72	260	492	101	376	376
15	32	720	44	148	604	73	264	488	102	380	372
16	36	716	45	152	600	74	268	484	103	384	368
17	40	712	46	156	596	75	272	480	104	388	364
18	44	708	47	160	592	76	276	476	105	392	360
19	48	704	48	164	588	77	280	472	106	396	356
20	52	700	49	168	584	78	284	468	107	400	352
21	56	696	50	172	580	79	288	464	108	404	348
22	60	692	51	176	576	80	292	460	109	408	344
23	64	688	52	180	572	81	296	456	110	412	340
24	68	684	53	184	568	82	300	452	111	416	336
25	72	680	54	188	564	83	304	448	112	420	332
26	76	676	55	192	560	84	308	444	113	424	328
27	80	672	56	196	556	85	312	440	114	428	324
28	84	668	57	200	552	86	316	436	115	432	320

* Rome was founded in the April of Ol. 7, 1., consequently in the latter half of that year, that is B.C. 751.

Ol.	A.U.	B.C.	Ol.	A.U.	B.C.	Ol.	A.U.	B.C.	Ol.	A.U.	B.C.
116	436	316	136	516	236	156	596	156	176	676	76
117	440	312	137	520	232	157	600	152	177	680	72
118	444	308	138	524	228	158	604	148	178	684	68
119	448	304	139	528	224	159	608	144	179	688	64
120	452	300	140	532	220	160	612	140	180	692	60
121	456	296	141	536	216	161	616	136	181	696	56
122	460	292	142	540	212	162	620	132	182	700	52
123	464	288	143	544	208	163	624	128	183	704	48
124	468	284	144	548	204	164	628	124	184	708	44
125	472	280	145	552	200	165	632	120	185	712	40
126	476	276	146	556	196	166	636	116	186	716	36
127	480	272	147	560	192	167	640	112	187	720	32
128	484	268	148	564	188	168	644	108	188	724	28
129	488	264	149	568	184	169	648	104	189	728	24
130	492	260	150	572	180	170	652	100	190	732	20
131	496	256	151	576	176	171	656	96	191	736	16
132	500	252	152	580	172	172	660	92	192	740	12
133	504	248	153	584	168	173	664	88	193	744	8
134	508	244	154	588	164	174	668	84	194	748	4
135	512	240	155	592	160	175	672	80	195	752	A.D. 1

PRELIMINARY NOTICES.

Grecian Chronology.

THE ancient Greeks reckoned by periods of four years, named *Olympiads*, from the Olympic Games, which were celebrated at the commencement of each period. They were counted from the first new moon after the summer solstice: the first Olympiad began July 21-22, 776 B.C.

Dates in Olympiads are thus expressed: *ex. gr.* Ol. 42, 3., that is, the 3rd year of the 42nd Olympiad.

To reduce Olympiads to years before Christ: subduct one from the Olympiad and one from the odd years, then multiply the Olympiad by four, and add the odd years; subtract the product from 776, and the remainder will be the number sought. *Ex. gr.* To find the year B.C. answering to Ol. 72, 3., the year of the battle of Marathon: $72 - 1$ and $3 - 1 = 71, 2$; and $71 \times 4 + 2 = 286$; and $776 - 286 = 490$. The reason of the rule is this: the year is the 3rd of the 72nd Olympiad, consequently seventy-one Olympiads and two years are past; the years which they make are therefore to be subtracted from 776.

Grecian Measures of Length.

The Grecian foot was somewhat longer than the English, being to it as 1.007 to 1. The Stadion was equal to 600 Greek feet, that is, to $604\frac{1}{5}$ feet English, and was therefore less than the furlong (which contains 660 feet) by $55\frac{4}{5}$ feet. In a loose approximative way, however, we may reckon the stadia as furlongs, eight to the English mile.

Grecian Money.

The Attic *Drachma*, or principal silver coin, has been found, from a comparison of several pieces, to weigh sixty-five grains Troy; hence the following values result:—

	£	s.	d.
Obolus, or Obole.....	0	0	$1\frac{1}{8}$
Drachma = 6 Oboles	0	0	$9\frac{2}{3}$
Mna, or Mina = 100 Drachmas.....	4	0	$6\frac{2}{3}$
Talent = 60 Mnas	241	13	4

It is not easy to ascertain the relative values of money in ancient and modern times; but the proportions of 1 to 10, and 1 to 8 or 7, those usually adopted, seem by far too great; and that of 1 to 3 to be nearer to the truth. This may be tested by the following examples of prices at Athens in the time of Socrates, which if multiplied by 10, 8, or 7 are enormous.

A good saddle-horse cost 12 minas = 48*l.*; a common working-horse 3 minas = 12*l.*; an ox 50 to 100 drachmas = 2*l.* to 4*l.*; a sheep 10 to 20 = 8*s.* to 16*s.*; a Copaic eel 3 = 2*s.* 5*d.*; a helmet 1 mina = 4*l.* The daily wages of the lowest workmen was 4 oboles = $6\frac{1}{2}$ *d.*; an acre of land sold for 396 drachmas = 16*l.* The ordinary fine imposed on state offenders was 50 talents = 12,100*l.* This was a fine which men were considered able to pay; the double of it was imposed on Timotheüs.—See Boeckh's Public Economy of Athens.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART I.

ARISTOCRATIC PERIOD.

CHAPTER I.

Description of Greece*.

THE great mountain-range which commences with the Pyrenees at the Atlantic ocean and terminates with Mount Hæmus or the Balkan at the Euxine sea, divides the three peninsulas which form the south of Europe from the continent which extends to the north. In its course it sends out branches on either side, one of which runs down Hellas, or Greece, the most eastward of the peninsulas. This branch in its progress southwards formed in ancient times the limit between the Illyrians on the west, and the Pæonians and Macedonians on the east, and then, under the name of Pindus, divided the Hellènes† of Thessaly from their semi-barbarous kindred the Epirots who dwelt to the west. This range also has its branches, and it continues its course under various names, till it ends at the sea.

A branch running eastwards from the commencement of Pindus separates Macedonia from Greece, forming the north-

* This description of Greece is in accordance with the maps in Müller's Dorians, and therefore answers principally for the time of the Peloponnesian war.

† By the inhabitants the country was named Hellas ('Ελλάς), the people Hellènes ("Ελληνες); the Romans called the former *Græcia*, the latter *Græci*.

ern limit of this last-named country. This branch is called the Cambunian Mountains; it was also named Olympus, from the lofty snow-crowned mountain of that name, once held to be the seat of the Grecian gods, which forms its eastern extremity. A narrow valley separates Olympus from Ossa, which rises, in form like a dome, on the south, and Ossa is joined on the south by Pelion, which is met by a ridge named Othrys running eastwards from Pindus. Parallel to Olympus and Othrys on the south, another branch, named Cæta, runs from the chain of Pindus to the sea.

The country lying between Olympus and Cæta is named Thessaly. It is divided by Mount Othrys, which runs parallel to these ranges. The northern part, which may be called the Vale of the Peneius (Penêus) from its principal river, is a rich fertile plain shut in on all sides by mountains. One narrow opening between Olympus and Ossa, the romantic glen of Tempe, affords an outlet to the waters of the limpid Titaresius, and the other streams which irrigate the valley. The Peneius receives them all, and pours them through Tempe into the sea. The towns of the Vale of the Peneius were Tricca, Larissa, Scotussa, Crannôn, Pheræ on the lake Bœbêis, Pharsâlus, etc.

The Vale of the Spercheius, as we may term (from the name of its principal river) the region lying between Othrys and Cæta, is open to the sea on the east where the Maliac bay runs into it. Its towns were Hypata and Lamia. Outside of the mountain-range from Pelion to Othrys round the Pagasaïc bay lies a third portion of Thessaly, celebrated in the mythic ages as the abode of the Lapiths and Minyans. Its principal towns were Larissa-Cremaste, Thebes, Itôn, Alos, Pagasæ and Iolcos, and in latter times Demetrias. The Argonauts sailed from the bay of Pagasæ.

A narrow strip of land between Ossa and Pelion and the sea extends from the mouth of the Peneius to that of the bay of Pagasæ: this was named Magnesia, and was considered a part of Thessaly.

As Tempe is the only entrance into Thessaly on the north, so the only passage out of it on the south is the narrow pass

named Pylæ (*Gates*), or Thermopylæ (*Hot-gates*), from its warm springs, which runs between the eastern termination of Œta and the sea. South-eastwards from Œta rise in succession the hills named Cnemis, Acontion, and Ptoön; which, with the land between them and the sea, form the Epicnemidian and Opuntian Locris, whose only towns of note were Opûs, Scarpheia, Nicæa, and Thronion.

Messapion, Mycalessos, and other hills run along the coast from Ptoön, and join Mount Parnês, which running westwards meets the rugged Cithærôn. The verdant Helicôn, the seat of the Muses, turns northward from Cithærôn, and is succeeded by Mount Hadyleion, which joins Acontion. The region thus inclosed, and named Bœotia, is not a plain like those of Thessaly, but rather a succession of hill and dale, and plains of small extent and great fertility. It is divided by a range of rocky hills, running from Helicôn to Ptoön. The northern part contained the towns of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, Lebadeia, Coroneia, Asplêdôn, Haliartus, Onchestus, etc. Its principal river is the Cephissus, which having collected the waters of the valley of Phocis on the west, enters it at the pass of Elateia on the north (the only entrance into northern Bœotia*), and empties itself into lake Copâïs, famous for its delicious eels. Subterraneous passages, thirty stadia in length, convey the superfluous waters of this lake to the sea on the east. The southern portion of Bœotia contained the towns of Thebes, Thespiæ, and Platæa. Its chief stream is the Asôpus, which rising in Cithærôn enters the sea near Tanagra. The coast from Locris to Attica, containing the towns of Anthêdôn, Tanagra and Orôpus, was part of Bœotia, as also a strip of coast along the Corinthian gulf. Bœotia being the central part of Greece, and affording plains of some extent, was the scene of most of the great land-battles which occur in Grecian history†.

* When we call Tempe, Thermopylæ, and the present one the *only* entrances, we mean exclusive of ways over the mountains.

† Epaminondas called it the dancing-place of Ares (*Ἄρεως ὀρχήστραν*), Plut. Marcell. 21.

South-east of Bœotia, and separated from it by the range of Parnês and Cithærôn, runs into the sea the peninsula of Attica. Hills, some rugged, some fruitful, inclosing valleys and small fertile plains, occupy the greater part of its surface. The chief hills are Hymettus, Pentelicus, and the promontory of Sunion : the most extensive plains are those of Eleusis, Athens, Braurôn and Marathôn. Athens and Eleusis were the only towns of note : the brooks of the Ilissus and Cephissus at Athens have obtained a celebrity not proportioned to their magnitude.

Opposite the coast of Locris, Bœotia and Attica, and separated from it by a narrow channel, lies the island of Eubœa, extending in a length of twelve hundred stadia from the Maliac bay to the parallel of Braurôn in Attica. It contained the towns of Oreos, Chalcis, Eretria, Carystus, etc.

West of Attica and south of Cithærôn, and extending to the Corinthian gulf, lies Megaris, consisting of barren hills and a single plain, on which stood the town of Megara, with a port on the Sarônic gulf.

Between Helicôn and Parnassus, in a valley extending from the Corinthian gulf to the Epicnemidian Locris, lies Phocis. Its towns were Delphi, renowned for its oracle, Stiris, Panopeus, Hyampolis, Elateia, etc.

Parnassus, Pindus and Cœta, inclose Dryopis and Doris to the north-west of Phocis ; and the Western or Ozolian Locris, with its towns of Amphissa and Naupactus, lies west of Phocis on the Corinthian gulf.

To the west of Locris and Parnassus, and extending northwards to Pindus and the bay of Ambracia, lies the mountainous but not unfertile Ætolia. Its towns were Thermon, Pleurôn, Calydôn, Chalcis, etc. The river Evênus, rising in Mount Cœta, runs through it from north to south ; the Achelœus, flowing from Pindus, forms its western limit.

Westwards of the Achelœus, and bounded by that river and the Ionian sea, lies Acarnania. Its towns were Stratos, Alyzia, etc.

The peninsula named the Peloponnese lies to the south of Greece, to which it is united by a neck of land named the

Isthmus, only thirty-two stadia in its least width. The Oneian mountains, which run southwards from Cithærôn, terminate at the Isthmus, and leave a plain which extends into the Peloponnese.

A mountainous quadrangle, inclosing a district divided into separate portions by lower ranges, and sending out arms on all sides, occupies the centre of the Peloponnese. The mountains named Erymanthus, Lampe, Aroania and Cyllêne, form the north side of the quadrangle; its eastern side is composed of those named Artemision, Parthenion and Parnôn; while Boreion, Taÿgeton, and Lycæon form its south side, and Pholoë, with the mountains which unite it to Lycæon, close it in on the west. The included region is named Arcadia; it consists of mountain-ranges, elevated plains, deep valleys, ravines, torrents, lakes, and forests. Its only opening is on the west, where the river Alpheius issues, carrying with it the waters of the Ladôn and other streams. Some streams leave it on the east by subterraneous passages. The towns of Arcadia were Tegea and Mantinea (both standing in a plain, the scene of many a hard-fought battle), Orchomenus, Cleitôr, Stymphâlus, Megalopolis, etc.

North of Arcadia the mountains gradually sink to the sea. The narrow strip running along the coast opposite Ætolia and Loeris was named Achaia. It contained twelve towns, Dyme, Patræ, Ægion, Pellêne, etc.

To the east of Achaia on the coast, was the small state of Sicyôn; and bounded by them, by Argolis and Arcadia, lay the equally small states of Phliûs and Cleônæ.

Eastwards of Sicyôn, in the plain extending through and from the Isthmus, and along the Saronic gulf, lies the district of Corinth. The wealthy luxurious city of that name was built south of the Isthmus, at the foot of the lofty rock named Acro-Corinth, which rises abruptly out of the plain to a height of some hundred feet. The city had two ports, Cenchræ on the Saronic, and Lechæon on the Corinthian gulf.

A peninsula named Argolis, from its principal town, runs hence in a south-east direction. Its northern side, named the

Acte (*Strand*), contained the towns of Epidaurus and Træzên; its southern side those of Argos, Mycênæ, Hermione, etc. It is chiefly composed of ranges of hills and plains along the coast, like the opposite Attica. The Inachus and Erasînus, which rise in Arcadia, are its most important streams.

South-east and south of Arcadia, stretch two mountain-ridges, terminating in the promontories of Malea and Tænaron. They inclose a fertile valley watered by the pellucid Eurôtas, and then receive between them the Laconian bay. This country was named Laconia; its towns were Sparta or Lacedæmôn, Amyclæ, Gythion (Gythium) on the gulf, Epidaurus Limêra on the east coast, etc.

West of the mountain limit of Laconia named Taygeton, and extending thence to the sea, lies Messêne*, one of the most fertile portions of Greece. Joining Taygeton, and at the head of the Messenian bay, is the rich plain named Macaria (*Happy*), watered by the Pamîsus, which though short in its course, and unsung by the poets, is one of the fullest and fairest streams of the Peloponnese. North of Macaria, and environed by hills, one of which is the ever-memorable Ithôme, extends the plain of Stenyclâros. Westwards the country becomes more rugged and hilly.

West of Arcadia, extending along the sea from Messene to Achaia, lies Elis, renowned as the scene of the Olympian games. It consisted of three parts, Triphylia, Pisâtis and Elis. The plain named Hollow Elis, lying between the arms of Pholoë and Scollis, is the largest in the peninsula. The chief towns were Elis and Pisa on the banks of the Alpheius, near which was Olympia, where the games named from it were celebrated.

Greece is nearly surrounded by water, the different portions of which bore peculiar names. The Ionian sea washes it on the west, sending in the Corinthian gulf to separate the west-

* So it is named by all writers, from Homer to Polybius; and by Livy, Diodorus and many of Polybius' successors. The Messenia (Μεσσηνία) of Polybius is an adjective, like Ἀττικὴ, Κελτικὴ, etc. (γῆ or χώρα being understood), and never occurs without an article.

ern part of the Peloponnese from Hellas Proper. The Cretan sea succeeds, from which the Myrtôan runs up along the east coast of the Peloponnese, sending in the bay of Argos and the Saronic gulf; which last is on the east what the Corinthian is on the west, and contains the islands of Ægina, Calauria and Salamis. The Ægæan sea then spreads from Greece to Asia.

Numerous islands stud these seas. In the Ionian, opposite Acarnania and Elis, lie Cephallenia, Ithaca and Zacynthus. Off Cape Malea in the Cretan sea is the isle of Cythêra, south-east of which Crete stretches about thirteen hundred stadia from west to east: the White Mountains and Ida and Dicte run along its whole length: its north side is the most fertile. The chief towns were Cydonia, Lyctus, Gortys or Gortÿna, and Cnossus.

The islands named Sporades (*Scattered*) lie north of Crete; and north-west of these, in the Ægæan, are the Cyclades (*Circling*), so named from the manner in which they are ranged. The chief of these are Andros, Tenos, Delos, Naxos, Paros, Melos, Cythnos and Ceôs. Above Eubœa are Scyros, Scia-thos, Peparêthos and others. Lemnos, Thasos, Samothrace and Imbros lie off the coast of Thrace. Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Côs, Rhodes and others of less note are along that of Asia. Each island had a town of its own name, but Lesbos and Rhodes had each more than one town.

Greece thus presents to view a land divided by mountains, undulating with hills, now spreading into fertile plains, now contracting into deep vales, watered by streams, of which none are navigable, and many are dry in the heats of summer, while clusters of islands raise their verdant heads from the sea, the apparent remains of a submerged continent. The whole surface of this Hellas, so renowned in history, is (islands included) less by a third than that of the small kingdom of Portugal, but its extent of sea-coast exceeds that of Italy by a fifth, and is more than double that of France.

Forest- and fruit-trees of various kinds grew on the hills and plains of Greece. Attica boasted its superior olives: the vine and fig-tree were everywhere to be seen. Wheat, barley,

and other kinds of corn, grew in all parts. Horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats, oxen and swine, fed on its hills, vales and plains. Its woods and mountains harboured hares, deer, wild boars, and other game; and wolves and bears enticed the daring hunter. Fish abounded in its seas and lakes.

No granite-peaks tower in Hellas: its mountains and hills are of lime- and sand-stone, forming spacious caverns, and affording sites in plains for strong castles. The quarries of Pentelicus, Carystus and Paros yielded marble in abundance to the sculptor and architect. The mines of Eubœa gave copper, those of Bœotia and Laconia iron; silver came from Laurion in Attica, and from the isle of Siphnos, which last also yielded small quantities of gold.

Such was Hellas, whose history we are about to relate,—a land yielding all the necessities and most of the luxuries of life, of varied surface, of temperate climate, lying within a moderate distance of all the civilised states round the Mediterranean, and inhabited by one of the most highly endowed portions of the human race.

CHAPTER II.*

Original state of Greece.—The Pelasgians.—Colonies from Egypt and Asia.—The Heroic Age.

HELLAS, in common with the rest of Europe, was peopled by that portion of mankind named the Japhetian, Caucasian or Indo-German race: but it is utterly beyond our power to say at what time this event occurred, or what was the condition of its first inhabitants. That they were not in the nomadic state, like the Turks and Arabs, is certain, for Greece affords no extensive plains for the herdsman to range with his cattle;

* The materials for this chapter have been almost exclusively derived from the Homeric poems. For a general account of the authorities from which the history of Greece is derived see Appendix (A).

and the theory of the poets and philosophers of its later ages, that their forefathers had been only naked acorn-eating savages, should be received with great caution : it rests on no positive evidence, and is manifestly a consequence of the autochthonic theory, or that which supposes men to have sprung as it were from the ground like plants, rude, ignorant and brutish,—a theory utterly at variance with experience.

There are nations of which the original condition is to be learned from the literature of some cultivated people who had relations of peace or war with them. It is thus that we derive our knowledge of the early state of the inhabitants of Germany, Gaul, and Britain, from the Roman writers. There are other nations whose history is only to be found among themselves ; in this last case it is always *mythic* or fabulous at the commencement, and only becomes, strictly speaking, true, when it is contemporary with the events which it records. The mythic portion is however by no means totally devoid of truth, but its truth is more frequently that of manners and institutions than of events. The history of Greece is of this last kind ; it is only from the Greeks themselves that we can learn their early history.

When, guided by the dim light of tradition, we attempt to penetrate the obscurity of the early ages of Hellas, we see it the abode of one race of men divided into various tribes. The name usually given to this race (but which was never common to the whole of it) is the Pelasgian. It appears to have been very extensive, occupying not merely Greece and its islands, but the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and the west coast of Asia Minor down to Mycale ; for a similarity of religion, manners, language, and style of architecture prevailed in all these countries.

The Pelasgians, we have reason to suppose, were far removed from the savage state. Their modes of life, it is probable, varied according to the nature of the country : in the mountainous districts they were herdsmen and hunters ; in the fertile plains agriculturists ; fishers, and perhaps traders, on the coasts ; for it is by no means improbable that the Phœni-

cians exchanged with them, as they did with their successors the Hellènes, the luxuries of Asia for the produce of their soil. Agriculture was, however, the chief occupation of the Pelasgians, and their name may without any force be derived from it*; their favourite abodes seem to have been the plains fertilised by streams which they named *argi*, and on which they erected strong *larissæ* or castles for their security against plunderers. These buildings were composed of huge masses of rude stone, put together without cement. They are named Cyclopian by later ages, as if built by the imaginary giants called Cyclôpes, and are still to be seen in Argolis, Arcadia, Bœotia, and Epeirus (Epîrus), as also in Italy (chiefly in the country of the Hernicans, Æquians, and Volscians), and on the coast of Asia Minor and elsewhere†.

As an agricultural people is usually under the monarchic, or mingled monarchic and aristocratic form of government, we may suppose such to have been the constitution of the Pelasgic states. Their religion was of a rural character, and they worshiped deities presiding over the various parts of nature, the givers of increase, and preservers of what had come into being, though perhaps without bestowing on them any particular names. The offerings made to their gods were, it is most likely, of a bloodless nature; and there seems to be little reason for supposing that the abomination of human sacrifices prevailed among the *divine* or *noble* (ἑῖοι)‡ Pelasgians. The people of Latium in Italy appear to have preserved the Pelasgian religion in greatest purity.

Beside the Pelasgians, tradition has preserved the names of other tribes who occupied Greece at this time. The Cauconians, it was said, dwelt on the west coast of the Peloponnese, the Curètes in Ætolia, the Carians occupied the isles of the

* For another and probably an older form of the name was *Pelargi*, which would come from πέλω *to be*, or *to be engaged on*, and ἄργος or ἄγρος, *ager*, *land*.

† Strabo (ix. p. 440) enumerates thirteen places in Europe and Asia named Larissa.

‡ So they are styled by Homer, Il. x. 429, Od. xix. 177.

Ægæan, the Lelegians inhabited Ætolia, Bœotia, Locris, Megaris, Eubœa, Laconia and Messene. Nothing certain, however, can be learned respecting these tribes, or their manners and institutions.

In this period also tradition, or the fancy of later times, placed the arrival of colonies from Egypt and Asia. Cecrops, a native of Saïs in the Egyptian Delta, is said to have come to Attica fifteen hundred and fifty years before the Christian era, where he taught the savages who occupied it to cultivate corn, and gave them social institutions. Danaüs, a native of Chemnis in Upper Egypt, came to Argos, and the government was resigned to him by the Pelasgian prince who ruled there. Cadmus, at the head of a colony of Phœnicians, landed on the coast of Bœotia, and proceeding inwards founded Thebes, in a fertile valley a hundred and forty stadia distant from the sea. Finally, Pelops, a Lydian prince, being forced to quit his own country, came with a large treasure to the Peloponnese, and by means of it established the dominion of his family over nearly the whole peninsula. Lelex, from whom the name of the Lelegians was derived, is also said to have been an Egyptian.

Not a single one of these colonists, we may observe, is mentioned in the Homeric poems, almost our only sure guide for these times; and scarcely any traces of Egyptian and Asiatic influence are to be discerned in the state of manners which these poems describe. The case of Cecrops is peculiarly liable to suspicion, as no mention whatever of his Egyptian origin occurs for thirteen hundred years after the assigned date of his arrival in Attica; and the supposition of the Attic population having been originally divided into castes, similar to those of Egypt, is a very unstable one; and even allowing its truth, such a division might have taken place without the operation of an Egyptian colony. The fact of the Phœnicians having communicated letters to the Greeks (as they undoubtedly did) is no convincing proof of their having settled in Bœotia; and it is rather curious, that Homer, whose poems chiefly celebrate the glories of the house of Pelops, in the time of his grandsons, should have taken no notice of his Asiatic origin.

These, however, are all questions of minor importance in a history of Greece; for, as we have observed, the influence of these colonies on the national character and institutions is inappreciable, and nowhere is a national character more strongly and distinctly marked than in Hellas.

It can hardly be supposed, that peaceful and industrious as the Pelasgians may have been, they could have been favoured with a total exemption from the evils of war. Disputes must have occasionally arisen among the various communities into which they were divided; and, as the strength of the Cyclo-pian *larissæ* proves, they must have been exposed to the sudden attacks of freebooters from the land or the sea. But tradition has preserved no memorial of any of these events, and the succeeding period, known under the name of the mythic, heroic, Achæan, or Hellenic period, appears before us under a totally different character. Poetry and tradition now present us with wars and battles, towns besieged, taken, and plundered, naval expeditions to distant regions, numerous exploits of single heroes: in a word, Greece appears as if growing into manhood, and, conscious of inborn strength, making trial of it in various directions.

What gave occasion to this change (if change it really was) it is difficult to say. Peculiar circumstances may have given a martial energy to the hitherto pacific character of the agricultural Pelasgians; or, as tradition told, a tribe from southern Thessaly, of vigorous character and martial habits, may by conquest or treaty have acquired the dominion over the peaceful occupiers of the valleys and plains of the south.

According to mythologists, a flood of water once overspread continental Greece, from which Deucaliôn and his wife Pyrrha alone escaped. After the flood they had a son named Hellên, who was the father of Dorus, Æolus, and Xuthus, which last was the father of Iôn and Achæus. This genealogy, it is probable, is not to be understood literally, and all we are to collect from it is, that at the time when it was framed the whole of the people of Greece were comprised under the name of Hellenes, but were divided into the separate races of Dorians,

Æolians, Achæans, and Ionians; between which last two a more intimate relation prevailed, which was expressed by making the personifications of them sons of one father, and distinct from the other two, which were perhaps regarded as elder branches of the Hellenic family.

By those who maintain that Deucaliôn, Hellên, and his sons were real personages, it is said that the country in which they originally dwelt was Phthiôtis in southern Thessaly, where in a rich and fertile land the numbers of their subjects rapidly increased; and the princes of the family of Hellên growing, in consequence, more powerful every day, they partly by conquest, partly by marriage, partly by invitation, became the rulers of most districts of Greece, to whose inhabitants (mostly Pelasgians) they imparted the Hellenic language, manners and institutions. It is certainly in favour of this hypothesis, that Hellas, originally, it would appear, only the name of a district of Phthiôtis, became that of the entire country*. It is against it, that the name Hellenes in this extent is unknown to Homer, who calls the Greeks only Argæians, Danaans, and Achæans.

Laying aside, therefore, all conjectures on this obscure subject, we will take a view of the heroic age of Greece, as it is presented in the mirror of the Homeric poems; which though they probably did not receive the form in which they have come down to us till long after the heroic age had passed away, were doubtless framed from poems and traditions that had descended from that age.

The Achæans, or the inhabitants of Hellas of those days, appear in these poems as a partially civilised race, skilled in agriculture in all its different branches, cultivating the olive, the vine, and the various kinds of corn, and keeping both large and small cattle. They were of course acquainted with all the necessary arts; and the smith, the carpenter, and even

* This does not, however, seem to be of much weight: Italy was at first the name of only the southern portion of the peninsula; Libya, of a district west of Egypt; Asia, of the plain about the Cayster; Europe, of the mainland of Greece.

the goldsmith, are spoken of in the poems. They had wheel-carriages, and consequently roads. They were by no means ignorant of navigation; and though their vessels were undecked, they made voyages through all parts of the Ægæan to the coast of Asia Minor, and even as far as Sidôn and Egypt. To the west, they probably visited Italy and Sicily. Phœnician traders resorted to their ports, where they bartered the manufactures and productions of the East. A martial spirit animated the whole population, petty warfare was of frequent occurrence, flocks and herds were carried off, towns were plundered and burnt, women and children dragged away into slavery. In times of peace, or in the intervals of war, music, poetry, and dancing enlivened the feasts of the Achæan nobles, and the character of the poet (*ᾠοιδὸς*) was held in high estimation.

Like almost every other people in a similar state of society, the Achæans were divided into two classes or orders, namely, the nobles and the simple free-men. The line of distinction between these orders was drawn clear and sharp, and was not to be passed; but whence it arose is, in this case as in most others, impossible for us to determine. As it is to be found in countries in which there are no traces of conquest*, and as the lower class in Hellas at this time present not the slightest appearance of serfs bound to the soil, we are not justified in assenting to the opinion of those who suppose them to be the Pelasgians reduced to serfship by the victorious Hellenes.

The nobles were the owners of the soil, and they probably gave the use of it to the free-men for a fixed share of the produce. The latter dwelt on the land, whence it would appear they derived their appellation of *Demos*†; the abode of the

* In heathen Scandinavia, for example, which offers so many points of resemblance to Greece in the heroic age. Nowhere is the line of distinction between the chiefs or nobles and the common people more determinate than in the Polynesian islands, yet here there is no vestige whatever of conquest.

† *Δῆμος*, from *δέμω* to cultivate, or more probably from *δῆ* (Doric *ῑῶ*), the same as *γῆ*, land.

noble was usually a castle on an eminence in the midst of his lands ; a portion of the Demos probably resided in cottages at its foot, and this castle and subject village were the origin of the future town. The appearance of Greece in the heroic age, in this as in many other points, presents a strong resemblance to that of Europe in the middle ages, but the condition of the free Achæan was far preferable to that of the feudal serf or villain.

The nobles formed an aristocracy, at the head of which, in every state of Hellas, was an hereditary king of limited authority. In both king and nobles high birth or descent from noble ancestors was a requisite condition ; the lineage of the king in particular was generally traced up to one of the gods whom the people adored. But birth alone did not suffice to secure respect : strength of body and vigour of mind, skill in martial exercises, and eloquence, justice, and generosity, were required from the prince or noble who claimed obedience.

No traces of taxes, and few of tribute, appear in this age : the nobles lived from the produce of their lands, the king from that of his own lands and of the domain (τέμενος) assigned him. He had a share of the booty gained in war, as he was always the leader of his people, and gifts were occasionally presented him by his subjects. The king and the nobles were the dispensers of justice, which they administered openly in the presence of the people ; they likewise deliberated before them on affairs of state, and though the people had not strictly speaking a voice in these matters, their approbation or the contrary must, to a certain extent, have had the force of public opinion. Finally, the king officiated as priest in the public sacrifices and worship of the gods.

The religion of the Achæans consisted chiefly in the worship of the Olympian gods,—deities whose abode was supposed to be the summit of Mount Olympus, whence they extended their power and their superintendence over the entire of Hellas, or perhaps of the earth. They adored them by prayers and sacrifices, by temples and consecrated portions of land. The oracles of Dodôna and Delphi were supposed to announce

their will to man. The soothsayer (μάντις) also discerned the will of the gods in the flight of birds, the flash of lightning, the entrails of beasts, and other signs. The religious system of the Achæans seems to have developed itself, along with the character of the people, from the more rural one of the Pelasgians. The gods of the Achæans had all the passions and appetites of men, and the life they led in the palace of Zeus their sovereign exactly resembled what was witnessed in the castle of the Achæan prince.

The Achæan warriors were led to battle by their king. The common people followed their chiefs on foot, indifferently armed with bows and other weapons. The nobles mostly fought from war-chariots, like the warriors of Asia, Egypt, and Britain. These chariots were two-wheeled, and drawn by two or three horses; they carried two warriors, both nobles, one to fight, the other to manage the horses. The nobles fought with spears, swords and bows; shields, helmets, breast-plates, girdles, and greaves protected them: brass (χαλκός) was the metal of which their arms and armour were usually formed. Captives taken in battle were reduced to slavery; they were either sold to strangers, or retained as domestic servants in the family of the captor. When a town was taken by storm, death was the lot of the men, slavery that of the women and children. It is not improbable, though we have no direct proof of it, that the sale of slaves formed a part of the traffic carried on with the Phœnicians.

The copious mythology of Greece, which is nearly confined to this period, narrates numerous adventures of single heroes, such as Hercules and Theseus. The great public events which it records are, the expedition of the Argonauts to Colchis at the extremity of the Euxine sea, in the ship Argo, in quest of the Golden Fleece; the wars of Thebes, in which, in consequence of the dispute for the throne between Eteocles and Polyneices, the sons of the unhappy Œdipûs, a Peloponnesian army twice invaded Bœotia, and finally took the city of Thebes; the war of Troy, caused by the abduction of Helena, wife to the king of Sparta, by a son of the monarch of Troy in Asia,—

the theme of Homer's immortal poetry. The details of these events belong, however, to mythology rather than history, and therefore find their more appropriate place in works on that subject*.

During the heroic age Minôs the lawgiver and king of Crete is said to have established a powerful marine, and to have extended his dominion over the isles of the Ægæan, Attica, and even as far as Italy and Sicily. The truth of this dominion of the Cretan monarch rests on the same foundation with that of the other events of this mythic age, and it must stand or fall along with them.

CHAPTER III.

The Dorian Migration, or Return of the Heracleids.

THE power of the Achæans may be regarded as being at its height at the time when their united forces (if truth be transmitted to us in the tales of the poets) overturned the kingdom of Troy. But the absence of the chiefs from their homes for a space of ten years must have tended to weaken their authority, and the Homeric and Cyclic† poems accordingly set before us scenes of murder, expulsion, and confusion in the several royal houses. These evils, however, appear to have been transient, and the state of society to have remained nearly unchanged for some space of time.

Troy is said to have been taken in the year 1184 B.C. Fifty years after that event a portion of the Thesprotians of Epeirus, we are told, crossed the mountain-barrier between their country and Thessaly, and invaded the vale of the Peneius. In cases of this kind, if the people of the invaded country are defeated in battle, they lose their lands, and their only alter-

* They will all be found in the *Mythology of Ancient Greece and Italy*.

† See below, chap. xiv.

natives are to remain and cultivate them as the tenants of the new lords, or to migrate and seek settlements elsewhere ; and thus they who have been vanquished, and have lost their own lands, often appear as conquerors in another quarter. So it was in the present case ; a portion of the Achæan race remained in Thessaly, the tenants of the Thesprotians ; the more enterprising quitted the country they had lost, and invading Bœotia expelled a part of its inhabitants and seized their lands.

These invasions do not seem to have been productive of any important consequences ; but thirty years later, that is eighty years after the Trojan war, the vicinity of Bœotia sent forth a body of invaders, whose successes altered the appearance and condition of a large portion of Greece ; this was the celebrated Dorian Migration, or Return of the Heracleids. We will relate it in the mythic form in which it has been transmitted to us, and then endeavour to show what may have been its real nature and course*.

According to the poets, the royal family of Argos, named the Perseids, derived their lineage and name from Perseus, the son of the god Zeus by Danaë, a maiden descended from the Egyptian Danaüs. Alcêmêna, a granddaughter of Perseus, and wife to her cousin Amphitryôn the son of Alcæus, Perseus' eldest son, bore to the same god a son named Hercules, who, as poets tell, was by a stratagem of the queen of heaven deprived of his birthright and made the subject of his cousin Eurystheus, the son of a younger son of Perseus. The right to the throne therefore lay with Hercules, and consequently descended to his children. After the assumption of that hero to heaven, Eurystheus, who had been his persecutor in life, continued his hostility to his children, whom he forced to fly from the Peloponnese. They took refuge with Ceyx, king of Trachis, at Mount Cêta ; but after some time, this prince being menaced with vengeance by Eurystheus, they quitted Trachis, and coming as supplicants to Athens sought protection. The Athenians, who always held sacred the rights of hospitality, refusing to give them up to Eurystheus, he led an army into

* Apollodorus, ii. 8.

Attica; but his forces were defeated and all his sons slain, and he himself, as he fled in his chariot along the pass of the Scironian rocks, fell by the hands of Hyllus, the son of Hercules. The Heracleids now entered the Peloponnese, and became masters of the whole country; but the following year a pestilence broke out, and the oracle at Delphi on being consulted said, that the Heracleids were the cause, who had returned before their time. They therefore abandoned the country, and went and dwelt at Marathôn in Attica.

After some time Hyllus consulted the oracle, and was told to wait for the third crop, and then to return by the strait. Supposing it to be the third year and the Isthmus that were meant, after waiting the due time, he attempted to pass the Isthmus, but met with only defeat and death from the Pelopids, who now occupied the throne. Other attempts proved equally fruitless: at length after many years the grandsons of Hyllus, Temenus, Aristodêmus, and Cresphontes consulted the oracle, which still gave the same response: and Temenus making answer that when they had followed it they had proved unfortunate, the god replied that it was the third crop [generation] of men, not of the ground, he had meant, and that the passage should be made by sea in the narrow part of the gulf of Corinth. They now collected an army, and building ships at a place thence named Naupactus (*Ship-building*), prepared to pass over. While they were there Aristodemus was struck with lightning and died*, leaving two sons named Eurysthenes and Procles; and a soothsayer having been slain by one of the Heracleids, the anger of the gods was manifested by a storm which destroyed their ships, and a famine which forced their army to disperse.

The oracle being consulted, directed that the homicide should go into exile for two years, and that they should take the three-eyed man for their guide. The former part of the response was easy to obey; the latter was of doubtful meaning. They sought after a three-eyed man, and at length

* The Spartan tradition (Herod. vi. 52.) made him live to share in the conquest.

meeting an Ætolian, named Oxylus, who was blind of an eye and was mounted on a horse, they judged him to be the person designated by the oracle, and made him their leader. When they landed in the Peloponnese, Tisamenus, son of Orestes, son of Agamemnôn, gave them battle. He was defeated and slain, and on the side of the invaders fell Pamphylus and Dyman, the sons of the Dorian king Ægimius. The victors now prepared to divide the realm of the vanquished prince. Elis, according to agreement, being assigned to Oxylus, they raised three altars to Father Zeus, and having offered sacrifice upon them, proposed to cast lots for their respective shares; Argos being the first lot, Lacedæmôn the second, and Messene the third. As the mode adopted was for each to cast a pebble into an urn of water, Cresphontes, who was desirous of getting Messene, cast in a piece of earth, while Temenus and the sons of Aristodemus threw in pebbles; and, as the earth dissolved, the other two lots were of course first drawn and he thus gained his object*. It was said, too, that on the altar of Argos was found a toad, on that of Lacedæmôn a serpent, and on that of Messene a fox,—emblematic of the future characters of these nations.

Such is the form in which the important event of the conquest of the Peloponnese has been transmitted to us, and its claims to the name of strict historic truth are evidently no better founded than those of the Trojan war. The following may, perhaps, be regarded as a nearer approach to the real state of the case.

The conquerors of the Peloponnese were evidently the Dorians; for a new dialect, new manners and institutions were introduced, and their descendants always bore the name of Dorians. These were a tribe whose first seats appear to have been about Mount Olympus, whence they migrated southwards, and settled in the district named from them Doris, between Mount Cæta and Parnassus. It is certainly by no means an improbable event that a branch of the royal family of Argos,

* The legend as related by Pausanias (iv. 3. 5.) differs slightly from this.

being driven from their paternal seats, may have sought to allure a mountain tribe to aid in recovering them by the prospect of the acquisition of rich, fertile, and cultivated lands. But when we consider the highly mythic character of Perseus and Hercules, their supposed ancestors, and the many improbabilities which this account involves, we may incline to regard this supposed descent of the chiefs of the conquering nation from the royal line of Argos as a late fiction, devised to give legitimacy to their possession. It would then appear more probable, that the Dorians, a mountain race, feeling excess of population and want of room, or, perhaps, urged merely by the desire of change, or pressed on in consequence of the migration of the Thesprotians into Thessaly, or excited by their example, might, like the Helvetians in the time of Cæsar, have resolved to quit their mountains and seek their fortune in the Peloponnese. As the Isthmus was remote from them, and might be easily guarded, they made a treaty of alliance and division of conquests with a portion of the Ætolians, who dwelt to the south of them; and vessels of various kinds being constructed or collected at the narrowest part of the Corinthian gulf, the allies passed over. That it was not at the Isthmus they entered is evident, for according to all testimony Corinth was the last of their conquests.

The Dorians were accompanied on their expedition by their wives and children. It is computed that the number of the men may have been about twenty thousand, the same number that the Duke of Normandy is supposed by some historians to have led to the conquest of England*. There is evidence enough remaining to prove that the Peloponnese was not won in a single battle, but was gradually, and in some cases slowly, gained. The Ætolians appear to have acquired by peaceful composition pre-eminence, and a share of the land from the people of Elis, to whom they were akin. The Arcadians would also seem to have been friendly disposed toward the

* Sismondi, *Histoire des François*, iv. 353. Mackintosh's *History of England*, i. 97. See however the author's *History of England*, vol. i. Appendix (F). 8vo edit.

Dorians, as they gave them a passage through their country, and in some places treachery or agreement with portions of the Achæans facilitated the Dorian conquests.

It was always the custom of the descendants of the Dorians, transmitted to them probably from their forefathers, to fight on foot in full armour and in close columns; and supposing the Achæans' mode of fighting to be that described above after Homer, we may easily see how inferior they must have proved in the field to the invaders. But it may be said, their towns, such as Tiryns and Mycenæ, were strong, fenced in by their huge Cyclopiian walls, and the Dorians were never skilled in besieging. Here, however, again tradition comes to our aid; the places were shown on which the Dorian invaders were said to have fixed their permanent camps in the proximity of Argos and Corinth, whence they harassed the people of these towns till they forced them to a composition.

In antiquity the different races were distinguished by their predilection for different political numbers. The Dorian number was three, and hence we find that three was the number of the great division of their conquests in the Peloponnese,—Argos, Laconia, Messene. The Dorians of Argos extended their power northwards, and Phliûs, Sicyôn, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Trœzên, and finally the isle of Ægina, became Dorian. When Corinth grew powerful, an attempt was made to extend the Dorian name beyond the Isthmus, and Megaris was won; but the efforts against Attica, as we shall see, were without effect.

The Dorians, also,—it is uncertain at what time,—passed over to Crete, and acquiring the supremacy in that island as in the Peloponnese, gave the Dorian character to its language and institutions.

After the Dorian migration no changes of abode occurred among the tribes of Greece. The Greeks continued to be one people, divided into separate communities, regarding themselves as of common origin and totally distinct from all other peoples, whom they called *Barbarians**. The main supports

* This word originally designated those whose language was not Greek.

of their nationality were, language, religion, and common institutions.

Like the modern Italians, the Greeks spoke different dialects of one language: the difference, however, was not such as to throw much difficulty in the way of communication, and a Dorian and an Ionian could perhaps converse together with more ease than a Venetian and a Neapolitan. The epic poetry of the Ionians was sung all through Greece; the Æolian lyrics were everywhere listened to with delight, and a mingled audience could enjoy the stately drama of Athens.

The same deities claimed the belief and worship of all Greece, though some were adored more in one, some in another state. The temples of Delphi, Delos, and Olympia were repaired to from all parts, and all Hellas sought oracular responses from Olympia, Delphi, and the ancient oracle of Dodona in Epeirus. At Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, and Nemea, games were at different intervals of times celebrated in honour of the gods; and in the gymnastic and other exercises at these games none but persons of true Hellenic descent were permitted to contend. People resorted from all parts of Greece to witness these games, which thus tended strongly to uphold the unity of the nation.

Associations named Amphictyonies seem also from very early times to have kept up union among various portions of the inhabitants of Greece. They are said to have been instituted by Amphictyôn, the son of Deucaliôn; but it is far more probable that, as the word denotes, they were so named from their consisting of the tribes which *dwelt round* some temple at which they worshiped, and which they supported in common*. There were several of these Amphictyonians, but by far the most celebrated is that which had charge of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and of which most of the leading states of Greece were members. This assembly met twice a year, in spring and autumn, at Pylæ and Delphi, and was

* There is every reason to suppose that the proper orthography is ἀμφικρίων (from ἀμφὶ *round*, and κρίω *to dwell*) and not ἀμφικρύων (from an imaginary personage).

composed of deputies from the different states belonging to it. It regulated all things relative to the temple, and decided on some political matters of common interest. The number of peoples composing this Amphictyony was twelve, namely, the Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Locrians, Cætæans, Phthiôtic Achæans, Melians, Phocians, Delphians.

CHAPTER IV.

The Colonies.

THE Dorian migration was the event which scattered Grecian colonies over the coasts of the Ægæan, and eventually over those of the Mediterranean and Euxine seas. As they commenced at the time of the migration, the present is perhaps the most suitable place for giving an account of these foreign settlements of the Greeks.

Various circumstances will conquer the natural love of the land of his birth in the heart of man. As in the present case, proud and high-spirited men, who have been overcome, and have lost their lands to invaders, will gladly, rather than become the subjects of the conquerors, try their fortune in distant regions, where their swords may win them possessions equal to those they had lost. Other colonies are indebted for their origin to the spirit of civil discord, in which a beaten or a discontented faction resolves to quit home, rather than remain witnesses of the triumph and the insolence of their rivals; such was the origin of some of the later Grecian colonies, and of some of the English ones in North America. Commercial advantages have led to the formation of numerous colonies at all times; such were the Grecian colonies in the Euxine, those of the Phœnicians, and several in modern times. The maintenance of dominion over a conquered country is also a cause of colonisation: the Roman colonies are instances, as also are the Latin colonies in Syria at the time of the Cru-

sades, and in some measure those of the Spaniards in America. This last motive is, however, usually united with a commercial one.

The difficulty, however, of procuring the necessaries and the comforts of life at home, caused by the increase of population, is the main motive with men to abandon their native land. They feel every day the pressure of want ; and as hope spreads illusive hues over the distant regions which invite them, the toils and dangers to be undergone are unheeded. This is the cause which is every year sending thousands from our own shores to cultivate the wilds of Canada or Australia : for had men ease and comfort at home, they never would wander in search of them to distant lands.

So it was also in Greece at a later period than that of which we treat at present ; and when the power of colonising had in a great measure ceased, we shall find the excess of population manifesting itself in the bands of Grecian mercenary soldiers, and in the barbarous practice of exposing newborn babes*.

We are now to take a view of the Grecian colonies on the coast of Asia Minor, and the colonies which proceeded from them.

The Achæans when vanquished by the Dorians submitted in part to the conquerors. A portion of them threw themselves on the Ægialeia, or southern coast of the Corinthian gulf, which was occupied by a kindred tribe, as it would appear, named the Ionians. In a battle which took place, the Ionians were defeated ; and as, according to the rules of war in those times, they thereby lost their lands, they abandoned their country and retired to Attica, whose inhabitants were of the same race with themselves. The Achæans remained masters of the country, which took from them the name of Achaia ; and a long period will elapse before we meet them treading the political stage as actors of importance.

* There is no allusion to this practice in the Homeric poems. The instances of it in the mythic legends are never ascribed to the poverty of the parents. China, the most densely peopled country, is the only one, we believe, in which it prevails at present.

Another portion of the defeated Achæans wandered further in quest of settlements. They are said to have departed under the guidance of Penthilus, a younger son of Orestes, and to have made their first stay in Eubœa. Thence proceeding northwards, they made trial of the coast of Thrace; and finally crossing the Hellespont, took possession of the coast of Asia Minor, from the isle of Cyzicus, in the Propontis, to the river Hermus, the former realm of the Trojan monarchs, whose power their fathers had overturned. They also occupied the isles of Tenedos and Lesbos. The number of their towns on the mainland was twelve, of which the best known are Cyme and Smyrna. These colonists were named Æolians, as they spoke the Æolic dialect of the Greek language*. The twelve Æolian towns it is said, but the fact is very doubtful, celebrated, as a bond of union, a common festival to Apollo in the grove of Gryneion, near Myrina.

The Ionians who had retired to Attica finding in the course of half a century a want of room and occupation in that light land, resolved to follow the example of the Æolians and pass over to Asia. Accordingly, uniting with Bœotians and others who were desirous of change, they crossed the sea, and attacking the Lelegians and Carians, who dwelt south of the Hermus, made themselves masters of the coast from the mouth of that river to Cape Poseidion. They divided themselves, as in their original country, into twelve towns; namely Phocæa, Clazomenæ, Erythræ, Teôs, Colophôn, Ephesus, Priène, Myûs, Lebedus, Milêtus, and Chios and Samos, in the isles of the same name. The leaders of the colonists are said to have been for the most part Neleids, or princes of the royal house of Pylos in the Peloponnese, who had retired from thence to Attica before the Dorians; and traces of the royal dignity long remained among the Ionians. The Ionian cities had a common festival named Panionia, which served as a bond of union among them. It was celebrated in honour of the

* The greater number of them then must have been Bœotians, as this was their dialect. Bœotians therefore are said to have joined the Achæans; it is more simple however to suppose that Æolis was colonised from Bœotia alone.

Heliconian* Poseidôn, at a place named Panionion, on the wooded promontory of Mycale, opposite the isle of Samos.

About the same time that the Ionians passed over to Asia, the Dorians of Argos, Epidaurus, and Trœzên, in consequence of dissension or of want of room, or urged by their adventurous spirit, crossed the sea also, and made themselves masters of the isles of Rhodes and Côs, and founded on the mainland Cnidos and Halicarnassus. The three cities of Rhodes, Lindus, Jalÿsus, and Cameirus, with Côs, Cnidos, and Halicarnassus, formed what was named the Dorian Hexapolis (*Six-towns*), and they kept a common festival to their national god Apollo on the Triopian promontory. The Dorians also settled on some of the Sporades, and on the isles between Crete and Rhodes.

Thus within one hundred and twenty years after the supposed date of the capture of Troy, the Grecian colonies occupied the coast of Asia, from the Hellespont to the borders of Lycia, a length of nearly three hundred English miles. It is interesting to inquire how they were enabled to obtain possession of so much territory.

We may suppose that the overthrow of the Trojan power left the region to which the Æolians came in a very feeble condition, so that probably no effectual opposition could be made to the settlement of the martial colonists when they landed. We have no information of the manner in which they acquired possession of the country; most probably it was by treaty. The Ionians would seem to have gained their settlements by the sword from the Carians and Lelegians; for we are told† that having brought no women with them from Attica, they took to wife the Carian women whose fathers and husbands they had slain. As these Carians and Lelegians

* So named from Helice in Achaia.

† Herod. i. 146. The historian says, that on this account the Ionian women never ate with their husbands, or called them by their names; the wives and daughters of the murdered Carians having bound themselves by oath not to do so, and transmitted the obligation to their daughters. The tale was perhaps invented to account for the custom.

seem to have formed separate independent communities, without any firm bond of union among them, it was easy for the Ionians, by attacking them separately, to subdue them one after the other: for in such a state of society men are singularly negligent of the approach of danger, and will stand calmly looking on, and perhaps rejoicing at the misfortunes of their neighbours, not perceiving that their own turn will probably come next. As to the interior of the country, there does not appear to have been at that time any state of magnitude in it, and the various tribes which dwelt there may have been indifferent as to who possessed the coast, or even may have been pleased with the arrival of the strangers, who, we know not from what cause, seem to have been more devoted to the arts of peace than to those of war.

During a long series of years the causes of colonisation continued to operate. The coasts of Macedonia and Thrace on the Ægæan were occupied by Grecian settlements; the Ionians of Miletus sent colonists to the Propontis, then entered the Euxine, and made settlements for the sake of commerce along the coasts of Asia, Colchis, and Scythia. In the west, Sicily and the south coast of Italy were filled with Grecian colonies, chiefly Dorian. In the south, the isle of Cyprus became Grecian; the jealous Egyptians allowed Greeks to settle in their land, and a flourishing Grecian state was established at Cyrène, on the coast of Libya. The Phocæans of Ionia, finally, as we shall see hereafter, effected a settlement on the south coast of France, the origin of the modern city of Marseilles.

The relation between the parent-state, and a Greek colony founded for the sake of trade or for disburdening the mother-country, appears in a very pleasing light. The colonists took with them a portion of the sacred fire which burned in the Prytaneion or council-hall of their native city; they invited the tutelar deities of the state to accept abodes in the new country to which they were going, and erected for them there temples and altars similar to those at home. Deputies regularly repaired from the colonies with offerings to the religious festivals of the mother-city; and its citizens, when they ap-

peared at those of the colonies, were treated with the utmost respect and consideration. Finally, if the new state was becoming a coloniser in its turn, it always fetched the leader (*ἀρχηγέτης*) of the colony from the original mother-country. In times of war or distress the parent-state and its colonies mutually aided each other.

CHAPTER V.

The Spartan Constitution.—Lycurgus.

THE uncertainty of tradition, and the want of contemporary written history, make all inquiries relating to these early ages of Greece extremely fluctuating and uncertain. We thus find it impossible to say positively in what manner, and in what space of time, the Dorian dominion was established in the Peloponnese, and what was its nature; and analogy and the view of the institutions existing in the historic times will perhaps be safer guides than the assertions of late historians*.

The most complete parallel which history presents to the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnese, is that of England by the Normans†. Admitting the truth in the main features of the mythic account of the former, the invaders were led by princes who asserted a legal claim to the invaded country; the invasion in either case was by sea; one great battle proved decisive, but the conquest was gradual, and a portion of the vanquished people migrated‡. In the Norman conquest the

* In the following account of the Spartan institutions we have taken Müller in his Dorians as our chief guide. Different views on some points will be found in Thirlwall's History of Greece.

† This, we believe, was first observed by Dr. Arnold. See his Thucydides, i. 530. 2nd edit.

‡ The Norman conquest of England was, as Sir James Mackintosh observes, gradual. It was however effected in the space of four years. See our History of England, i. p. 68. 12mo edit. The English conquest of Ireland (*Ib.* 117) also presents some strong points of resemblance to that of the Dorians.

original inhabitants were treated at first with mildness ; but as the power of the victors became consolidated, their use of the rights of conquest, as they are styled, became more oppressive and unjust. The same was probably the case in Laconia, to which we now confine ourselves.

According to the historian Ephorus*, the Dorians won the whole land at once, which they divided into six districts, one of which, Sparta, they kept for themselves ; Amyclæ they gave to the Achæan Philonomus, who had betrayed the country to them, and over the other four they set viceroys. This, however, is only the assertion of an historian not of the highest character for judgement and accuracy ; and against it is to be observed, that there is very probable evidence that Amyclæ, a strong town, only twenty stadia from Sparta, maintained its independence to a certain extent till near the time of Lysurgus, and that in the narratives of late historians gradual conquests are frequently resolved into one decisive victory.

When we consider the small number of the invading Dorians, it may appear the most probable supposition, that in Laconia, Argos, and Messene, they contented themselves at first with a moderate portion of the territory, the property perhaps of those Achæans who had retired to Ægialeia and elsewhere. Thus we find the Dorians in Argos, in the plain about that city, which must have been the first they entered on when coming from Arcadia ; those of Messene in the Stenyclarian plain, also next to Arcadia ; and those of Laconia at Sparta, and the parts nearest to Arcadia. In the course of time, as their numbers and strength increased, they extended their dominion.

The Achæans of Laconia were called Lacedæmonians† (as distinguished from the Dorians, who were named Spartans, Σπαρτιῆται), and Pericæcians (Περίοικοι, *Dwellers-round*,—as, Sparta being regarded as the centre, their towns lay in the circumference of the territory). They paid the state a tribute—ap-

* *Ap. Strabo*, viii. p. 364.

† The historians, however, employ this name for all the free inhabitants of Laconia, the Spartans included.

parently a very moderate one—for the lands which they possessed. All the arts which were exercised in Laconia were in their hands; they wrought the iron-mines of Taygeton; the Laconian wares, so celebrated throughout Greece, such as drinking-vessels, tables, seats, carriages, shoes, cloaks, swords, helmets, and hardware in general, were manufactured by them. As they dwelt in the sea-ports, all the foreign trade of the state was in their possession. Though they were a distinct race from the Dorians, with whom they had not the right of intermarriage, and had no share in the government or legislative assemblies, they were treated by them with consideration, and their Hoplites (ὀπλίται) or heavy-armed troops always formed a portion of the Lacedæmonian line of battle. They were not entitled to command in the field; but when Sparta began to be a naval power, the command at sea was open to them*. They were therefore always on good terms with the ruling Dorians, and we hear of no general risings of the Laconian Perioecians.

There was another class of the conquered people whose lot was a much harder one: these were the Helots (ἑλωτες), or serfs. The common story is, that the people of the town of Helos on the coast, having risen in rebellion against their Dorian lords, were, when overcome, reduced to serfship, and the name was extended to all who afterwards came into the same condition. This, however, is apparently only a bad piece of etymology†; the Helots were more probably a portion of the Achæans, who, instead of making terms like the others, fought for and lost their liberty: or supposing that the Achæans had originally won the land like the Dorians, the Helots may have been the descendants of the former inhabitants whom they had reduced to this state, and who now only made a change of masters.

The condition of the Helots did not at all resemble that of

* Thuc. viii. 22.

† To derive ἑλωτες from ἑλος, says Müller, violates all the principles of the Greek language. The root is most probably ἔλω, *to take*, of which it is an old perfect participle taken passively. It will thus correspond with ἐμῶς, which comes from δαμάω. On the other hand we are to observe, that the Argive Perioecians were named Orneates from a place Orneæ.

the slaves at Athens and Rome, or in the European colonies in America. They answer much more nearly to the villains* of the middle ages, and to the peasants of Russia at the present day. They belonged to the state, and not to individuals (differing in this from those just mentioned); and those who had the use of them as servants could neither sell them nor give them their freedom. The Helots dwelt in cottages on the lots (κληῖροι) or portions of land of the Spartans, and from each they yielded them every year eighty-two medimns (about one hundred and twenty bushels) of barley, and wine and oil in proportion: the remaining produce was their own, and hence they not unfrequently acquired wealth. It is calculated that there may have been six or seven Helot families on each lot. Both the public and private servants were Helots, and large numbers of them served as light troops in the Spartan armies, and also on board their ships; they were the tutors† of the Spartan boys, and Helot women were the nurses of even the royal families. The way was open to them to freedom, and even to full citizenship. Those who had distinguished themselves in the service of the state, particularly in war, were, under the name of Neodamôds (*New-citizens*), made free, and assigned a piece of land as their own property; and their number soon equalled that of the Spartans‡. There was another class of free Helots named Mothons§ (Μόθωνες), or Mothacs (Μόθακες), who had become so on account of their having been reared up with young Spartans. Their descendants acquired full citizenship, for some of the most distinguished Spartan commanders of later times, such as Lysander, Callicratidas and Gylippus, were such||.

The lot of the Helots was doubtless not an enviable one;

* *Villani*, predial servants or farm-labourers.

† Παιδαγωγός does not answer exactly to our word *tutor*. The pedagogue was a servant who had charge of the boys of a family.

‡ Arnold (on Thuc. v. 34.) assigns a later date to the formation of the class of Neodamods than Müller has done.

§ Μόθων is *verna*, a house-slave. This proves that the Mothons were not, as has been erroneously supposed, Periæcians.

|| Ælian. V. H. xii. 43.

and, as in our West Indian colonies, there must have been individual cases of cruelty and injustice; but such could hardly have been the general practice. Late writers, in their hostility to the Spartans, and their desire to produce effect, describe their condition with a ludicrous degree of sensibility. Thus we are told by one writer* that they were obliged to wear dogskin caps and sheepskin jackets, (the ordinary dress, by the way, of the country-folk in Greece,) and to perform the meanest offices; that they were frequently beaten, to keep them in mind that they were slaves; and that death was the fate of any Helot who was distinguished for size and beauty; nay, his master was punished if he did not slay him. Another late writer† adds, that as a warning to the Spartan youth the Helots were at times forced by their lords to get drunk and perform unseemly dances. The gross exaggeration of all this is apparent; we have surely no reason to suppose that the Spartans were worse than the nobles of the middle ages, and we find no charges of this nature brought against these as a body.

There is some difficulty about the celebrated *Crypteia* (κρυπτεία). We are told on the authority of Aristotle‡, that the Spartan Ephors, when entering into office, always proclaimed war against the Helots, in order that it might be lawful to murder them; and that from time to time the most discreet of the Spartan youth were sent through the country armed with daggers; and that lying in wait they fell on and slew by day or by night such of the Helots as came in their way. On the other hand, Plato§ gives a different view of the *Crypteia*, as an institution for teaching the youth of Sparta to bear hardship, and for inspecting the state of the country. Individual cases of atrocity may have given origin to that darker view of it among strangers; but it is hardly possible to conceive that so numerous a body as the Helots would not have stood on their defence, instead of letting themselves be thus periodically butchered. Still the subject is not free from

* Myrôn, the romantic historian of the Messenian wars. Athen. xiv. 657.

† Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 28.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Laws*, i. § 7. *cum Schol.* vi. § 9. ed. Bekker, Lond. 1826.

difficulty, and as we proceed we shall meet with a dreadful proof of the atrocious measures to which the Spartans could have recourse, in order to free themselves from apprehension with respect to their Helots*.

We now come to the dominant class in Laconia, the descendants of the conquerors,—the Spartans, as they were named, from Sparta, the town in which they *all* dwelt; the camp perhaps we might call it, for the Dorians have been justly compared to “an army of occupation in a conquered country †.”

The Dorians were a class of military nobles, owners of land, forbidden to exercise any trade or art, enjoined to practise continually military exercises. At some time, which cannot be assigned with certainty, the Laconian territory had been divided into nine thousand large, and thirty thousand smaller lots; the former, which were about two-thirds of the whole land, belonged to the Spartans, and, as we have seen, were cultivated for them by the Helots; the latter were assigned to the Pericæcians. Freed thus from the necessity of even overseeing their lands, the Dorians had abundant leisure for gymnastic exercises, and for thus acquiring the high military attainments which always distinguished them.

A certain fixedness and adherence to ancient manners and customs were distinctive of the Dorian race. Hence the manners of the heroic ages, portrayed by Homer, may very frequently be discerned among them. The following are some of the most remarkable of the institutions of Sparta.

All the Spartan men ate together at public tables, the kings not excepted. These meals, usually named Syssities (συσσίτια ‡), i. e. messes, were plain and simple. Each member contributed monthly a certain quantity of barley-meal, wine, cheese and figs, and a small sum of money to purchase *opson* §.

* See Müller, Dor. ii. 40. *seq.* Thirlwall, i. 211.

† Arnold, Thucydides, i. 525, 2nd edit.

‡ The Spartan term was *φιδίτια*, or *φιλίτια*.

§ “Every thing eaten, with the exception of what was prepared from corn, was originally comprehended under the name of *opson* (ὄψον, ὀψώνιον).” Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, i. 133.

Fifteen was the usual number of persons in each syssity, or mess: the members were admitted by ballot, in this manner. The attendant setting a vessel on his head went round, and each member of the mess threw into it a bit of bread, which he squeezed in his fingers if he wished to vote against the candidate. Should there be found in the vessel even one such piece, the candidate was rejected. The little boys sat on stools at their fathers' feet, and got their share of the food; the elder boys messed in a similar manner to that of the grown men.

A chief part of the *opson* was the celebrated black broth (*μέλας ζωμός*), which by all accounts was a very unpalatable dish. The office of cook, at Sparta, we may observe, was hereditary in certain families; and as there was therefore no competition, there was no improvement in cookery.

The Dorians attached great importance to the rearing and educating of their youth. When a child was born, it was brought to the elders of the House (*γένος, gens*) to which its father belonged, by whom it was examined: if found strong and healthy, it was directed to be reared; if puny or deformed, it was sent away and cast into the caverns of Mount Taygeton,—a barbarous practice no doubt, but one useful in a military state. Till the age of seven the boys were left with their parents; they were then, those of the royal houses not excepted, placed under public instructors, and passed through various classes, till they were old enough to be admitted among the men. Their chief occupations were gymnastics, and things relating to the military life, to which every Spartan was destined.

The Spartans, being of opinion that only strong and healthy women could bear healthy children, were equally solicitous about the rearing of their females. They too practised gymnastics like the youths, and in their presence. The Spartan women were famous throughout Greece for their beauty and their virtue. Love was felt more strongly and purely at Sparta than elsewhere in Greece, breach of chastity was nearly unknown, the married woman was held in honour by her husband, and addressed by the respectful title of Mistress (*δέσποινα*).

With respect to the constitution and government of Sparta, we may regard it in one sense as an oligarchy, in another as a democracy, fixing our view on the Dorians alone. It most resembled regal Rome among ancient, Venice among modern states*; but its chiefs were hereditary, and not elective.

At the head of the Spartan government stood two kings who claimed descent from Hercules, through Procles and Eurysthenes, the sons of Aristodemus†. Their rank and authority were therefore founded in religion, as they derived their lineage from heaven. They alone could offer certain sacrifices; they named the persons sent to consult the Pythian oracle; when they died, all the people of the land, Spartans, Pericæcians, and Helots, repaired to Sparta to mourn the monarch, who was interred with magnificence. In peace the kings presided in the senate, in war they led the armies, and their power beyond the bounds of Laconia was unlimited. The Dorian royalty was evidently a continuation of that of the Heroic ages.

The Gerusia (γερονσία) or council of elders, the Dorian senate, consisted of twenty-eight men of sixty years or upwards, elected by the popular assembly. They held their office for life. In conjunction with the kings they deliberated on all public affairs, and prepared such measures as were to be laid before the people. They decided as judges in all criminal matters, and could punish with degradation (ἀτιμία) and death; as censors they exercised an oversight over the morals of the citizens in general.

The *people*, that is the Spartans or Dorians, possessed the legislative power. As has been already observed, in antiquity the different races had favourite political numbers. The Dorian number was *three*, and accordingly the Spartans were

* For it was an oligarchy with respect to the Pericæcians, a democracy among the Dorians themselves, who resembled the Roman Patricians and the Venetian Nobili.

† The two royal families were named, the one Agids, from Agis the son of Eurysthenes; the other Proclids, from Procles, or Eurypontids from his grandson Eurypôn. The Agids were regarded as the superior house. Herod. vi. 51.

divided into three tribes,—the Hyllæans, the Dymans and the Pamphylians*. Each of these was again divided into ten Obes (ὠβαί) or Phratries; and each obe contained a certain number of Houses (γέρεα, *gentes*), each composed of a certain number of families.

All Spartans who had attained the age of thirty years, and who had not been by law deprived of their rights, were authorised to appear in the popular assembly ('Αλία), which was held every full moon in the open air, at a place westwards of the town between the brook named Knakion and the bridge Babyca. Here they decided on peace and war, and other questions of foreign policy, on laws, on the succession to the throne, on changes in the constitution, on the election of magistrates, etc., exercising in fact the supreme political and legislative power. But they could only deliberate on what was laid before them by the government, and the magistrates alone were permitted to speak. The assembly might accept or reject a proposed measure, but could make no alteration in it.

The most remarkable magistracy at Sparta was the Ephory, —an office, the institution of which was by some ascribed to Lycurgus, by others to king Theopompus, but which seems to have been coeval with the state†, though with different powers at different times. The five Ephors (*Overseers*) appear to have been originally the magistrates of the five villages (κῶμαι) which composed the town of Sparta, and appointed to decide in *civil* matters among their fellow-citizens. In their enlarged capacity they were a popular magistracy chosen annually by the *people* out of themselves, without any qualification of wealth or age, bearing some resemblance to the Tribunes at Rome, and becoming eventually in power like the formidable Council of Ten at Venice.

The Ephors sat every day in their court (ἀρχεῖον), in the market by the temple of Fear. They were censors of morals, and overseers of education; all magistrates, even the kings

* See the personifications of these tribes above, pp. 19, 20.

† For it was not peculiar to Sparta, but was to be found in several of the other Dorian states. Müller, *Dor.* ii. 115.

(the senators excepted), were obliged, if required, to render them an account of their conduct in office, and they could even prosecute them capitally ; they directed the police, and had the management of the treasury ; they were the chief conductors of the foreign relations of the state, and some of them usually accompanied the armies sent out of the country. In fine, as the representatives of the people, like our House of Commons, they possessed in reality the supreme power in the state.

Political constitutions, like natural ones, are usually of gradual growth ; but when in any country there has been, or is supposed to have been, some eminent legislator, tradition is apt to ascribe to him singly what has been the work of many persons and of different times. Thus Rome deduced her institutions from Numa and Servius ; and we ourselves have collected around the person of Alfred the most valuable institutions of our Saxon ancestors. The Servius or Alfred of Sparta was Lycurgus.

When we recollect that it was long before the Greeks, though acquainted with letters, began to write, and that Lycurgus by the testimony of tradition is placed more than three centuries before that time, we may see at once that his history must be purely a traditional, and in some sort a mythic one. We know how tradition loves to magnify its heroes, and to invent adventures to give interest to their story. Premising therefore these cautions, we proceed to relate of the lawgiver of Sparta*.

Lycurgus was the younger son of king Eunomus (*Good-law*) or Prytanis (*Presiding*). His elder brother Polydectes dying without children, Lycurgus succeeded ; but it appearing that the widow was pregnant, he declared that the royalty belonged to the child if it should be a boy, and that he would only act as guardian. The queen sent secretly to him offering to destroy the child if he would marry her. Lycurgus feigned assent, and required her to let the babe be born and he would then dispose of it. When her delivery was at hand, he placed trusty persons about her, with directions if the child should

* Herod. i. 65. Plutarch, Lycurgus.

prove a male to bring it to him, wherever he should be. He was sitting at supper with the magistrates when the new-born babe was brought to him. He took him, and saying, "Spartans, a king is born unto us!" laid him in the royal seat and named him Charilâus (*People's-joy*), to commemorate the joy that was exhibited at his own moderation and justice.

Some time after, finding the queen's family and others united in opposition to him, Lycurgus resolved to leave Sparta and visit foreign countries. He first went to Crete, and there studied the Dorian constitution in its greatest purity; and he sent to Sparta the lyric poet Thales, whom he met there, that his songs might prepare the way for the legislation he meditated. He thence proceeded to Ionia, to study other men and other manners. Here he became acquainted with the poems of Homer, of which he took copies. He is said to have extended his travels to Egypt; nay, one Spartan writer sends him to Libya, Iberia and India!

Meantime Lycurgus was greatly missed at home, and repeated messages were sent desiring his return, for all was in confusion, the royal power being such only in name. He came to Sparta determined to re-model the entire state. His first care was to go to Delphi and consult the oracle, where the Pythia or inspired priestess, on seeing him, pronounced him a god rather than a man, and declared the god's approval of his meditated changes. Returning home he communicated his plans to the principal people and secured their aid. He then caused thirty of them to enter the market (*ἀγορά*) one morning in arms to check the opposers of his views. A slight tumult ensued, and king Charilaüs in terror fled to the temple of Athene-Chalcicecos (*Brass-house*)* for safety: he was, however, easily induced to come forth and sanction the measures of reform.

Lycurgus' first measure was the institution of the Gerusia or senate. Then, having observed the excessive disproportion

* So named as being lined with brass plates, like the ancient *treasuries* at Mycenæ and elsewhere.

of landed property, and the consequent evils to the state of the extremes of wealth and poverty, he prevailed on the wealthy to surrender their lands, which he divided into thirty thousand lots for the Pericecians, and nine thousand for the Spartans. Next he prohibited the use of gold and silver money, and introduced a heavy coinage of iron, tempered in vinegar so as to be of no value. His object in this was to banish foreign trade, and all the ministers and incentives of luxury. Proceeding a step further, he instituted the Syssities, and then established the regulations regarding marriage, and the rearing and educating of children, and the discipline of youth. The Crypteia is also ascribed to him.

Having completed the constitution, and seen it for some time in operation, he meditated to give it the utmost stability. He therefore assembled the kings, the senate, and the people, and telling them that he had some measure of still greater importance to bring forward, but would not do so till he had consulted the god, he required from them an oath that they would make no change before his return from Delphi. They readily took the oath. He then repaired to the oracle, and when he had sacrificed and inquired, the god replied that his laws were excellent, and Sparta would be most glorious while she followed them. This response he sent home, resolving never to return and release the Spartans from their oath. He died in Crete, or Elis, or Cirrha, and in after-times the Spartans raised a temple to him as a god.

CHAPTER VI.

The Messenian Wars.

THE early history of the Dorians in Messene is as obscure as that of their brethren in Laconia, and for the same reason,—the want of letters. It would appear that they coalesced more with the people of the land; and to judge by the names of

their kings which have been transmitted to us, their character was more gentle and rural than that of the contemporary kings of Sparta*.

The Dorians established themselves chiefly in the plain of Stenyclaros, bordering on Arcadia, to a daughter of one of whose princes, named Cypselus, Cresphontes was married. Cresphontes, it is said, being disposed to favour the people (*i. e.* the Achæans), was with his sons put to death by his Dorian subjects; but Æpytus, his youngest son, happening to be with his grandfather in Arcadia, escaped, and when he grew up he was brought back to Messene by the Arcadians, and by the Dorians of Laconia and Argos, and having recovered the throne he took vengeance on the murderers of his father. Æpytus became so famous that the royal family were named from him the Æpytids.

About three centuries and a half had elapsed since the Dorian conquest, when feud and enmity broke out between the Dorians of Laconia and of Messene. The most probable cause is, that the Spartans having now fully reduced the Achæans of Laconia, began to cast a longing eye on the fertile plains of Messene; the first occasions of enmity are thus transmitted to us†.

On the confines of Laconia and Messene was a temple of Artemis-Limnâtis (*Of-the-Lake*) common to the two nations. Hither when the Spartan maidens repaired one time to keep the festival, they were violated by some young Messenians. The Spartan king Teleclus attempting to defend them was slain; and the maidens, unable to bear disgrace, put an end to themselves. So said the Spartans. The Messenian account was, that when several of their principal men had visited the temple, Teleclus sent to them some beardless youths, disguised as maidens and armed with daggers, hoping by removing them to conquer the country more easily. The Messenians discovering his design slew both himself and the youths, and the Spartans were so conscious of being in the wrong that they sought no satisfaction for the death of their king.

* Paus. iv. 3, 4.

† Paus. iv. 4-24.

Nothing further occurred at this time. In the next generation a new cause of enmity arose. A wealthy Messenian named Polychares sent some of his kine to graze on the lands of a Spartan named Euæphnus. The Spartan was to have a share of the produce of the cows ; but not content with this, he secretly sold them to some foreign traders, and then coming to Polychares told him that pirates had landed, and carried off both herds and herdsmen. Just then one of Polychares' slaves whom Euæphnus had sold with the cattle, having made his escape, came and told the truth ; and Euæphnus being thus convicted implored forgiveness, and offered to pay the full value of the cattle if Polychares' son would accompany him home. The youth set out with him ; but as soon as they were on Laconian ground, the treacherous Spartan fell on and slew him. Polychares, having vainly sought justice at Sparta, became desperate, and he put to death every Spartan that fell into his hands.

The Spartans now sent an embassy demanding the surrender of Polychares. The two kings of Messene, Androcles and Antiochus, were of opposite opinions, the former wishing to comply with, the latter to reject, the demand of the Spartans. It came to blows, and Androcles and his principal friends fell in the civil conflict ; Antiochus then sent to Sparta offering to submit the matter to the judgement of the Argives, their common kinsmen, or to the court of Areiopagus at Athens. The Spartans made no reply. Antiochus died, and was succeeded by his son Euphaës ; and then the Spartans, without any declaration of war, having secretly bound themselves by oath never to rest till they were masters of Messene, made an irruption by night into that country and surprised the town of Amphia, which was situated on a lofty hill near the borders. All the inhabitants were put to the sword, a few only escaping.

King Euphaës, having summoned an assembly of the people to Stenyclaros, advised them not to be cast down, and exhorted them to apply diligently to the practice of arms, and relying on the gods and the justice of their cause to prepare for the

war. Three years passed away in preparation, during which the Spartans plundered, but did not injure, the land which they hoped would be theirs; and the Messenians made descents on the coast of Laconia, and ravaged the corn-fields of Mount Taygeton. At length, when Euphaës thought his people sufficiently prepared, he summoned them to his standard, and led them against the Spartans, followed by a number of servants carrying timber and all things necessary for the construction of a rampart. The armies met in a plain where there was a deep gulf in the earth: the heavy-armed troops stood separated by it, while the horse and the light-armed engaged each other above it. Meantime the servants raised a rampart round the rear and flanks of the Messenians, and during the night they completed it in front: the Spartans, seeing their enemies thus secured, deemed it not prudent to remain, and retired home.

The following year, the Spartans, shamed by the reproaches of their old men, invaded Messene, and a battle was fought, which was terminated by night, victory remaining with neither side. The Messenians, however, soon found that they were losers on the whole, as they had spent all their money, their slaves had deserted in great numbers to the enemy, and a contagious disease had broken out in the country. They therefore resolved to abandon all their towns in the plain, and betake them to the nearly impregnable hill of Ithôme, which stands detached on the confines of the Stenyclarian plain, and there to make their stand. When this was done they sent to consult the god at Delphi.

The Messenian envoy (*θεωρὸς*), whose name was Tisis, was waylaid on his return by the Spartans from Amphibia; and as he would not surrender, they wounded and would have slain him, when a voice, they knew not whence, called out "Let go the oracle-bearer!" Tisis reached Ithome, and having delivered the oracle to the king, died of his wounds. Euphaës read the response to the assembled people, and it was found that the god directed that a virgin of the blood of the Æpytids should be sacrificed at night to the subterrane deities. If she whose lot was drawn should escape, any other Æpytid

might give his daughter voluntarily. The lot fell on the daughter of Lyciscus; but the soothsayer Epebolus, gained by her father, declared that she was a supposititious child and forbade the sacrifice. Lyciscus then made his escape with his daughter and fled to Sparta. The people learning this were in consternation, but Aristodemus, an Æpytid, came forward and offered to sacrifice *his* maiden daughter for the good of his country. Her lover—for she was betrothed—in agony, denied that her father had now the right to dispose of her: then foiled in this attempt, he boldly asserted that he had enjoyed a husband's privilege, and that she was no longer a maid, and would be ere long a mother. Aristodemus, stung to madness by this imputation on the honour of his house, slew his hapless child with his own hand, and ripping her open proved the falsehood of her lover's assertion. Epebolus called for some other Æpytid to give his daughter, for Aristodemus had murdered *his*, and not sacrificed her to the gods as directed. The people rushed to take vengeance on the lover, but Euphaës, whose friend he was, declared the oracle fulfilled; the Æpytids all joyfully assented; the assembly was dissolved, and the sacrificial feast was held. The Spartans lost spirit when they heard what had been done in Ithome.

Six years afterwards, in the thirteenth of the war, the Spartans again invaded Messene, and in the battle which ensued, king Euphaës, fighting with the utmost heroism, received a mortal wound. As he left no children, the Messenians proceeded to elect a king: the candidates were Aristodemus, Cleonnis, and Damis. The soothsayers Epebolus and Ophioneus were unanimous in declaring that the dignity of Æpytus should not be given to a man stained with the blood of his own child. The people however would have him, and he was chosen king. In his high office he was just and generous, and he held in particular esteem his rivals for the throne.

For four years the war was confined to pillaging incursions into each other's territory. In the fifth year the allies on both sides appeared. The Arcadians and some companies of Argives and Sicyonians joined the Messenians; the Spartans

were only aided from Corinth. Aristodemus drew up his army at the foot of Ithome : he gave chief commands to Cleonnis and Damis. His arrangements were judicious, and a signal victory that day crowned the Messenian arms.

The Spartans now sent in their turn to consult the oracle, and the god directed them to employ art as well as force ; for Messene was originally acquired, and would be acquired again, by stratagem. Stratagem was then tried, but in vain ; equally vain were the attempts to detach the allies of the Messenians.

In the twentieth year of the war the Messenians sent to Delphi, and the god replied that victory would be with those who first placed one hundred tripods round the altar of Zeus-Ithomates. As this altar was within the walls of Ithome they were now certain of success, and having no brass they resolved to make the tripods of wood. But a Delphian had sent the response to Sparta. The council there could decide on nothing ; but a man of no note, named Cæbalus, formed one hundred tripods of clay, and putting them in a bag, and taking a hunting-net with him, entered Ithome with the peasants in the evening ; and having during the night placed them about the altar, he hastened home to tell what he had done. The Messenians, when they saw the tripods, knew it was an artifice of the enemy ; Aristodemus however bade them be of good cheer, and they set the wooden ones round the altar.

But the end of Messene was now at hand, and signs and prodigies came to announce it. The shield fell from the hand of the armed statue of Artemis, and the rams which Aristodemus was about to offer to Zeus-Ithomates dashed their heads against the altar and died. The dogs in the town assembled and kept howling all through the night, and then went off in a body to the Spartan camp. A terrific dream came also to appal the firm mind of Aristodemus. He dreamed that he was armed and going forth to battle ; the entrails of the victims lay on a table before him : suddenly his murdered daughter appeared clad in black, and displaying her opened breast and womb, she cast the entrails on the ground, stripped him of his arms, placed a golden crown on his head,

and arrayed him in a white garment. Aristodemus on waking judged that his death was at hand, for such was the dress in which the Messenians bore to the grave all persons of note. Soon after, seeing no further hopes for his country, and aware that he had to no purpose been the slayer of his own child, he slew himself on her grave. Struck by this event, the Messenians thought on surrender, but nobler sentiments soon prevailed : they chose Damis for their leader, and went forth to battle ; but fortune still was adverse, their leaders and men of note all fell, and after sustaining hunger and siege for five months longer, they abandoned Ithome and their country. Thus terminated the first Messenian war (Ol. 14, 1.), after a continuance of twenty years.

Such of the Messenians as had *proxenies** in Argos, Sicyôn, and Arcadia, retired to these places. Those who remained were reduced to the most oppressive state of Helotism, being obliged to yield their Spartan lords one half of the annual produce of their lands, and to mourn for their kings like the Helots of Laconia, etc.

During thirty-eight years the Messenians remained in this state of thralldom. A generation had arisen which knew not the evils of the former war, and it was resolved to make an effort for independence. An alliance was secretly formed with the Argives and Arcadians, and (Ol. 23, 4.) the standard of revolt was raised. The foremost in this movement were the people of Andania (the district north-east of Stenyclaros), headed by Aristomenes, a valiant youth of the race of the Æpytids, to whom popular tradition assigned a divine origin ; for a god, it was said, had visited the chamber of his mother Nicoteleia (*Victory-completer*).

It was at Deræ, a place on their own territory, that the Messenians first ventured to meet their oppressors in arms. The battle was indecisive ; at the close of it the Messenians elected Aristomenes king, but he declined royalty, satisfied with the office of commander-in-chief. He shortly afterwards secretly entered Sparta by night, and next morning

* The *proxeny* (προξενία) was an engagement of mutual hospitality.

the haughty Dorians saw on the temple of the Chalciœcos a shield bearing the inscription "Aristomenes to the goddess from the Spartans."

The Spartans, as was their wont, sent to Delphi, and the god directed them to fetch a counsellor from Athens. The Athenians, when applied to, feared to disobey the god, but they wished not to see the power of the Spartans increased; they therefore sent a lame poet of no great repute for wisdom, named Tyrtæus. Events showed their expectation that he would be of no advantage to be a vain one.

Next year the allies on both sides appeared; Arcadians, Eleians, Argives, and Sicyonians joined the Messenians; the Corinthians were with the Spartans. The armies met in the Stenyclarian plan, at a spot named the Wild-Boar's Monument (*κάρπον σῆμα*): the soothsayers on both sides urged to battle; Tyrtæus encouraged the rear of the Spartans, the priests of the Great Goddesses (Demêter and the Kora) that of the Messenians, to vigorous exertion. Aristomenes, at the head of eighty picked men of his own age, rushed against the Spartan king Anaxander: the contest was long and bloody; at length the Spartans fled; the Messenian band attacked and routed the enemy wherever they made a stand. The soothsayer Theocles had warned Aristomenes not to pass a wild pear-tree on which the Dioscûri* were sitting, the invisible spectators of the conflict; but in the ardour of pursuit he neglected the warning; at the tree he dropped his shield, which the Twins conveyed away unseen, and while he sought it the remaining foes escaped. The hero came victorious back to Andania, and the women strewed ribbons and flowers before him while they sang verses celebrating his glorious deeds.

Anxious to recover his shield Aristomenes went to Delphi, and by the directions of the Pythia he visited the cavern of Trophonius in Lebadeia. Here he found his buckler, and returning home placed himself at the head of his chosen band, and one evening took and plundered the town of Pharæ in Laconia. Soon after he penetrated by night into Sparta itself,

* Διόσκουροι (*Zeus'-sons*), the Twin-gods Castor and Pollux.

but was repelled by an apparition of Helena and the Dioscuri. He then lay in wait for the Spartan damsels who were dancing in honour of Artemis at Caryæ, and carried off those of highest rank among them. At night he halted in a village of Messene ; and there some of his comrades, having drunk too much, went to offer violence to their captives. Finding remonstrance vain, the hero slew the most violent with his own hand, and he returned the virgins uninjured to their parents on receiving the usual ransom.

Aristomenes next made an attempt on the town of Ægila, where the women were celebrating the feast of Demeter ; but they defended themselves so well with knives and spits, that they drove off the Messenians, and made Aristomenes himself a prisoner. But the priestess of the goddess, who loved him, gave him his liberty that night, and asserted to the Spartans that he had contrived to burn his bonds.

In the third year, the Messenians, strongly aided by the Arcadians, met their oppressors at a place named the Great Ditch. The Spartans, dubious of victory, had recourse to corruption ; they bribed Aristocrates the commander of the Arcadians, and he induced his troops to fly as the engagement was commencing ; the Spartans then easily surrounded the Messenians, and in spite of all the efforts of Aristomenes and his devoted band, a total defeat was the lot of the patriots.

Assembling those who had escaped on this fatal day, the Messenian hero advised to abandon Andania and all other towns, and make their last stand at Eira, a mountain north-west of Stenyclaros, on the river Neda, and not far from the sea, whence they might obtain supplies. Thither they accordingly retired, followed by their persevering foes. Aided by the people of Pylos and Mothône, the Messenians ravaged alike by sea their own country and Laconia ; and Aristomenes, having augmented his chosen band to three hundred men, did such mischief by plundering excursions, that the Spartans made a decree to let all the lands within his reach lie waste. Famine ensued at Sparta, and then rose a sedition, which was stilled by the strains of Tyrtæus.

Late one evening Aristomenes set out with his trusty band, and ere day he reached the town of Amyclæ near Sparta, which he took and plundered. He retired before aid could arrive from Sparta; but continuing to scour the country, he fell in with a large body of the Spartans who were in pursuit of him. Numbers overwhelmed the brave Messenians; and fifty of them, with their leader, who was stunned by a blow of a stone on the head, were made prisoners. On reaching Sparta they were thrown into the pit called the Kaiadas: all perished in the fall but Aristomenes, whom, as the legend told, an eagle supported on his wings and bore safely to the bottom*. Awaiting his death from hunger he lay patiently enveloped in his cloak; on the third day hearing a noise, he uncovered his face, and saw a fox come to prey on the bodies; he caught the animal by the tail when it came near him, and ran as it ran till he saw the light from the hole through which it used to enter the cavern†. This hole he widened sufficiently to admit him to pass through, and soon the Spartans learned to their dismay that Aristomenes was once more at Eira.

A body of Corinthians, coming to the aid of the Spartans before Eira, were fallen on in the night and cut to pieces by Aristomenes, who now offered for the second time a hecatomphony‡ to Zeus-Ithomates. As their national feast, the Hyacinthia, was at hand, the Spartans made a truce for forty days to celebrate the festival, and went home. Aristomenes came out of Eira, relying on the truce, but he was waylaid and seized by seven Cretan archers in the pay of the Spartans: they bound him with their bowstrings: two of them ran with the joyful news to Sparta; the rest, as it was evening, took him to a cottage, in which were dwelling only a widow and

* It is ludicrous to see the manner in which Gillies endeavours to extract truth out of this evident fiction. He says, the shield of Aristomenes, on which was the figure of an eagle, broke his fall, etc.—never once thinking of the improbability of such a circumstance.

† The fox was the emblem of Messene (see above, p. 20),—hence the legend.

‡ A sacrifice offered for having slain a hundred enemies.

her daughter. This maiden had the night before had a dream, in which she saw wolves bringing her a lion bound, without claws: she had in her dream loosed the lion and given him claws, and he had torn the wolves: she now saw its meaning; she made the Cretans drunk, cut the captive's bonds with one of their swords, and with it he then slew them all. To reward the maiden Aristomenes united her in marriage with his son Gorgos.

The eleventh year of the siege was come. Aristomenes and the soothsayer Theocles had, after the defeat of the Great Ditch, gone to Delphi, where the Pythia told them that Messene would be lost when the buck-goat (*τράγος*) drank of the Neda. They thought only of the animal: the god meant differently; for in this year, as Theocles was walking along the river, he saw a wild fig-tree, which the Messenians called Buck-goat (*τράγος*), growing so as to dip its leaves in the water: he secretly brought his friend to the spot, and pointed out the tree. Aristomenes saw that the end of Messene was at hand; he therefore took the sacred pledge on which the hopes of its recovery rested, and when night came he set out and buried it in the most desert part of Ithome.

A runaway slave of a Spartan of rank, who carried on an intrigue with a Messenian woman, used to visit her when her husband was on guard at the Acropolis of Eira. One night it rained tremendously, and as Aristomenes was confined by a wound, and there seemed no danger of the Spartans making an attempt in such weather, the guards resolved to go home to their houses. The adulteress had her lover with her when her husband came: she concealed him, and he heard the Messenian tell her how they had left the citadel unguarded. He instantly stole out and ran to the Spartan camp, where his master happened to have the chief command. The occasion was not to be lost; heedless of the storm the Spartans set forth, and occupied the deserted citadel: a terrific howling set up by the dogs told the Messenians that the enemies were within, and they flew to arms. During the night nothing was done on either side. With day, Aristomenes and Theocles, though

they knew that all was over, exhorting the Messenians to do valiantly, led them on ; the women also, bearing arms, resolved to die rather than be slaves. The rain still poured, the thunder roared, and lightning flamed ; the Messenians fought undismayed, the conflict was sustained day and night. On the third day Theocles called to Aristomenes to fight no longer in vain, but to save himself and the Messenians ; then rushing amid the foe, he cried out that Messene would not always be theirs, and fell covered with wounds. Aristomenes recalled his men from the fight, and directed them to form in a body, placing the women and children in the centre : he advanced at their head, intimating that he demanded a passage : the Spartans, deeming it imprudent to drive them to despair, made way, and the last champions of independence abandoned Eira. (Ol. 28, 1.)

The exiles directed their steps toward Arcadia. At Mount Lycæon they found an abundant supply of food and raiment provided for them by the Arcadians, who had only been prevented from going to their aid by the treachery of Aristocrates, and who now offered to divide their lands and houses with them. Shortly after, Aristomenes selected five hundred chosen Messenians, and proposed in the assembly of the Arcadians to fall with these on the town of Sparta, now without defenders : if they succeeded, they might get their own country again in exchange ; if they failed, they would die the death of heroes. The assembly approved, and three hundred Arcadians offered to join him ; but the royal traitor sent intelligence to the Spartan king. Some of the Arcadians, who suspected him, waylaid his messenger on his return, and found on him a letter thanking Aristocrates for his services. The traitor was stoned to death, and his body cast out of the land unburied*.

The people of Pylos and Mothone also quitted their country. Getting on shipboard they came to the port of Cyllene in Elis, whence they sent to the Messenian exiles, inviting them to come and join them in forming a colony. They joyfully consented : some were for seizing the isle of Zacynthus, and thence harassing the Spartans ; others for going to Sar-

* See Polyb. iv. 33.

dinia. Meantime envoys came from Anaxilas, prince of the Dorian colony at Rhegium in Italy, inviting them to come and aid him against the Zancleans of Sicily. They went, conquered the Zancleans, then coalesced with them, and named the town, instead of Zancle, Messâna,—a name which, slightly altered, it still retains.

Aristomenes, still hoping to be able to do injury to the Spartans, would not join the colony. Some time after, Damagetes, prince of Jalysus in Rhodes, consulting the oracle, was directed to marry the daughter of the bravest man in Greece. As none could dispute the palm with the hero of Messene, the Rhodian prince became his son-in-law, and the illustrious warrior ended his days in tranquillity at Rhodes.

Those who are versed in mythic narrative will at once discern the semi-mythic character of these Messenian wars, which are only less marvellous than those of Thebes and Troy, because the gods do not personally and visibly appear in them*. The details are not given by Herodotus; they are only to be found in the work of Pausanias, a late writer, who derived them from the poem of Rhiânus, and the romantic narrative of Myrôn, of Priene, both of whom wrote long after the Messenians had been restored to their country† (Ol. 102, 3.), from the various traditions which remained of the ancient heroes and ancient misfortunes of Messene. The main facts only can therefore be regarded as truth; the details are mostly to be viewed as fiction.

After the conquest of Messene the power of the Spartans was by far the greatest in the Peloponnese. They still however were unable to make any impression on Arcadia; and a long course of warfare with their Arcadian neighbours of Tegea, whose hoplites nearly equalled their own, terminated in the Tegeans acknowledging their supremacy in military confederations, and being assigned in return the second place in the combined armies‡.

* Yet even this feature is not totally absent. See p. 46.

† Rhianus flourished Ol. 140; the age of Myrôn is unknown.

‡ Herod. i. 66–68.

With their neighbours of Argos the Spartans had also frequent warfare. The Dorians of Argos, who seem to have made their first settlement at the head of the Argolic gulf, extended their conquests southwards along the sea-coast; and the district round Cynuria, reaching to Cape Malea, acknowledged their authority. When the Spartans became sufficiently strong, they coveted this region, and gradually succeeded in acquiring possession of it.

CHAPTER VII.

Early State of Attica.—Crissæan War.—Legislation of Solon.

WE have seen that when the Ionians abandoned the Peloponnese they retired to Attica. In like manner the royal house of the Neleids, descendants of Neleus, father of Nestôr, and prince of Pylos in Messene, when forced to yield to the Dorians sought a refuge in this hospitable land. The Athenians were at that time, it is said, at war with the Bœotians, and the Bœotian prince offered to decide the dispute by a single combat between himself and the Athenian monarch. The combat was declined by Thymœtas, the Theseid, who then governed Athens; Melanthus, the exiled Neleid, offered to fight in his stead; his proffer was accepted, the Bœotian prince fell beneath his arm, the degenerate descendant of Theseus was deposed, and his royal dignity given to the valiant stranger.

The throne of Athens was occupied by Codrus*, the son of Melanthus, at the time when the Dorians of the Peloponnese endeavoured to extend their dominion beyond the Isthmus. They had pitched their camp on the banks of the Ilissus near the town of Athens. But a response of the oracle made it dubious what the result would be, for it had promised the victory only on condition of not violating the person of the Athenian

* *Illustrious*, it being probably the same with κνδρός.

king. Codrus, learning this, disguised himself as a peasant, and entered the Dorian camp. Here he picked a quarrel with a soldier, and fell by his hand; an Athenian herald soon appeared to demand the body of their king; the Dorians now hopeless of success retired, limiting their conquests to Megaris; and the Athenians, to honour the self-devotion of Codrus, decreed that none should bear the royal title again in Attica. Archôn (*Prince*) was the name under which his son Medôn (*Ruler*) was appointed to succeed: his authority was however for life. Others of the sons of Codrus placed themselves at the head of the colonies which were at this time going over to Asia.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the air of fable which these narratives present*. Their date alone, so long anterior to the time in which history was first written in Greece, would suffice to throw doubt on them. The facts which they contain seem to be only these: the Neleids came to Attica, though it does not follow that they obtained the royal authority; and monarchy was abolished there at an early period.

Like all the rest of Greece, Attica appears to have originally consisted of a number of small communities, independent of each other, each with its prince and its body of nobles or landowners. Tradition spoke of a fourfold division of the population, into Geleontes or Teleontes, Hoplitæ, Ægicoreis, and Argadeis or Ergadeis, which some suppose to have been castes like those of Egypt and India, and to have been established by the Egyptian Cecrops; by others they are regarded as merely local *phyles* (φυλαὶ) or tribes; the Argadeis being the cultivators of the plains and vales of the interior, the Ægicoreis the goatherds of the hills, the Hoplitæ the military, perhaps Ionian†, possessors of the plain of Athens, and the Teleontes the sacerdotal owners of Eleusis and its district‡.

* They are not to be found in Herodotus, but are related, after Ephorus chiefly, by Pausanias, Justin, and other late writers.

† It was a tradition, that Iôn, the son of Xuthus (see above, p. 12), came to Attica, and was the author of this division of the people.

‡ The theory in the text is that of Wachsmuth, from which that of bishop Thirlwall differs in some respects.

A further division of these phyles into the orders of the Eupatrids (*Well-born*), Geomores or Thetes (*Cultivators*)*, and Demiurgs (*Workmen*), is also mentioned. This accords with the divisions of society presented by the Homeric poems, the Eupatrids being the owners of the soil, the Geomores the tenants, and the Demiurgs the class of artizans. The phyles were also divided into Phratricies (φρατρίαι) and Houses (γένηα), answering to the *curiæ* and *gentes* of the Roman patricians. Each phyle contained three phratricies, each phratricy thirty houses, and each house thirty families.

A union of the phyles into one state is ascribed to a prince named Theseus, of Ionian descent, from the opposite coast of the Argolic Acte. Whether Theseus be a real prince, or, as his name might seem to denote†, a purely mythic person, is a matter of little consequence. His name stands for an order of things, the union of Attica under one head, with the town of Athens for its capital. We are henceforth to view the Eupatrids of the four phyles as forming one body actuated by a common interest, and the inferior classes (there being as yet no town-population of any magnitude) yielding a willing obedience to those whom they regarded as their natural superiors. The struggle was between the nobles and the prince; and, as we have seen, the first advantage which they gained was the transforming him into an accountable magistrate (like the Doge of Venice), the office however being for life, and confined to the family of the Codrids and their relatives the Alemaeonids.

The chronologists place the death of Codrus and this change in the year 1068 B.C., and three hundred and sixteen years afterwards (Ol. 7, 1.) the office of archon was limited to ten years, but it was still confined to the Codrids and Alemaeonids. Hippomenes, the fourth of these magistrates, having, it is said, put his daughter to a cruel death for breach of chastity, the Eupatrids, taking advantage of the odium which he thereby incurred, seized the opportunity of extending their authority;

* There was probably among these a good number of small proprietors.

† Θησεὺς, from θέω, τίθημι, *to set, arrange, regulate.*

and, as it would appear, they opened the office of archon to other families beside the former two. At length (Ol. 24, 2.) they advanced still further; they reduced the archontate to one year, and instead of one archon there were nine annually elected by and out of the body of the Eupatrids. Of these, the first was named the Archon Eponymus (*Name-giving*), as the year was named from him; the second the Basileus (*King*), whose duty it was to perform such sacrifices as had been performed by the kings; the third was the Polemarch or general; the remaining six were named Thesmothetes or judges, they presided in the courts, and from their decision there was no appeal.

The Eupatrids, having thus succeeded in abolishing the monarchy, and drawing all power to themselves, had converted the constitution into an aristocracy, verging on oligarchy. Their treatment of the inferior classes was, as is almost always the case in such a state of things, harsh and oppressive. Want of documents prevents our being able to say with certainty what the condition of the latter was at this time, but it is probable, that in consequence of the connexion with the flourishing colonies of Ionia, Athens now began to have a considerable trade; for this and for other purposes money was borrowed from the Eupatrids; the Geomores of the country may have gotten into their debt also from various causes. The law of debt was cruel, as the insolvent debtor and his family might be made slaves, and even sold out of the country; and, as the courts of law were in the hands of the Eupatrids, justice was not to be always had: altogether the state of things very much resembled that at Rome after the abolition of royalty.

In the first year of the thirty-ninth Olympiad an attempt was made to obviate the evils of a want of fixed rules, and Draco, the archon of that year, introduced laws for that purpose; but as he did not attempt to remedy the defects of the constitution, and his laws were so immoderately severe as to defeat their own object, the attempt was a complete failure.

Fortunately for mankind, those who are possessed of power

have not always the wisdom to preserve it by concord among themselves. The Attic nobles, like those of the Italian cities of the middle ages, had their feuds and animosities. Cylôn, one of their number, had married the daughter of Theagenes, the *tyrant* or prince of Megara; and in reliance on his aid and that of his own party at home, he resolved to attempt to gain similar power. He therefore (Ol. 42, 1.) suddenly seized on the Acropolis or citadel of Athens; but the other Eupatrids would not tamely yield him the supreme authority. They hastened from all parts at the head of their tenants, and besieged him in the Acropolis. It would appear that he had been able to lay in a sufficient supply of provisions; for, wearied out with the length of the siege, the greater part of them went home, leaving the archons to continue the blockade. Cylôn and his brother contrived to escape; the remainder, when several of them had died of hunger, sat as suppliants at the altar of the goddess Pallas-Athene. Megacles the Alcæonid, one of the archons, persuaded them to leave it, promising them justice. They fastened a cord to the altar and went down, still holding it in their hands; but the cord happening to break as they came to the temple of the Erinnyes, the archons, crying out that the goddess gave them up, fell on and slaughtered them. A bitter feud now prevailed between the two parties; and at length, the wiser and more prudent people interfering, the Alcæonids were induced to submit their cause to justice, and thirty of them were sentenced to banishment; the bones of such as had died were dug up and cast out of the land, that it might be purified from the guilt of blood*.

The Megarians, who had aided the party of Cylôn, recovered during the feud their port of Nisæa and the isle of Salamis, of which the Athenians had had possession. The wrath of Heaven seemed also, to the apprehension of the people, to be declared against their involuntary guilt; and Epimenides, a sage and soothsayer from Crete, was invited to come and purify the city. Epimenides, the friend of Solôn, and of those

* Herod. v. 71. Plut. Solôn, 12.

who meditated a removal of the political, the true evils of the country, sought to calm the terrors of superstition, and to pave the way for the intended legislation of his friend, by inspiring a desire for order and justice*.

Solôn, the author of the new legislation, was a Codrid by descent; and his character, in which moderation and the love of justice were conspicuous traits, qualified him beyond all men of his time for the office of a lawgiver†. We must here relate the events in which he had previously borne a part.

The Athenians, it is said, had suffered so much in their contests with the Megarians for the recovery of the isle of Salamis, that they at length made a law imposing the penalty of death on any one who should advise the renewal of war on account of it. Solôn was indignant at the dishonour of his country, and to evade the law he caused a report to be spread that he was out of his mind. He meantime kept close at home, occupying himself with the composition of a poem on Salamis. When it was completed he suddenly came into the market, and mounting the herald's stone began to sing it. The people assembled round him; his friends, as had of course been arranged, were rapturous in their applause; the enthusiasm spread, the law was repealed, war declared, and by a stratagem of Solôn's the island taken. The matter being referred to five Spartan arbitrators, they decided in favour of the Athenians, and adjudged them the island.

The Crissæans, who inhabited the fertile plain of Phocis, extending from Delphi to the sea, naturally derived great advantage from the concourse of pilgrims who landed in their ports to repair to the oracle. As trade was in Greece, as in the East, connected with religion, merchants were in the habit of resorting to Delphi with their wares, and the Crissæans were not long without imposing duties on their goods. These

* Plut. Solôn. This writer's life of the legislator is the chief authority for his history and laws.

† The maxim 'Too much of nothing' (*Μηδὲν ἄγαν*) was by some ascribed to Solôn; but the majority of authorities give it to Cheilôn the Lacedæmonian.

duties they gradually augmented, and then proceeded to levy a tax on the pilgrims. The Delphians, finding the number of pilgrims diminishing, complained of this infraction of the decree of the Amphictyons, who had declared that the oracle should be accessible to all without expense. The Crissæans entered the Delphian territory in arms, and laid it waste; and not content with this injustice, they sacrilegiously plundered the temple and slaughtered the inhabitants of Delphi. The Amphictyons were now required to interfere; but the Crissæans, it would appear, were not without friends in that assembly, and it was with difficulty that Solôn, who was one of the Athenian deputies, induced them to declare war. The war, however, was feebly carried on; the Crissæans, who now had wealth, probably got soldiers and friends with ease, and the Crissæan war, like that of Troy, lasted ten years. Like it, too, it ended in the slaughter or slavery of the vanquished people, and the whole Crissæan territory was, in accordance with Solôn's interpretation of a response of the oracle, consecrated to the god, and a curse pronounced on whoever should presume to cultivate it.

It was during the time of the Crissæan war that Solôn was called on to legislate for his country. The want of contemporary history leaves us very much in the dark as to the real state of things in Attica at this time, but it appears that the number of the inferior orders of the people engaged in agriculture and commerce must have been considerable*, and that the distress to which they were reduced by their debts to the nobles had rendered them desperate. The nobles, on the other hand, were weakened by feuds among themselves, and they probably were wise enough to discern that it was better to give way in time, and yield up a part of their privileges, than see themselves deprived of the whole by the establishment of a *tyranny*.

* It is probable that the trade of Athens was very extensive at this time. There was a corn trade from the Euxine, timber for ship-building was imported from Macedonia, and the Chersonese was colonised. The commercial population of Athens must therefore have been numerous.

Solôn being archon (Ol. 46, 3.)*, and invested with absolute powers for the purpose, reformed the state with the consent of all parties. He adhered as closely as was possible to the original forms of the constitution, reforming not subverting, improving what was good, cutting away what was evil.

His first measure was the relief of the debtors, which was effected by his *seisachthy* (σεισαχθεία), or act of *disburdenment*, of which according to some authorities the provisions were, the reduction of the rate of interest, and the raising the nominal value of money (making the mina be counted at 100 instead of its previous value 73 drachmas); but others maintained that the *seisachthy* was a literal abolition of all outstanding debts and securities, answering to the *tabulæ novæ* of the Romans. A necessary consequence of this measure was, that the lands of the small proprietors which had been pledged were restored unincumbered to their owners. The practice of reducing debtors to slavery was abolished; those who were in that state were released; those who had been sold out of the country were repurchased and set at liberty.

Solôn then restored to the enjoyment of their civic rights all the citizens who had fallen into *atimy* † (ἀτιμία), excepting only those who had been found guilty of crimes against the state. Every Athenian citizen who had not become *atimous* anew, was now authorised to appear and to speak in the public assembly, and to be a juror in the courts of justice. The different ages at which these rights might be exercised were determined by law.

Abolishing the exclusive privileges of the Eupatrids, Solôn divided the citizens into four classes, regulated by property. The first class contained all those whose lands yielded them annually five hundred measures and upwards of solid or liquid

* Tarquinius Priscus was reigning at this time in Rome.

† *Atimy* is *incapacity of honour or office*. The chief causes of *atimy* were, debt to the state, neglect of parents, waste of property, immoral life, cowardice, false witness, etc. The *atimous* could not appear in the assembly, sit as jurors, or be present at the public sacrifices. In the present case the far greater part of the *atimous* were so on account of debt.

produce; hence they were called Pentacosio-medimnians* (Πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι); the archontate and other great offices in the state, and the chief commands in war, belonged to them. The second class were those whose income was three hundred measures and upwards, and who were able to keep a war-horse: they were named Horsemen (Ἱππεῖς)†. The third class consisted of those whose income was one hundred and fifty measures and upwards: they were named Zeugîts (Ζευγῖται), as keeping a yoke (ζεύγος) of plough-cattle. These last two classes formed the main strength of the army, and were eligible to be members of the Council of Four Hundred. The fourth class, named Thetes (Θῆτες), whose income fell short of one hundred and fifty medimns, were not required to serve in war and could hold no office; their only privileges were those of serving on juries and appearing in the assemblies.

Thus we see that Solôn changed the aristocracy of birth into a *timocracy* (τιμοκρατία), or one of wealth. The four phyles and their subdivisions were left untouched, and the Eupatrids, as the persons of greatest wealth in general, being in the upper classes, had still all the chief offices in their hands; the priesthoods also were, and long continued to be, their exclusive possession. But noble birth ceased to be a thing needful, and even a Thete might now look forward to attaining to some importance in the state.

Nowhere is Solôn's political wisdom more apparent than in his measures for checking precipitation in decision and action,—the great fault of the Athenian character‡. It was necessary, it appears, to give the people the legislative power, and the task of the legislator was to regulate it. For this purpose he established a series of councils.

The first of these was the Senate (Βουλῇ), or Council of Four Hundred. It was composed of four hundred members of the

* The Attic *medimnus* contained nearly an English bushel and a half; the *metrêtês* or liquid measure was $\frac{3}{4}$ ths of the medimnus.

† Usually rendered *Knights*. This word, however, suggests ideas which are too modern.

‡ See Solôn, Eleg. xv. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 630; and *Clouds*, 569 *cum scholiis*.

first three classes, one hundred from each phyle. They were elected annually by lot, being thirty years of age, and having stood the requisite previous examination. The chief business of this council was to consider and propose the matters which were to be brought before the popular assembly. The members at the end of the year had to render an account of their conduct while in office.

The popular assembly (*Ἐκκλησία*) was regularly held on certain days in each month. Every citizen was required to attend, and every one might speak on the subjects sent to it by the senate. The voting was usually by a show of hands, sometimes by ballot. The matters brought before the assembly were questions of peace, war, alliance, embassies, laws, elections of magistrates, matters of finance, etc.

But it was not enough for a measure to pass the senate and assembly; the cautious lawgiver had provided a further restraint. Every year, out of the whole number of the Ecclesiasts, or members of the assembly, six thousand of those who had attained the age of thirty years were sworn in as members of the *Heliaea* (*Ἠλιαία*)* to act as Dicasts (*Δικασταὶ*) or jurors in the several courts into which it was divided. Most matters of importance, after passing the assembly, had to undergo a scrutiny in a court of the *Heliaea*: the magistrates laid these matters before the courts of the *Heliaea*, after having previously considered them. The *Heliasts* were still members of the assembly, and they were not, like the senators, required to give an account of their conduct in office.

The court of *Areiopagus* (*Ares' Hill*), though not instituted by Solon, was invested by him with a greater degree of importance than it had previously enjoyed. Its members were those who had served the office of archon with credit. It took cognizance of the moral conduct of the citizens, of matters relating to religion and public worship; and it judged in cases of murder, and of false witness and bribery, etc. Solon evi-

* This word is of common origin with the Spartan *ἀλία*: both are derived from *ἀλέω*, *ἀλίζω*, *to assemble*.

dently intended it to be the great moral principle of the state, to stem the tide of corruption which he possibly foresaw.

To secure good public officers, Solôn ordained that each senator and magistrate, before he entered on his office, should be examined by the senate and a court of the *Heliaæa* as to his being a genuine citizen, of sufficient property, of perfect mind and body, whether he discharged his duties to the gods and his parents, paid his taxes, and had served in war. This was called the *Dokimasy* (*Δοκιμασία*), or scrutiny. During, and at the end of, his office, he was subject to another trial, the *Euthÿne* (*Εὐθύνη*), respecting the mode in which he exercised it.

CHAPTER VIII.

Time of the Tyrants.—Peisistratus and his Sons.—Harmodius and Aristogeitôn.—End of the Tyranny.—Legislation of Cleisthenes.—War of Sparta and Argos.

SOLÔN, having thus given the Athenians, not the best of possible constitutions, but, as he himself said, the best they could bear, resolved to quit his country for a time. Like *Lycurgus*, he made the senate and the people swear to make no alteration in the laws for the space of ten years, hoping that by that time they would have become perfectly inured to the new constitution, and have lost all desire of change. He then departed, and visited *Cyprus* and *Egypt*; thence repaired to *Ionía*; and finally, it is said, passed some time at the court of *Cræsus*, king of *Lydia*, at that time the resort of the curious and the ingenious among the Greeks*.

The laws of Solôn were, however, too just and equitable to give satisfaction to all parties. The lower orders had looked forward to a total abolition of debts, and a new division of the land, of which each should have a share; the *Eupatrids* did

* Herod. i. 29-33.

not consider the advantages secured to them a sufficient compensation for the surrender of their ancient privileges, and of so much of their property. The result of these discontents was the establishment of a *tyranny*. (Ol. 55.)

Here we must pause and go back a little, to show the origin and true nature of the *tyrannies* of these early times.

The word *tyrant* (τύραννος) originally signified merely *ruler**, and had no bad meaning attached to it. A tyrant was generally the head of the popular party in the struggle against the aristocracy, to whom the sole authority was yielded when the victory had been achieved. Though there were tyrants in various parts of Greece and the colonies, during the period (Ol. 26–50.) which may be named the Time of the Tyrants, they were chiefly to be found in the Dorian states; for here the rule of the nobles, being founded on conquest, was most galling and oppressive.

The first tyrant of whom we hear was Orthagoras of Sicyôn† (Ol. 26.), whose family held the tyranny for a century because they respected the laws and governed with mildness and equity. Orthagoras, whom the Dorian aristocrats called a cook, belonged to the Ægialians, an Achæan tribe, which enjoyed an equality of rights with the three Dorian tribes in Sicyôn. His son or grandson Myrôn was victor in the chariot-race at Olympia (Ol. 33.), where he built a treasury, lined with Tartessian brass, and having Doric and Ionic columns. Cleisthenes, the last of the family, was distinguished in war; he commanded, in conjunction with Eurylochus, the Thessalian Aleuad, the army of the Amphictyons in the Crissæan war, and he was at constant enmity with the Argives his Dorian neighbours. Out of spite to them he suppressed the worship of the Argive hero-king Adrastus at Sicyôn, and forbade the rhapsodists to recite the Homeric poems, because they con-

* It is perhaps derived from τῦρος, a castle, or it may be the same with κοίρανος, κύριος, from κάρα head. Saran is 'a lord' in Hebrew.

† Arist. Pol. v. 9. Goettling. We are told that Sicyôn was the oldest monarchy in Greece; a thing of which we have no proof, and which perhaps owes its origin to the fact in the text.

tained the praises of Argos, or rather of the aristocratic principle*. He attempted to destroy the Dorian principle completely, by forcing the Dorian tribes to cultivate the land like the rest of the people. Cleisthenes was, like Myrôn, a victor in the public games, and he lived in great magnificence.

This prince had an only daughter named Agariste, whom he wished to see married to the best of the Greeks; for this purpose, when he won the prize at Olympia (Ol. 49, 1.), he caused proclamation to be made, inviting those who deemed themselves worthy to be his son-in-law to repair to Sicyôn within sixty days. The noblest youths of Greece and the Italian colonies appeared at his residence; and after having detained them a year, making every trial of them, he bestowed the hand of Agariste on Megacles, the son of Alcmaëôn the Athenian†. Cleisthenes appears to have had no son, and the tyranny expired with him.

At Corinth the Heracleid family of the Bacchiads had converted the government into an oligarchy, by confining all public offices to themselves. They were therefore hated, and Cypselus, a man not of Doric origin, but related to them on the mother's side, contrived, by placing himself at the head of the lower orders, to eject them from Corinth‡. He thus (Ol. 30.) became tyrant: his rule was, like that of the tyrants of Sicyôn, mild and just; he had no guards, he treated the people with great consideration, adorned the city with stately buildings, and founded colonies abroad. After a peaceful reign of thirty years he left his power to his son Periander.

Periander ruled at first with still greater mildness than his father. His sway however gradually became more rigorous; he surrounded himself with guards; he forbade the use of the public meals, and in everything sought to root out the Dorian principle. He was a rigid guardian of the public morals, was brave in war and wise in council, and had a taste for elegance and splendour. He maintained an intimacy with the monarchs of Lydia and Egypt, and like his father planted colonies along the coast of Illyria. Periander was succeeded by his son Psam-

* Herod. v. 67.

† *Id.* vi. 126-130.

‡ *Id.* v. 92.

mitichus, with whom the tyranny ended (Ol. 49, 3.), after a duration of about seventy-four years*.

Procles, tyrant of Epidaurus and Ægina, was father-in-law to Periander; and Megara was ruled at this time by Theagenes, whose daughter was married to the Athenian Cylôn. Theagenes had attained to power, like the others, by heading the people against the aristocracy, and like them he gratified the people by raising works of utility and ornament. After the failure of Cylôn at Athens, Theagenes was driven from Megara, and a wild democracy established†.

We thus see that Argos and Sparta alone, of the Dorian states, did not fall under the rule of tyrants. The tyranny in Greece was in fact a struggle against the rigid Dorian principle; the time during which the Tyrants ruled was one of rapid advance in the career of improvement; they were all friends of the arts, and maintained relations with distant and more cultivated regions, and hence luxury and a taste for elegance were diffused throughout Hellas. When we consider that most of the Grecian colonies in Asia and Italy were at this time ruled by tyrants, and that they kept up a close connexion and intercourse with each other; and see, as we presently shall, the relations of the Ionians with the East, we may discern the progress of refinement, and mark its influence in Greece.

The aristocratic Spartans were the declared foes of the tyrants, and they are said to have overthrown several of them. The people, in most places oppressed by the nobles, and taught by poetry the mildness of the regal rule in old times, looked forward with hope to the establishment of a tyranny in their cities.

We are now to witness the establishment of this form of dominion in Attica‡.

The parties into which the people of Attica were divided, when Solôn undertook the regulation of the state, were named, the Pedieans (Πεδιᾶναι), the Paralians (Πάραλοι), and the Hy-

* Herod. *ut supra*. Arist. *ut supra*.

† Arist. Pol. v. 4; Rhet. i. 2; Plut. Q. G. 18.

‡ Herod. i. 59-64.

peracrians (ὑπεράκριοι). Of these, the first, the people of the interior or plain country, favoured the old aristocratic system; the Paralians, or people of the coast round by Cape Sunion*, were for a medium; the Hyperacrians, or people of Parnês and the hills to the north, were for a democracy†.

The Pedieans were headed by a nobleman named Lycurgus; the Paralians by Megacles the son-in-law of Cleisthenes of Sicyôn; Peisistratus, a man descended from the Codrids and related to Solôn, placed himself at the head of the Hyperacrians, who were mostly Thetes. He trod the usual path by which the demagogue rises to power, exaggerating the evils to which the people are subject, and representing himself as the only person anxious to alleviate them. Noble birth is always of weight with the people; Peisistratus had moreover distinguished himself in the war against the Megarians, and taken their port of Nisæa. Not content with these advantages, he had, it is said, recourse to a very disgraceful stratagem; one day he gave himself and his mules several wounds, and in that condition drove into the market and told the people that he had barely escaped with life from his and their enemies, who had fallen on him as he was going into the country. The people, to protect their benefactor, assigned him a guard of clubmen to attend him wherever he went. He soon then made himself master of the Acropolis and absolute ruler of the city, but he governed with justice, and did not disturb the existing laws.

The rival factions soon combined and drove him from the city; but ere long Megacles being worsted in a contest with his rival, sent to Peisistratus, offering to re-instate him in the tyranny if he would engage to espouse his daughter. This offer was readily accepted, and Peisistratus returned to Athens. On this occasion, it is said, his entrance into the city was pre-

* Thuc. ii. 55.

† Plut. Solôn, 13. As the chief scene of contest between the parties was the city of Athens, and the strength of the Hyperacrian party, as will appear, lay there, these are probably to be taken as mere party denominations derived from places, like Ghibellines, Girondists, and such like.

ceded by a woman of lofty stature, habited like the goddess Pallas-Athene, in full armour, and standing in a chariot; and heralds going before cried to the Athenians to receive Peisistratus, whom the goddess herself was conducting to her Acropolis*.

Megacles, finding that Peisistratus did not act as he should to his daughter, drove him away again. He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained ten years, collecting the means of recovering the tyranny. The Thebans and others sent him money; Lygdamis, who aspired to the tyranny in his native isle of Naxos, brought men and money; hired troops came from Argos, and in the eleventh year he passed over and encamped at Marathôn. His friends from the city and country flocked to him. His enemies advanced to engage him, but falling on them by surprise he gave them a defeat, and entered Athens for the third time. The Alcæonids and some other families left the country: he obliged such as remained to give their children as hostages, whom he placed in Naxos, which he had reduced under the dominion of his friend Lygdamis. The wealth which he derived from his estates in Eubœa, and from his mines on the Strymôn in Thrace, enabled him to gratify the people with gifts, and to adorn the city. During the ten years he now ruled Athens his sway was mild, and he left his dominion to his sons Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thesalus. (Ol. 63, 1.)

These princes ruled with still greater lenity than their father had done. They reduced the land-tax, which he had imposed, from a tenth to a twentieth; they were easy of access to all, and they sought to diffuse knowledge among the people. But an act of private revenge altered the entire face of things in Athens†.

* Herodotus wonders at the folly of this; he supposes the people took her for the goddess herself, but it was probably intended and understood to be nothing more than a symbolic action; it may, however, have been expected that fame would, as usual, magnify it in the ears of the country-people. Perhaps as the name of the woman was Phylê (*Size*), the whole may be only a fiction.

† Thucyd. vi. 54-59.

There was an Athenian of moderate fortune named Aristogeitôn, who, according to the custom in Greece, had selected as the object of his affection a beautiful youth named Harmodius, of the same rank in life as himself. Hipparchus was taken with the beauty of Harmodius, but the youth rejected his advances. Aristogeitôn, however, resolved to be avenged; and as Hipparchus took an opportunity of insulting Harmodius, by preventing his sister from bearing a part in a religious procession, that youth readily entered into the project of his friend. Others actuated by various causes engaged in their plans, and it was agreed to fall on and murder the tyrants at the festival of the Panathenæa, when the persons who formed the *pomp* or procession being clad in armour, they might accomplish their design the more easily.

On the day of the feast Hippias marshaled the procession in the Cerameicus outside of the city. Harmodius and his friend were ready with their daggers, but seeing one of the conspirators talking familiarly with him, they feared that they were betrayed, and being resolved that Hipparchus should not escape, they went back into the city, and meeting him at the place named the Leocorion fell on and slew him. His guards despatched Harmodius on the spot; Aristogeitôn escaped for the moment, but he was slain after a stout resistance. When Hippias heard what had happened, he ordered those who were to form the *pomp* to retire to a certain spot without arms. He then had them searched, and as they were to go in procession bearing only spear and shield, he knew that all who had daggers were in the conspiracy, and dealt with them accordingly. (Ol. 66, 3.)

The conduct of Hippias now changed, he became suspicious and cruel, he put several citizens to death, and to strengthen himself by foreign connexions he gave his daughter in marriage to the son of the tyrant of Lampsacus who was in great favour at the court of Persia.

Meantime the rigorous measures which Hippias pursued augmented the number of the discontented; and the foes of his family, the Alcmaeonids, were steadily on the watch to over-

turn his power. This family, which was one of the most wealthy in Greece, had fixed themselves in a strong position at a place named Leipsydriou, on the southern declivity of Mount Parnês; but they did not feel themselves sufficiently strong to attack the tyrant. Just at this time the Amphiclyons proposed to rebuild the temple at Delphi: the Alcmaeonids got the contract, and though they were only bound to build it of an inferior kind of stone, they, at their own expense, fronted it with Parian marble. They moreover, it is said, gained the Pythia by presents, and whenever the Spartans came to consult the oracle, she enjoined them to give liberty to Athens. Moved by these repeated injunctions of the god, the Spartans collected an army, chiefly of mercenaries, and putting it under the command of a Spartan named Anchimolius, sent it by sea to Attica, where it landed at Phalêron, close by Athens. Hippias had applied to his allies in Thessaly for aid, and a body of one thousand Thessalian horse was now arrived; these fell on and routed the invaders, and the Spartan leader himself was among the slain*.

The Spartans collected another large army, and sent it under the command of Cleomenes, one of their kings, overland to Attica. The Thessalian horse who came to oppose them were defeated and went home. Cleomenes marched to Athens, and being joined by those who were ill-affected to the Peisistratids, besieged them in the Pelasgian wall which surrounded the Acropolis. As they had abundance of provisions, and the Spartans knew little of sieges, Cleomenes was about to lead home his army, when a lucky chance put him in possession of their children whom they were sending out of the country. Hippias, to recover his children, agreed to evacuate Attica within five days. He retired to Sigeion (Sigêum) in the Troas, on the coast of Asia, and the tyranny thus ended after a duration of thirty-six years†. (Ol. 67, 3.).

The Alcmaeonids and Cleomenes, we may thus see, were in reality those who freed Athens, and never was fame more un-

* Herod. v. 62, 63.

† *Id.* v. 64, 65.

deserved than that which has been bestowed on Harmodius and Aristogeitôn. But time is sure to do justice to all.

The tyranny was now ended, but a struggle still remained between the aristocratic and the democratic principles. The advocates of the former were headed by a man of noble birth named Isagoras, the friend of Cleomenes. Cleisthenes, the son of Megacles, the Alcæonid, his rival for power, either from revenge*, love of justice, or family principle,—for he was grandson of the tyrant of Sicyôn,—took the popular side, and when archon made a great change in the constitution. Isagoras applied to Cleomenes, and a herald came from Sparta requiring the expulsion of the *piacular* (ἐναγέας), that is, those on whom the guilt of the murder of the Cylonians lay. Cleisthenes, as an Alcæonid, was forced to retire; and Cleomenes coming to Athens, expelled seven hundred persons whom Isagoras pointed out as favourable to the new constitution, dissolved the senate, and put the government into the hands of three hundred of the partizans of Isagoras. The people however rose; Cleomenes, Isagoras, and their friends sought refuge on the Acropolis, whence after a siege of two days Isagoras and the Lacedæmonians were allowed to depart; the remainder were put to death. Cleisthenes and the seven hundred were immediately recalled, and, a war with Sparta being apprehended, envoys were sent to the Persian governor of Lydia to ask his aid. He offered assistance on condition of the Athenians giving earth and water, that is becoming vassals, to the Persian king. The envoys assented to these degrading terms, but they were severely reprimanded when they returned home†. (Ol. 68, 1.‡)

* This was his motive in Niebuhr's opinion. "Cleisthenes, one of the nobles," says he, "from a grudge against his own order, by transforming the tribes levelled the distinctions of ranks, and introduced an equality which led to a frantic democracy; Athens being unaccountably preserved by fortune from falling under the dominion of tyrants." Hist. of Rome, i. 477. It is the fate, we believe, of every free state in its transition to democracy to have its Cleisthenes, members of the aristocracy, who, to gratify their spleen, pride, vanity, avarice, or other mean passions, become ready and active instruments in destroying the influence and power of their order in the state.

† Herod. v. 66, 70-73. ‡ In this year royalty was abolished at Rome.

Cleomenes, meantime, bent on revenge, resolved to establish a tyranny in the person of Isagoras, and having assembled an army of the Peloponnesian confederates, he led them into Attica; the Thebans and the Chalcidians of Eubœa invaded, in concert with him, the parts of Attica nearest to them. The Athenians advanced to oppose the Peloponnesians, who were now in the plain of Eleusis, but discord had arisen among them; the Corinthians, perceiving Cleomenes' real object, retired; his colleague Demarâtus opposed his design, the rest of the confederates broke up and went home. The Athenians thus freed from the Peloponnesians turned their arms against the Chalcidians. They defeated at the Eurîpus the Thebans, who were coming to their aid, passed the same day over to Eubœa, and overcame the Chalcidians, and took from their wealthy men (*ἱπποβόται*) four thousand lots of land for colonists. The Thebans now, in obedience to the oracle, looked for aid to the Æginetans, who, having an old ground of quarrel with the Athenians, made descents on and ravaged the sea-coast of Attica*.

Ægina, we must observe, was at this time a state of great importance in Greece. Its favourable situation in the Saronic gulf made its people, like the Phœnicians of old times and the Hydraots of the present day, turn their thoughts to trade and navigation. We are told that even in the second century before the Olympiads began, the merchants of Ægina, being excluded by the jealousy of their neighbours from access to the parts of Arcadia nearest to them, used to sail round to Cyllene in Elis, and putting their goods on wagons convey them into the heart of Arcadia†. The population, crowded on their little isle of only two hundred stadia in circuit, is said to have been enormous; the slaves alone being reckoned at forty-seven myriads!‡. Its trade at this time extended to the Euxine and to all points of the Mediterranean. But its power, like that of all states without agriculture, was but transient.

* Herod. v. 74-80.

† Paus. viii. 5, 8.

‡ Athenæus vi. 20, from Aristotle's Polity of the Æginetans. A myriad is 10,000: the number would therefore seem to be a gross exaggeration. Boeckh, however (Pub. Econ. i. 55.), sees nothing incredible in it.

The Spartans, seeing the successes of the Athenians, began to fear that their power might increase too rapidly, and that they might in time become their rivals, and they felt that they had erred in expelling Hippias. They therefore sent for him with the design of restoring him. Having assembled the deputies of the confederates, they declared that, deceived by false oracles, they had been led to act wrong and expel their friends, but that now they wished to amend their error. Then Sosicles the Corinthian deputy rose, and drawing a highly coloured picture of the evil deeds of the Cypselids in his native city, declared that the Corinthians would have no hand in the setting-up of a tyranny. The other deputies cried out to the same effect, and the Spartans were obliged to give up their project and dismiss Hippias, who returned to Asia, placing all his hopes now in the Persian power*.

Before we quit Athens we will take a slight view of the changes made in the constitution by Cleisthenes.

The Solonian constitution was, as we have seen, in its substance aristocratic; the new one tended much more to democracy. To effect the change it was necessary to break up the existing societies and relations in the state. Accordingly, Cleisthenes divided the people into *ten* instead of *four* tribes; the *phratries* and *houses* were allowed to remain, but their connexion with the *phyles* ceased. The phyles were divided into *demes* (δημοί); over each phyle was its Phylarch; over each deme its Demarch. The senate was increased to five hundred members, fifty from each phyle. The number of public officers was in general augmented; ten, that of the phyles, becoming the prevailing number. The archontate was still confined to the Pentacosio-medimnians; but the archons were now, like the rest, appointed by lot.

The *ostracism*† is ascribed to Cleisthenes. It was designed as a safeguard against tyranny, but it became the mere instrument of popular envy and party-spirit. Any citizen, whose continuance in Attica a majority of six thousand votes pro-

* Herod. v. 90-94.

† So called from ὄστρακον a *potsherd*, with which the votes were given.

nounced to be dangerous to the state was *ostracised*, and obliged to quit the country for ten years.

We are now to leave Greece for a time, but ere we depart we must attend to the progress of hostilities between Sparta and Argos.

The Spartans had gradually deprived the Argives of the whole coast of the Myrtoan sea. The district of Thyrea, on the confines of Laconia, being ravaged by the Spartans (Ol. 59, 3.), the Argives came in arms to repel them. As the right to the possession of Thyrea was a subject of dispute between the two nations, it was now agreed to select three hundred men on each side to fight on the part of their respective countries; and the disputed district to be the property of those whose champions were victorious. The armies retired, and the six hundred champions fought till all were slain but three, two Argives and one Spartan. It was now night, and the Argives ran home with the news of their victory; but the Spartan, whose name was Othryades, stripped the bodies of the slain Argives, and having carried their arms to his camp, remained there. Next morning the two armies returned to the spot. The Argives claimed the victory, because a greater number of their men had survived; the Spartans, because their champion had kept the field. From words they proceeded to arms, and the Lacedæmonians were victorious. Othryades, ashamed to have survived his companions, slew himself after the battle*.

Some years afterwards (Ol. 64, 1.) Cleomenes the Spartan king, being told by the oracle that he should take Argos, led an army to the banks of the Erasinus. The sacrifices, previous to crossing, not proving favourable, he returned to Thyrea, and passed over by sea to Nauplia and Tiryns. The Argives came and took their station opposite him at Tiryns. As an oracle menaced them with defeat by stratagem, they adopted the expedient of doing everything they heard the herald proclaiming to the Lacedæmonians. Cleomenes, discovering this, directed his men when they heard the herald give the word for breakfast, to seize their arms and advance

* Herod. i. 82.

against the enemy. The Argives, being thus attacked when at their meal, were routed with great loss, and the survivors fled to the sacred grove of the hero Argos. Cleomenes, who had learned their names from deserters, sent in a herald inviting them to come out, saying that he had received the usual ransom of two minas each. About fifty had come out as he summoned them by name, and had been put to death, when one of those in the grove climbed a tree and saw their fate. As no more would leave it, Cleomenes made the Helots pile wood round the grove, and setting fire to the wood he burned the grove and all the Argives who were in it. While it was burning he asked one of the deserters to what god it belonged: on being told to Argos, he cried out that the god had deceived him, and without attacking the town, now void of defenders, he led his army back to Sparta*.

Not less than six thousand Dorian Argives, it is said, perished on this occasion, and the Dorians were so enfeebled by it, that the Gymnesians, as the serfs (answering to the Helots) were called at Argos, were enabled to seize the government, which they held till the sons of the slaughtered Dorians were grown up, who drove them to Tiryns, and after an obstinate contest succeeded in reducing or expelling them†.

CHAPTER IX.‡

Kingdom of Lydia.—Persia.—Invasion of Scythia by Darius.—Revolt of the Asiatic Greeks.

Ol. 55, 1-72, 1. B.C. 560-492.

THE expulsion of the Peisistratids gave occasion to the political relations between Greece and the East, which have so much influence on the future Grecian history.

* Herod. vi. 76-80.

† *Id.* vi. 83. vii. 148. Arist. Pol. v. 2.

‡ Herod. i.-vi.

The Grecian colonies on the coast of Asia early rose to wealth by means of trade and manufactures. Though we have not the means of tracing their commerce, we know that it was considerable with the mother-country, with Italy, and at length Spain, with Phœnicia and the interior of Asia, whence the productions of India passed to Greece. The Milesians, who had fine woollen manufactures, extended their commerce to the Euxine, on all sides of which they founded factories, and exchanged their manufactures and other goods with the Scythians and the neighbouring people, for slaves, wool, raw hides, bees-wax, flax, hemp, pitch, etc. There is even reason to suppose that by means of caravans their traders bartered their wares not far from the confines of China*.

The facility with which the Greeks formed their first establishments on the coast of Asia leads to the supposition that there was no extensive monarchy in the vicinity at that time. But while they were advancing in wealth and prosperity, a powerful monarchy formed itself in Lydia, of which the capital was Sardes, a city at the foot of Mount Tmôlus, about four hundred stadia from the sea. Historians tell of three dynasties of kings of Lydia; the Atyads, named from their god Atys; the Heracleids, or rather Sandonids, from a god or hero Sândôn, whom the Greeks identified with their own Hercules; the Mermnads, the origin of whose name is doubtful†. Of these the first two are mythic and semimythic, the third belongs to history.

Gyges, the first of this dynasty (Ol. 16.), turned his arms against the Ionian cities on the coast. During a century and a half the efforts of the Lydian monarchs to reduce these states were unavailing. At length (Ol. 55.), the celebrated Cræsus mounted the throne of Lydia, and he made all Asia this side of the river Halys (Lycia and Cilicia excepted) acknowledge his dominion‡. The Æolian, Ionian, and Dorian cities of the

* Völcker (*Myth. Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, ch. viii.) traces the route to the foot of the Altai Mountains.

† Herod. i. 7.

‡ The Roman king Servius Tullius was the contemporary of Cræsus.

coast all paid him tribute ; but according to the usual rule of Eastern conquerors, he meddled not with their political institutions, and they might deem themselves fortunate in being insured against war by the payment of an annual sum of money. Cræsus, moreover, cultivated the friendship of the European Greeks. The Lydian monarchs, from the time of Gyges, had been benefactors of the Delphic oracle, but the offerings of Cræsus far exceeded in number and value those of his predecessors. The splendid court of Sardes was the resort of the sages and the nobles of Greece ; and the felicity of the king of Lydia seemed complete, when a storm from the East burst over his realm and levelled all his glories*.

In the country east and south of the Caspian sea a powerful and civilised empire had long existed. The people named the Medes had been for some time at the head of it ; but in the time of Cræsus king of Lydia, the Persians who dwelt, subject to the Medes, partly stationary, partly nomadic in the mountains bordering on the Persian gulf, rose in arms under their native prince Cyrus, and wrested the supreme power from the hands of the Medes. The change was little more than a change of dynasty† ; but, as is usually the case, it was productive of an increase of martial energy. The river Halys had been the boundary between Median and Lydian dominion : there had moreover been affinity between the Lydian and Median monarchs ; a war between Cyrus and Cræsus therefore naturally followed.

Cræsus having assembled an army crossed the Halys and wasted the country beyond it. Cyrus hastened to engage him. The armies encountered in the Pterian plain‡, south of Si-

* Herod. i. 26–29. The remainder of this writer's First Book contains the history of Cræsus and Cyrus.

† There is, perhaps, too much importance given to this event in the history of the world. It is probable that the change was not in reality much greater than what has occurred almost in our own days in Persia. The Kajers, who now govern there, are a Turkish tribe who won the throne from the Zends, a native Persian tribe.

‡ On this plain Pompeius defeated Mithridâtes ; Timoor Bayazeed ; and

nôpe, and victory remained with neither. Crœsus, finding his troops inferior in number to those of the Persian monarch, led them back to Sardes. He dismissed the Greeks and other strangers who were in his service, and wrote pressing letters to the kings of Babylôn and Egypt, and to the Lacedæmonians, with all of whom he was in alliance, urging them to send him troops against the ensuing spring, when he intended again to take the field. But Cyrus, on learning that Crœsus had dismissed his army, resolved to push on for Sardes and take him unprepared. He soon appeared before that city. Crœsus led his valiant Lydians out against him: but as the Lydian troops were mostly all horse, Cyrus had recourse to the stratagem of putting in the front of his army the camels, the sight and smell of which the Lydian horses could not endure. They became unmanageable; the riders dismounted and fought bravely, but were obliged to yield to numbers. Crœsus was besieged in his capital and forced to surrender, and the Lydian empire merged in that of Persia. (Ol. 58, 3.)

Cyrus had during the war endeavoured without success to alienate the Ionians from Crœsus. They and the Æolians now sent ambassadors praying to be received to submission on the same terms as those on which they had obeyed the Lydian monarch; but the Milesians alone found favour, the rest had to prepare for war. They repaired the walls of their towns and sent to Sparta for aid. Aid, however, was refused; but Cyrus, being called away by the war with Babylôn, neglected them for the present. Three years afterwards (Ol. 59, 2.), Harpagus, who had saved Cyrus in his infancy from his grandfather Astyages, came as governor of Lydia. He instantly prepared to reduce the cities of the coast. Town after town submitted; the Teians abandoned theirs and retired to Abdêra in Thrace; the Phocæans, getting on shipboard, and vowing never to return, sailed for Corsica, and being there harassed by the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, they went to

an army of Crusaders was annihilated on it by the Turks in the time of the first Crusade.

Rhegion in Italy, and at length founded Massalia (*Marseilles*) on the coast of Gaul.

The Grecian colonies thus became a part of the Persian empire. Cyrus meantime had taken Babylôn; but not long afterwards he was defeated and slain by the Massagetans, a Turkish tribe who dwelt north of Persia. His son and successor Cambyses invaded and conquered Egypt. On his death the throne was usurped by a Magian, or priest of the fire-religion of Persia, who personated the late monarch's brother; but a conspiracy deprived him of life, and the throne was occupied (Ol. 64, 4.) by Darius son of Hystaspes, a Persian of noble birth. The dominions of Darius extended from the river Indus to the Mediterranean, from the confines of Scythia to those of Æthiopia*.

An energetic prince like Darius at the head of a powerful empire could not be expected to remain at rest. As Asia now offered no enemy, he resolved to lead an army into Scythia and teach the nomades who roamed its plains to respect the power of the lord of Asia. Under the direction of a Samian named Mandrocles, a bridge of boats was constructed by the Greeks across the Bosphorus, over which Darius led his army of seventy myriads of men. The Greeks then sailed away to the Ister (*Danube*), near the mouth of which they made another bridge, while the Persian army marched through Thrace, crossed Mount Hæmus, and came to the banks of that river. Leaving the Greeks to take care of the bridge, Darius entered Scythia (southern Russia); but the Scythians would give no opportunity for fighting, and want of supplies at length forced the Persian monarch to make a rapid retreat to the Ister. The Scythians had meantime urged the Greeks to seize the opportunity now presented of regaining their independence, by breaking up the bridge and leaving the Persian army to perish. In the council held by the chiefs, that is, the tyrants of the subject Greek cities, Miltiades, an Athenian, who was tyrant of the Chersonese, strongly exhorted them to follow the

* It was during the reign of Darius (Ol. 68, 1.) that the Romans expelled the Tarquins and abolished royalty.

advice of the Scythians; but Histiaëus of Miletus reminding them that if the Persian yoke was thrown off, their own would not long be submitted to, it was resolved to remain faithful to the king. To deceive the Scythians, however, they began to loosen the bridge at the further side of the river.

It was night when the Persian army reached the Ister, and finding the bridge loosened they were in consternation. An Egyptian who had a powerful voice stood by Darius' command on the side of the river and called Histiaëus the Milesian. Histiaëus soon appeared, the bridge was speedily put together again, and the Persians passed safely over. Darius marched his army to Sestos on the Hellespont, whence he passed over to Asia, leaving a part of his troops with one of his generals named Megabâzus in Thrace to subdue the remainder of that country. He proceeded thence to Sardes, where he stayed some time.

Megabazus speedily reduced all Thrace as far as the confines of Macedonia, the king of which country also acknowledged himself the vassal of Persia. He then proceeded to Sardes, where he remonstrated with Darius on the impolicy of which he had been guilty, in giving Histiaëus, as a reward for his services, permission to build a town on the river Strymôn in Thrace*, where there were mines of gold and plenty of timber for ship-building; so that by putting himself at the head of the Greeks and the people of the country, he could raise a rebellion whenever he pleased. Darius saw the force of what Megabazus said, and by his advice sent for Histiaëus, and pretending that his counsel and presence were indispensable to him, took him with him when he was returning to Susa the Persian capital.

Histiaëus left the government of Miletus to his son-in-law Aristagoras. Some time afterwards (Ol. 69, 4.), in consequence of the contest between the aristocratic and democratic principles which prevailed there as well as everywhere else at this time, some of the nobility were expelled from the isle of

* The site of the future Amphipolis. Thuc. iv. 102.

Naxos. Being guest-friends* (*ξένοι*) of Histæus, they came to Miletus seeking aid. Aristagoras said that his own power was not adequate to restore them, but offered to apply to Artaphernes, king Darius' brother, who was at Sardes, in their behalf. To the Persian he represented how easily he might make himself master of Naxos, and then of the other Cyclades, and finally of the rich isle of Eubœa, under the pretext of restoring these exiles. Artaphernes approved, the consent of the king was obtained, and a fleet of two hundred triremes with troops put to sea under the command of a Persian named Megabâtes. They sailed as if for the Hellespont, and stopped at Chios, intending to run for Naxos with the north wind. While there Megabates punished for neglect of duty one of the captains who was a friend of Aristagoras. The Milesian insulted Megabates, who in revenge sent secretly to inform the Naxians of their danger. As soon as the Naxians learned that their isle was to be attacked, they collected all their property from the country into their town, and the Persian army, after besieging them for four months, was obliged to retire for want of supplies.

Aristagoras, fearing the ill consequences of this failure to himself, began now to meditate a revolt. Just at this time, too, came a message from Histæus recommending this course to him; for, weary of his abode at Susa, the Milesian prince thought his only chance of escape was to raise a rebellion on the coast which he might be sent to quell. Fearing to write, he took a trusty slave, and shaving off the hair of his head pricked on the skin what he wished to say; then having kept him till the hair was grown, he sent him to Miletus, telling him to desire Aristagoras to shave off his hair and look at the skin. This decided Aristagoras; he held a council of the principal Milesians, and all declared for revolt but Hecataeus the historian, who knew the extent and the strength of the Persian empire far better than they. Finding them however bent on it, he advised them to take the treasures which Cræsus had de-

* We use this compound, as no single word in our language will express the relation of mutual friendship and hospitality indicated by it.

dedicated at the temple of Branchidæ, and to endeavour to become masters at sea. This counsel too was rejected. The greater part of the commanders of the ships which had been at Naxos were gained over. To win the people, Aristagoras laid down his own tyranny, and seizing the other tyrants who were on board the ships, sent them prisoners to their respective towns, and with one exception the people let them go free and uninjured,—a proof that their rule had not been very oppressive.

Some powerful ally being necessary, Aristagoras repaired in person to Lacedæmon (Ol. 70, 1.), taking with him money and a brass plate on which was cut a map of the world,—probably the work of Hecatæus. He addressed himself to king Cleomenes, showing him on the map the different nations of Asia, expatiating on their wealth, and assuring him that with ease he might reach Susa and win the Persian empire. Cleomenes promised to give him his answer on the third day. When that day came he asked him how many days' journey it was from the coast to Susa: the Milesian incautiously replied three months. Cleomenes, appalled at such a distance, ordered him to quit Sparta by sunset, and left him. Aristagoras taking a branch of olive in his hand followed him to his house as a suppliant: he found him alone with his little daughter Gorgo, a child of eight or nine years. He begged him to send the child away, but Cleomenes bade him to say what he wished without heeding her. Aristagoras then offered him ten talents if he would do as he desired: he rose gradually to fifty, when the child cried out, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you if you do not go away!" Cleomenes left the room, and the baffled Milesian had to depart from Sparta without delay.

He thence proceeded to Athens, now revelling in her recovered liberty, and drew there to the people the same brilliant picture of Asiatic dominion which he had set before the Spartan king, reminding them at the same time that the Milesians were their colonists. His words found ready acceptance, and it was decreed to send twenty ships to the aid of the Ionians. Aristagoras returned home, and sent to the people named

Pæonians, whom Megabazus had taken from their own country and placed in Phrygia, offering to convey them back to Europe. The love of home excited them: with their wives and children they came down to the coast, and were passed over to Chios, thence to Lesbos, thence to Doriscus in Thrace, whence they proceeded overland home.

The Athenian fleet and five triremes from Eretria soon arrived at Miletus (Ol. 70, 2.), and being joined by the Milesians proceeded to Ephesus. Here the troops landed, and guided by the Ephesians crossed Mount Tmolus and took Sardes without opposition; Artaphernes and the few troops that were with him having retired to the citadel. The houses in Sardes were mostly built of reeds, with which such of them as were of brick were also roofed. A soldier chanced to set one of them on fire; the flames spread rapidly from house to house, the inhabitants retired to the market, through which the river Pactólus ran, and there stood on their defence. The Ionians, seeing their numbers, retired to Mount Tmolus, and in the night retreated to the coast. The Persians, who were on this side of the Halys, hastened to the aid of the Sardians, and pursuing the invaders came up with and defeated them at Ephesus. The Athenians went home, refusing to take any further part in the war. The Ionians having gone so far could not recede; they sailed to the Hellespont, reduced Byzantion and some other towns, then returning gained over the whole of Caria, and finally induced the isle of Cyprus to join in the revolt.

Darius, when he heard of the revolt of the Ionians, sent for Histæus, and intimated his suspicion of his being concerned in exciting it. Histæus easily cleared himself in the king's mind, and assuring him that the want of his presence had been the true cause, persuaded him to let him go down to the coast, promising to return to Susa when he had re-established tranquillity.

Meantime, Artybius, a Persian general, having assembled an army in Cilicia, and being joined by the Phœnician fleet, passed over to Cyprus, in which the people of Amathûs alone

obeyed the king. Onesilus, the leader of the independent party, sent to the Ionians for aid. Their fleet soon appeared, and engaged and defeated that of the Phœnicians; but the Cypriotes, though Artybius fell by the hand of Onesilus, were overcome in the land-battle, and the whole island was again reduced beneath the yoke of Persia*. At the same time the other Persian generals reduced the cities on the Hellespont, and defeated the Carians and Milesians at Labranda; and Aristagoras, despairing of safety, retired to Myrcinus in Thrace, where he shortly afterwards fell in a battle against the people of the country. (Ol. 70, 4.)

The whole force of Persia in these parts was now turned against Miletus. A fleet of six hundred triremes came from Phœnicia, Cyprus, Cilicia, and Egypt, and a numerous army advanced against it by land. The Milesians resolved merely to defend their walls, and only to try the chance of a naval engagement. Miletus, Myûs, Erythræ, Priene, Teôs and Phocæa sent among them 123 ships, of which Miletus furnished 80; Chios sent 100, Lesbos 70, Samos 60; in all 353 triremes were assembled at the isle of Lade before the port of Miletus. The Persian leaders, fearing the number of the Greek ships, called together the expelled tyrants of the cities who were in their camp, and urged them to try to detach their former subjects from the confederacy. They therefore sent secretly, giving them terrific accounts of the evils that awaited them in case of defeat; but their efforts were in vain, the Ionians would not resign their liberty without at least a struggle.

Dionysius, who commanded one of the three triremes which Phocæa had furnished, promised the Ionians, if they would follow his directions, to render them superior to the enemy. They assented, and every day he made them get on board of their ships and put out to sea and exercise. They bore this

* Herodotus says that the defeat was caused in a great measure by the retreat of the Salaminian war-chariots. This is the last time we hear of these vehicles in Grecian warfare. They may, however, have belonged to Asiatic rather than Grecian warfare. See *Mythology of Greece and Italy*, p. 498, 2nd edit.

labour for seven days, but at length declaring that slavery to the Persians would be more tolerable than such hardship, they positively refused to go on board any more, and setting up tents in the isle lived there at their ease. The Samian leaders, it is said, seeing them acting thus, lent a willing ear to the representations of Æacus their former tyrant, and agreed to desert the Ionians. In the battle which ensued all the Samian ships but eleven turned and fled; the Lesbians, who were next, then followed their example, as also did some of the Ionians. The Chians fought bravely and lost most of their ships, the rest they ran ashore at Mycale; but as they were going home by land, they came by night near Ephesus, where the women were celebrating the feast of the Thesmophoria; the Ephesians, taking them for robbers, who had come to carry off the women, fell on them, and the brave Chians perished by their hands. Dionysius, knowing that his country would be enslaved, would not return. He made sail for Phœnicia, where he captured several merchant-vessels, and then going to Sicily exercised piracy against the Carthaginians and Etruscans, always sparing Greek vessels.

Miletus was now attacked by sea and by land. It was taken (Ol. 71, 3.) in the sixth year after its revolt, and its inhabitants were transplanted by king Darius to Ampe on the Tigris, at the head of the Erythræan sea or Persian gulf. Such of the Milesians as escaped joined a portion of the Samians who would not live under the tyranny of Æacus, and going to Sicily made themselves masters of Zancle. The whole of the revolted towns were reduced one after the other by the Persian arms, and the struggle for independence terminated.

We must now relate the fate of Histiaëus, the author of the revolt. On coming to Sardes and finding himself suspected by Artaphernes, he fled away by night and got over to Chios. He then tried to recover his former power in Miletus, but the people having tasted the sweets of liberty would not admit him, and he received a wound in the thigh in an attempt which he made on the town by night. He then went to Lesbos, where the people gave him eight triremes, with which he sailed

to Byzantion and captured the Ionian vessels coming from the Pontus. When he heard of the defeat of the Ionians, he made sail for Chios, and with the aid of the Lesbians reduced that isle. Immediately after he attacked the isle of Thasos, but hearing that the Phœnician fleet was reducing the coast of Ionia, he returned to the defence of Chios and Lesbos. His troops being in want of food, he led them over to the mainland to seize the corn on the plains of Mysia; but Harpagus, the Persian commander, fell upon and cut them to pieces, and Histiaëus himself was made a prisoner. He was brought to Sardes, where he was instantly put to death by Artaphernes, and his head was sent to Susa. Darius, mindful of his former services, gave it an honourable sepulture, and severely blamed those who had put him to death.

Artaphernes now (Ol. 71, 4.) regulated the tributes of the Greek cities*, but the amount was not raised. He also prohibited their making war on and plundering each other, as they had been in the habit of doing.

The following spring (Ol. 72, 1.†), Mardonius, the son of Gobryas, and nephew of king Darius, to one of whose daughters he was lately married, came down to the sea-coast with a large army. In Cilicia he got aboard of the fleet, leaving his army to proceed by land; and as he sailed along the coast of Ionia he re-established the democracies in the cities—probably with a view to attaching the people to the Persian monarchy. Having put the army across the Hellespont, he advanced, professing to be about to take vengeance on Eretria and Athens. He reduced the isle of Thasos and Macedonia; but his fleet being greatly shattered in doubling Mount Athôs, and his army having suffered and himself being wounded in a night-attack of the Thracian Bryges, he returned to Asia after having subdued that people.

* "Which," says Herodotus (vi. 42), "they *still* pay," *i. e.* toward the end of the Peloponnesian war.

† The year of the secession of the Roman Plebs to the Sacred Mount.

CHAPTER X.*

Invasion of Greece.—Battle of Marathon.—Aristeides and Themistocles.

Ol. 72, 2-72, 4. B.C. 491-489.

THE conquest of Greece was now become the favourite object of the Persian monarch's ambition. He was probably well instructed of the state of parties there, and expected that some states would be induced to yield a voluntary submission to his yoke. Accordingly, after the Persian fashion, he sent (Ol. 72, 2.) heralds demanding earth and water, which were given by some of the continental states, and by all the islands, particularly Ægina. The Athenians, who instantly suspected that the object of the Æginetans was to overcome them with Persian aid, sent to Sparta to complain of this their treachery to Greece. King Cleomenes forthwith passed over to Ægina to seize the guilty persons; but his colleague Demaratus had secretly furnished the Æginetans with an excuse for refusing compliance with his demands, and he retired, meditating vengeance on Demaratus, which he accomplished in the following manner.

Aristôn, the father of Demaratus, had by stratagem obtained for himself the beautiful wife of his friend Agetos. When her first child by him was born, a servant ran to announce it to him as he was sitting with the Ephors. Reckoning and finding that her ten months were not accomplished, he inconsiderately cried out, "Then it is not mine." No further notice, however, was taken at the time, and Demaratus succeeded him on the throne. But now Cleomenes incited Leotychides, of the same house with Demaratus, to call his legitimacy in question. The matter was, as usual, referred to the Delphian oracle, and Cleomenes induced one of the principal men at Delphi to use his influence with the priestess to procure a response such as he desired. Demaratus was accord-

* Herod. vi. 104-136.

ingly declared not to be of the blood of Hercules, and was deposed, and his place given to Leotychides. He became a private Spartan; but fired by an insult offered him by his successor, he left Lacedæmôn, and finding himself still persecuted by the Spartans, he passed over to Asia, where king Darius received him joyfully, and, according to the custom of Persia, gave him lands and towns for his support.

The two kings now went to Ægina, and caused ten of the principal people to be surrendered to them. These they gave to their enemies, the Athenians, to keep in safe custody. After the death of Cleomenes, the Æginetans accused Leotychides before the Spartans, and he was obliged to obtain the release of the prisoners from the Athenians.

The guilty conspiracy against Demaratus did not pass unpunished. It came to light; the Delphian was forced to fly; the priestess was deprived of her office; Cleomenes fled to Thessaly, and thence to Arcadia, where he sought to excite war against his country. The Spartans recalled him; but ere long he went mad, and having procured a knife while in confinement, he cut off his own flesh and died. Leotychides, having been sent with an army to Thessaly against the Aleuads, was caught in the act of taking bribes, and being accused at Sparta, and fearing a condemnation, he fled to Tegea, where he passed the remainder of his days.

The Persian monarch had now completed his preparations for the subjugation of Greece. A large army, under the command of Datis a Mede, and Artaphernes a Persian, son of the king's brother of the same name, was assembled in Cilicia. (Ol. 72, 3.) A fleet of six hundred triremes and a number of horse-transports, furnished by the maritime subject states, there took the troops on board. They sailed along the coast northwards to the isle of Samos; then crossing the Icarian sea, directed their course to the isle of Naxos, where they burned the town and the temples, and enslaved such of the inhabitants as they found, the greater part having fled to the mountains. On coming to Delos, and finding that the inhabitants had retired to Tenos, Datis sent to inform them that

they need not fear, as the king's command and his own feelings forbade him to injure the place "where the two gods were born*." He burned there three hundred talents of incense on the altar. Having received the submission and hostages of the Cyclad isles, the Persian commanders steered for Eubœa, where they landed, and forced the city of Carystus to submit. They then proceeded to Eretria, whose people, hearing of their approach, sent to the Athenians for aid. The four thousand colonists at Chalcis† were ordered to go to their assistance; but as they were coming they were informed by the principal man of the town that a large party of the Eretrians were for surrender, and he advised them to reserve themselves for the defence of their own country. They therefore retired, and passed over to Orôpus.

After a siege of seven days, Eretria was betrayed to the Persians; its temples were plundered and burnt, and its inhabitants reduced to slavery‡. By the advice of Hippias, who was with them, the Persians then passed over to Marathôn, on the coast of Attica, where a plain of some extent would permit their cavalry to act with advantage.

At Athens, meantime, all was prepared for a vigorous defence. The command was committed to the ten generals (one from each phyle) and the Polemarch Archôn. A swift courier, named Pheidippides, was sent to summon aid from Sparta; and on the second day, though the distance was more than nine hundred stadia, he reached that town. The Spartans readily promised their assistance, but it was only the ninth day of the month, and it was their custom never to march from

* Apollo and Artemis, whom he therefore regarded as the gods of the sun and moon.

† See page 72.

‡ Plato (Laws, iii. § 14, Menexenus, § 10. Bekk.) says that the Persians *dragged* (ἐσαγῆνευσαν) the island. Of this Herodotus says nothing, and it is not likely. The historian (vi. 31.) thus describes the process of *dragging*: the soldiers taking hands extended themselves in a line from sea to sea, and thus marched from one end of an island to the other, so that nothing could escape them, and the inhabitants were taken like wild beasts.

home but at the full of the moon. They therefore were reluctantly obliged to defer their departure for five days.

The Athenians meantime had advanced to Marathôn, about two hundred stadia from their city. They halted at the temple of Hercules, where they were joined by the whole military population of their faithful allies the Platæans: for this people, who dwelt at the foot of Cithærôn, in Bœotia, being hard pressed by their ambitious neighbours the Thebans, had (Ol. 65, 2.) offered king Cleomenes and the Lacedæmonians to put themselves under their protection; but they represented to them that, on account of the distance, they could not always come to their aid, and advised them to apply to the Athenians; and this they did, says Herodotus, not out of regard to the Athenians, but that they might be embroiled with the Thebans. The Platæans did as directed, and the friendship and fidelity between them and their patrons was most enduring and highly honourable to both parties.

Among the Athenian generals was Miltiades, who had been tyrant of the Athenian colony at the Chersonese, and, as we have seen, advised the Ionians to loosen the bridge on the Ister. To escape the vengeance of the Persians, he had fled back to Athens, where his family was of consequence, and resumed his rights of citizenship: his enemies there accused him of having held the tyranny, but the people acquitted him, and now had chosen him one of the ten generals. His knowledge of the Persians and their tactics and mode of fighting, had, of course, influenced them in their choice.

In the council of war which was held, the opinions were divided equally; Miltiades and four others being for engaging, the rest for delay. The casting vote lay with the polemarch Callimachus. Miltiades urged on him the danger of delay, as in such case there could be little doubt that dissension would break out, and a portion of the people *medise**, and that then their reduction under the yoke of Hippias would be inevitable.

* Μηδίζω. We use this verb and the substantive *medism* (μηδισμός) for the act of siding with the Persians. The Medes seem at this time to have been better known than the Persians.

Callimachus was convinced, and he gave his vote for immediate action. Aristides and the other generals who had voted on the same side, when their day of command (for they took it by turns) came, resigned it to Miltiades, who however would not engage till his own day was come.

On that day Miltiades drew up his forces in line of battle. The Polemarch, in virtue of his office, commanded the right wing, the Athenians extended thence in order of their phyles, and the Plataeans formed the left wing. To give the greater extent to his front, Miltiades diminished the number of ranks in the centre, while he increased those of the wings. The enemy was now also in battle array, the Persians and Sacians forming the centre. The distance between the armies was eight stadia. The sacrifices proving favourable, the Athenians advanced running, probably to give more force to their charge, or to escape the Persian arrows. The Persians, deeming them mad, received their charge, and broke and pursued the Greek centre; but the Greek wings were victorious, and instead of pursuing they turned, and engaged and defeated those who had broken their centre. The Barbarians fled to their ships, abandoning their camp, which became the prey of the victors, and seven of the ships also were taken*. On the side of the Persians six thousand four hundred men fell; the Athenians are said to have lost but one hundred and ninety-two: the polemarch Callimachus was among the slain. The Persians, having taken on board their Eretrian captives, whom they had left in a small island, sailed round Cape Sunion in the hope of surprising Athens; but when they came to the port of Phaléron near the city, they saw that the troops were prepared to meet them; for the Athenian commanders, suspecting their

* We have here an instance of the absurd exaggerations in which the later writers indulged. Herodotus (vi. 114.) relates that an Athenian named Cynægeirus, having laid hold of the stern of one of the ships, the Persians cut off his hand with an axe. Ephorus, or some other writer, who is followed by Justin (ii. 9.), to augment the marvel, added, that when his right hand was struck off he grasped the ship with his left, and that also being cut off he seized it with his teeth!

design, had led back all the phyles but one, which remained under Aristeides to guard the booty and prisoners*. The Persians thus baffled returned to Asia. The Eretrians were sent to Darius, who settled them at a place named Ardericca, in the land of the Cissians.

After the full moon two thousand Lacedæmonians came to Athens, having marched nine hundred stadia in three days. Finding the battle over, they went to Marathôn to look at the bodies of the Barbarians†, and then returned home praising the valour of the Athenians.

Contrary to the usual custom of the Athenians, those who fell at Marathôn were buried in a mound on the spot, and pillars were set up inscribed with their names and their phyles. Another mound contained the bodies of the Platæans and the slaves‡. Neither mound nor pillar marked the burial-place of the Persians. In after-times the Marathonians worshiped the slain as heroes, and with them a hero named Echetlæos; for it was said, that in the fight there appeared a man of rustic mien, armed with a plough, with which he did great scathe to the Barbarians. After the battle he was seen no more, and the oracle, being consulted, directed them to honour the hero Echetlæos. It was also believed in after-times that at night might be heard by wayfarers on the plain of Marathôn the neighing of the Persian war-steeds, and the clash and clang of the arms of warriors engaged in the fray; but no visible object met the eye of the astonished listener§.

It is possible that the details of this memorable battle may have fallen short of the expectations of the reader; but its

* Plutarch, Aristeides, 5.

† This was the general Greek name for all people but themselves. The Romans as well as the Egyptians and Persians were Barbarians in their view.

‡ Pausanias, i. 32, 3. The slaves, if any were there, were probably a part of the Platæan forces.

§ Paus. *ut sup.* The same is told of the plain of Munda in Spain, where Julius Cæsar defeated the younger Pompeius.—See Mendoza, *Guerra de Granada*, p. 320. At the present day the shouting and the blows of the warriors at Marathôn sound so loud in fancy's ear, that the shepherds abandon their flocks and seek shelter. See Turner's Tour in the Levant, i. p. 349.

importance must be estimated by its effects : it taught the Greeks their superiority in the field over the Orientals, and led to those victories which checked the westward progress of the Persian arms. The honest historian whom we have followed does not tell what the numbers were on each side ; the Latin biographer Cornelius Nepos and other late writers state that of the Athenians at nine thousand, of the Platæans at one thousand men—probably the true number. These were all hoplites, for Herodotus asserts that they had neither horse nor light troops. This biographer also gives details of the battle at variance with the narrative of Herodotus. He tells us that Miltiades drew up his army at the foot of the mountain, having its flanks, and apparently its front, protected by felled trees, where he sustained the charge of the Persians. Now, that the Athenians were the assailants can hardly be doubted, and we are not sure that trees fit for the purpose grew in that part of Attica, a country remarkably bare of timber. Details given by late writers must, we warn the reader, be always received with very great caution.

This important victory of Marathôn justly gained Miltiades great influence at Athens ; and when (Ol. 72, 4.) he asked the people to give him seventy triremes, with the necessary men and money, to go on an expedition which would be greatly for the advantage of the state, they granted them at once. It was probably his design to make the isles pay for their submission to the Medes ; private vengeance, it is said, made him sail first to Paros, where he laid siege to the town, demanding one hundred talents as the price of safety. Having wasted the country and besieged the town in vain during twenty-six days, he retired, and on his return to Athens popular indignation was high against him, and Xanthippus, the son of Ariphron, and others accused him capitally for the deception he had practised on the people. As he had had the misfortune to break his thigh during the siege of Paros, he was unable to defend himself ; but he was brought in his bed into the assembly, and his friends, by reminding the people of the eminent services he had done the state, caused the capital charge to be dismissed. He was condemned, however, to pay the usual

fine of fifty talents ; but he died shortly afterwards, and his son Cimôn paid the fine*.

It is usual to regard this conduct of the Athenians as an instance of flagrant ingratitude ; but before we condemn, we should be sure that we know all the circumstances of the case. Public men are seldom actuated by a pure and disinterested love of their country, and if on one occasion, in their pursuit of their own glory, they have chanced to render it some signal service, it surely is not reasonable to expect that this should procure indemnity for future transgressions. Public life, like private life, must be pure in its whole course, or praise and reward will be converted into blame and punishment.

In the case of Miltiades, we are to recollect that he had more at stake than any one else at Marathôn, for the Persians regarded him as a rebel and a traitor, and would have dealt with him accordingly. He certainly showed more military skill than some of his colleagues ; but in true patriotism he was perhaps exceeded by the Polemarch. There does not appear any strong party-virulence in the prosecution of him, which was conducted by one of the leading men at Athens ; he was in effect only treated like any other citizen†.

Two rival statesmen now appear on the scene at Athens, Aristeides the son of Lysimachus, and Themistocles the son of Neocles. The former, of noble birth and the intimate friend of Cleisthenes, moderate and disinterested in his character, leaned to the aristocratic principle ; his rival, of inferior birth (his mother being a foreigner), courted more the people : in integrity and moral dignity of character, he was as inferior to his rival as in birth ; but his brilliant qualities gained

* Plutarch (Cimôn, 4.) and Nepos (Milt., 7.) say that he was cast into prison, where he died ; Plato (Gorgias, § 153, Bekk.) says that the people voted to cast him into the pit named the Barathron to perish, and that the sentence would have been executed had it not been for the Prytanes, or presidents of the assembly. This last account is not very probable, and we doubt if the authority of those two careless biographers be sufficient to justify us in attributing to the Athenians (who were not a cruel people) the inhumanity of casting a man with a mortified limb into prison.

† The same political rivalry probably however prevailed between Miltiades and Xanthippus as between their sons Cimôn and Pericles.

the people, and his influence soon became considerable in the state.

Aristeides, who was styled the Just, directed his attention chiefly to the management of the finances, and he more than once was chosen archon. Themistocles sought the more showy station of military command. After the death of Miltiades, he obtained the command of a fleet, and he reduced the Cyclad isles to submission. While others fondly deemed that the victory at Marathôn had ended the projects of the Medes against Greece, he, as doubtless did many others, saw in it only the prelude to greater conflicts, for which it behoved Athens to prepare. Aware that her situation and character did not qualify her to be a land-power, he sought to turn the thoughts of the people to the augmentation of the navy. To speak of the distant dangers from Persia he knew would be idle, but the enmity to Ægina might, he saw, be turned to advantage. In the very year that Miltiades went against Paros while Aristeides was archon, he induced the people to consent to the produce of the silver mines of Laurion, which used to be divided among them, being devoted to the building of ships of war, and they soon had a fleet of two hundred triremes afloat in their harbours. The influence of Themistocles was ere long so great, that he was able to turn the weapon of *ostracism* against his rival, and Aristeides was obliged to go into honourable banishment*.

CHAPTER XI.†

March of Xerxes.—Preparations of the Greeks.—Battle of Thermopylæ.—
Battle of the Artemision.—Attempt on Delphi.

Ol. 73, 4-75, 1. B.C. 485-480.

WHAT Themistocles had foreseen came to pass. It is not in the character of despotic princes to give over a contest because their arms have received a check. Darius was bent more

* Plut. Themist. 4.

† Herod. vii.-viii. 39; Diodorus xi. 1-14; Plut. Themistocles.

than ever on the subjugation of Greece ; and during three years, troops and ships, stores and corn, were collected for another and a greater armament against that country. But when all was nearly ready, a rebellion broke out in Egypt, and then a dispute about the succession to the throne between his sons called his thoughts away from Greece. Having arranged the succession, he was preparing for civil and foreign wars, when death surprised him in the thirty-seventh year of his reign. (Ol. 73, 4.)

Xerxes, the son of Darius by Atossa daughter of Cyrus, succeeded to the throne of Persia. His first thoughts were directed to the reduction of Egypt, and he gave but little heed to the affairs of Greece ; but Mardonius, his hot and ambitious cousin, kept urging him to the subjugation of Europe ; the Peisistratids were also at the court of Susa, and showed oracles portending conquests to the arms of Persia ; and envoys from the Aleuads, the princes of Thessaly, who feared for their own power from the growth of republican principles in Greece, called on him to come and receive their submission. The young monarch lent an ear to these inducements, and in the second year of his reign, the Egyptians having been reduced to obedience, he assembled a council to consider of the invasion of Greece. (Ol. 74, 1.)

The king spoke, enumerating the injuries which the realm had sustained from the Greeks, and drawing a flattering picture of the extent which a conquest of this people, who were the only impediment to that of Europe, would give the empire. He was followed by Mardonius, speaking slightly of the Greeks, and dwelling on the facility of the enterprise. But on the other side rose Artabânus, brother of Darius and uncle of the king, who showed the danger, the difficulty, and the folly of the expedition. Xerxes kindled in wrath, and was only withheld from injuring him by respect for his father's brother. The council broke up : dreams at night came to the monarch and to Artabanus ; and the latter, convinced that the war was the will of Heaven, ceased to oppose it*.

* The whole account of the councils and affairs of Persia given by He-

Three years were still employed in making preparations for the conquest of Europe. Provisions of all kinds were conveyed by the maritime subjects of the empire to the coast of Thrace, and laid up in the towns there. A ship-canal, wide enough to let two triremes go abreast, was cut across the isthmus, of seven stadia in width, which connects Mount Athôs with the mainland; cables and all things necessary for the construction of bridges of boats were brought from Egypt and Phœnicia.

At length (Ol. 74, 4.) the immense army of the lord of the East was assembled in the plains of Cappadocia. The monarch set forth from Susa, and at its head crossed the Halys, marched through Phrygia, and came to Celænæ in Lydia, where he and his entire army were entertained by a Lydian of noble birth named Pytheas, who offered the whole of his immense wealth for the war; but Xerxes generously added to the riches he would not accept. The host moved thence to Sardes, where the king passed the winter. While there he sent heralds to all parts of Greece but Athens and Lacedæmôn, demanding earth and water, and ordering them to prepare a dinner for the king.

Meanwhile the Egyptians and Phœnicians were bridging over the Hellespont, at Abÿdos, where the breadth is seven stadia; but a tempest came on and broke their work asunder. Then, say the Greeks, Xerxes kindled in ire; he ordered the heads of those who were over the work to be cut off, and he sent persons charged to give three hundred lashes to the unruly Hellespont, to cast into it a pair of golden fetters, to rebuke it for its insolence, and to say that the king would pass whether it would or not. The bridge was then renewed and completed. It was built in the following manner. On the side next the Propontis (whence the stream flows) they ranged three hundred and sixty triremes and fifty-oar vessels lengthways across the stream, and three hundred and fourteen on

rodotus has such an Oriental air and is so like what may be seen in the Shâh-Nâmeh, that he must have derived it from Persian authorities.

the other side facing down it ; all were secured by anchors, and cables were stretched along them. Three narrow passages were left for small vessels. The whole was made fast to the shore on either side by thick cables. Pieces of timber, sawn to the due length, were laid along the cables ; over these were spread branches of trees and brushwood, which were covered with earth, and bulwarks were raised along each side, lest the sight of the sea should terrify the horses and beasts of burden*.

In the following spring (Ol. 75, 1.)† Xerxes led his host from Sardes. As he was setting forth the sun became eclipsed, which the Magians said portended to Greece the failure (eclipse) of their cities before the king, a response which filled the monarch with joy. Ere he departed, Pytheas came before him and prayed him, on account of his advanced age, to allow the eldest of his five sons to remain with him. The despot was inflamed with ire, and telling Pytheas that his hospitality alone saved his other sons, he had the eldest seized and cut in two, and the army marched between the severed parts of his body‡.

The order of the march was as follows. First went the beasts of burden and the baggage-drivers ; then a mass of troops of various nations, without any certain order ; 1000 chosen Persian horsemen followed ; after these came 1000 chosen spearmen, carrying their spears points downwards ; next were led ten stately Nisæan horses§ richly caparisoned ; the chariot of Zeus (Ormuzd||) drawn by ten white horses followed, the driver on foot holding the reins in his hands ;

* There is some difficulty in Herodotus' description of this bridge. It would appear that there were two roads, one over each rank of ships. See the account of the passage presently to be given.

† Properly Ol. 74, 4 ; but as it was B.C. 480, we give the Olympic year which commenced the following midsummer. As we shall continue this practice we beg of the reader to keep this principle in mind.

‡ As Herodotus (iv. 84.) tells a similar story of Darius, a mild and merciful prince, it is probably true neither of him nor of Xerxes.

§ Horses of a superior breed from Nisa in Media.

|| In the religious system of Persia Ormuzd was the good principle, the lord of light and happiness ; his opposite was Ahriman, the prince of darkness.

and then came the monarch himself, in a car drawn by Nisæan horses ; 1000 Persian spearmen, of the noblest families, followed the king ; 1000 chosen horsemen succeeded ; then came 10,000 Persian footmen, named the Immortals, 1000 with golden, the remainder with silver pomegranates on the butts of their spears ; 10,000 Persian horse followed. With an interval of two stadia, the rest of the army came behind.

In this order the army marched through Lydia and Mysia ; and leaving Mount Ida on the left, came to the Troas, where the famed Scamander failed them as they drank. Xerxes ascended and sacrificed on the place where Troy had stood. Soon the host spread along the straits of Helle. A throne of marble was set on an eminence near Abydos, on which the king sat and viewed the tents and banners of the myriads who marched at his command : men and horses in countless numbers covered the plain ; the bridge which joined the two continents stretched before him ; his numerous navy, engaged in a sham battle, gratified the lord of Asia with its skilful evolutions. As he gazed, his heart distended with pride, and he gloried in his strength : but soon tears were seen to gush from his eyes : Artabanus drew nigh, and inquired the cause : " I weep," said the monarch, " to think that a hundred years hence not one of these will be alive."

On the following day, as the sun rose, Xerxes poured from a golden cup a libation into the sea, and prayed the lord of day, the glorious Mithra*, to guard him from all peril in his progress. He then cast into the sea the cup he held, a golden bowl (*crater*), and a Persian scymitar. Incense fumed all along the bridge, which was strewn with boughs of myrtle. The passage then began ; on the left side of the bridge moved the beasts of burden and the servants ; on the right, the troops, both horse and foot. The Immortals, all wearing garlands, led the way ; a mingled host followed. Next day the Persian horse and spearmen, also crowned, passed the first ; and after them the sacred horses and chariot, the king himself, the

* So the Persians called the Sun-god.

spearman and the 1000 chosen horsemen. Seven days and nights lasted this passage of Asia into Europe, the lash quickening the pace of the tardy.

When the whole host had passed, the march was resumed, the fleet sailing along the coast. The waters of the Melas failed, like those of the Scamander. The host passed the Hebrus and reached Doriscus; and there, where a wide plain and a long shore extended, the monarch resolved to number and review his troops and his navy. The ships were for this purpose all drawn on shore along the extensive beach. To number the land troops the following plan was devised. A myriad of men were placed in as close a manner as they could stand, and a circle was drawn round them. They were then dismissed, and a dry-stone wall was built on the circle as high as a man's waist. Myriad after myriad the army entered the inclosure, and the whole was found to amount to one hundred and seventy myriads!

The Persians, the Medes, the Cissians, the Bactrians, Hyrcanians, Sacians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians*, and other neighbouring peoples were armed and clad in nearly the same manner. They wore limber caps named *tiaras* on their heads, tunics with sleeves covered with iron scales, and trowsers. They bore four-cornered shields covered with raw ox-hide (γέῤῥα), short spears, quivers, bows, and arrows of reed, and daggers hanging at the right side. The Assyrians wore brazen helmets of a peculiar fashion; their shields, spears, and swords were like those of the Egyptians; their corselets were of linen, and they carried clubs headed with iron. The Indians were clad in cotton, with bows and arrows of cane. The Arabs wore *zeiræ* (ζεῖραι) or coats reaching to the feet, and carried long bows. The Æthiopians were clad in the skins of lions and leopards; when going into battle they painted their bodies half red, half white; their bows, of six feet in length, were the peduncles of the palm leaves, from which they shot small reed-arrows headed with hard stone;

* All these last-named nations dwelt to the east and south of the Caspian sea.

their short spears were headed with antelope-horn, and they carried knotty sticks. The Libyans were clad in leather, and used darts of wood hardened in the fire. The Paphlagonians, Lygians, Mariandynians, Phrygians, and other peoples of Lesser Asia wore helmets, and had small shields and spears, with darts and swords, and boots coming half up the leg. The Lydians were armed like the Greeks. The Bithynians had caps of fox-skin and fawn-skin buskins; they wore tunics, over which were *zeiræ* of various colours; they carried darts, four-cornered shields, and short swords. The Moschians, Tibarenians, Macronians, and Mosyncæcians*, had helmets of wood, small shields, and short spears with long heads. The Colchians and Mares had shields covered with hide, wooden helmets, and short spears: the Colchians bore, moreover, heavy swords. The islanders from the Erythræan sea were clad and armed like the Medes: these were the infantry,—a hundred and seventy myriads in number. The flower of the army were the ten thousand Persians, named the Immortals, because their number was always kept up at its full amount. They had peculiar privileges, were richly attired, and were in effect the Guards of the Persian army: their leader was Hydarnes.

The Persians, Medes, Cissians, Bactrians and Caspians furnished cavalry armed and clothed like the infantry. Of these the most remarkable were the Sagartians, a Persian tribe, who gave eight thousand horse; they used no arms but daggers, but they carried a long chain of leather, with a noose on the end of it†, which they flung and caught men or horses, whom they then despatched. The Indians sent single horsemen, and chariots drawn by horses and wild asses. The Libyans also drove war-chariots. The Arabians rode on camels fleet as horses. Eight myriads was the number of the cavalry, exclusive of the chariots and camels.

* These nations dwelt between the Euxine sea and Armenia.

† This is the *kamûnd*, or noose, borne by the heroes in the Persian heroic poem the *Shâh-Nâmeh* of Ferdousee. See the tale of Roostem and Soohrâb in the author's *Tales and Popular Fictions*, particularly the note at page 152.

The Egyptians sent 200 triremes; the people of Palestine and Phœnicia, 300; the Cyprians, 150; the Cilicians, 100; the Pamphylians, 30; the Lycians, 50; the Dorians of Asia, 30; the Carians, 70; the Ionians, 100; the islanders, 17; the Æolians, 60; the Hellespontians, 100. The whole number of triremes was 1207; that of the smaller vessels and transports was 3000. Persians, Medes, and Sacians were on board the triremes to fight them. The Sidonian ships were the best; next to these the five triremes which Artemisia, the brave queen of Halicarnassus, commanded in person.

When Xerxes had driven in his chariot from nation to nation, and reviewed his entire army, he got on board a Sidonian vessel, where he sat under a golden canopy, and rowed along by the prows of the ships, which were anchored for the purpose in a line four plethra (four hundred feet) from the land, with their prows turned to the shore.

The review being completed, the word was given to set forward. The army marched in three parallel divisions; the towns on the way were ruined by the quantity of provisions they were forced to supply; the Lissus, the Echedôrus, and other streams were drunk dry. All the tribes of Thrace were forced to march in the train of the Great King, and swell the number of his array. At length the host encamped at the head of the Thermaïc gulf in Macedonia. Here the king was met by the heralds whom he had sent to Greece. They brought him the submissions of the Thessalians, Dolopians, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Melians, Phthiotic-Achæans, Locrians, and of the Thebans and all the other Bœotians except the Thespians and Plataeans.

It is now time that we should direct our view to Athens and Lacedæmôn, whose destruction was menaced by this formidable host. As soon as it was ascertained that Xerxes was about to lead the forces of the East for the subjugation of Greece, the Athenians, whose conduct in this war we shall find to exceed all praise, sent to consult the oracle at Delphi. The response in dark and dubious terms announced the destruction of towns, the conflagration of temples. Filled with terror, they

implored a more favourable oracle for their country. The god replied, that Zeus would only grant to the prayers of Pallas the safety of the wooden wall, and announced that "divine Salamis" would destroy the children of women. This response, when brought to Athens, gave rise to great doubts as to its meaning. Some of the aged people, calling to mind that the Acropolis had of old been surrounded by a thorn-hedge, thought that it was the place of safety indicated, others said it was the fleet that was meant; but as destruction at Salamis seemed to be menaced, they advised to get on shipboard and fly to some distant country. Themistocles said, that if the god meant evil to Greece, he would have said 'pernicious' (σχετλίη) and not 'divine' (θείη) Salamis, and that the oracle was against the foe. His opinion prevailed, and they resolved to man their triremes and fight for independence. It was decreed to build more ships immediately.

A council was held at the Isthmus by the friends of the independence of Hellas, and it was determined to call on the Argives, the Cretans, the Corcyraeans, and Gelôn the tyrant of Syracuse in Sicily, to aid the common cause. Spies were also sent to Sardes to ascertain the real strength of the enemy. These spies were seized by the Persian generals, who were about to put them to death; but Xerxes proudly ordered that they should be led through the host, and then dismissed in safety to tell of the might of the lord of Asia.

The Argives, according to their own account, had sent to consult the god at Delphi, and the response had been to guard their head and they would be safe. They, however, offered to join if the Lacedaemonians would make a thirty years' truce with them, and give them the command of half the army. The truce they required, lest, if any calamity should befall them in the war, the Lacedaemonians might attack and conquer them before their sons were grown up. The Spartan envoys replied that they would lay the truce before the general assembly at Sparta; as to the command, as they had two kings and the Argives but one, they could only let him be of equal authority with them. The Argives forthwith ordered them to quit the

city before sunset. They deemed it, they said, better to obey the Barbarians than to yield to the Lacedæmonians. According to another account, the Argives had already contracted an engagement with Xerxes.

The Cretans also sent to Delphi, and the god advised them, as they interpreted the response, to abstain from the war. The Corcyræans readily promised aid, and manned sixty triremes ; but they loitered off the coast of Messene till the great naval action was fought, to make a merit of it with the Persian if *he* won, and to be able to say to the Greeks if the victory was *theirs*, that adverse winds alone had prevented them from doubling Cape Malea and sharing in it.

Gelôn, the powerful tyrant of Syracuse, reminded the envoys how, when he was in straits in a war with the Carthaginians, he had sought aid from Greece in vain ; he offered nevertheless to join with 200 triremes, 10,000 hoplites, 2000 horse, and 6000 archers, slingers, and light horse, and to supply corn for the whole Grecian army during the war, if they would give him the supreme command. The Spartan envoy haughtily refused. Gelôn then offered to be content with the command either by sea or by land ; but the Athenians declared that they would yield the command at sea only to the Spartans. Offended at their haughtiness, the Sicilian bade them go back and tell to Greece that they had taken the spring out of the year ; meaning his own troops, which were to the Grecian army what the spring is to the year. It was said however by the Sicilians, that he would have sent aid, but that he was engaged in a war with the Carthaginians.

The Thessalians were at first true to Greece. They sent to the Isthmus requesting that a body of troops might be sent to guard the Vale of Tempe, and offering to join their cavalry with it. This offer was readily accepted ; ten thousand hoplites, commanded by Euænetus a Spartan polemarch, and by Themistocles the Athenian, got on shipboard, and landing on the coast of the Phthiotic Achaia, marched through Thessaly to Tempe. But when Alexander the Macedonian sent to tell them that it was madness to stay there, and they learned also

that there was another entrance from Macedonia, through Perrhæbia, at Gonnos, the Greek commanders re-embarked their troops and went back to the Isthmus. The Thessalians, thus left to themselves, sought their safety in *medism*. The council at the Isthmus then resolved to guard the passage at Thermopylæ, while the fleet should lie at the Artemision *, or shore of Eubœa, opposite the bay of Pagasæ, to oppose the progress of the Persian fleet. This fleet meantime had weighed anchor, and was sailing down the Thermaïc gulf. The Greeks, on hearing of its numbers, were seized with dread, and leaving the Artemision retired to the Eurîpus, the narrow strait between Eubœa and Bœotia. The Persians sailed leisurely between the isle of Sciathos and the land, and anchored at Sepias and along the coast of Magnesia. Xerxes conducted his troops through Upper Macedonia, entered Thessaly at Gonnos, marched through it unopposed, and finally spread his tents and pavilions in Melis before the pass of Thermopylæ.

The historian whose guidance we follow takes a survey of the land and sea forces of the Persian monarch while they are complete and unimpaired, and he gives the following results. Reckoning 200 men to each of the 1207 triremes, their crews amounted to 241,400 men; there were besides 30 soldiers on board of each, which made 36,210. Calculating the 3000 small craft at 80 men a-piece, they carried 240,000,—in all 517,610 men. There were 1,700,000 foot, and 80,000 horse, and 20,000 Libyans and Arabians with chariots and camels. The Greeks along the coasts and isles of Thrace had to furnish 120 ships, carrying 24,000 men; and the Thracians, Macedonians and other subject peoples increased the host by 300,000 men. The whole army of Xerxes therefore amounted to 2,641,610 men. The crowd of camp-followers, suttlers, etc., the women and eunuchs not included, he reckons at an equal number; so that the whole amount was 5,283,220!—a most monstrous exaggeration of Persian and Grecian vanity com-

* So named as being sacred to the goddess Artemis, who had a temple there. Herod. vii. 176.

bined, for Greece never did and never could contain a population equal to what was assembled according to this account in the valley of the Spercheius*.

The Persian fleet, the very first night it anchored on the coast of Magnesia, was assailed by a furious tempest from the east, which lasted for three days, and destroyed not less than four hundred ships and a vast number of the smaller vessels. The Greeks on learning their loss took courage and returned to the Artemision; but the Barbarians, as soon as the wind fell, got round into the Pagasæan bay and anchored at Aphetæ. Fifteen vessels having loitered behind, and taking the Greek fleet at the Artemision for their own, were captured.

A narrow pass leads from Thessaly into Greece: its length is about five English miles, its breadth where narrowest does not exceed sixty paces. The west side of this pass is formed by the steep declivity of Mount Cæta; marshes and the sea bound it on the east. About the middle of it are the hot springs which give it its name of Thermopylæ, and a small plain, at either end of which it contracts again. At the northern end of the pass was a wall nearly in ruins, which had been formerly erected by the Phocians to defend their country against the Thessalians.

When Xerxes reached Thermopylæ, he found a small army there ready to dispute the passage. This army consisted of 300 Spartan hoplites, 1000 from Tegea and Mantinea, 1120 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Phliûs, and 80 from Mycenæ,—in all 3100 Peloponnesians, and commanded by Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta. With these were 700 Thespians, and 400 Thebans from Bœotia; the Phocians came 1000 in number, and all the fighting men of the Opuntian Locrians. It was not expected that this small force would be able effectually to resist the Persians; but it was the intention of the Spartans, as soon as the feast of the Carneia, which they were then celebrating, was over, to march thither with all their powers. It was not known that there

* See Appendix (B.).

was another way over the mountain into Greece, and it was thought that this force might hold out a sufficient time.

At the nearer approach of the Persians, the Peloponnesians, who had heard of the path over the mountain, and also dreaded their immense numbers, were for retiring and defending the Isthmus; but at the prayer of the Phocians and Locrians, Leonidas detained them. Xerxes, on his side, sent forward a horseman to examine the position of the Greeks. The Spartans happening at that time to be posted outside of the wall which they had repaired, the Persian to his surprise beheld them amusing themselves with gymnastic exercises and carefully combing out their long hair. The king asked Demaratus, who was with him, the meaning of this practice, and he assured him that it denoted their determination to combat to death. Xerxes heeded him not, and having waited four days in expectation of their flight, sent a body of Medes and Cissians with orders to take them and bring them before him; but after having continued their attacks for the entire day they were obliged to retire with loss. The Immortals were next sent: by a feigned flight the Greeks drew them into the pass, where their numbers could not avail them, and then turning made great havoc among them, but they sustained on this occasion some loss themselves. Xerxes, it is said, leaped from his throne in dismay when he saw his guards thus defeated. The following day the assault was renewed, as it was thought that a great number of the Greeks must be disabled by their wounds; but the resistance was as vigorous as ever. This obstinate defence of the Greeks perplexed the Persian monarch, as he saw that his army might thus be destroyed in detail. Treachery, however, soon relieved him from his apprehensions; for a Melian, named Ephialtes, came and informed him that there was a path leading over the mountain, along which he offered to conduct a body of Persian troops. Xerxes joyfully accepted the offer; the Immortals were selected for this service, and at night-fall they set out under the guidance of Ephialtes.

This path ran up the mountain, at first along the little stream Asôpus, and it came out at the town Alpênus at the southern

end of the pass. Leonidas, when he learned its existence, had confided the charge of it to the Phocians, and they had taken their station on the summit.

At break of day the Persians reached the summit unperceived; but as the mountain was covered with trees, and the summer air was perfectly still, the Phocians now heard the sound of their tread on the leaves which lay on the ground. They instantly took to their arms; the Persians, who had not expected to meet any resistance, were daunted at first, but the showers of their arrows soon drove off the Phocians, who retired to the highest point of the mountain. The Persians then went down with all speed to get in the rear of the Greeks, who meantime had learned their impending fate. As the soothsayer Megistias viewed the victims in the evening, he told them that they were to die in the morning. Deserters arrived during the night with tidings of the treason; at daybreak the sentinels came down from the mountain to announce the approach of the foes. Leonidas saw that all was over, and he deemed it useless to squander blood in vain: himself and his Spartans must remain and fall, for their laws forbade retreat; the Thebans, as their state had *medised*, he resolved should share their fate; the rest he desired to return to their homes. All obeyed except the gallant Thespians, who would not quit the Spartans. The Thebans remained against their will. The soothsayer, an Acarnanian, would stay, but he sent home his only son.

In the morning Xerxes sent troops to attack the Greeks, who now, resolved on death, came boldly out from the pass to meet them. The contest was obstinate, the Persian officers urged on their men with blows, the Greeks fought with desperation. Numbers of the Barbarians were slain, among whom were two uncles and two brothers of the king. Most of the Greeks had now broken their spears, and fought with their swords. Leonidas fell, and a severe conflict arose over his body, which the Greeks finally carried off. When news came of the descent of the Persians behind them, they retired into the narrow pass, and taking their station on a little knoll, the

Spartans and Thespians fought till all were slain. The Thebans, as soon as they had an opportunity, advanced with outstretched hands suing for mercy, and as the Thessalians testified for their *medism*, they were spared.

The head of Leonidas was cut off, and his body hung on a cross, by the impotent vengeance of the Persian monarch. But when the Barbarians were expelled from Greece, the Amphictyons placed on the knoll a marble lion in memory of Leonidas, and erected pillars with inscriptions over the graves of the fallen patriots. A price was set on the head of the traitor Ephialtes, and when some years afterwards he was slain by a Trachinian, though it was on another account, the Lacedæmonians rewarded his slayer.

Another but a much less probable account of this battle says, that Leonidas led forth his men while it was yet night, assailed the Persian camp, penetrated even to the royal tent, and slew all who were in it. Xerxes, fortunately for himself, had gone out when he heard the tumult, or the war might have been ended that night*.

It is said that only one of the three hundred Spartans returned home. There were two of them, Eurytus and Aristodemus, who were at Alpenus on account of sore eyes. Eurytus, on hearing of the passage of the Persians, called for his arms and made his helot lead him to where they were fighting, and there leave him, and he fell with the rest. As Aristodemus had not done the same he was made *atimous* on his return; no one would speak to him or give him fire, and he was called *the Coward*. But he afterwards nobly retrieved his character†.

One of the most distinguished of the Spartans who fell in this conflict was Dienêces, many of whose acute sayings were recollected: the following is the only one transmitted to us. A Trachinian telling the Spartans, who had not yet seen the Medes, that their number was so great that the sun would be hidden by the multitude of their arrows, "T is good," said

* Diodorus, xi. 10. Plut., De Herod. Malig. 32. Justin, ii. 11.

† Another account said that he and another had been sent on some business out of the camp, and that his comrade returned, while he would not.

Dieneces, "what the Trachinian stranger says ; for if the Medes hide the sun, we shall fight in the shade and not in the sun."

While the pass of Thermopylæ was thus contested by the land-forces, the fleets were not inactive. The Greeks at the Artemision, when they saw the great number of the Persian fleet, were for dispersing, and not venturing to engage it. The Eubœans besought Eurybiades the Spartan, who held the chief command, to remain till they had removed their children and slaves over to the mainland, but in vain. They then came to Themistocles, and gave him thirty talents to induce him to cause the fleet to stay and engage the enemy there. The Athenian sent Eurybiades five of these talents as from himself, and with three he gained Adeimantus the Corinthian, the most strenuous advocate of retreat : the remainder he kept for himself. It was resolved, therefore, to remain and fight.

The Persians, aware of the small number of the Greek ships, were only afraid lest they should take to flight. They therefore despatched two hundred ships to sail round Eubœa, and occupy the Euripus behind them, and in the meantime they prepared for action. A celebrated diver named Scyllias, who was with the Persians, came over to the Greeks with the intelligence, and it was resolved to attack the two hundred ships first. As these however did not appear, they sailed boldly to Aphetæ in order of battle. The Barbarians advanced to engage them, and the combat lasted the entire day ; the Greeks took thirty ships, and one Lemnian vessel came over to them.

During the night there came on a tremendous storm of thunder, lightning, wind, and rain, which did great damage to the Persian fleet. The two hundred ships which were at sea suffered still more, and most of them were wrecked off the coast of Eubœa. "The whole was done by the Deity," observes Herodotus, "that the Persian power might be made equal to that of the Greeks."

Next day the Greeks were joined by fifty-three Athenian ships. The following day the Persian fleet sailed to the Artemision in the form of a half-moon, and inclosed the Greeks. The combat lasted the entire day, with great loss of men and

ships on both sides, nearly one half of the Athenian triremes being disabled. They now consulted about retiring; and when their sentinel came from Trachis, and told how Leonidas and his men had just fallen, an immediate retreat was resolved on. The Corinthians led the way, the Athenians brought up the rear. Themistocles, taking some of the best sailing ships, went ere he departed to the various watering-places on the Artemision, and cut on the rocks an address to the Ionians, reminding them of their injustice in aiding to enslave their fathers, and calling upon them to desert if possible, if not to keep back, in the engagement. This he did in expectation that, if they did not come over, it would make them suspected by Xerxes.

The pass being now free, the Persian host led by the Thesalians advanced into Locris and Doris, and thence to Phocis, where following the course of the Cephissus they burned all the towns, the Phocians having fled to the tops of Parnassus, or to Amphissa in the country of the Ozolian Locrians. At Panopeus Xerxes divided his army, himself leading the main body into Bœotia, and sending off a large detachment to seize and plunder the temple at Delphi. The tidings of the approach of the Barbarians threw the Delphians into consternation, and they inquired of the god whether they should bury the sacred treasures, or convey them to another country. The reply was, that he was able to take care of his own. They therefore sent their wives and children over to Achaia, and took refuge themselves in the large Corycian cave on Parnassus and elsewhere, leaving only sixty men and the prophet in the town.

The Barbarians were now within sight of the temple, when the prophet to his amazement looked and beheld the sacred arms which hung in the sanctuary, and which no man might touch, lying on the ground out before the fane. The Persian troops had reached the temple of Athena-Proneia (*Before-the-temple*), when suddenly there burst from heaven a storm of thunder, lightning and rain; huge masses of rock rolled down on them from Parnassus, and from the fane of Athena issued cries of onset and conflict. Some were crushed to death, the

rest fled in dismay, pursued by the Delphians; and when they reached the camp they told that two warriors of superhuman size had aided in the pursuit and slaughter. In these warriors the Delphians recognised their domestic heroes, Phylacus and Autonoüs, whose chapels were in that neighbourhood.

CHAPTER XII.*

Burning of Athens.—Battle of Salamis.—Flight of Xerxes.—Battle of Plataea.—Battle of Mycale.

Ol. 75, 1-75, 2. B.C. 480-479.

XERXES meantime led his army through Bœotia, all of which, as we have seen, had *medised*, except Thespiæ and Plataea; which towns, being deserted by their inhabitants, he burned. He then entered Attica, just three months having elapsed since he left the Hellespont. On coming to Athens he found the city deserted, except by a few persons who had remained on the Acropolis, which they had barricadoed with timber; either believing this to be the sense of the oracle, or prevented by poverty from departing with the other citizens.

For Themistocles, by appealing to the superstition as well as the reason of the Athenians, had induced them to leave their city to its fate. The sacred serpent, it was given out, had vanished from the Acropolis,—a sign, he said, that the goddess herself had abandoned it. A decree therefore was passed at his suggestion, that the city should be commended to the care of its patron-goddess, that the men should all get on board the ships, and each provide for the security of his wife, children, and slaves as best he could. Cimôn, the son of Miltiades, set the first example; followed by a number of young men of his own age and rank, and carrying his bridle in his hand, he ascended the Acropolis, and hanging up the bridle as now use-

* Herod. viii. 40.-ix. Diodor. xi. 15-19. 27-37. Plut., Themistocles and Aristideides.

less, and taking down one of the shields which were suspended at the temple, and making his prayer to the goddess, he went down to the sea-side and embarked *. The greater part sought refuge in the isle of Salamis, the retreat of the Athenians at all periods of their history; others conveyed their families to Ægina and to Trœzên, on the opposite coast, and nothing, it is said, could surpass the generosity with which the Trœzenians acted toward them; they allowed them two oboles a day each for their support, permitted the children to pull the fruit where they pleased, and paid schoolmasters to teach them †.

The Acropolis of Athens is a rock rising perpendicularly out of the plain to a height of two hundred and forty feet; its summit is accessible in only one place; a small number therefore could easily defend it. The Persians took their station on the Areiopagus (*Ares' Hill*), opposite the ascent, and thence discharged arrows, bearing lighted tow, against the wooden defences, which they thus burned. The Peisistratids then sought but in vain to induce the defenders to surrender. When the Barbarians attempted to climb the ascent, they rolled down ponderous stones to crush them; but at length some of the Persians discovered an unguarded place by the temple of Aglauros, where with some difficulty they ascended, and then rushed to the gates and opened them. Some of the Athenians flung themselves down from the wall and perished; others fled to the temple, whither they were pursued and slaughtered by the Barbarians. The temple was plundered, and all the buildings on the Acropolis were burnt. The same was the fate of the town, with the exception of such houses as the Persian officers reserved for their own quarters.

The destruction of Athens was viewed by the assembled fleet of Greece, which was now lying at the isle of Salamis: for when they retired from the Artemision they came thither at the request of the Athenians; who finding that the Peloponnesians had not, as they expected, marched with all their forces into Bœotia to meet the invaders, but thinking only of

* Plut. Cimôn, 5.

† Plut. Themist. 10. Herodotus says nothing of it.

themselves, were securing the Isthmus, had besought them to remain at Salamis till they should have removed their families, and also to take counsel as to what future measures should be adopted. When the Athenian women and children had been placed in safety, a council was held to determine in what place they should stay and fight. The Peloponnesians were for drawing up the fleet before the Isthmus, as in that case, if defeated, they would have the land to escape to; whereas, if defeated at Salamis, there was no retreat, and they should be slaughtered in the island. They had not come to a decision, when they learned that the Acropolis of Athens had been taken by the Barbarians. Some in their terror got on board their ships to fly instantly, and the rest determined to retreat to the Isthmus. Night came on, and all embarked to sail from Salamis in the morning.

When Themistocles returned to his ship, one of his friends named Mnesiphilus came and asked him what had been resolved on: he told him. "Then," replied he, "all is lost, for they will disperse, and Eurybiades will be unable to retain them. Go, and, if you can, make him stay, and fight here." Without reply, Themistocles hastened to Eurybiades, and on his saying that he had something to communicate to him, was desired to come on board his ship. He then spoke with such effect, that the Spartan agreed to summon a council to re-consider the matter. When the generals met, Themistocles, without waiting for Eurybiades to propose the subject of deliberation, according to usage, was employing his eloquence to gain the members to his opinion. "Themistocles," said Adeimantus the Corinthian, "those who rise before their time in the games are flogged."—"Yes," replied he, "but those who loiter are not crowned." Then turning to Eurybiades, he showed him that if they retired to the Isthmus they would lose Megara, Salamis, and Ægina, and bring the Persians on the Peloponnese; that, moreover, they would then have to fight in the open sea instead of in a narrow strait, where their ships, which were heavier and fewer in number, would be less able to contend with those of the Barbarians; that further, Salamis, in which there were

so many Athenian families, ought to be protected. When he had spoken, Adeimantus called on Eurybiades not to listen to a man who had no country. Themistocles, kindling in anger, told him that those who had manned two hundred triremes had more land and country than the Corinthians, for that no people in Greece could resist their attack. He then turned to Eurybiades, and said, that if he did not stay and fight where he was, the Athenians would take their families on board and sail away and settle at Siris in Italy, leaving them to their fate. This menace was conclusive, and it was resolved to fight at Salamis.

At sunrise an earthquake shook the sea and land. It was resolved to seek by prayer the aid of the gods and of the heroes: the Æacids, Telamôn and Ajax, the tutelar heroes of Salamis, were immediately invoked, and a vessel was sent to Ægina to call on the rest of this heroic family. It was afterwards told that the deities of Eleusis, Demeter and the Kora, had announced defeat to the Barbarians; for as the Persians were wasting Attica, an Athenian exile and the Spartan Demaratus being in the Thriasian plain, saw a dust as if raised by three myriads of men coming from Eleusis, and heard a cry proceeding from it which the Athenian knew to be the mystic *Iacchus*. He told his ignorant companion, that if the dust moved toward the Peloponnese, it was to announce ruin to the king and the land-army; if towards Salamis, to the fleet. They gazed, and the cloud of dust rising high in the air, sailed on to Salamis and the camp of the Greeks. They saw that destruction menaced the invaders, but they held their peace, fearing the wrath of the king.

The Persian fleet, having sailed down through the Euripus, had now reached the Athenian harbour of Phaleron undiminished we are assured* in number, for its losses had been made up by the accession of the ships of the islanders: it therefore counted 1200 ships of war. The Grecian fleet lay at Salamis: it contained 16 Lacedæmonian triremes, 40 Corinthian, 15 Sicyonian, 10 Epidaurian, 5 Trœzenian, 3 Her-

* Herod. viii. 66; but what addition of force could the Cyclads give?

mionian, 180 Athenian, 20 Megarian. Ægina furnished 30, Chalcis 20, Eretria 7, Ceos 7, Naxos 4, Styrea 2, Cythnos 1. Crotôn in Italy sent one trireme,—the only aid Greece received in her glorious struggle! The whole fleet, exclusive of a few fifty-oared vessels, amounted to 378 ships, exceeding that at the Artemision by 107.

Xerxes forthwith issued his orders for the commanders of his navy to meet in council; and when they were assembled, Mardonius went round taking their opinions as to whether they should fight or not. All but Artemisia voted for immediate action. This wise and heroic princess reminded Mardonius how much superior the Greeks were to the Asiatics in valour. She asked why run the risk of defeat, showed how want of provisions would soon compel the Greeks to quit Salamis and disperse, and advised as the better course to lead the land-army into the Peloponnese. All her friends trembled for the heroine who had spoken thus freely; but Xerxes when informed highly applauded her, though he resolved to follow the opinion of the majority. The fleet moved for Salamis in order of battle, but night came on and prevented an engagement.

Meantime a portion of the land-forces were advancing toward the Isthmus, where a large army of Peloponnesians under Cleombrotus the Spartan king was assembled. They had blocked up with rocks the narrow Scironian Way which overhangs the sea, and built a wall from sea to sea across the Isthmus. The Peloponnesians at Salamis, on hearing of this movement of the Persians, again lost courage, and seemed determined to return to the defence of their homes, and Themistocles saw that if any more time was allowed them all would be lost. He therefore during the night sent a trusty servant named Sicinnus, the tutor of his children, in a boat to the Persian camp, desiring him to say that the Athenian commander, who was their secret friend, had sent him to inform them that the Greeks were at disunion and meditated flight, and that if they attacked them at once they would obtain an easy victory. The Persians fell readily into the snare, and that very night preparations were made for the attack. The Egyptian ships

were sent round Salamis to occupy the strait behind the Greeks, and a body of men was landed in the little islet of Psyttaleia which lies before the strait, and to which it was supposed the wrecks would be carried and the men would come for refuge.

The Greeks ignorant of all this were still in debate, when Aristides, having seen the motions of the Persian fleet, came in a boat from Ægina, and calling out Themistocles informed him how things were, and represented that retreat was now impossible. Themistocles then told him in confidence that it was all his own doing, and requested him to enter and inform the chiefs, as they would probably give credit to *him*. Aristides did as he wished, but still several refused to believe it. But presently came a Tenian trireme, which had deserted, with the same intelligence, and the truth of it was no longer to be disputed. Day was now dawning; the warriors all assembled, Themistocles addressed them in enlivening terms, they got on board; the trireme sent to Ægina to invite the Æacids returned at that moment and took her station with the rest.

The Persian monarch seated himself on his throne on the summit of the hill Ægaleos, opposite Salamis, to view this important conflict: secretaries stood around him to note each event of the engagement. His fleet advanced in line of battle; the Phœnicians forming the right, the Ionians the left: the Athenians were opposed to the former, the Lacedæmonians to the latter. For some time the Grecian mariners lay on their oars hesitating to begin*. At length an Athenian trireme rushed forth and struck one of those of the enemy: others then came to its aid, and the fight soon became general along the line. So said the Athenians: the Æginetans asserted that it was *their* trireme which had been sent to call the Æacids that began the fight. It was also said that a female phantom appeared, and cried so as to be heard over the whole fleet, "Dastards! how long will you lie on your oars?"

* Plutarch says (Them. 14.) that Themistocles deferred commencing the action till the hour was come when a strong breeze blew each day up the gulf. We shall find as we proceed an Athenian admiral taking advantage of this breeze in the Corinthian gulf.

When the Persians came within the strait, owing to their numbers they were unable to keep their order, while the Greeks had sufficient room. They therefore soon fell into confusion, and though the crews individually fought with the utmost heroism, several ships were soon taken, and still more disabled. Artemisia being closely pursued by an Athenian trireme, and seeing no chance of escape, ran at a Calyndian vessel and sank it; and the Athenian captain, judging from this that she must be a friend to Greece, gave over the chase. Xerxes, seeing the deed, and thinking it was one of the enemy's ships she had sunk, observed, "The men are women, the women men!" Every moment now augmented the confusion and the loss in the Persian fleet, and it soon was seen in flight for Phaleron. While the Athenian triremes moved about everywhere carrying destruction to the enemy, the Æginetans got out to sea, and fell on and destroyed those who were flying from the Athenians. Meantime Aristides having collected a good body of hoplites who were on the shore of Salamis, passed over with them to Psyttaleia and slaughtered all the Barbarians that were in it. Evening terminated the conflict. The Greeks lost forty triremes; the Barbarians two hundred, exclusive of those which were taken. Among the slain were Xerxes' brother, Ariabignes the admiral, and several Medes and Persians of high rank.

The Greeks returned to Salamis and collected the wrecks, and got their vessels in order, expecting another attack in the morning. But Xerxes now, either in earnest or to conceal his intentions of retreat, began to make preparations for constructing a bridge over to the island, in order to bring his land-troops against them. Whilst he was thus engaged, Mardonius came to him, and advised either an immediate invasion of the Peloponnese, or that the king should return home, leaving with him three hundred thousand chosen troops, with which he pledged himself to reduce Greece beneath his yoke. This last proposal was well-pleasing to the king, now weary of war: Artemisia on being consulted approved of it, and a secret message from Themistocles finally decided him to lose no time in getting

over to Asia. For Themistocles, after the victory, proposed that the fleets should sail to the Hellespont and destroy the bridge, so as to cut off the retreat of the king; but Eurybiades representing the danger and the impolicy of such a course, it was given up; and Themistocles then prudently resolving to make a merit of what he could not prevent, sent Sicinnus again secretly to Xerxes to tell him that the Greeks had proposed to destroy the bridge, but that *he*, as a friend to the king, had diverted them from it.

When Xerxes had determined on retreat, he sent his fleet in all haste to the Hellespont to guard the bridge. The Greeks pursued them as far as Andros, and it was there that Themistocles made the proposal just mentioned. That project being rejected, it was resolved to punish the islands for their *medism*. Themistocles told the Andrians that the Athenians came, having with them two great deities, Persuasion and Necessity, and that they must therefore give them money. The Andrians replied, that there were two worthless deities, Poverty and Inability, who never would leave their island, and who prevented them from giving any. The Greeks therefore besieged their town. The people of Paros, Carystus, and some other places, hearing of this, sent money secretly to Themistocles, and thus escaped; and the Greeks having spent some time to no purpose before Andros, returned to Salamis, laying waste the lands of Carystus in Eubœa on their way.

Having divided the booty, the Greeks repaired to the Isthmus to decide on whom the prize of valour and conduct should be bestowed. The Æginetans were pronounced to have merited more than any other people, Themistocles more than any other commander: for each chief being desired to go to the altar of Poseidôn, and declare who was first and who second in merit, each gave the first place to himself, the second to Themistocles, who was evidently therefore entitled to the first, though envy withheld it. When he went to Sparta shortly afterwards, he was presented with an olive-crown for wisdom, one for valour being given to Eurybiades: he was also presented with the handsomest chariot there; and when he was

departing, three hundred Spartans of rank attended him to the frontiers,—honours never before bestowed on any one.

Meanwhile the Persian host was in full retreat. In Thessaly the king parted with Mardonius, who selected the Immortals, the Persians, Medes, Sacians, Bactrians and Indians, and such portions as he deemed best of the other troops, in all three hundred thousand horse and foot, resolving to winter there and renew the war in spring. Xerxes came in forty-five days to the Hellespont, and found the bridge broken up by the winds and the current. He had scarcely any troops with him; famine and the dysentery made terrific ravages among those who followed after him; they were reduced to feed on grass and the leaves of trees, and the carcasses of myriads mouldered on the plains of Macedonia and Thrace. Xerxes led the feeble remnant of his host to Sardes, and thence returned to Persia. The fleet, after it had carried the king and his troops over to Asia, wintered at Cyme, and in the spring sailed to Samos to keep Ionia from revolt.

In the spring (Ol. 75, 2.), the Grecian fleet, commanded by Leotychides the Spartan, the Athenians being led by Xanthippus the son of Ariphron, assembled to the number of one hundred and ten ships at Ægina. Here they were visited by envoys from Ionia, praying them to come and deliver that country. They sailed as far as Delos, but feared to go any further; and, the Persians in like manner not venturing to leave Samos, both remained inactive.

Mardonius, ere he opened the campaign, resolved to try to gain over the Athenians, who were now returned to their city. For this purpose he sent to them their guest-friend Alexander the Macedonian, offering in the name of the king to secure them in their independence, and in their territory, to give them any other territory they chose, and to rebuild the temples which had been burnt. Alexander, as their friend, urged them to accept these terms. On the other side, the envoys who had hastened from Sparta besought them not to abandon the common cause, offering to maintain their families and do all in their power to aid them. To Alexander the Athe-

nians replied, that while the sun pursued his course, they never would be the friends of him who had burnt their houses and temples. To the Spartans they said, that nothing but ignorance of the Athenian character (which however they excused) could have made them suppose that they would abandon the cause of Greece. They gratefully declined their offer of supporting their families, but requested of them to send without loss of time an army to their aid, as the Barbarian host would soon be in motion.

Mardonius now entered Bœotia, and came to Thebes, where the oligarchs advised him to stay and fight, as the country was suited to cavalry; but he would return to Attica, and in the tenth month after Xerxes had taken Athens he entered it anew, but found it deserted, the people having as usual passed over to Salamis. Again he tried negotiation, sending a Hellespontine Greek, named Munychides, to offer the terms he had offered before. Lycidas, one of the senate, proposed to treat, but senators and people stoned him to death, and the women inflicted the same penalty on his wife and children: the envoy was dismissed uninjured. Mardonius now wasted the country which he hitherto had spared, and he burned the remaining houses and temples.

The Athenians, when they heard of the approach of Mardonius, had sent envoys to upbraid the Spartans with not having come to the defence of Attica, and to menace them with defection if they still neglected them. The Spartans, who were then keeping their festival of the Hyacinthia, put them off from day to day for a space of ten days, during which time the wall at the Isthmus was nearly completed; but Chileos, the Tegean, reminding the Ephors that if the Athenians joined the Barbarians the wall would be of no use, they saw that their policy was foolish as well as base, and resolved to change it. That very night they sent off five thousand Spartans, each attended by seven helots, under Pausanias, the cousin and guardian of the young king Pleistarchos. In the morning the Athenian envoys came and informed the Ephors, that, if not aided at once, they would depart, and the Athenians would

join the king. The Ephors assured them, on oath, that an army was on its march, and must have already reached Arcadia. The envoys could scarcely believe them; but when they had ascertained the truth, they joyfully departed, accompanied by an additional force of five thousand Lacedæmonian Perioecians.

The Argives, who had promised Mardonius to prevent the march of the Spartans, now sent a swift courier to inform him that they had been unable to stop them. As Attica was not adapted for cavalry, he resolved to return to Bœotia. He led his army into Megaris, which, as it was reported, a Lacedæmonian army had entered; but finding the rumour false, he returned to Attica, where he was met by some of the people who dwelt on the Asopus, sent by the Bœotarchs to conduct him. They led him by Deceleia and Sphendales to Tanagra; and having passed the night there, he came next day to Scotos in the Theban territory. He extended his camp from near Erythræ to the river Asopus, and raised a rampart of timber for its defence.

The Lacedæmonians were joined at the Isthmus by the other well-affected Peloponnesians; and the sacrifices proving favourable, they crossed it and advanced to Eleusis, where they were joined by the Athenians from Salamis. The sacrifices proving again favourable, they entered the passes of Cithærôn, and came to Erythræ, where finding the Barbarians encamped on the Asopus, they took up their position at the foot of Cithærôn.

Mardonius, finding that they would not come down into the plain, sent his cavalry under the command of Masistius to attack them. The most assailable position was occupied by the Megarians; and the Barbarians, attacking them in squadrons, reduced them to extremity. They sent to tell the generals that unless aided they must give way. None, however, would stir from their place except the Athenians, three hundred picked men of whom with some archers went to their relief. In one of the charges the horse of Masistius was wounded by an arrow, and he reared and threw his master. The Athenians rushed on to slay him, but his gold scale-corselet resisted

all their efforts, till some one pierced his eye and thus killed him. The whole Persian horse made a charge to recover his body, the other Greeks came to the aid of the Athenians, and at length the Barbarians were driven off, leaving the corpse of the fallen chief in the hands of the Greeks; who, placing it on a cart, carried and exposed it along their whole line. The Persians, as he was a man of high rank, made a great lamentation for him, cutting off, according to their usage, their own hair and that of their horses.

The Greeks, finding their present position inconvenient, determined to get nearer to Plataea, where there was plenty of water, of which they were in want; and moving along Cithærôn by Hysiaë, they came and pitched by the fount Gargaphia, and the *temenos* of the hero Androcrates, on some low hills and uneven ground. Here a dispute arose between the Tegeans and the Athenians, as to which should be stationed on the left wing (the claim of the Spartans to the right one not being disputed); each pleaded their deeds in former and late times, but the recollection of Marathôn made the Lacedæmonians decide in favour of the Athenians. The army was then drawn up as follows. 1*. On the right were 10,000 Lacedæmonian hoplites and 35,000 helots; then the Tegeans, 1500. 2. The Corinthians, 5000; their colonists the Potidæans from Pallène, 300; the Arcadian Orchomenians, 600; the Sicyonians, 3000. 3. The Epidaurians, 800; the Trœzenians, 1000; the Lepreates of Elis, 200; the Mycenians and Tyrrinthians, 400; the Phliasians, 1000. 4. The Hermionians, 300; the Eretrians and Styreans of Eubœa, 600; the Chalcidians of the same island, 400. 5. The Ambraciots, 500; the Leucadians and Anactorians, 800; the Paleans from Cephalenia, 200; the Æginetans, 500. 6. The Megarians, 3000; the Platæans, 600; the Athenians, 8000, commanded by Aristides. The whole number of hoplites therefore was 38,700; the light troops, inclusive of the helots, amounted to 69,500; and as 1800 Thespians came, though without hoplite arms,

* The numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. in this and the next paragraph indicate the troops which were opposed to each other.

to join them, the entire army amounted to eleven myriads (110,000) of fighting men*.

The Persian general drew up his troops, under the advice of the Thebans, in the following order: 1. The Persians, in several lines, the weaker part being opposed to the Tegeans; 2. The Medes; 3. The Bactrians; 4. The Indians; 5. The Sacians; 6. The Bœotians, Locrians, Melians, Thessalians, Macedonians, and 1000 Phocians, who had unwillingly joined him, the rest having fled to Parnassus, whence they descended and harassed the Barbarians. Herodotus reckons the Barbarians at 300,000 men, their Greek allies at 50,000.

The soothsayers on both sides (for Mardonius complied with the usage of the Greeks) declaring that the sacrifices portended defeat to those who should attack, the two armies remained inactive for eight days. As the Greeks were constantly receiving accessions of men and provisions from the Peloponnese, a Theban named Timagenidas advised Mardonius to send a body of horse to occupy the pass of Cithærôn in their rear, named the Three Heads (*Τρεῖς Κεφαλαί*), or Oak Heads (*Δρυὸς Κεφαλαί*). This advice was followed, and that very night the Persian horse intercepted at the pass five hundred beasts laden with provisions for the Grecian army. Two days more passed away, during which, at the instigation of the Thebans, the Persian cavalry kept harassing the Greeks. At length Mardonius resolved to give no further heed to soothsayers. He called a council. The advice of Artabazus, one of his principal officers, and of the Thebans was to fall back to Thebes, and thence to send large quantities of gold and silver to the leading men in the different Grecian states, who would be easily induced to barter national independence for private gain. Mardonius, however, in reliance on the superiority of his army, resolved to give battle at once; and sending for the different commanders, he told them to prepare for action in the morning.

In the middle of the night Alexander the Macedonian rode

* One must regret the absence of the Achæans on this glorious occasion. It is the only stain on the fair fame of that most estimable people.

secretly to the Athenian outposts ; and calling for the commanders, informed them of Mardonius' resolution. They sent to inform Pausanias, who proposed that the Athenians, who were used to the Persian mode of fighting, should take the right wing. The change was therefore made, but in the morning the Thebans perceived it, and Mardonius, on being informed of it, made the Persians make a similar movement. The Lacedæmonians then returned to their former position, and all things became as before. Soon after Mardonius sent a herald to the Spartans, taunting them with their cowardice, and offering to put the whole battle to issue on a combat between an equal number of them and of the Persians. They made no reply ; and Mardonius, confident of victory, ordered his cavalry to advance. The Greeks suffered greatly from the showers of their arrows, and the Persians seized and filled up the fount of Gargaphia, which was the only watering-place the Greeks had, as they were cut off from the Asopus. Most of the leaders then repaired to the right wing, to consult with Pausanias ; and it was resolved, as they had now no water, and their provisions were all delayed in Cithærôn, through fear of the enemy, that they should move in the night to the island of Oëroë (as a piece of land east of Platæa, and ten stadia from their present position, was named, as being insulated by the river Oëroë, which flowing from Cithærôn divides to the breadth of three stadia, and then reunites) ; and then to send one half of the army to fetch the servants and provisions to the camp.

When the appointed time of the night was come, the greater part of the Greeks went off in haste, and took up their position at the Heræon or temple of Hera before Platæa. Pausanias then ordered the Lacedæmonians to follow, but Amompharetus the leader of the company (λόχος) of Pitane refused to fly, as he termed it, before the *strangers* (Barbarians). Pausanias did all he could to move him, but in vain. The Athenians, meantime, aware, as the historian says, that the Spartans usually said one thing and thought another, sent a horseman to ascertain if they were really setting out. The

envoy was witness of the angry dispute, and Pausanias requested him to tell the Athenians to come and stand by them, as they were now left alone. Day dawned while they were debating. Pausanias would stay no longer : he moved off at the head of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, keeping upon the hills through fear of the Persian horse ; the Athenians set out at the same time along the plain. Pausanias halted about ten stadia off at the temple of Demeter, on the river Moloeis, to be at hand to aid the obstinate Amompharetus. This officer, however, when he found himself really left alone, hastened to follow, and he soon came up and joined.

The Persian cavalry, on finding the ground which had been occupied by the Greeks deserted, pursued after them ; Mardonius, mounted on a stately white horse, and surrounded by a thousand chosen warriors, leading them in person. The rest of the Barbarians, when they saw the Persians in motion, raised their banners and followed, without any order. As the hills concealed the Athenians from their view, the Persians fell only on the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans. Pausanias sent to pray the Athenians to come to their aid, but just as they were about to comply, they were assailed by the *medising* Greeks, and the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans had to stand alone. The flights of arrows reduced them to great straits, and the sacrifices which they continued offering promised no good result, when Pausanias, looking to the Heræon, implored the goddess not to let their hopes be deceived. Immediately the sacrifice proved favourable, the Tegeans advanced, the Lacedæmonians followed ; a furious conflict, hand to hand, arose at the temple of Demeter, Mardonius fell by the hand of a Spartan, his guards were slain with him, and the rest turned and fled to their camp in disorder. Artabazus, when he saw them in flight, stayed no longer, but at the head of his division of forty thousand men made the best of his way to the Hellespont.

The Athenians, on their side, defeated the Greeks opposed to them. When the rest of the Greeks heard of the battle, they hastened to share in it ; the Corinthians and others keeping along the upper grounds, the Megarians and Phliasians along

the plain. These last were fallen on by the Theban horse, and six hundred of them slain.

The Lacedæmonians pursued the fugitives to their wooden rampart, on which however they could make no impression, till the Athenians, who were used to such attacks, came up; the camp was then forced, and the Barbarians slaughtered without mercy. The historian says, that of the whole army not three thousand men escaped. The quantity of gold, silver, rich arms, furniture and clothes found in the camp amazed the Greeks, unused to splendour. By command of Pausanias all was collected by the helots; a tenth was then sent to Delphi, and the rest divided. The helots had, however, contrived to secrete many articles of value, which they sold at a low rate to the Æginetans, who thence acquired great wealth.

After the battle a body of Mantineans came up, and, vexed at their having had no share in the victory, they followed the flying Barbarians of Artabazus as far as Thessaly. A corps of Eleians also arrived when too late. The leaders of both of these corps were punished for their delay on their return home.

The first care of the Greeks was to bury their dead. The Lacedæmonians raised three barrows, one for the Irenes (officers), one for the other Spartans, and one for the helots. The Tegeans were buried under another; the Athenians, Megarians and Phliasians were interred together in the plain. Shame and vanity led those who had no share in the action to raise in after-times cenotaphs or empty barrows.

On the eleventh day after the battle the army appeared before Thebes, and demanded the surrender of Timagenidas, Attagînus, and all those who had *medised*. Meeting with a refusal, they wasted the land and attacked the town. The Thebans then agreed to surrender the guilty persons, but Attagînus made his escape, leaving his family, which however Pausanias was too just to punish for *his* offence: the others he took to Corinth, and put to death.

The very day the victory was won at Platæa, another, nearly as important, was gained on the coast of Asia. Samian envoys

having come to the fleet at Delos, praying for aid to shake off the Persian yoke, Leotychides, moved by their arguments, and by the ominous name of one of them, Hegesistratus (*Army-leader*), agreed to make sail for Samos. The Persians, when they heard of the approach of the Greeks, quitted Samos and sailed to Mycale, where an army of sixty thousand men, under a general named Tigrânes, lay encamped. They drew their ships on shore, raising a rampart of stones and timber to defend them, and there awaited an attack. The Greeks at first hesitated to follow them: at length however they sailed, prepared for action, and their surprise was great when they saw the ships all hauled up, and the shore lined with troops. Leotychides then sailed as close to the beach as he could, calling out to the Ionians, in imitation of Themistocles at the Artemision, and with the same design, to join their kindred in the battle. The Persians had, however, disarmed the Samians in the camp, and sent the Milesians to keep the pass of the mountains.

The Greeks having landed, marched in two divisions against the camp. The Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Trœzenians moved along the shore; the Lacedæmonians more inland, over rugged and uneven ground. The former arriving first, attacked and carried the rampart; the Samians and other Ionians in the camp gave them all the aid in their power; the other Barbarians soon turned and fled, but the Persians resisted bravely, till the Lacedæmonians came up. The rout then became general: the whole Barbarian army was cut to pieces; for the Milesians, who guarded the only passage into the peninsula, either led them back to their enemies or slaughtered them themselves; and but a small number reached Sardes, where Xerxes was still residing. The Greeks, having plundered the camp, and burnt the wall and ships, returned to Samos.

It was said that, as they were advancing to the attack, a report was spread among them that the Greeks had defeated Mardonius in Bœotia, and a herald's staff was seen on the sea. It was further remarked, that as the Persians were defeated at

a temple of Demeter in Greece, so there was a temple of the same goddess at Mycale.

Ionia being now in revolt for the second time, the Spartans proposed, as it would be so difficult to defend them on account of the distance, to remove the Ionians to Greece, and give them the sea-ports of those states which had *medised*. To this, however, the Athenians would not consent. The Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders were then sworn to be faithful to the alliance, and the fleet sailed to destroy the bridge at the Hellespont. Finding this already broken, and the winter being at hand, the Peloponnesians returned home. The Athenians resolved to remain, and attempt the recovery of the Chersonese. They laid siege to Sestos, which was gallantly defended by its Persian garrison; till being reduced to extremity by famine, it evacuated it in the night, and the whole country then submitted*.

CHAPTER XIII.†

Rebuilding of Athens.—Treason and Death of Pausanias.—Flight of Themistocles.—Assessment of Aristides.—His Death.—Victory of Cimôn at the Eurymedon.—Peace of Cimôn.

Ol. 75, 3–82, 4. B.C. 478–449.

As soon as Greece was delivered from the presence of the Barbarians, the people of the different states returned to their homes. The Athenians forthwith (Ol. 75, 3.) set about rebuilding their city, which was now only a heap of ruins. When they commenced the walls, the Æginetans sent word to Sparta, and an embassy came thence to represent to them

* Herodotus ends his history at this point. See Appendix (C.)

† Thucyd. i. 89–117. Diod. xi. 38–47, 50, 54–62. Plut., Them., Arist. and Cimôn.

the impolicy of raising fortifications without the Isthmus, which might be to the Barbarians in their next invasion what Thebes had been to Mardonius. The true reason of this Spartan anxiety Themistocles plainly saw was jealousy and fear of the rising power of Athens; but he knew that the Peloponnesian power was too great to be resisted, and he deemed it best to have recourse to art. By his advice the Athenians said that they would send an embassy to Sparta about the affair. The envoys appointed were himself, Aristides and Abronychus. The Spartans departed; and then Themistocles, having strictly charged the people to work without ceasing at the walls, sparing neither sacred nor profane edifice for materials, set out alone for Sparta.

On his arrival he did not go near the magistrates; and to those who asked the cause he said, that he was waiting for his colleagues, and wondered much at their delay. Meantime intelligence came that the walls were greatly advanced; this he denied, and bade them not to trust to rumours, but to send some persons to ascertain the truth. He sent at the same time a private message to the Athenians, directing them to keep the ambassadors as hostages for the safety of himself and his colleagues (who were now arrived), for he feared that the Spartans might detain them. As soon as he learned that the walls were sufficiently advanced, he went to the authorities and openly told them that Athens was now walled-in, and that the Athenians were as competent judges as any of what was for their own and the general weal. The Spartans dissembled their anger, as it was now useless to show it, and the envoys were dismissed on both sides.

Having thus, with so much address, secured the independence of Athens, Themistocles advanced another step in his policy, which was to raise her to empire. Owing to him, in a great measure, she was become the first naval power of Greece, and all she wanted for maintaining her eminence was a fortified harbour. That of Phaleron, which was nearest to the city, was too small, and he had already, while archon (the year before Xerxes entered Greece), commenced securing that of

Piræus*, which was at a greater distance, but far more capacious. These works he now prevailed on the people to prosecute; and it does not appear that any opposition was made by Lacedæmôn. The wall was however raised only to one half of the height he designed, but it sufficed for all the purposes of defence, and Athens might now safely bid defiance to any power in Greece.

The Lacedæmonians sought to extend their influence in another way. They proposed, with a great appearance of justice, that such states as had *medised* should be excluded from the Amphictyonic council. Their real object was, by excluding the Thebans and Argives, to draw the chief power to themselves. Themistocles saw through their design, and it is probable privately exposed it; in public he maintained that it would be unjust to punish a state in perpetuity for the crimes of its government at a particular time. Their proposal was therefore rejected: they however soon had their revenge on Themistocles.

Athens, like almost every other Grecian state, was at all times a theatre of faction. The aristocratic party was still strong, and was supported by Sparta; the people, with their usual fickleness, were offended at being frequently reminded by Themistocles of his services, and little inclined to support him against his opponents, the chief of whom were Alcmaôn, Cimôn, and Xanthippus; the influence of Sparta was employed to ruin him, if possible; and finally, the victor at Salamis, the saviour of Greece, was ostracised! (Ol. 77, 2.)

We must now return to foreign affairs. The year after that of Platæa and Mycale, a fleet under Pausanias, the Athenian squadron being commanded by Aristides and Cimôn, sailed to Cyprus and expelled the Persians from that island. It then proceeded to the Propontis, and laid siege to Byzantium, which surrendered; and several Persians of rank were among the captives.

* *Piræus* (Πειραιεύς) is the word in the classic authors, both Greek and Latin. We doubt if *Piræus*, the word commonly employed, is to be found in any earlier prose writer than Stephanus Byzantinus. See Cic. ad Att. vii. 3.

Pausanias had not strength of mind to bear his elevation ; he became haughty and tyrannical to the allies, and began to imitate the pomp and splendour of the Orientals. He even, by means of Doriscus, an Eretrian who was settled in Asia, opened a treasonous communication with the court of Persia ; offering, if Xerxes would engage to give him one of his daughters in marriage, to reduce all Greece beneath his power. He set Doriscus over Byzantion, and one by one the Persian nobles were suffered to escape. Meantime the Ionians and others, disgusted with his haughtiness, put themselves under the Athenian admiral's command ; and the Lacedæmonians, having heard of Pausanias' conduct, recalled him for the purpose of inquiry. He was found guilty of some private offences, but there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of treason. It was resolved, however, not to entrust him again with command : Dorkis and some other Spartans were sent out with a small fleet, but the allies would not obey them. The Lacedæmonians then returned home, and their government having resolved to send out no more generals, lest, as they said, their morals should be corrupted, the maritime supremacy was tacitly surrendered to the Athenians. (Ol. 75, 4.)*.

Pausanias could not rest content in a private station. He hired some time after a trireme at Hermione, and proceeded to the Hellespont, where he renewed his negotiations with Artabazus, the Persian satrap. Soon however a herald, bearing the *scytale*†, came to command his return to Sparta. He obeyed, trusting to his wealth, and by bribery he eluded inquiry. He now turned to the helots, offering them full citizenship if they would support him in his projects. They gave information to the Ephors, but still the government hesitated.

* The period of the Athenian empire is always reckoned from this date. Clinton, Fast. Hell. a. 477. In this year the Roman Fabii settled at the Cremera.

† When a Spartan commander was sent out, two round sticks of equal size were made, one of which was given to him, the other kept at home. If any orders were to be transmitted to him, the Ephors rolled a narrow slip of paper round their stick and wrote them on it. The slip was then sent, and the general putting it on his stick read the contents. Plut. Lys. 19. It does not appear why the *scytale* was sent to Pausanias, who had no command at this time.

At length a young man named Argilius, whom he was sending with a letter to Artabazus, having observed that none of those who had been sent hitherto had returned, opened the letter, and finding in it a charge to put the bearer to death, went and showed it to the Ephors. They had now sufficient evidence; but they would hear Pausanias confess his guilt. By their direction Argilius took sanctuary in the temple of Poseidôn at Tænaron, and raised there a double hut for himself. Pausanias, hearing he was there, hastened to him; the man acknowledged what he had done; Pausanias excused himself: the Ephors who were concealed in the hut heard all and went away, resolved to seize him in the city; but one of them giving him a sign, he fled and took sanctuary at the temple of the Chalcæceus, and sheltered himself in a small building belonging to it. The Ephors, taking the roof and doors off the place he was in, built it up, and set a guard over him. When they saw him near expiring with hunger, they took him out of the sacred precincts, lest they should be polluted by death. They were going at first to fling his corpse into the Kaiadas*, but they relented and gave him decent sepulture†. (Ol. 78, 2.)

The hero of Salamis was involved in the fate of Pausanias. The Lacedæmonians found, or said they had found, proofs of his having been acquainted with his projects, and they sent envoys to Athens to accuse him. The party in power there readily listened to the charge, and persons were sent to Argos, where he was then residing, to seize him. Having had timely information, he fled to Coreyra, to the people of which island he had rendered some services. In dread of his enemies they passed him over to the opposite coast of Epeirus, and he resolved to trust himself to the magnanimity of Admêtus, king of the Molossians, though he knew him to be his enemy. Admetus being from home when he arrived, he implored the pity of the queen, and when her husband returned she gave her infant child to her guest, and bade him holding it to sit as a suppliant on the hearth, such being the most solemn mode of supplication among that people. Admetus was moved to

* Above, p. 49.

† Thuc. i. 128-134.

pity, and laid aside his enmity ; but soon came envoys from Sparta and Athens to demand him ; and the king, too generous to betray and too weak to defend him, aided him to depart and escape from his unrelenting foes. (Ol. 78, 3.)

Themistocles now saw that the Persian monarch alone could protect him. He therefore crossed the mountains to Macedonia, and coming to the port of Pydna, and finding there a merchantman ready to sail for Ionia, he got on board. A storm drove the vessel to Naxos, which an Athenian fleet under Cimôn was then besieging. Themistocles told the captain who he was, and threatened if he discovered him to say that he had bribed him to carry him to Ionia ; but assured him on the other hand that if he would save him he would find him grateful. He then desired that no one should be permitted to leave the ship. The captain assented ; the vessel lay for a day and a night off the island ; they then made sail for Ephesus, and Themistocles, having rewarded the captain, conveyed intelligence of his retreat to his friends at Athens and Argos, who sent him as much of his property as they could save ; the remainder, to the amount of eighty or one hundred talents, was confiscated. It is said that he had not been worth more than three talents when he first engaged in politics, and we have seen some instances of the manner in which he acquired this wealth.

Knowing how well Grecian exiles were received at the court of Susa, he resolved—though it is said that Xerxes had set a price of two hundred talents on his head—to proceed thither ; making little doubt that he should be able to conciliate the young Artaxerxes, who had just ascended the throne. (Ol. 78, 4.) We are told that he was secretly conveyed in a covered carriage, as if he were a Grecian female who had been purchased for some Persian noble. His reception at court was such as he had anticipated. He promised the king great advantages, but required a year's time in order to learn the Persian language, so as to be able to explain them. At the end of that time he spoke the language with ease, and he rose higher than any Greek had ever done in the royal favour. Artaxerxes,

deeming it best that he should be near the sea, sent him down to Ionia, assigning him, according to Persian usage, the revenues of Magnesia (fifty talents a year) for his bread, those of Lampsacus for his wine, and those of Myûs for his meat (*ὄψον*). It was reported that he had pledged himself to reduce Greece under the yoke of Persia, and that, finding it impossible, or being unwilling to perform his promise, he put a voluntary end to his life* ; others said that he died a natural death. A monument was raised to him in the market at Magnesia ; his bones, it is said, were by his own orders secretly brought to Attica and there interred. We are not informed of the year of his death†.

Such was the end of Themistocles, undoubtedly one of the greatest men that Greece ever produced. His character, as we have seen, was far from faultless, but nothing will remove the stain of ingratitude from the Athenian people for their treatment of him ; for questionless, as far as such an effect could be ascribed to one man, it was he who had made them what they now were. His character is thus drawn by the pen of Thucydides. "He exhibited most decidedly the strength of nature, and is in this respect far more to be admired than any other. For by native genius, without having previously or afterwards had instruction, he was with slight consideration the best judge of present affairs, and the best guesser at the turn which future matters would take. What he had in hand, he could execute ; of that with which he was unacquainted, he could form a good judgement. He clearly foresaw the good or ill of what was as yet hidden ; and, in one word, by the force of nature and quickness of thought he was qualified better than any other to act at once when it was required‡."

* By drinking bull's blood, according to the common belief at Athens in the next half-century. See Aristoph. *Knights*, 83, 84.

† Thuc. i. 135-138. Plutarch in his usual manner adds a variety of romantic circumstances.

‡ The reader will observe that we rarely relate anecdotes from Plutarch : the truth is, we put little faith in them. Thus he says that Themistocles' father took him, and pointing to the old triremes that were lying to rot on the beach, told him that so the people treated their demagogues. Now, as this must have been in the time of the Peisistratids, Athens could hardly as

Aristeides and Cimôn were meantime actively engaged in laying the foundation of the future power and dignity of Athens. When the Greeks of the isles and of the coast of Asia had agreed to place themselves under the command of the Athenians, and to continue the war, it was necessary to determine what share of the burden each should bear. The task of regulating it was committed to Aristeides, and he decided that some of the allies, such as the Chians, should keep a certain number of ships at sea, while others should contribute an annual sum of money. This sum, which he assessed in so equitable a manner that it became the theme of praise to succeeding ages, amounted to 460 talents. The treasury for these contributions (*φόρος*) was in the sacred isle of Delos, where deputies of the allies met to consult: the treasurers, named Greek-treasurers (*Ἑλληνοταμίαι*), were Athenians. This was the foundation of the Thalassocracy or naval dominion of Athens. We must guard against the error of supposing that the Athenians acquired the supremacy over Greece in general. Sparta was supreme in the Peloponnese, as before; the rest of Greece was independent of both. As the Athenians and most of their allies were of the Ionian race, and their rivals the Spartans and their confederates of the Dorian, historians fell also into the incorrect habit of regarding all the Greeks as adhering to the Dorian or the Ionian principle and party.

Some years after (Ol. 78, 1.)* Aristeides died, so poor it is said that he had to be buried at the public cost, and the state undertook to provide for his children. If we may credit an anecdote given by Plutarch, his right to the title of *Just* might be contested. He tells us that on some occasion the allies all swore to some matter in the most solemn manner, Aristeides swearing on the part of the Athenians. Some time after it appeared to be for the interest of the Athenians not to keep the oath, and Aristeides told them to act for their advantage, leaving the guilt of the perjury to fall on him. Again, it is

yet have had demagogues. Themistocles himself was the first person, not a genuine Eupatrid, who rose to importance in the state.

* The year of the birth of Socrates.

said, that when the Athenians talked of removing the treasure from Delos to Athens, and the Samians remonstrated, Aristides replied, that doubtless it was not just, but it was advantageous. In a word, says Theophrastus of him, in private and domestic matters he was perfectly upright, in public affairs he acted for the advantage of his country, which often required injustice.

Aristides was the agent in giving further advance to the democracy. In consequence of the destruction of their property during the Persian invasion, the weight and influence of the upper ranks were greatly diminished, while the inferior classes had merited so well of their country in the war, and had in consequence become of such influence in the state, that the very highest honours could no longer be with safety withheld from them*. Aristides therefore was the author of a decree opening the archontate—now however nothing but a splendid pageant—to all citizens, subject of course to the Dokimasy and Euthyne.

Under the guidance of Athens the war against the Persians was continued. Cimôn (Ol. 76, 1.) sailed with a fleet to the coast of Thrace, and laid siege to Eïôn on the Strymôn. The Persian garrison made a gallant defence; and finally Boges, the governor, rather than surrender, cast all his gold and silver into the river; and having raised a huge pile of wood, slew his wives, children and slaves, and laid their bodies on it; then setting fire to it, he flung himself into the flames: the garrison surrendered at discretion†. Doriscus was attacked in vain, but all the other Persian garrisons in Europe were reduced. Cimôn then, as executor of an Amphictyonic decree, turned his arms against the piratic Dolopians of the isle of Scyros, whom he expelled, and filled the island with Athenian colonists. On this occasion he sought and found (as was supposed) the bones of the hero Theseus, who had died in this island eight hundred years before; and he brought them in his own trireme to Athens,—an act which gained him great favour with the people‡.

* Arist. Pol. ii. 8.

† Herod. vii. 107.

‡ Plut. Thes. 36. Cimôn, 8. It was probably a political artifice of the aristocratic party to excite in the minds of the people a veneration for the

By this time some of the confederates were grown weary of war, and began to murmur at the toils and expense to which it put them. The people of Naxos were the first who positively refused to contribute any longer; but the Athenians, who had tasted of the sweets of command, would not now permit the exercise of free will to their allies. Cimôn appeared (Ol. 78, 3.) with a large fleet before Naxos; the Naxians defended themselves with vigour, but were at length forced to submit, and the Athenians had the hardihood to reduce them to the condition of subjects to Athens!—an example which they soon followed in other cases. For most of those allies who were to give personal service agreed, in order to escape being taken from their homes, to give money and empty ships instead of service. Thus the Athenian navy increased greatly, and an irresistible force could at once be brought against any state that hesitated to obey or withheld its contribution.

After the reduction of Naxos, Cimôn sailed over to the coast of Asia, and learning that the Persian generals had assembled a large fleet and army in Pamphylia, he collected a fleet of two hundred triremes at Cnidos, with which he proceeded to the coast of that country, and laid siege to the city of Phaselis, which, though Greek, obeyed the Persian monarch. Having reduced it to submission, he resolved to proceed and attack the Persian fleet and army, which he learned were lying at the river Eurymedôn. On his arrival, the Persian fleet, of three hundred and fifty triremes, fearing at first to fight till eighty Phœnician vessels which they were expecting should come up, kept in the river; but finding that the Greeks were preparing to attack, they put out to sea and engaged them. The action did not continue long: the Barbarians fled to the land; and two hundred of their ships were taken or destroyed. Without a moment's delay, Cimôn debarked his men, and led them against the land-forces; the resistance of the Persians was obstinate for some time, but at last they turned and fled, leaving their

ancient institutions of the state. The relics were deposited in the centre of the city and a temple erected to the hero on the spot, which became a place of refuge for slaves and all the other victims of oppression.

camp a prey to the conquerors; and Cimon had thus the rare glory of having gained two important victories in the one day. Hearing then that the eighty Phœnician vessels were at Hydros in the isle of Cyprus, he immediately sailed thither, and took or destroyed the whole of them.

The victory at the Eurymedon may be regarded as the termination of the conflict between Greece and Persia. The year after it (OL. 78, 4.), Xerxes was assassinated, and the usual confusion took place in the court of Susa. It is said* that some years afterwards (OL. 82, 4.) a treaty, named the Peace of Cimon, was concluded between the Athenians and king Artaxerxes, of which the conditions were these: the Greek cities in Asia should be independent; no Persian ship of war should appear in the seas from the Cyanean isles at the entrance of the Bosphorus in the Euxine to the Chelidonian isles off the coast of Pamphylia; no Persian commander should lead an army within that space nearer to the coast than a day's journey for a horse (*i. e.* 300 stadia): the Athenians on their side should not molest the King's territory†.

CHAPTER XIV.

Constitutions of Thessaly, Bœotia, and other parts of Greece.—Military and Naval Affairs.—Literature.

WITH the glorious conclusion of the war with Persia we terminate the first period of Grecian history. The spirit of independence, arms and armour of greater size and strength, superior discipline, and perhaps higher mental endowments and greater physical force, enabled the Greeks to evince that superiority which the Europeans have always shown in their conflicts with the Asiatics. Henceforth the court of Persia

* Diodor. xii. 4: Plut. Cimon, 13.

† See Appendix (D.)

abandoned all thoughts of attempting the subjugation of Europe.

We have denominated this the Aristocratic period, because, until the close of it, the political power in all the states of Greece was in the hands of the nobles, or those possessed of hereditary wealth and consideration. The people at length in some states had, chiefly in consequence of trade, risen in power and consequence; and the aristocracy, as is its nature, had shrunk to an oligarchy, which had lost the noble, generous feelings of the old aristocracy, and was cruel and oppressive where it had the power; the people, on the other hand, became insolent, tyrannic, and unjust. The next division of our history will present the ceaseless struggle of these two opposite and hostile principles. Sparta, Tegea, Bœotia, and Thessaly are the chief seats of oligarchy; Athens, Argos, Mantinea, Megara, and Elis, those of democracy.

The constitutions of Sparta and Athens, the heads of these principles, have been already displayed. We will now briefly notice those of the states next in importance, and conclude with a sketch of the military affairs and the literature of this period.

The Thesprotians, when they made the conquest of Thessaly, reduced a part of the original inhabitants to a serfship similar to the Laconian Helotism. The Thessalian serfs were named Penests (Πενέσται*); they tilled the lands, on conditions similar to those of the Helots; like them, too, they were employed as light troops in war. But the main strength of Thessaly lay in its cavalry, composed of the nobles, who appeared in complete panoply on strong war-horses. No part of Greece it may be observed presents such a resemblance to Europe in the middle ages as Thessaly. Among the Thessalian nobles some families exercised a preponderating influence: such were the Aleuads of Larissa and the Scopads of Crannôn, who were *dynasts* (δύνασται†), or princes in the country. As the cities

* From *πένωμαι* to be poor.

† This word is mostly used in a bad sense. Arist. Pol. vi. 5.

of Latium chose a Dictator to command their united forces in war, so the Thessalian nobles appointed one of their number for that purpose, under the name of Tagos (Ταγός), or *regulator*. There was a Demos in Thessaly, similar, it would seem, to the Laconian Pericecians, but treated with less consideration, and therefore always disposed to revolt.

The principal towns of Bœotia were united in a military federation, at the head of which were officers named Bœotarchs. Thebes had the *hegemony* (ἡγεμονία), or supremacy; and most of the towns, particularly Orchomenus and Thebes, were oligarchic. The government of Thespiæ, the enemy of Thebes, was in the hands of the ancient nobility of the family of the Thespiads, whose rule was mild and paternal. Plataea, to escape the oppression of Thebes, put herself, as we have seen, under the protection of Athens.

Argos had at one time extended her hegemony over the whole of Argolis and Sicyôn and Phliûs: but with the aid of Sparta the towns had all shaken it off. After her great defeat by Cleomenes, several of the Pericecian towns, such as Cleônæ, Mideia and Mycenæ, strove to become independent. When the Argives succeeded in reducing any of these towns, they removed the inhabitants to Argos, giving them rights of citizenship. This practice, hatred of Sparta, and close union with Athens, quickened the development of the democratic principle at Argos.

The aristocracy in Elis having become an oppressive oligarchy, a *synœcism* (συννοικισμός), or union of several of the small towns, was effected (Ol. 77, 2.), and the city of Elis formed from them*. Democracy in consequence rapidly advanced; but as the Eleians were of all the Greeks the most devoted to a country life, and the practice was introduced of sending judges through the land, which kept the people from resorting to the town, they long escaped the curse of *ochlocracy*, or mob-rule.

Tegea and Mantinea, standing in the same elevated plain, were, the one oligarchic and allied with Sparta, the other democratic and connected with Argos, with whose aid it effected

* Diod. xi. 54. Strab. viii. p. 336.

a union (*synœcism*) of its four rural communities with the chief town*,—a measure which necessarily strengthened the democratic principle.

Megara, even before the Persian war, gave Greece the first example of a wild ochlocracy, which was naturally succeeded by an oligarchy, when the persons of rank and wealth rallied against the rabble†.

The military condition of Greece at this time was as follows.

The hoplites (*ὀπλῖται*), or fully-armed soldiers, were the main strength of the Grecian armies. These were the militia of the different towns, composed entirely of those who had property to defend, and who served without pay, finding their own arms, equipments, and provisions. Most towns had a list (*κατάλογος*) of the citizens from the age of eighteen to sixty, who were bound to serve as hoplites, and they were called out when required according to their place in this catalogue. The arms of the hoplite were the same as those used in the heroic age. The inferior citizens and the serfs (in the states which had such) served as light troops (*ψιλοὶ*), that is, as archers, slingers, and dartmen. The Thessalians, Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians alone at this time had cavalry in their armies.

The usual mode of drawing up troops was *in phalanx*, that is, in a close body, the depth and breadth varying according to custom or circumstances. In a confederate army, as at Plataea, the troops of each state occupied separate ground. The troops of the same state were, as at Marathôn, placed according to their phyles, or similar political divisions. The Spartans were divided into six *moræ* (*μόραι*), or regiments which varied in strength from 400 to 900 men‡, according to the number of men called out: each mora was divided into four *lochi* (*λόχοι*), or companies. The mora was commanded by a Polemarch. The Lacedæmonian Pericæcians, and also the Neodamods, were probably arranged in a similar manner.

Before engaging, the Greeks always offered sacrifices, and

* Xen. Hell. v. 2. 7. Strab. *ut sup.*

† Arist. Pol. iv. 12; v. 2. 4. See above, p. 66.

‡ Plut. Pelop. 17.

they did not give battle till the soothsayer had declared the signs in the entrails of the victim favourable. Similar sacrifices were made, especially by the Spartans, previous to passing their frontiers on any military expedition. It is natural to suppose that there was usually an understanding between the general and the soothsayer, and that the signs were declared to be favourable or the reverse as suited the plans and intentions of the commander. After a victory, a *trophy* (τροπαῖον) of wood, hung with arms, was erected, and the enemies' dead were restored on their sending a herald to demand them. In a naval victory the wrecks of the enemies' vessels were carried off.

The ships of the Greeks of the early ages were undecked, and served merely for passage. The Phocians are said to have made the first *long ships*, as they were called: these were the *pentecontors*, or fifty-oared vessels, twenty-five rowers at a side. The Erythræans first constructed vessels with two benches of oars; and finally (Ol. 19, 1.) the Corinthian Ameinocles built for the Samians *triremes* (τρίηρεις)*, or war-galleys with three benches of oars. These ships were decked; and their crews, composed of rowers, sailors and marines, usually amounted to 200 men, of which the marines (ἐπιβάραι) formed by much the smallest portion†. The trireme had at its head a strong beak of metal, and one of the principal manœuvres in a sea-fight was to strike the enemy's ships in the side with this beak, and thus sink them. The earliest sea-fight on record is one between the Corinthians and their colonists of Coreyra. (Ol. 28, 2.)‡.

At the head of the literature of Greece stand the wonderful Homeric poems, which record the manners and ideas of the heroic age, and which were to the Greeks of all times their most precious heritage and most valued records. Whether these poems, which were written in the Ionic dialect, and were evidently composed on the coast of Asia, are the production of one or of many minds; whether they were originally written, or

* The captain of a trireme was called a *trierarch* (τριεράρχης).

† The number in an Athenian trireme seldom exceeded ten. See Arnold on Thuc. iii. 95.

‡ Thuc. i. 13.

were transmitted orally for centuries ; how far they may be regarded as possessing a claim to historic credibility,—are questions which engage, and long perhaps will engage, the attention of the learned. In any case, we possess in them a faithful picture of the manners of ancient Greece and a source of the highest enjoyment of which the human kind is capable.

Beside the Homeric poems, the Greeks of this age possessed those of the poets named *Cyclic* *. Of these, whose works have all perished, the following were the principal. Stasinus, of Cyprus, who sang in a poem of eleven books, named the *Cypria*, the events of the Trojan war anterior to the action of the *Ilias*. Arctinus of Miletus, the poet of the *Æthiopis*, which related in five books the expedition and death of Memnôn at Troy : he also composed the *Destruction of Troy*, another poem of two books. Lesches of Mytilêne, who, in the *Little Ilias*, sang in four books the events from the contest of Ulysses and Ajax to the building of the wooden horse. Agias, who related in five books the returns of the chiefs from Troy ; and Eugammôn, who sang in the *Telegonia*, in two books, the story of Ulysses after his return. There were also poems on the adventures of Hercules, Theseus, and other heroes.

Hesiod, of Ascra, in Bœotia, gave the earliest example of didactic poetry in his *Works and Days*. He also sang the *Theogony*, or origin of the gods and the world ; and the heroes and heroines of ancient days were celebrated in his verses, which were sung at festivals, like those of Homer.

Tyrtæus animated the Spartans in the Messenian wars by his spirit-stirring strains. Theognis and Solôn, Mimnermus and Simonides gave lessons of moral wisdom in their *Elegies*. The lyric muse animated Alcman, Terpander, Alcæus, Stesichorus, Ibycus, Anacreôn, and others, and the poetesses Sappho, Erinna, and Corinna ; and finally, in Pindar revealed her utmost strength. The drama, perhaps of immemorial use in Attica †,

* They were so named because their poems were formed with the *Ilias* and *Odyssey* into a cycle (κύκλος) extending from the beginning of the world to the death of Ulysses. See *Mythology of Greece and Italy*, p. 28. 2nd edit.

† It is so asserted by the author of the Socratic dialogue named *Minos*, § 16.

rose into dignity toward the time of the Persian wars: Thespis so far improved it as to pass for its inventor; Phrynichus, famed for the natural charms and sweetness of his lyric choruses, raised it to a still higher degree of perfection: following, perhaps, the ancient usage of the drama, he presented on the scene the recent capture of Miletus (Ol. 71, 3.), and the party which had prevented the people from giving more effectual aid caused him to be fined one thousand drachmas and the piece to be suppressed*. Æschylus, who was destined to raise the drama to its utmost point of sublime perfection, had already (Ol. 70, 2.) presented his first piece. This warrior-bard fought at Marathôn, Salamis and Plataea, and (Ol. 77, 1.) he brought on the stage before the triumphant Athenians the flight of Xerxes after the defeat of Salamis. In vigour, sublimity, and all the higher qualities of poetry, the dramas of Æschylus remain, and ever will remain, unsurpassed and rarely approached.

These poets, with few exceptions, breathe the tone and spirit of genuine and high-souled aristocracy. They inculcate veneration for religion and the gods; they inspire respect for law and for ancient institutions; virtue, both public and private, is the theme of their praise; high birth, attended by suitable deeds, is extolled; the pomp and splendour of courts, and the liberal hospitality of princes and nobles, meet their due encomiums; and many of the lyrists inculcate the precepts of a philosophy akin to that afterwards taught in the gardens of Epicûrus.

Philosophy toward the close of this period rose in Ionica above the simple moral wisdom and personified cosmogonies of the elder times. Thales, Anaximander, Xenophanes, and above all Pythagoras, taught the wisdom which they are supposed to have learned in the East. Their dogmas, however, fall not within the province of history. The papyrus of Egypt now supplying a more abundant material than had yet been enjoyed for writing, histories began to be composed in prose, verse having been the vehicle in which the memory of events

* Herod. vi. 21.

had hitherto been preserved. The names of Hecataëus of Miletus, Charôn of Lampsacus, and others, and a few short fragments of their works have reached us, but no contemporary narrative of the events of this period remains, and our chief or only authority is Herodotus, who was born only four years before the passage of Xerxes into Greece. His honest narrative was mostly derived from hearsay and report, and the reader must have observed the mythic tinge which pervades it*.

* We have also, as we have seen, Diodorus, Justin, and the Lives of Plutarch and Nepos ; but they drew from Herodotus, or authorities posterior to him.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II. DEMOCRATIC PERIOD.

Ol. 78, 4-103, 4. B.C. 465-361.

CHAPTER I.*

State of Greece.—Revolt of the Messenians.—War of Athens with Ægina and Corinth.—Battles of Tanagra and Œnophyta.—Athenian Expedition to Egypt.—Battle of Coroneia.—Conquest of Samos.—Power of the Athenians.—Influence of Pericles.

Ol. 78, 4-85, 1. B.C. 465-440.

THE portion of Grecian history which we now enter on will differ from the preceding in many points. It will present Greece in a state of intestine commotion, turning her forces against herself; and the events transmitted by the pens of contemporaries will exhibit the perfect lineaments of truth†. Not only Greece in general, but every single state and town (Sparta excepted), will be divided into two opposite and hostile factions‡,—the aristocratic, or, in the majority of cases,

* Thuc. i. 100-117. Diodor. xi. 63-65, 70, 74-88; xii. 1-7, 27, 28. Plut. Cimôn and Pericles.

† How few of the events of even the Persian wars can be regarded as strictly true!

‡ Hence when any change of policy takes place in any state or town, we

oligarchic, and the democratic; and the foreground of the piece will, during the greater part of the period, be occupied by the brilliant democracy of Athens, to be succeeded after an interval by that of Thebes. Hence we denominate this the Democratic Period of Grecian history.

Athens was at this time, like the other states, divided into two parties. At the head of the aristocracy stood Cimôn, the son of the victor at Marathôn; Pericles, son of him who prosecuted Miltiades and conquered at Mycale, was the leader of the democracy. Cimôn, who had recovered his estates in the Chersonese and had had a large share of the plunder of the war, was extremely rich; and he employed his wealth so as to keep up and extend his influence in the state. He built at his own expense the south wall of the Acropolis, and commenced those which were to connect the city with her ports. He laid out and planted the garden named the Academy, and planted the market with plane-trees. The citizens were all at liberty to walk and gather fruit in his gardens and grounds near the town. As he went about, followed by his well-dressed slaves, if he met an elderly citizen badly clad, he made one of them take off his cloak and give it to him, and he lent or gave money to any whom he knew to be in need. His rival, inferior in wealth, trod a different path to popularity*.

Cimôn and his party were anxious to keep up the friendly union with Sparta which had subsisted in old times. But the condition of Athens was now so much altered that harmony was not to be maintained, and an occasion of enmity soon presented itself.

The people of the isle of Thasos conceived that they had a right to the ports and gold-mines on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which the Athenians had taken possession, as they had been originally their property. But might was right, now as ever,

are to infer at once that the party opposed to the one previously in power had gotten the upper hand. We request the reader to keep this constantly in mind.

* Theopomp. *ap.* Athen. xii. 533. Plut. Cim. 10.

in the councils of Athens ; and Cimôn appeared (Ol. 78, 4.)* with a fleet to end their murmurs and make them pay their tribute. He defeated them at sea, landed, and ravaged the island and laid siege to the town. After holding out three years the Thasians submitted, pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, paid a large sum of money, and resigned all claim to the ports and mines of Thrace. During the siege of Thasos the Athenians sent ten thousand colonists from their own and the allied states to that country, and settled them at a place called the Nine Roads (Ἐννέα ἰδοί), afterwards Amphipolis. But shortly after, these colonists venturing too far into the interior, were nearly all cut to pieces by the Thracian tribes†.

The Thasians in their distress had implored the Lacedæmonians to aid them by invading Attica, and they were on the point of secretly sending an army thither, when (Ol. 79, 1.) a tremendous earthquake occurred, which destroyed the whole city of Sparta except five houses, and a great number of the inhabitants. The Messenians who had been reduced to Helotism, seized the opportunity for vengeance and revolt ; they were joined by a part of the other Helots, and by the Thuriate and Æthæan Pericecians, and Ithome became once more their stronghold. The Spartans in their need called on their Peloponnesian allies for aid, which was readily given ; but their united forces not being able to reduce Ithome, the Athenians were applied to as being skilled in sieges. The leaders of the anti-Laconic party at Athens were for refusing aid, but Cimôn's influence prevailed, and he himself appeared with an Athenian force at the foot of Ithome. An assault having been tried without effect, the system of blockade was resorted to ; but the Lacedæmonians, jealous or suspicious of their Athenian allies, under pretext of themselves and their other friends being quite sufficient for the blockade, declined their further services. (Ol. 79, 4.) The Athenians retired in indignation. Cimôn's opponents soon after (Ol. 80, 2.) succeeded in having him ostracised ; and notwithstanding their *medism*, an alliance

* The year after his victory at the Eurymedôn.

† Thuc. iv. 102.

was formed with the Argives, the hereditary foes of Sparta, and also with the Thessalians. The Megarians soon after, offended with the Lacedæmonians, who allowed the Corinthians to harass them, joined the Athenians and put into their hands their port of Nisæa (which the Athenians united by long walls to the city of Megara), and that of Pegæ on the Corinthian gulf.

The alliance with Megara brought on a war with Corinth and her allies. (Ol. 80, 3.) Some Athenian troops which landed at Haliæ on the Acte were defeated by the Corinthians and Epidaurians; but the Athenians gained a naval victory off Cephallæia in the Saronic gulf. A great naval action was then fought between the Athenians and the Æginetans, and their allies on both sides, in which the latter were defeated with the loss of seventy triremes. The Athenians landed and laid siege to the town; three hundred hoplites passed over from Corinth and Epidaurus to its relief, and the Corinthians and their allies invaded Megaris, thinking that as one part of the Athenian forces was at Ægina, and another at a still greater distance, they either could not relieve it, or to do so must leave Ægina. But the heroism which now animated the Athenians extended to all ages. Myronides, an able general, set out for Megara at the head of an army of old men and boys. An indecisive battle was fought; but as the Corinthians retired after it, the Athenians raised a trophy. The Corinthians, being reproached for their cowardice at home, returned after twelve days and began to erect a trophy; the Athenians came out of Megara and killed those who were raising it, and defeated a party who came to their aid. As they were flying, a part of them inadvertently got into a piece of ground inclosed by a deep ditch, with but one entrance. The Athenians coming up, placed their hoplites at this entrance, and then surrounding the place with slingers, stoned to death every one who was in it.

The revolt of the Messenians seems to have kept the Lacedæmonians from sharing in the war which was going on: but when at this time (Ol. 80, 4.) the Phocians attacked their little parent-state of Doris, filial piety led them to her aid. With fifteen hundred hoplites of their own, and ten thousand

of their allies, they appeared in Phocis and reduced its people to submission. The presence of this army in Bœotia inspired the Thebans with the idea of recovering the supremacy which they had lost; and the Lacedæmonians, glad to form a counterpoise to the Athenians, made an alliance with them. The Athenian oligarchs also sent secretly to secure the co-operation of the Peloponnesian army; but the democratic party, which now governed, were on their side vigilant and prepared. The Peloponnesians therefore could not leave Bœotia, for the Athenians guarded Mount Geraneia at the Isthmus, and their fleet at Pegæ commanded the Corinthian gulf. An army also was collected to attack, and if possible destroy, the Peloponnesians. The Athenians gave all their disposable forces; and, with their allies and one thousand Argives, the army numbered fourteen thousand hoplites; and a body of cavalry came from Thessaly. A battle was fought at Tanagra, in which, owing chiefly to the defection of the Thessalians, the victory remained with the Lacedæmonians, who entered Megaris, and, as was the usage of war, cut down all the fruit-trees, and then returned home by the Isthmus, which was now unguarded.

The battle of Tanagra was fought in the month of November; and sixty-two days after, Myronides the Athenian general engaged the Bœotians at a place named Cœnophyta, in the plain of Tanagra, and completely routed them. The walls of Tanagra were thrown down, the Athenian interest gained strength throughout Bœotia, and the power of Thebes was lowered*. The same took place in Phocis, and the Opuntian Locrians were forced to give one hundred of their principal men as hostages to the Athenians. Thus this glorious campaign of Myronides rendered the Athenian power supreme without the Isthmus, and in this same year (Ol. 81, 1.) the Æginetans agreed to demolish their walls, surrender their ships,

* Aristotle (Pol. v. 2.) says that after this battle the democracy at Thebes was overturned (by the aristocrats) in consequence of its bad management. That event would rather seem to have taken place after the battle of Coroneia, and the democracy to have been established after this of Cœnophyta.

and pay tribute. Further to confirm the Athenian power, their Long Walls, the one extending to Piræus, the other to Phaleron, were completed, and Athens had thus little to fear from her foes. A fleet and troops under Tolmidas, one of her annual generals, sailed round the Peloponnese (Ol. 81, 2.), burned Gythion the naval arsenal of the Lacedæmonians, took the Corinthian town of Chalcis in Ætolia, and landing in Sicyôn defeated those who came to oppose them.

Among the conquests made by Tolmidas in this expedition, was that of Naupactus on the Crissæan gulf, which had belonged to the Ozolian Locrians. As the Messenians, after gallantly sustaining a blockade of ten years, had at length come to an agreement with the besiegers, by which they were to quit the Peloponnese, the Athenians gave them their recent conquest of Naupactus for an abode, where they and their posterity continued to dwell till happier times arrived.

While victory was thus crowning the arms of Athens, Pericles provided for her indigent citizens by founding numerous colonies. He sent five hundred *cleruchs* (κλήρουχοι), or colonists, to Naxos, two hundred and fifty to Andros, one thousand to the Chersonese, an equal number to the country of the Bisaltians in Thrace, and another large body to Eubœa*. These colonists resembled those of the Romans† rather than those of the early Greeks; they served as garrisons in the places where they were settled; the colonists were still Athenian citizens, and might even reside at Athens, letting their lands to the original owners‡. That the colonies served greatly to maintain the power of Athens there can be little doubt; it is equally clear that, as the instances of Naxos and Andros show, the rules of justice were little heeded in the acquisition of the territories which they occupied.

It has been already hinted that a part of the Athenian forces were all this time away from home: they were in fact in Egypt! A Libyan prince named Inarôs had (Ol. 80, 1.) made

* Plut. Per. 11. Diod. xi. 88.

† Hist. of Rome, p. 65.

‡ In this lay the difference between the original Greek colony (ἀποικία) and the Athenian *cleruchy* (κληρουχία).

himself master of a part of Lower Egypt, where the Persian yoke was felt oppressive. To strengthen himself, he invited the Athenians who were at Cyprus, with two hundred triremes of their own and their allies, to come to his aid. They accepted the invitation, and sailing up the Nile, made themselves master of two-thirds of the city of Memphis; the other third was still held by the Persians and their Egyptian friends. King Artaxerxes, when he heard of this act of the Athenians, sent money to the Lacedæmonians to engage them to make an irruption into Attica; but they had enough on their hands already, and could not stir. He then sent an army to Egypt, which defeated the Egyptians and their Greek allies. These last were driven out of Memphis, and retiring to an island of the Nile, held out there for a year and a half; till the Persians, having turned off the water, got over to the island to attack them. A few escaped, and made their way to Cyrene; the rest perished: Inarôs was taken and crucified. Fifty triremes which were coming as a relief having entered the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and being assailed by land and by water, were nearly all destroyed. (Ol. 81, 2.) And thus terminated this ill-fated expedition.

The great efforts which the Athenians had made having exhausted them in some measure, they felt desirous of repose. Immediately after the defeat at Tanagra, the people, it is said*, fearing an invasion of Attica, resolved to bring back Cimôn, and Pericles himself proposed the decree for his recall. He returned to his native city, and through him some time after a truce for five years was made with the Lacedæmonians. (Ol. 82, 3.)† About the same time a peace for thirty years was concluded between Lacedæmon and Argos.

Meantime the war against the Barbarians was continued, and a fleet of two hundred Athenian triremes put to sea under the command of Cimôn, who sailed to Cyprus, where he laid siege to the town of Citium; at the same time he despatched

* Plut. Cim. 17.

† In this year the Decemvirate was formed at Rome. The three Roman senators had been sent to Athens in Ol. 82, 1.

sixty triremes to Egypt, to the aid of one Amyrtæus, who was holding out against the Persians in the marshes of the Delta. But Cimôn died (Ol. 82, 4.) before Cition; and a scarcity of provisions being felt, the siege was given up, and the fleet, joined by the triremes from Egypt, sailed homewards. As the Athenians were passing by Salamis, on the coast of Cyprus, they met a fleet of Phœnician and Cilician ships, which they engaged and defeated by land and by sea*.

In this year also, on occasion of a dispute between the Delphians and the Phocians as to which should have the care of the temple and its treasures, the Lacedæmonians sent an army and gave them to the former; but as soon as they were gone, Pericles led thither an Athenian army and put the Phocians in possession. Of this the Lacedæmonians took no notice. The right of *Promanty*, or first consulting the oracle, which had been given to Sparta by the Delphians, was now assigned to Athens by the Phocians; and this honour, which was of political importance, was probably a chief cause of the interference of both states.

As the Athenians had given the upper hand to the democratic party in Bœotia, there was of course a large number of the opposite party in exile. These had made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other places, and if not checked in time might greatly endanger the Athenian influence. Tolmidas, therefore (Ol. 83, 2.), led an army and took and garrisoned Chæroneia; but as he was returning, he was attacked at Coroneia by the exiles from Orchomenus, joined by those of Eubœa and their other friends. Tolmidas fell himself in the action, and his troops were all slain or made prisoners. The Athenians, fearing a general war, agreed to a treaty, by which, on their prisoners being restored, they evacuated Bœotia. The exiles returned to their several towns, and things were placed on their old footing. So transient is this species of dominion!

Some time after (Ol. 83, 4.) Eubœa revolted; and while

* The celebrated Peace of Cimôn, as it is called, is said to have been made at this time. Diod. xii. 4.

Pericles was at the head of an army reducing it, the party in Megara adverse to Athens rose and massacred all the Athenian garrisons except that of Nisæa. Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians came to their aid; and the Peloponnesians, led by Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, one of the Spartan kings, entered and wasted the plain of Eleusis. Pericles led back his army from Eubœa; he easily found means to induce the enemy to retire without fighting*: and he then returned and reduced that island, where he expelled the people of Hestîæa, and gave their lands to Athenian colonists. The Athenians, however, being unwilling to risk the chance of war with the Dorian confederacy, gladly agreed to a truce for thirty years, surrendering Nisæa and Pegæ, and withdrawing a garrison which they had in Trœzên, and ceasing to interfere in Achaia. The real weakness of Athens as a land-power is thus apparent; she had grasped at empire beyond her strength, and her hold on it was therefore a feeble one.

About five years after this truce (Ol. 85, 1.), the Milesians and Samians went to war for the possession of Priene, and the former, having the worst of it, called on the Athenians to interfere. Pericles sailed with a fleet of forty Athenian triremes to Samos, where a democracy was established, and fifty men and as many youths of the aristocratic party were taken as hostages and placed in Lemnos, and a garrison was left in Samos. But the Samians, who had fled, having concerted measures with their friends in the island, and being aided by Pissuthnes, the Persian governor of Sardes, passed over to Samos in the night, and having overcome the popular party and contrived to steal their hostages away from Lemnos, delivered the Athenian garrison up to Pissuthnes and revolted. The Byzantines joined in the revolt, and they prepared to attack the Milesians.

As soon as the news reached Athens sixty triremes put to

* Namely, by bribing Cleandridas, whom the Ephors had sent out with the young king as his tutor and adviser. The transaction being discovered, sentence of death was passed on Cleandridas, who had taken to flight, and Pleistoanax was fined so heavily that he found it necessary to quit his country. Plut. Per. 22.

sea, sixteen of which went, some to Caria to oppose the Phœnicians, others to summon aid from Chios and Lesbos. Pericles* sailed to Samos with the remaining forty-four, and engaging a Samian fleet of seventy triremes defeated it. Being joined by forty vessels from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, he landed his troops and invested the town of Samos by land and by sea. Soon after, hearing that the Phœnician fleet was approaching, he sailed with sixty triremes to the coast of Caria; and the Samians taking advantage of his absence ventured out, and defeating the fleet that remained, became masters of the sea for the space of fourteen days, and brought in such supplies as they required. But Pericles returned; sixty triremes more came from Athens, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians, having ventured a slight action at sea, were again shut up, and after a blockade of eight months they yielded on the usual conditions of demolishing their walls, giving hostages, surrendering their ships, and paying the expenses of the war. The Byzantines also were glad to make their peace.

Here let us pause, and survey the power of Athens abroad and her condition at home at this period.

The comic poet Aristophanes† gives one thousand as the number of the places subject to Athens. This is doubtless an exaggeration, but still it proves the number to have been very great. She ruled over Ægina, Eubœa, all the Cyclades and Sporades, except Melos and Thera, the isles and towns on the coast of Thrace and along the Propontis and Bosphorus, Sinôpe and some other towns in the Pontus, where she had succeeded to the power of the Milesians, nearly all the towns and islands of the west coast of Asia Minor, and some towns of Lycia. She had Naupactus in the Corinthian gulf; and the isles of Cephallenia and Zacynthus in the Ionian sea, and she had lately sent a colony

* The poet Sophocles was joined in command with Pericles on this occasion. Strabo, xiv. p. 638. He was indebted for this honour to his tragedy *Antigone*.

† Wasps, 707 *et seq.*

to Thurii on the coast of Italy*. The democratic party in every state of Greece looked up to her as their protector.

The condition of these subject-states was different. Chios and Lesbos, which had never agreed to give money instead of men, were independent, and regarded as allies. That of Naxos and Eubœa was the worst, as the lands were in the hands of Athenian colonists, and the people were nearly in a state of Pericæism. The other towns and islands annually paid their share of the contribution, which the Athenians had now arbitrarily raised to six hundred talents†, and had removed the treasury to Athens. Sixty Athenian triremes, in which the citizens served by turns, were constantly at sea, ready to fall on any town that wavered in its obedience. Resistance was hopeless; the Athenian power was, as Thucydides truly terms it, a *tyranny*, and was exercised without mercy. The people of these subject-towns were obliged to bring not merely their public but their private causes to be tried in the Athenian tribunals, as this brought money into the purses of the now sovereign people, in the form of rent for their houses, hire for their slaves, and pay to themselves as jurors; and the decision of the causes was therefore delayed as much as possible. In a word, a more unjustly oppressive dominion has never been seen than this of Athens over her confederates: but history testifies, that one of the greatest and most capricious of tyrants is a sovereign democracy, or rather, as a general principle, that uncontrolled power is tyranny.

* Ol. 84, 2. The historian Herodotus was one of the colonists.

† If the war with Persia ended as it did, in Ol. 82, 4. (whether by the peace of Cimôn or not is a matter of no importance), what further right had the Athenians to collect contributions, much less to raise their amount? Their injustice and tyranny in so doing is only paralleled by the impudence of Pericles, who told them that they were not bound to give the allies any account of the money, as they defended them against the Barbarians, and it was no business of theirs if the Athenians chose to spend it in embellishing their city. Plut. Per. 12. Not a single talent, however, was spent in war against the Barbarians after the death of Cimôn; the only value the allies got for their money was, that the Athenians for their own sake kept down piracy in the Ægæan, and they shared in the advantage of this state of security.

The constitution of Solôn, even when altered by Cleisthenes, was, as it is called, in essence aristocratic : Aristides had rendered it somewhat more democratic. But the great changes were made at the present time by Pericles, who, to gratify his own ambition, introduced the wild unbridled democracy which eventually conducted the state to its ruin.

This extraordinary, nay, even great man, was the son of Xanthippus, the victor at Mycale ; his mother Agariste was the daughter of Cleisthenes. The lessons of the philosophers, Damôn, Zenôn, and Anaxagoras, freed his mind from prejudice and superstition, gave him political science, and taught him the art of making it avail in practice. When he commenced his political career, the influence of the aristocratic party, headed by Cimôn, was strong ; and he saw that his only chance of becoming the head of the state was by raising the Demos, whom he trusted he could sway at his will. He first sought to diminish the authority of the court of Areiopagus, which, being composed of those who had served the office of archon with repute, gave a great moral influence in the state to the aristocracy, to which its members belonged*. This he effected through his friend Ephialtes, for it was his policy to appear as little as possible himself in matters of this kind†.

Having succeeded in ostracising Cimôn, he pursued his plans, though still openly and secretly opposed by the aristocratic party, at whose instigation probably it was that Ephialtes

* It was on this occasion that the poet Æschylus produced his magnificent trilogy the *Oresteia*, which has fortunately been preserved. His object was to uphold the authority of the court of Areiopagus by investing, in the *Eumenides*, its mythic origin with all the awful conceptions of his powerful genius. It has been thought with great probability that the persecution he underwent in consequence of it from Pericles' party was the cause of his returning to Sicily, where he died. See Welcker, *Æschyl. Trilogie*, p. 521.

† Plut. *Per.* 9. *Arist. Pol.* ii. 8. Ephialtes is always joined with Aristides by the orators as a model of political integrity. The present measure, beyond doubt an injurious one, furnishes one among many proofs of how little connexion there may be between personal worth and political wisdom, and may teach us not to regard a measure as good merely because it is advocated by a good man.

was murdered at this time by a man of Tanagra*. The defeat at Tanagra was an advantage to this party, as it obliged Pericles himself to propose the recall of Cimôn. On the death of Cimôn, his kinsman Thucydides, son of Melesias, became its leader; but he was far inferior to Pericles in talent, and when an attempt was made to have Pericles ostracised, the latter put forth his strength and ostracised his opponent (Ol. 84, 1.). The aristocratic party was now completely broken up, and Pericles remained monarch of Athens for the remainder of his life†.

It was necessary for the views of Pericles, that the Demos, through whom and over whom he ruled, should be kept in occupation, in comfort, and in good temper. Colonies therefore were founded which took off its superfluous members, and served as garrisons at a distance: constant service aboard the fleet gave occupation and pay to a large number of citizens. The contributions of the allies were, under the direction of the great Pheidias, spent in erecting stately temples and other works of art at Athens, which gave employment to all kinds of tradesmen, mechanics, and labourers. Sums of money (τὰ θεωρικά) were distributed to the people to pay for their seats in the theatres, in which at solemn festivals the dramas of Æschylus, Sophocles, and other poets were represented; and pay was now given to those who sat as jurors in the different courts of justice‡; which bad precedent afterwards led to another evil, when on the proposal of Callistratus money was given to those who attended the assembly§.

* Aristotle in Plut. Per. 10.

† Ἐγίγνετο τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχῇ ('It was in theory a democracy, in reality the dominion of the leading man') is the description given by Thucydides (ii. 65.) of the Athenian constitution in the time of Pericles.

‡ Plut. Per. 9. Arist. Pol. ii. 8. It was at first an obole. Cleôn raised it to three oboles.

§ This also was an obole. It is uncertain when Callistratus lived, but it was probably not long after this time. Boeckh (i. 305.) says that this innovation took place a *considerable* time before the Ecclesiastusæ of Aristophanes, which was acted in Ol. 96, 4. He is of opinion that it was in the time of Pericles.

Under Pericles, the Athenians were the most powerful, the most cultivated, and the most polished people in Greece; and Athens was by far the most splendid city, and the resort of all who admired or cultivated the arts. Pericles himself towered high above all the men of his time: in him eloquence was first seen to display her powers: unlike Themistocles, his hands were clean; a demagogue* in the nobler sense of the word, he led the people, who looked on him with awe, and whom he never, like his unworthy successors, flattered to their evil†; a general, as well as a statesman, he was brave as any, but his valour was always guided by prudence.

Not to admire such a man were impossible, but admiration must not close our eyes to his faults. Ambition, certainly a noble one, was his vice; he would have Athens the first state of Greece, and be himself her sovereign. To effect this purpose, he little cared what mischief he introduced: for must he not have observed the evils of mob-rule in Megara? and must not a man of his intellectual powers have discerned, that when the influence of wealth and birth was made naught in the constitution, when by giving pay to jurors the seats of justice would be almost exclusively occupied by the poorer citizens, who would regard them as the means of life, and when attractions were held out to draw them to the assembly,—the power of the state would eventually fall into the hands of the ignorant, venal, weak, tyrannic, superstitious mob‡? might he not easily have seen that though *he* (and not always without difficulty) could control the many-headed monster, and lead it to good, his successors might not have the inclination, and could hardly

* As παιδαγωγός was a tutor or guide of children (παῖδες), so δημαγωγός was a tutor or guide of the people (δῆμος).

† The power of Pericles' eloquence is thus finely described by the comic poet Eupolis (*ap.* Diodor. xii. 40.):—

Περικλέης Οὐλύμπιος
 "Ἡστραπτεν, ἐβρόντα, συνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
 Πειθῶ τις ἐπικάθισεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν.
 Οὕτως ἐκῆλει, καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων
 Τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις.

‡ See Aristotle, *Pol.* iv. 5; Cicero, *Flaccus*, 7.

have the power, to do the same ? The claim of Pericles to the fame of pure patriotism we therefore regard as one which may be easily contested : his splendid talents must ever command our respect and admiration.

CHAPTER II.*

War between the Corinthians and Corcyræans.—Siege of Potidæa.—Origin of the Peloponnesian War.

OL. 86, 2-87, 2. B.C. 435-431.

HAVING seen Athens at the climax of her power, we have now to view her gallant efforts to retain and extend it.

The island of Coreyra had been colonised from Corinth. Owing to its situation, and emulous, as it were, of the naval fame of the Phæacians of Homer, whose abode it was supposed to have been, the Corcyræans became wealthy and powerful by trade and navigation. They founded a colony named Epidamnus on the coast of Illyria, which in course of time grew large and populous ; but it escaped not the curse of Greece,—internal dissension. The Demos expelled the *Optimates*, who, joining the neighbouring Barbarians, harassed and plundered them by land and by sea. They sent to implore the mother-state to mediate between them and the exiles ; but the Coreyræans refused to interfere. As, according to custom, the leader (*ἀρχηγέτης*) of the colony had been fetched from Corinth, and many Corinthians had been among the original settlers, they sent envoys to Delphi and inquired of the god if they should give their city to the Corinthians as its founders, and ask aid of them. The god desiring them to do so, they proceeded to Corinth. The Corinthians, who hated the Coreyræans for their insolence and want of the usual filial respect of colonists to—

* Thuc. i. 24-88, 139 to the end. Plut. Pericles, Diodor. xii. 30-41 : this compiler followed Thucydides and Ephorus.

ward them*, accepted the offer, and sent colonists and a garrison to Epidamnus. The Corcyræans were offended, and on the exiles applying to them, sent orders to the Epidamnians to receive their exiles, and to send away the Corinthian garrison and colonists. Meeting with a refusal, they sent forty ships to aid the exiles and the Barbarians, and laid siege to the town.

When the Corinthians heard that Epidamnus was besieged, they collected, with the aid of their allies, among whom were the Thebans and the Eleians, a fleet of seventy-five triremes and a force of three thousand hoplites. The Corcyræans, hearing of their warlike preparations, sent ambassadors to Corinth, offering to leave the question of the colony to the decision of any towns in the Peloponnese on which they might agree, or to that of the Delphian god. The Corinthians told them, first to raise the blockade of Epidamnus, and that then they would treat. The Corcyræans refused, and the Corinthian fleet put to sea, having two thousand hoplites on board. At the mouth of the bay of Ambracia it encountered a Corcyræan fleet of eighty ships, and in the engagement the Corinthians were defeated with the loss of fifteen triremes. On the same day Epidamnus surrendered, and by the terms of capitulation the foreign settlers were to be sold and the Corinthians to be kept as prisoners. (Ol. 86, 2.)

The following year the Corinthians applied themselves vigorously to their warlike preparations, building ships and collecting seamen. The Corcyræans growing alarmed, resolved to try to form an alliance with Athens, and for that purpose sent an embassy thither (Ol. 86, 4.): the Corinthians hearing of it sent another, and both appeared and spoke in the assembly. After some hesitation it was decided to form an alliance, but merely a defensive one, with the Corcyræans; for the advantage of attaching to their side a people second only to themselves at sea, was thought worth the risk of war with the Peloponnesians. A fleet of ten ships was therefore sent to Corcyra.

The Corinthians soon after (Ol. 87, 1.) sent a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships against Corcyra, which took its position

* See above, p. 28.

on the opposite coast of Thesprotia. The Corcyræans put to sea with one hundred and ten ships of their own and the ten from Athens. At break of day the battle—the greatest yet fought at sea among the Greeks,—commenced. The Corcyræans were victorious on the left, the Corinthians on the right: the Athenians did not share in the action, but kept moving to and fro to daunt the enemies by their presence. The rout however on the side of the Corcyræans soon became general, and the Corinthians at first gave no quarter, destroying by mistake even some of their own friends. At length they collected the wrecks and the bodies of the slain on their own side, and carrying them to the coast gave them in charge to their Barbarian allies, and then put again to sea. The Corcyræans assembled such of their vessels as were fit for action, and advanced to engage them. The Athenians also, as they had taken some part in the previous fight in defence of their routed allies, saw no reason for remaining any longer inactive, and they formed in the Corcyræan line. The *Pæan*, or hymn of onset, had been sung, when to the surprise of their enemies the Corinthian line was seen to fall back. But the Corinthians had discerned, though from their position the Corcyræans could not, twenty Athenian triremes approaching; and taking them to be a part of a larger fleet, and night being at hand, they resolved to retire.

Next morning the combined fleet sailed over to the port where the Corinthians were lying, who instantly got their ships out and prepared for action. As the Athenians were fresh, the Corinthians did not wish to engage, and they sent some persons in a boat to reproach them with breaking the truce, and to learn their intentions. The Athenians replied that they were not breaking the truce, and that the Corinthians might go whithersoever they pleased, except against the possessions of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians then having erected a trophy sailed home; and the Corcyræans claiming the victory, as the Corinthians had refused their challenge, raised a trophy on their side. The loss of the Corcyræans was seventy triremes and one thousand men, that of the Corinthians about thirty triremes. The Corinthians, as they were going home, made

themselves masters by artifice of Anactorion, a common possession of theirs and the Corcyræans. The Athenian fleet also returned home.

The Corinthians, naturally anxious for revenge, now exerted themselves to raise up enemies to the Athenians, who on their side sought to thwart their designs. Potidæa, a town on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallène, was a Corinthian colony, but it was one of the subject-allies of Athens. As, however, its connexion with the mother-state was still very intimate, its fidelity was dubious, and orders were sent out to the people to pull down their wall on the Pallene side, to give hostages, and to send away the magistrates who came annually from Corinth. On the other hand, the Corinthians and Perdiccas king of Macedonia, who was at enmity with the Athenians because they aided his brother against him, urged the Potidæans to revolt. Perdiccas also tried to induce the Chalcidians and Bottiæans on the coast of Thrace to join their defection. The Athenians, learning what was going on, lost no time in sending thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites to the coast of Macedonia.

The Potidæans, meanwhile, sent deputies to Athens, and at the same time others secretly to Sparta. From the Athenians they could obtain no favour: the Lacedæmonians promised, in case of their being attacked, to invade Attica. Simultaneously then the Potidæans, Chalcidians, and Bottiæans cast off the yoke of Athens; and, at the persuasion of Perdiccas, the Chalcidians abandoning all their other towns retired to and fortified Olynthus. He gave them lands during the war around lake Bolbe in Mygdonia.

The Athenian commanders took the town of Therma and laid siege to Pydna in Macedonia; and when news came to Athens of the revolt of Potidæa, and of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light troops having gone from Corinth to its aid, a reinforcement of forty ships and two thousand hoplites was sent without delay to the force before Pydna. This town speedily surrendered, and Perdiccas was forced to enter into an alliance with Athens. The Athenian forces, of seventy triremes and three thousand hoplites, with a good number of

allies, and six hundred Macedonian horse, then proceeded against the Potidæans, who with their allies were encamped at Olynthus. Their infantry was commanded by Aristeus the Corinthian, the horse by Perdiccas, who had already revolted from the Athenians. The two armies engaged at the isthmus. Aristeus was victorious on the wing where he took his post, but the Athenians were successful on the other wing, and when he returned from the pursuit he found the battle lost, and collecting his men set out with all speed for Potidæa. The horse was not engaged on either side; the victors lost a hundred and fifty men and their general Callias; on the side of the vanquished there fell about double the number. The Athenians now placed themselves at the wall on the side of Potidæa towards Chalcidice; and shortly after, Callias' successor Phormiôn coming out with an additional force of sixteen hundred hoplites, raised a wall on the Pallene side, and the town was now shut in by land, while the fleet blockaded it by sea.

When the Corinthians received the intelligence from Aristeus, they became more vehement than ever in their charge of breach of truce against the Athenians, and at their desire a meeting of deputies of the Dorian federation was convened to Lacedæmôn, whither also were invited all who had any charge to make against the Athenians. The Æginetans therefore, not daring to do so openly, sent secretly to complain of their being deprived of their independence in violation of the treaty of Pausanias*. The Megarians openly complained, that in contravention of the same treaty, they were excluded from the Athenian ports and markets†. The Corinthians, finally, set

* This was a treaty (*σπονδαί*) or engagement of mutual peace and respect for each other's independence entered into by the Greeks after the battle of Plataea. It could not be the peace of Ol. 83, 3, as Ægina had been conquered in Ol. 80, 4.

† Plut. Per. 29. The Megarians being accused of having caused the death of an Athenian herald, Charinus proposed a decree of hostility, without truce or herald (*ἄσπονδον καὶ ἀκήρυκτον*), against them, that any Megarian who entered Attica should be put to death, and that the generals, beside their usual oath, should swear to invade Megaris twice a year. According to the comic poet Aristophanes (*Acharn.* 524.), some young Athenians had carried

forth at full length the restless and encroaching ambition of the Athenians, and the necessity that there was for checking it in time.

There chanced at this very time to be an Athenian embassy at Sparta, come about some other matters ; and hearing the charges made against their country, the ambassadors asked permission to speak. Leave being granted, they displayed the great merits of Athens toward Greece, and showed the honourable way in which she had acquired her present dominion. They did not deny that she exercised it with rigour, but maintained that she only acted on the ordinary principles of human nature, and that any others in her case would perhaps have acted worse. They advised them to remain at peace, but added that Athens had no fear of war. All then retired, and the Lacedæmonians proceeded to deliberate. King Archidâmus, a man of age and experience, having shown the advantages which a naval power like Athens possessed, advised peace at least for the present ; but to prepare for war, by collecting funds and forming alliances ; meantime, as the Athenians had offered to submit to law, to send an embassy to Athens. But the Ephor Sthenelaïdas, in a blunt laconic speech, cried for war without delay ; and a great majority of the assembly having voted with him, the decision was communicated to the allies, and they were desired to come again to deliberate on the mode of conducting the war. As usual, the Lacedæmonians sent to consult the god at Delphi, and it was said that he assured them of success if they acted with vigour, and that called or uncalled he would himself be with them.

When the congress re-assembled at Sparta, most of the deputies were vehement against the Athenians : the Corinthians, who in the interval had been unremitting in their efforts to excite them, now spoke, as was their practice, the last. They reminded the people of the interior, that if they suffered the

away a courtesan from Megara, and the Megarians had by way of reprisals seized two of those who lived in the house of Pericles' mistress Aspasia, to gratify whom he had the above decree passed.

states of the coast to be conquered, they would lose the mart for their produce, and the means of obtaining foreign commodities; they dwelt, again, on the necessity of checking the ambition of Athens, and suggested a plan of borrowing money from the sacred treasuries at Delphi and Olympia*, with which the defection of the mercenary sailors of the Athenian navy might be purchased.

War was thus unanimously resolved on; but as the confederacy was as yet by no means in a condition to begin it, recourse was had to negotiation to gain time, to throw if possible the odium of commencing hostilities on the Athenians, and to cause dissension among them. An embassy was therefore sent to Athens, requiring the expulsion of those hereditarily polluted by the blood of Cylôn's adherents†. This was aimed at Pericles, whose mother was an Alcæonid. The Athenians replied by desiring the Lacedæmonians to put away the iniquity of Tænaron and of the Chalcæcos‡. This plan therefore having failed, a second embassy came from Sparta, requiring the Athenians to retire from Potidæa, to leave Ægina independent, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians. Compliance being refused, ambassadors came to Athens for the third and last time, stating that the independence of the Greeks was the only condition of the continuance of peace. An assembly was held; some spoke for, some against war; at length Pericles rose and declared for war, which he regarded as inevitable, displaying the advantages which their naval power and skill, their superior wealth, and the position of their country would give them in the contest: he proposed that they should offer however to submit all differences to the decision of equity. A decree was passed accordingly; the Lacedæmonians returned home, and the war which was to be the ruin

* For instances of this practice see Boeckh, *Pub. Econ.* ii. 17.

† See above, p. 57.

‡ See above, p. 133. Some time before (Ol. 78, 3.) some helots who had taken refuge at the temple of Poseidôn at Tænaron were dragged from it and slaughtered. This impiety was regarded as the cause of the earthquake which desolated Sparta in the following year. *Paus.* vii. 25, 5.

of Greece was thus rashly run into. (Ol. 87, 2.) The commencement of hostilities was as follows.

One dark night in the spring a party of Thebans came secretly to Plataea, distant seventy stadia from their city, where they were admitted by the oligarchic faction; but the people having risen, slew or took them prisoners; and a large force which was coming from Thebes to their support being impeded by the swelling of the Asopus, the treacherous enterprise miscarried. The Plataeans sent off word instantly to Athens, and a herald was despatched, desiring them to do nothing to their prisoners till the Athenians should arrive; but what the Athenians feared had already taken place—the Plataeans had put their prisoners, one hundred and eighty in number, to death in cold blood. The Thirty-Years' Truce was now clearly broken, and both sides prepared for war.

CHAPTER III.*

Commencement of the Peloponnesian War.—Invasion of Attica.—Plague at Athens.—Siege of Plataea.—Naval actions in the Corinthian Gulf.—Death of Pericles.—Revolt of Mytilene.—Escape of the Plataeans.

Ol. 87, 2–88, 1.

B.C. 431–428.

GREECE was now full of young and ardent spirits, eager for the excitement, ignorant of the evils, of war. Public opinion was on the side of the Lacedæmonians, who stood forward as the champions of independence; while the tyranny of Athens was hated by those who felt it, dreaded by those who apprehended it. Every mind was in anxious expectation, oracles and prophecies were circulated in all parts, the sacred isle of Delos shook for the first time on record†,—indicative, as it was thought, of the coming commotion.

* Thuc. ii.–iii. 24. Diod. xii. 42–56. Plut. Pericles.

† Thuc. ii. 8. Herodotus (vi. 98.) says that Delos shook before the battle of Marathôn for the first and last time in his memory, and he was living in

On the side of the Lacedæmonians were all the Peloponnesians, except the Argives and the Achæans, both of whom were neuter; the Megarians, Bœotians, Locrians, Phocians, and the Ambraciots, Lencadians and Anactorians of Acarnania. The coast-states supplied shipping; the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, cavalry. Ships and money were also expected from the Dorian states of Italy and Sicily, and embassies were sent, or to be sent, to the King* and other foreign powers.

On the side of the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, Messenians of Naupactus, the Acarnanians, Corcyræans, Zacynthians, the towns of the coasts of Asia and Thrace, and all the isles of the Ægæan, except Melos and Thera. The Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyræans furnished shipping. The troops of Athens were in all 29,000 hoplites, 1200 horsemen, and 1600 archers, and her fleet numbered 300 triremes, exclusive of those of her allies. The annual income from the allies was 600 talents; the coined gold and silver on the Acropolis amounted to 6000; the sacred utensils, votive offerings, and Medic spoils were worth 500 talents, and the gold on the statue of Pallas-Athene, which could be taken off and replaced when peace came, weighed 40 talents, equivalent therefore to 400 talents of silver.

The war was one of opposite principles, feelings, and interests. Dorians were opposed to Ionians; power by land to power by sea; voluntary confederacy to compulsive service; men to money; aristocracy to democracy; finally, attachment to ancient institutions to the desire of innovation, slowness and hesitation in action to rapidity and boldness. The restless and encroaching spirit of the Athenians, fostered by Pericles, caused the war, in which they were decidedly in the wrong;

OL. 92. It may be that both historians refer to the same event. See Arnold *in loco*.

* The Greeks usually called the Persian monarch the King, or the Great King, as being the only king of any note they knew of. It is thus the Italians of the middle ages called Naples simply the kingdom (*Il Regno*), it being the only one in Italy.

for they had no right whatever to interfere in the dispute between Corinth and her colony, and their conduct at Potidæa violated all the principles of the Greek colonial relations. The Spartans were to blame (as they afterwards confessed) in not accepting the offer to decide the dispute by law and equity; but we shall find them from first to last sincerely anxious for peace, though perhaps more in consequence of the reverses they experienced than out of regard to justice and love of tranquillity.

Pericles' plan for conducting the war was to abandon Attica to the Peloponnesians, to bring all the people into the city, and to send out fleets to ravage the coast of the Peloponnese. When he found the Lacedæmonians preparing to invade Attica, he ceased not to urge the people to retire into the city, and to give the country up to be ravaged*. Nothing could be more repugnant to Attic feeling than such a course. There was no people in Greece more fond of a country life; all the ravages of the Persian war had been repaired, and now they were called upon to abandon again their houses and farms and the temples of their gods, and leave them to be destroyed by their enemies: yet such was the influence of Pericles that they consented. They sent their cattle over to Eubœa and the adjoining isles, and then, pulling down their houses, carried the timber to Athens. Some found there an abode with their friends and relatives, others in the temples and *herôa*, others in the towers on the walls, the rest constructed huts in the space between the Long Walls, and in the vacant parts of the city and the Piræus. Meantime every effort was made to get ready a fleet of one hundred ships to ravage the Peloponnese.

The city of Athens lay a short distance from the sea, at the foot of the limestone rock which formed its Acropolis. It was surrounded by a strong wall, from which ran two others named the Long Walls, the one forty stadia in length to the port of Piræus, the other thirty-five to that of Phaleron; the small pe-

* As Pericles was the guest-friend (*ξένος*) of Archidamus, and feared that that prince, through friendship or by the directions of the Spartan government, would spare his lands in the invasion of Attica, he told the people that in such case he would give them to the state.

PLAN OF ATHENS.

p. 170.



A. Asty, or City.
B. Long Walls.
C. Piræeus.
D. Phaléron.
E. Munychia.

a. Acropolis.
b. Areiopagus.
c. Lyceion (Lycæum).
d. Museion (Musæum).
e. Cynosarges.

f. Ilissus.
g. Cephissus.
h. Academy.
i. Colónos.

THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF LONDON



By J. G. ...
...
...

ninsula of Munychia was also walled round on the sea side *. The whole fortifications of Athens thus formed a circuit of one hundred and forty-eight stadia, and might from their strength defy the attacks of any enemy, and famine was not to be dreaded while Athens was mistress of the sea.

The Lacedæmonian troops, led by Archidamus, when they were joined by the allies†, passed the Isthmus, and having sent, but to no purpose, an envoy with proposals of peace to Athens, advanced to Plataea. Having ravaged its lands they entered Attica, and besieged the frontier-fort of CEnoë. While they were before it the Athenians had time to remove their property out of the country, and Archidamus was much blamed for this delay. He had, in reality, been from the first adverse to the war, and he hoped that the Athenians would listen to terms while their lands were yet untouched. Deceived, however, in this hope, and unable to take CEnoë, he entered and ravaged the plain of Eleusis. No one coming out to oppose him, he advanced to Acharnæ, sixty stadia north of Athens. This was one of the principal Demes of Attica, it alone giving three thousand hoplites, and he hoped that the Acharnians would not patiently see their lands ravaged. There was accordingly great dissension in Athens, the Acharnians and the young men in general being eager to go out and fight; but Pericles still restrained them, and he would call no assembly lest some imprudent resolve should be made. The Thessalian horse, and a troop of the Athenian, however, were sent out, and a skirmish took place between them and the Bœotians. At length the Peloponnesians, weary of delay, broke up from Acharnæ, and having wasted the Demes on their way, returned to Bœotia by Oropus, and then dispersed to their several homes.

* On the subject of these walls see Arnold on Thuc. ii. 13.

† On these occasions each state was required to send two-thirds of its fighting-men with provisions, as it would appear, for forty days. This was the term of service for the feudal tenants in the Middle Ages. See Arnold on Thuc. ii. 10. The number on the present occasion is stated by Plutarch (Per. 33.) at 60,000 hoplites beside the light troops, by Androtiôn (Sch. Soph. CEd. Col. 697.) at 100,000 men in all.

Meanwhile an Athenian fleet of one hundred triremes, with one thousand hoplites and four hundred and three archers on board, being joined by fifty triremes from Corcyra, sailed round the Peloponnese, and made a descent on the coast of Messene, where they attacked the town of Methone; but a young Spartan named Brasidas came to its relief with one hundred hoplites, and having forced his way through the Athenian troops saved the town. This deed gained Brasidas great credit at the time. The Athenians then departed, and wasted the coast of Elis. Another fleet of thirty triremes was at the same time ravaging the coast of Locris opposite Eubœa.

As the Athenians regarded the Æginetans as a chief cause of the war, they now adopted the cruel resolution of expelling them from their island, and filling it with Athenian colonists, in whose hands it would be more secure. The Lacedæmonians, mindful of their services in the Helot-war, and on other occasions, gave the exiles the lands of Thyrea, on the borders of Laconia and Argos, to cultivate.

During this summer the Athenians formed an alliance with Sitalkes, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas of Macedonia, and with the people of the isle of Cephallenia. At home a decree was made that one thousand talents of the money on the Acropolis should be reserved to be employed only in case of a hostile fleet appearing before Athens, and that each year one hundred of the best triremes should be set apart for the same purpose.

In the autumn, the Athenians, led by Pericles, invaded and ravaged Megaris. The fleet of 100 ships, which was at Ægina, sailed over and joined the army, and there were now in Megaris 10,000 Athenian and 3000 Metæc* hoplites, beside a large number of light troops,—the largest army that Athens was able for some time to send to the field. In the winter, the Athenians, according to their usual and honourable custom, gave public sepulture in the suburb of the Cerameicus, to the

* The *metæcs* (μέτοικοι) or resident aliens were those who, mostly for the sake of trade, dwelt in a city of which they were not natives. They paid for protection a tax of 12 drachmas a year, named the *μετοίκιον*.

bones of those who had fallen in the war. Pericles was chosen to deliver the customary funeral oration; and his speech, as given by Thucydides, is a model of sublime and dignified oratory.

The following spring (Ol. 87, 3.)* Archidamus led, as before, two-thirds of the Peloponnesians into Attica; where they had not been many days, when the plague broke out at Athens. They proceeded along the coast (Paralus) to the silver mines of Laurion, and having wasted all that coast, went on to ravage that opposite Eubœa. Meantime the Athenian fleet of one hundred ships under Pericles, joined by fifty from Chios and Lesbos, sailed over and ravaged the coast of Epidaurus, Trœzên, and Hermione, and took and destroyed the town of Prasiæ on the coast of Laconia. On their return they found the Peloponnesians gone; for fearing the plague, they had stayed but forty days in the country.

This celebrated plague, the first which was known to have visited Greece, was said to have come from Egypt through Asia. It appeared first in the Piræus, and then spread to the city. Owing to the density of the population and the heat of the weather its ravages were dreadful. The historian Thucydides, who had it himself, has left a most minute account of it†, showing its effects, both physical and moral; among the last he notes, what is always to be observed in such calamities, the dreadful laxity of manners which took place, the utter disregard of all the restraints of religion and law; for it would seem that with a large portion of mankind fear is the only motive to obedience, and when that, as in the present case, is withdrawn, nothing remains to curb the passions and appetites.

It is remarkable that the pestilence does not seem to have visited the Peloponnese or the other parts of Greece, but

* Though we place the dates at the beginning of each campaign, the reader must recollect that the Greek year began at midsummer. See above, p. 98.

† It is curious that some of the most accurate and faithful accounts of plagues are to be found in works of fiction; witness Boccaccio's description of that of Florence, Defoe's of that of London, and Manzoni's of that of Milan.

wherever there was an Athenian army it was communicated to it by those who came from Athens. It may give an idea of its virulence to observe, that when Hagnôn sailed with the fleet which Pericles had commanded to Potidæa, though he was only forty days away, he lost by sickness one thousand five hundred out of the four thousand hoplites who were aboard, and communicated the disease to the troops there under Phormiôn.

There was always a party in Athens adverse to the war, and now, seeing the people irritated against Pericles on account of their losses and the disease, they prevailed on them to try to effect an accommodation with the Peloponnesians; but the embassy which was sent proved fruitless. Pericles then called an assembly, and spoke with his usual power in favour of continuing the war, and as usual, he swayed the multitude at his will. It was resolved to persevere; but to soothe their angry feelings, he submitted to pay a fine and go out of office. Ere long, however, as he well knew they would, they again chose him general, with full powers.

During the summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, and some Lacedæmonians and others, set out on an embassy to the King, to endeavour to form an alliance with him against the Athenians. On their way they called on Sitalkes, in hopes of detaching him from his alliance with Athens; but this prince's son Sadocus had them seized on their road to the Hellespont, and given up to the Athenians, by whom they were put to death in retaliation; for the Lacedæmonians had, from the beginning of the war, thus treated all the merchants, whether Athenians or not, whom they found sailing round the Peloponnese,—certainly a most unjustifiable piece of barbarity!

Phormiôn now sailed, with thirty ships, to the aid of the Amphilocheians and Acarnanians against the Ambraciots, and afterwards took his station with twenty ships at Naupactus, to command the Corinthian gulf. Toward winter, the Potidæans, overcome by famine, surrendered. They were allowed to depart, each man with one, each woman with two garments, and a small supply of money. Even these terms seemed too mild

to the democracy at home, and the generals were blamed for their lenity. The Potidæans went to Chalcidice and elsewhere, and Athenian colonists were some time after sent to Potidæa.

The next spring (Ol. 87, 4.) Archidamus led the allies into the territory of Platæa, and prepared to ravage it. In reply to the remonstrances of the Platæans, he said, that if they would but remain neuter their lands should be spared. They made answer that they could do nothing without consulting the Athenians, in whose hands their wives and children were; and on sending to Athens, they were desired to hold out to the uttermost, and assured of aid. They then called out from the walls that they could not do what was required of them; and Archidamus, having taken the gods and heroes of the land to witness of the justice of his cause, commenced hostilities. Having cut down all the trees, he formed with them a paling round the town to prevent escape; he then proceeded to raise a mound against a part of the walls. The sides of this mound were formed of timber from Mount Cithærôn, and the interval was filled with wood, clay, and stones. Day and night, for seventy days, the troops wrought at the mound, one part of the army taking rest while another was working.

The Platæans raised on the wall, opposite the mound, a framework of wood, in front of which they fixed hides and leather to protect both it and the workmen against fiery arrows: they built into this frame with bricks from the adjoining houses. Finding that the mound rose equally with the wall they were raising, they devised a new plan; namely, that of opening the town-wall, where the mound abutted against it, and carrying in the earth. The besiegers, perceiving this, made baskets of reeds, which they filled with clay and put down next the wall. The besieged, thus foiled, ran a mine under the mound, and kept taking the earth from beneath it. Fearing, however, that owing to the paucity of their numbers they might not avail, they gave over raising the wall against the mound, and built in the town a half-moon wall, whose ends met the town-wall on each side beyond the mound; so that if the besiegers should carry the outer wall, they would

still have to continue their mound with greater labour and danger on to this new one.

The Peloponnesians, having set a large machine on the mound, assailed with it and shook the fortification of the Platæans, to the great terror of the besieged. They set other machines against other parts of the walls, but the Platæans catching them in ropes turned them aside, or letting beams hung by chains fall upon them, broke the force of the blow. Foiled thus in their attempts, the Peloponnesians saw no resource but a blockade: as this, however, would be tedious and expensive, they resolved first to try to burn the town. They therefore brought faggots, and filled with them the space between the mound and the wall, and then piled as far as they could into the town. Then throwing pitch and sulphur on the wood they set it on fire, and instantly a terrific flame sprang up. Had a wind blown on the town nothing could have saved it; but providentially a storm of rain and thunder came on and quenched the flames and the hopes of the besiegers. Nothing now remaining but blockade, they dug a double ditch round the town, and having built a strong brick wall* between the ditches, they left a party of men from each state to guard one half of it, the Bœotians undertaking the guard of the remainder. It being now late in September, the army separated as usual for the winter. The garrison of Platæa consisted of four hundred Platæans and eighty Athenians, with one hundred and ten women to make bread for them.

During the siege of Platæa the Athenians sent two thousand hoplites and two hundred horse against the Chalcidians in Thrace; but they were defeated, with the loss of their generals and four hundred and thirty men. The Lacedæmonians also, at the desire of the Ambraciots, sent an officer named Cnemus with one thousand hoplites to Leucas, where being joined by them and their Barbarian allies from Epeirus, he invaded Acarnania: a fleet, meantime, was in preparation at Corinth, Sicyôn, and the adjacent places. The confederates

* The bricks were made from the clay thrown out of the ditches, and were unbaked.

advanced in three divisions against the Acarnanian town of Stratos. The Chaonians and the other Barbarians marched in the centre, the Leucadians and Anactorians on the right, the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the left; the space between them was considerable. The Greeks moved with order and caution; the Chaonians, vain-glorious and confident, pushed on heedlessly, hoping to take the town alone; but the Stratiots, having laid an ambush, sallied forth, and attacked and routed them; and the Greeks, learning their defeat, passed on to the river Anâpus, and having received the bodies of the slain, separated and went home.

The very day of the defeat of the Chaonians, an action was fought in the gulf between Phormiôn and the fleet which was going to co-operate with Cnemus. This fleet of forty-seven ships kept along the coast as far as Patræ; it was then stretching across the gulf to Acarnania, when Phormiôn, who had been watching it, came in sight with his twenty Athenian ships from the mouth of the Evenus. As the Peloponnesians had left Patræ in the night, they were now half-way across, and could not avoid fighting. Aware of the superior skill of the Athenians, they placed their ships in a circle, that they might not be able to break their line; the small vessels were set within the circle, and five of the most agile triremes also remained inside, to give aid where needed. Phormiôn, having formed his line ahead*, kept moving round and round them, waiting for the breeze to spring up, which blows every morning down the gulf, knowing that he could then attack to most advantage†. As he expected, when the wind blew, the ships were driven against each other, and the crews fell into the greatest confusion. The Athenians seized the moment of attack; they sunk one of the admirals and several other ships, and the Peloponnesians fled, almost without attempting resistance, to Patræ and Dyme. The Athenians having taken twelve ships, raised a trophy on Cape Rhion and returned to Naupactus; the Peloponnesians sailed with the wreck of their

* That is, in a line of single ships, *κατὰ μίαν ναῦν*.

† See above, p. 117. *note*.

fleet to Cyllene in Elis, where they were joined by the ships under Cnemus from Acarnania.

The Lacedæmonians, unused to the sea, could see no cause but cowardice for the defeat of a large by a small fleet, and they sent Brasidas and two other officers out to join Cnemus, with orders for the fleet, which now contained seventy-seven ships, to put to sea. Phormiôn, aware of their intentions, sent to Athens for aid, and twenty ships were sent out; but as they had orders to take Crete on their way, they did not arrive till it was too late.

The Peloponnesians sailed from Cyllene round to Panormus in Achaia, where a land-army was encamped. Phormiôn stationed his ships without the Crissæan bay at Anti-Rhion; the enemy then proceeded to Rhion, and took their station there; the distance between these points being only seven stadia. The two fleets remained six or seven days opposite each other. At length, the Peloponnesians, to draw the Athenians within the gulf, moved along the coast in a line of four ships abreast, twenty of the swiftest leading the line. Phormiôn, fearing for Naupactus, as its youth were in the camp at Anti-Rhion, sailed in also with his line formed ahead. As soon as the Peloponnesians saw them within the gulf, they faced about and crossed straight over. The eleven leading ships of the Athenians escaped into the open gulf by superior sailing; of the remainder, one was taken with its crew, and the rest forced ashore. Such of the crews as did not escape by swimming were put to the sword, and the ships were already taken in tow, when the Messenians coming up dashed into the sea, and getting on board of them drove off the victors, and saved the ships. Meantime the twenty Peloponnesian ships chased the eleven Athenian to Naupactus. One of the Athenian ships being pursued by a Leucadian, its captain, seeing a merchantman at anchor, made for it, and doubling round it, came on the Leucadian, and struck her with such force on the side that she went down. At the sight of this exploit, the Peloponnesians, who were already chanting the hymn of victory, stopped short and fell into disorder. The Athenians

seeing this advanced against them, and they fled to Panormus, leaving six ships in the hands of the enemy. The Athenians justly erected a trophy on Anti-Rhion; the Peloponnesians, as they had been successful in the early part of the day, and had taken one ship, thought themselves entitled to raise one on the opposite headland. Phormiôn acquired great fame by his conduct in these two actions.

The Peloponnesians, before they separated for the winter, resolved to make an attempt on the Piræus; which they learned from the Megarians was unguarded. Each seaman, therefore, took his oar, cushion, and oar-thong, and coming to Megara in the night, they launched forty triremes and made for the Piræus; but, either losing courage or impeded by the wind, they landed in Salamis, and began to plunder it. Beacons were instantly raised to convey the alarm to Athens. The terror at first was great, but it soon subsided; and getting on board of what ships were there, the Athenians passed over to Salamis, whence they found the enemy gone. After this alarm the Piræus was more strictly guarded.

In the autumn of this year the great Pericles died. His latter days were clouded by calamity; for the plague carried off all his legitimate children and most of his nearest relatives. In the height of his power, some years before, he had caused a law to be passed restricting the right of citizenship to those who were Athenians on both the father's and mother's side, but now he was obliged to supplicate the people to dispense with his own law, and enroll among the citizens his son of the same name with himself, the offspring of the celebrated Milesian Aspasia. After his death events soon showed how little he had looked to consequences when engaged in establishing his own power; for his place in the popular assembly was instantly taken by Cleôn, a man who has acquired an infamous celebrity as the perfect type of the selfish, venal, insolent, and tyrannic demagogue*.

* "With the death of Pericles," says K. O. Müller, "ended the democracy and began the ochlocracy." The philosopher Plato was born the year of Pericles' death.

Toward winter, Sitalkes king of Thrace, as the ally of the Athenians, invaded Macedonia and Chalcidice. To his original subjects the Odryssians, who dwelt in the plain between Rhodope, Hæmus, and the Euxine, he united the Getans, who dwelt from Hæmus to the Ister, and collecting as he advanced the tribes of Rhodope and the country thence to the Strymôn, he entered Pæonia, and at the head of one hundred and fifty thousand men, as was said, of which a third were cavalry, invaded Macedonia from the north. Fearing to encounter so numerous an army in the field, the Macedonians and Chalcidians shut themselves up in their towns; and Sitalkes, having wasted the country during thirty days, by the advice of his nephew Seuthes, led his army home, as provisions began to run short, and the weather was growing severe. Seuthes had been induced to give this advice by Perdiccas of Macedonia, who had gained him by the promise of the hand of his sister and a large dowry.

The following spring (Ol. 88, 1.) Archidamus invaded Attica as usual. When their provisions were exhausted the allies retired and dispersed.

The people of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnæans, had long meditated revolt from Athens, whose alliance they felt to be a grievous yoke*. The Mytilenæans, intending to seize the first favourable opportunity, had been building ships, strengthening their walls, securing their harbours, and purchasing corn, and hiring archers in the countries on the Euxine. But the Tenedians, Methymnæans, and a party in Mytilene itself, were devoted to Athens, and they sent word of what was going on.

The Athenians were unwilling at first to believe what they did not wish to be true, but when compliance was refused with the orders which they sent out to Lesbos, they saw that they must have recourse to stronger measures. A fleet of forty ships which was about to go round the Peloponnese, was therefore ordered to sail secretly to Mytilene, and fall on and

* Aristotle (Pol. v. 3.) says that a dispute relative to an heiress was the occasion of the revolt of Mytilene.

seize the inhabitants, while keeping the feast of Apollo Malloeis, according to custom, outside of the town. If that failed, the admiral was to require them to give up their ships and demolish their walls, and, on their refusal, to make war on them. To prevent intelligence being conveyed to them, their ten ships which were in the Athenian fleet were seized and their crews cast into prison ; but a friend to the Mytilenæans passed over to Eubœa, and getting on board a merchantman which was just sailing, reached Mytilene on the third day with the news, and the people therefore did not go out as usual to hold the feast.

When the Athenian fleet arrived, the Mytilenæans made some show of fighting, but they soon proposed a truce that they might send deputies to justify them at Athens. The Athenian commanders, doubtful of their own strength, granted it, and the deputies set out ; at the same time a trireme sailed secretly with an embassy to the Peloponnese. As was to be expected, that to Athens was unsuccessful, the other envoys appeared at Olympia during the games, and having stated their case were received into alliance. To make a diversion in their favour, it was resolved to invade Attica a second time this year, by sea and land. The Lacedæmonians having directed the allies to join them as usual at the Isthmus, repaired thither themselves, and made preparations for conveying ships across it ; but it being harvest time the rest came in very slowly, and the Athenians having manned one hundred triremes sailed to the Isthmus to show their strength ; so that the Lacedæmonians seeing little hopes of forcing them to recall their fleet from Lesbos, returned home to protect their own coast, which they heard that another Athenian fleet was ravaging.

The Mytilenæans had meantime made a successful attack on the Athenians, and forced them to retire ; but the Athenians being reinforced by their allies, anchored their fleet before the harbour, and formed a naval camp on each side, so as to command it. The land however being still open to them, the Mytilenæans marched out in a body and made an attack on Methymne, and having strengthened their allied towns re-

turned home. Soon after, Paches, one of the generals of the year, came out from Athens with one thousand hoplites; and a single wall with forts on the heights was built round Mytilene on the land side, so that it was now completely shut in. The expenses of this siege gave occasion to the first property-tax in Athens*. It produced two hundred talents.

In the winter, the garrison of Plataea, seeing no hopes of aid from Athens, and their provisions running short, resolved to attempt the passage of the wall built by the besiegers. Having carefully counted the rows of bricks in it, they made ladders of a sufficient height, and waited till a night suited to their purpose should arrive.

The besiegers, it must be observed, had built two walls, sixteen feet asunder. The interior space was roofed over for the habitation of the soldiers; the walls had battlements, between every ten of which was a tower of the same breadth as the wall, and which was pervious, affording shelter to the guards in foul weather. Ditches ran round the walls on both sides.

The garrison selected for their attempt a dark, windy, and rainy night. Only two hundred and twenty of them, however, left the town, the courage of the remainder having failed. They kept at a little distance from each other, in order that their arms might not clash, and they had the right foot bare that they might not slip in the mud. The rattling of the storm favoured them, and its violence had forced the guards to retire to the towers. Placing their ladders in the space between two of the towers, twelve men, armed only with dagger and breast-plate, mounted, and went six to each tower: they were followed by others armed with javelins, after whom came others bearing their shields to give them when engaged. A good number had mounted, when one of them chancing to throw down a brick from the battlements, its noise alarmed the guards. But just then, those in the town made, as agreed on, an attack on another part of the wall, to distract the attention of the besiegers, who therefore remained inactive, while a

* Thuc. iii. 19. The first *extraordinary* one in the opinion of Tittmann and Thirlwall, the first one absolutely according to Boeckh, Goeller and Poppo.

party of three hundred men, who were appointed to move about and give aid where required, went outside of the wall in the direction of the noise. Fire-signals were raised towards Thebes, but signals were also raised in the town to make them of no avail.

The Platæans had now made themselves masters of the two towers, and setting ladders, some mounted to the top of them, whence they kept off the enemies with their missiles. Their comrades meantime pulled down the battlements, mounted and crossed the outer-wall as fast as they could, and then, standing on the other side of the ditch, kept up a discharge of darts and arrows on such of the enemies as appeared. Those who occupied the towers then descended, and just as the last of them were preparing to cross the ditch, the three hundred men came up with torches in their hands. The Platæans outside of the ditch, being in the dark, shot at them to great advantage ; and their companions, in the meantime, got safely across, though the state of the ditch, which was thinly frozen over, rendered the passage very difficult.

To mislead their enemies, the Platæans went for six or seven stadia along the road to Thebes ; and, just as they expected, they saw them pursuing with torches along that leading to Cithærôn : they then turned to the mountains on the right, and made their way to Athens. They had lost only one of their number, an archer who was taken at the outer ditch. Seven others had lost courage and turned back to the town ; those who remained in Platæa sent a herald next morning to demand their bodies, thinking that they must all have been slain, and to their great joy they learned their escape.

CHAPTER IV.*

Surrender of Mytilene and Plataea.—Massacre in Corcyra.—Transactions in Western Greece.—Occupation of Pylos.—Capture of the Spartans.

Ol. 88, 2–88, 4. B.C. 427–425.

THE next summer (Ol. 88, 2.) the Peloponnesians, having sent their admiral Alcidas with forty-two ships to Lesbos, invaded Attica, where they remained long and did much mischief. Alcidas made such delay that food began to run short in Mytilene. Salæthus, a Spartan envoy, who was there, having made the government arm the Demos for a sortie against the Athenians, they refused, when armed, to obey the magistrates, and threatened, if the rich did not bring forth their corn and distribute it, that they would give up the town. As the lesser of the two evils, the upper classes resolved to surrender at discretion to Paches, only stipulating for permission to send deputies to Athens, and that no one should be injured till the decision of the Athenian people was known.

The tardy Spartan admiral, when he came to Myconos, heard of the loss of Mytilene. He sailed thence to Erythræ in Ionia, and while there he was strongly urged to try a sudden attack on Mytilene, of which the Athenians had now had possession only seven days. On his declining, he was advised to take Cyme or one of the Ionian towns, in order to induce the people there to cast off the yoke of Athens: but he thought only of getting back to the Peloponnese as fast as he could. He sailed along the coast as far as Ephesus, and then steered homewards. Paches pursued him a good way in vain. On his return to Mytilene, he sent, contrary to the treaty, the principal men, and Salæthus with them, prisoners to Athens.

The sovereign people were highly incensed against the Mytilenæans, whom they had always, as they supposed, treated so gently. Salæthus was put to death at once, though he offered

* Thuc. iii. 25.–iv. 41. Diod. xii. 57–63. Plut. Nicias.

the liberation of Plataea as a ransom for his life ; and at the impulse of Cleon, who was now the leading demagogue, a decree was passed to put to death not only those whom Paches had sent, but all the males of puberty in Mytilene, and to sell the women and children for slaves. A trireme was instantly despatched with these instructions to Paches ; but next day, the Athenians, who were not naturally a cruel people, began to repent of what they had done ; and the friends of humanity, taking advantage of this change, had another assembly called to reconsider the decree. Cleon avowing, as Pericles and others had done, that the Athenian dominion was a tyranny, maintained that it could only be held by tyrannic measures, and he urged the people not to relent : an orator named Diodotus, on the other side, showed that it was impolitic, if nothing else, to drive their allies to despair ; and on the votes being taken, a small majority appeared in favour of mercy. A trireme was instantly sent off with counter-orders to Paches. The Mytilenæan deputies put wine and bread on board, and promised the crew a large reward if they should arrive in time. They rowed night and day, eating bread dipt in wine and oil as they rowed, and sleeping by turns ; and as they met with no adverse winds, and the crew of the other trireme had not hurried with their unpleasant commission, they arrived just as Paches had read and was about to execute the decree. Frugal, however, of their mercy, were the Athenian people ! The prisoners sent to Athens by Paches, nearly one thousand in number, were, on the proposal of Cleon, all put to death ; the walls of Mytilene were thrown down, and the ships seized ; all Lesbos, except Methymne, was divided into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were set apart for the gods, and the rest distributed among Athenian citizens, to whom the Lesbians, who cultivated them, paid an annual rent of two minas a lot*.

* Paches on his return was prosecuted for some offence which is unknown, and seeing no chance of acquittal, he stabbed himself in the presence of his judges. Plut. Arist. 26. A late Greek writer (Agathias, Epigr. 57.) says that the charge was his having offered violence to some respectable women at Mytilene.

Such was Athenian mercy ! Let us now see how the Spartans exercised this godlike quality. Platæa, hopeless of aid, and exhausted by want, now surrendered. The besiegers could have taken it, but as they expected that in case of peace the conquests on both sides would be restored, and they wished to retain Platæa, which they could do if a voluntary surrender was made, they proposed to the Platæans to give up the town and take their trial, assuring them that none but the guilty should be punished. The terms were accepted; five judges came from Sparta; no charge was made against the Platæans, they were only asked what service they had rendered the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the present war. They saw at once that they were to be sacrificed to the Thebans; they therefore only urged their former merits, and the *medism* of the Thebans, reminded the Lacedæmonians that it was by their advice they had put themselves under the protection of Athens, and concluded by imploring mercy. The Thebans replied, endeavouring to justify themselves, and excite the judges against the Platæans; and as they were a powerful and a useful ally in the present war, their arguments prevailed. The former question was again put to the Platæans, and each, as he answered in the negative, was led to execution. Thus two hundred Platæans, and with them twenty-five Athenians, were butchered in cold blood. The women were sold for slaves, the town and lands given to the Thebans, who at first gave the town to some Megarian exiles and to the Platæans of their party, to live in, but the next year they levelled it, building out of the materials a large inn or caravanserai at the Heræon, and a temple to the goddess. The land was made public property, and let on lease for ten years to Theban citizens. Such was the end of Platæa, in the ninety-third year from her alliance with Athens.

One act of atrocity follows another in this unhappy war. We must now turn our view to Coreyra. The Corinthians had released the Coreyræans whom they had taken at Epidamnus, on their giving sham security for eight hundred talents, but in reality on an understanding that they would endeavour to gain over the island to them. They kept their word, but they were

counteracted by Peithias the leader of the Demos and the friend of Athens, whom they therefore accused to the people of a design to reduce the island beneath the Athenian dominion. He in return charged five of the richest among them with cutting stakes in the groves of Zeus and Alcinoüs; and as the penalty was a *statêr* for each stake, and therefore amounted to a large sum*, they went and sat as suppliants at the temples. Hearing that Peithias, who was a senator, was persuading the people to an alliance offensive and defensive with Athens, they arose, and taking daggers rushed into the senate-house and murdered him and sixty other persons. They then assembled the people, and having made them vote not to admit more than one ship at a time of either of the belligerent parties into their port, they sent an embassy to announce this resolve at Athens.

The Athenians seized the ambassadors and confined them at Ægina. Meantime, encouraged by the presence of a Corinthian trireme and some Lacedæmonian ambassadors, the oligarchs, who had now the upper hand at Corcyra, fell on and defeated the Demos. In the night the Demos fled to the Acropolis and the higher parts of the town, and they kept them and the port named the Hyllaïc harbour: the others held the market, where most of them lived, and the harbour which was close to it.

Next day both parties sent out into the country to try to gain the slaves by the offer of liberty. These mostly joined the Demos, but eight hundred auxiliaries came over to the others from the main-land. After the interval of a day, the parties came again to blows: the Demos were victorious, and the oligarchs, fearing lest they might seize the docks, set fire to and burned the houses round the market without distinction. In the night the Corinthian ship made sail, and most of the allies from the main-land slunk home. The following day,

* If, as is probable, this was the silver *statêr*, it was four drachmas; the gold one was worth twenty drachmas. Dr. Arnold (on Thuc. iii. 70.) thinks that the nobles were tenants of the sacred ground, and had held it for a long course of years, and been in the habit of cutting the trees when they wanted them, in which case the number cut may have been considerable.

Nicostratus, an Athenian general, came with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites from Naupactus. He sought to reconcile the two parties and induce them to form a strict alliance with Athens; and having succeeded, was about to depart, when the leaders of the Demos persuaded him to leave them five of his ships, to give them the advantage in any future conflict, and to take five of theirs in their stead. They then selected their enemies to man these ships, who fearing that they were to be sent to Athens, sat as suppliants at the temple of the Dioscûri. Nicostratus tried to reassure them, but in vain; the people then, affecting to be convinced that they had some bad design, took arms, and would have killed some of them but for Nicostratus. The rest of the aristocrats, to the number of four hundred, went and sat as suppliants in the Heræon; but the people persuaded them to pass over to the opposite islet of Ptychia, whither they sent them provisions.

Four or five days after, came a Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships under Alcidas and Brasidas. The Corcyræans got ready in all haste sixty ships, and led by the twelve Athenian triremes moved out to engage them. The action lasted the entire day, and terminated in favour of the Peloponnesians. Next day Brasidas proposed to attack the town, but the indecisive Alcidas refused: they then landed at the other end of the island and plundered the fields; and in the night, having learned by fire-signals that sixty Athenian ships were coming from Leucas, they set out for home, hauling their ships across the Leucadian isthmus, to avoid fighting the Athenians.

The Demos at Corcyra, fearing that their prisoners might make some attempt against them, had brought them back to the Heræon; and now, emboldened by the presence of the Athenian fleet, they resolved to glut their vengeance. Having made their own ships sail round to the Hyllaïc harbour, they put to death such of the opposite party as were in them; then going to the Heræon, they persuaded fifty of the suppliants to come forth and stand their trial. All these were forthwith put to death; the rest seeing no chance of escape put an end to their lives, some by hanging themselves out of the sacred trees,

others in other ways. During seven days the Demos put to death, under the pretence of their being hostile to the popular state, their supposed enemies. Private enmity or private gain actuated many; debtors, for example, cancelled their debts with the blood of their creditors. Atrocities were perpetrated beyond what were usual on such occasions; fathers slew their own sons, suppliants were dragged from the temples and slaughtered beside them; some were built up in the temple of Dionysus, where they perished of hunger. The Athenians remained cool spectators, if not approvers, of these atrocities. About five hundred persons escaped over to the main-land, whence they returned some time after, and having fortified a position on an eminence named Istône, did their enemies all the mischief in their power.

In the winter of this year the plague revisited Athens, and continued for a year. There died of it on the whole three hundred horsemen, four thousand four hundred hoplites, and an immense number of the inferior people.

The following summer (Ol. 88, 3.) the Peloponnesians appeared in arms as usual at the Isthmus, under the Spartan king Agis the son and successor of Archidamus; but they did not invade Attica, being prevented by the earthquakes which were so frequent this year in Greece. The Athenians on their part, though suffering from the plague, sent out two fleets, one of thirty ships under Demosthenes and Procles, to go round the Peloponnese; the other, of sixty ships with two thousand hoplites under Nicias, against the isle of Melos, which persisted in refusing to become one of their subject-allies.

Nicias landed and ravaged the island, but the Melians would not submit. He then proceeded to Oropus, in Bœotia, and a land-force from Athens, under Hipponicus son of Callias, having joined him, they entered and plundered the lands of Tanagra. Next day the Tanagræans, joined by some Thebans, came out and engaged them, but were defeated. Having raised a trophy, the land-troops returned to Athens, and Nicias sailed on and ravaged the coast of Locris.

Demosthenes meantime was at Acarnania, acting against the

Leucadians. While he was there, the Messenians urged him to come and make war on their enemies the Ætolians, showing him that though they were a numerous and warlike people, yet from their mode of living scattered in villages, and using only light arms, it would be no difficult matter to conquer them. Demosthenes conceived that if he could reduce the Ætolians, he might, with them and a part of the Epeirots, march at the back of Parnassus and into Phocis, where being joined by the Phocians, he might make a sudden irruption by the pass of Elatea into Bœotia. He therefore resolved to follow the advice of the Messenians. He sailed to Sollion; and as the Acarnanians refused to join him, he proceeded with the Zacynthians and some of the other allies to Locris, and without waiting for the Locrians, who were to share in the expedition, he entered Ætolia, and plundered three of the open villages of that country. But in an attempt on a fourth he was defeated by the Ætolians, who had now assembled, and was forced to retire to Naupactus. Procles the other commander, with a hundred and twenty Athenian hoplites and a good number of the allies, was slain. Demosthenes sent home the ships, but fearing the indignation of the people, he himself stayed about Naupactus.

The Ætolians now sent to Corinth and Sparta to propose a joint attack on Naupactus; the Lacedæmonians in the autumn directed three thousand hoplites of the allies to join them, and having obtained a free passage through Locris, they came and laid siege to that town. But Demosthenes hastened to Acarnania, and having with some difficulty procured a thousand hoplites, brought them to Naupactus, which, as it had strong walls, it was easy to defend. The besiegers, finding that they could not take it, retired and dispersed.

In this summer, the Lacedæmonians, at the desire of the Trachinians and Dorians, founded a colony, named Heracleia, within about forty stadia of Thermopylæ and twenty of the sea. They expected to find it very useful for keeping up a communication with Thrace, and reckoned that by having a fleet there they could at any time pass over to Eubœa. The Athenians were at first apprehensive; but their fears proved vain,

as the colony never became of any great importance; for the Thessalians, not relishing this settlement of strangers in their neighbourhood, harassed the colonists, whom moreover the Lacedæmonian governors, acting with their usual harshness, disgusted and alienated.

When the Peloponnesians retired from Naupactus, the Ambraciots prevailed on their general Eurylochus to lead them to join in an attack on the Amphilocheian Argos. In the beginning therefore of the winter, three thousand Ambraciot hoplites entered the Argeian territory and took Olpæ, a strong place on the coast twenty-five stadia from Argos. A part of the Acarnanians came, some to the defence of Argos, while others posted themselves at a place named Crenæ (*the Springs*) to stop Eurylochus, who was advancing from Calydôn, and they sent to invite Demosthenes to come and take the command. Eurylochus, having crossed the Acheloös, marched through Acarnania unimpeded, and taking advantage of the night, passed between Argos and Crenæ, and reached Olpæ in safety.

Demosthenes was now arrived, and there was also a fleet of twenty Athenian ships in the bay of Ambracia. A battle was fought, in which, owing to the judicious arrangements of Demosthenes, the Acarnanians gained a decisive victory. Eurylochus and another Spartan general having fallen, Menedæus the remaining commander sent to propose to surrender Olpæ on condition of a free passage. This was publicly refused, but he was secretly told that the Peloponnesians might depart in safety. The object of Demosthenes and the Acarnanian chiefs was to make the Lacedæmonians odious in this country as treacherous and self-interested, and to get the Ambraciots and their other allies into their power. The offer however was accepted, and under the pretext of gathering herbs and fire-wood the Peloponnesians all came out. They were at some distance when the Ambraciots perceived their departure, and ignorant of the secret agreement, they resolved to follow them. The Acarnanians attacked them all at first, but when they were told by their officers of the treaty with the Peloponnesians, they spared them as far as they could distinguish them. About

two hundred of the Ambraciots were slain, the rest escaped to the adjoining territory of Agrais.

Meantime the Ambraciots at home, when they heard of the first capture of Olpæ, hastened thither with all their strength. They had entered Amphilochia ignorant of what had occurred, when Demosthenes hearing of their approach sent a strong party to lie in ambush for them. There were two hills not far from Olpæ named Idomene, on the lower of which the Ambraciots had taken their post: the troops sent by Demosthenes arriving at night-fall took possession of the other. In the evening Demosthenes led his army out in two divisions, one going with himself along the plain, the other through the hills. He reached the place where the enemy lay while it was yet dark, and as he had set the Messenians, who spoke the Doric dialect, in advance, who were therefore supposed to be their friends from Olpæ, the surprise was complete. The slaughter was great; those who fled were slain by the division coming through the hills, or by those in ambush at Idomene; some swam to the Athenian triremes, where it would appear that they found no mercy, for we are told that a very small number got home alive.

The next day a herald came from Agrais to demand the bodies of those who had been slain on the former occasion. When he saw the arms of the slain, he marvelled at the number; and when he learned what had occurred, he was so overwhelmed with grief that he went away without claiming any of the bodies. The historian does not give the number of the slain, because he says it was incredible: it was the greatest loss, he adds, that any town experienced in the same space of time during the war. The allies having refused to join in an attack on Ambracia, which might easily be taken, Demosthenes, who had now nothing to fear at home, sailed for Athens, and the confederates made peace with the Ambraciots on terms which do honour to their moderation.

The seventh year of the war (Ol. 88, 4.) opened as usual with an invasion of Attica; but as the corn was not ripe, and an event occurred which called them home, the invaders remained but fifteen days in the country.

The Athenians, who had begun to interfere in the politics of Sicily, were now sending thither a fleet of forty ships. The commanders, Eurymedôn and Sophocles, were directed to take Corcyra in their way, and aid the Demos against the exiles, to whose support sixty ships were come from the Peloponnese. Demosthenes obtained permission to go with them, and to use the fleet in any attempt that he deemed feasible on the Peloponnese.

As they were coasting Messene, Demosthenes proposed that they should land and fortify the promontory of Pylos, where there was a good harbour; adding, that if a Messenian garrison was placed there, they might do the Lacedæmonians great injury, as they spoke the same dialect with them, and were akin to the people about there. The generals, however, refused, and they were sailing for Corcyra, when a storm obliged them to take shelter in the harbour of Pylos. Here the soldiers, to whom Demosthenes had also applied in vain, began of themselves by way of pastime to build the wall. Having no tools they put the stones together in the best way they could, and they carried clay on their backs by locking their hands under it. As the position was naturally strong, they expected to have it secured before any aid could come from Sparta, which was four hundred stadia distant. In six days the wall was built across the land side: they then departed, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to guard it.

The Lacedæmonians, who were at this time keeping one of their festivals, made light of the matter. As soon, however, as the news reached the army in Attica, it was resolved to return home; and the Spartans, with the nearest Pericæcians, set off immediately for Pylos: the fleet was also recalled from Corcyra, and, as before, the ships were dragged across the Leucadian isthmus, and thus escaping the Athenians came to Pylos, which was now invested by land and by sea. Before they came, however, Demosthenes had sent two of his ships to recall to his aid the Athenian fleet, which was at Zacynthus.

At the entrance of the harbour of Pylos* lies the islet of

* This is the port of Navarin, so famous of late years.

Sphaacteria. The space between it and Pylos would only admit two triremes abreast ; the entrance at the other end, which is wider, would admit eight or nine. The islet was woody and desert, and it was thought that by occupying it with soldiery, and mooring triremes across the two entrances of the harbour, the Athenians could be prevented from giving any aid to the besieged, who, as the promontory without the harbour offered no landing-place, might then easily be reduced by famine. Accordingly four hundred and twenty Spartan hoplites with their helots were placed on the islet.

Demosthenes hauled his three triremes on shore under the wall, and raised a paling round them. He armed the sailors as well as he could, most of them having only osier shields, and even for these he was indebted to fortune, which had brought two Messenian privateer-boats into the harbour : there were forty hoplites in these boats, which added materially to his strength. Having selected sixty hoplites and some archers, and leaving the rest to guard the wall, he took his post with them where the defences were slight, at the water's edge in the harbour. The Lacedæmonians, while their land-forces assailed the wall, ran their ships in reliefs to this place ; but the captains fearing to damage their vessels hesitated to go in close to shore, till Brasidas, who commanded one, called to them not to suffer, for the sake of sparing paltry timber, an enemy to establish himself in their country, but boldly to run their ships ashore. He then made his own steersman lay his ship in close to the land ; and he was on the gang-board leading his men, when having received several wounds he dropped his shield into the water, and fell himself back in a swoon into the ship. The attack was continued during the remainder of this and a part of the following day. On the third day the besiegers sent some of their ships to Asine for timber to construct machines, and Demosthenes raised a trophy on which he hung the shield of Brasidas.

Eurymedôn soon arrived with the Athenian fleet, but seeing the coast and the island full of troops, and the ships lying in the harbour, he retired for the night to the adjacent isle of

Prote. Next morning he sailed for the harbour, and as the Lacedæmonians had not, as they intended, occupied the entrances, the Athenians went in at both sides of the islet, and attacked and put to flight all the ships which came in their way, taking five of them. They then fell on those other ships which the men were only now getting aboard of; and were dragging away some of the empty ones, when the Lacedæmonians rushing into the water laid hold of them. After much tumult, and many being wounded and slain on both sides, the conflict terminated; the Athenians retaining only the five ships which they had first taken. They then raised a trophy, and kept a strict watch on the island.

When the intelligence reached Sparta, the chief magistrates came down to Pylos to see the state of things, and perceiving that there was no chance of getting their men out of the island, they proposed to the Athenian commanders to make a truce, that they might send an embassy to Athens. The truce was made on these terms: All the ships in Laconia were to be given up to the Athenians; no attack was to be made on the wall by land or sea; provisions were to be sent daily to those in the island in presence of the Athenians, and no vessel was to approach it secretly; the Athenians were to make no attack on the Peloponnesians; an Athenian trireme was to convey the ambassadors to and from Athens; on their return the truce was to end, and the ships to be given back. The ships were sixty in number.

The ambassadors when they came to Athens proposed a peace and alliance between the two states. There was a party, mostly the land-owners, who had been always adverse to the war, and would gladly accept so honourable a peace; but the demagogue of the day, as we have already observed, was Cleôn, a rude, ignorant, brutal man, who exercised the trade of a tanner, and had great influence over the lower people of the city, who, from their numbers and the fatal measures of Pericles, were now omnipotent in the assembly; and he persuaded them to answer, that those in the isle must first surrender and be brought to Athens, that Pegæ, Nisæa,

Troezen, and Achaia, of which the Athenians had been deprived in the season of their distress, must be restored, and that then a treaty might be concluded.

As the affair concerned their allies also, the ambassadors did not wish to speak on it publicly. They proposed that some persons should be chosen to confer with them. Cleôn then was open-mouthed against them, declaring that he knew they never meant honestly. The ambassadors, finding that nothing was to be done where he had the sway, departed.

On their return, the Lacedæmonians demanded their ships; but the Athenians, under the frivolous pretext of some attacks having been made on the wall, refused to give them back. Operations were resumed; all day long two triremes moved in opposite directions round the island; at night all the ships, which were now increased to seventy, anchored round, except on the outside, when the wind blew that way. But the Spartans offering rewards to any freeman, and liberty to any helot, who would convey flour, cheese, wine, etc., into the island, boats constantly put off from the coast when the wind blew from the sea, and carried in supplies. Divers, also, putting bruised poppy- and hemp-seeds into bags, swam over with them unobserved. The Athenians meantime suffered greatly from the want of corn and good water, and of space to encamp in. They sent, therefore, to inform the people of the state of affairs.

At Athens, the people, finding that the island still held out, began to repent of their having rejected the offer of peace. Cleôn asserted that all the accounts they got were false. The envoys then proposed that commissioners should be sent to ascertain the truth. Cleôn and Theagenes were named; but this not suiting Cleôn's purpose, he cried out, looking at Nicias, one of the generals of the year, that if the generals were men, the island would soon be taken, and that if *he* were in command he would take it. Nicias offered to give him any troops he pleased. Cleôn, thinking he was not in earnest, accepted the offer; but finding that he was serious, he hung back, saying that *he* was not the general. Nicias pressed

his offer, taking the people to witness, who, fond of mischief, as they always were, the more Cleôn declined the more they urged Nicias to give him the command. Finding that he could not escape, he resumed his blustering, and saying that he only required the Lemnians and Imbrians, and the Ænian peltasts*, who were then at Athens, and four hundred bowmen, declared that within twenty days he would slay the Lacedæmonians, or bring them all prisoners to Athens. The people laughed; the wiser sort were pleased, expecting, says Thucydides, "one of two good things; that they should get the Lacedæmonians, or, what was still better, get rid of Cleôn."

Cleôn set sail, having prudently caused Demosthenes to be appointed his colleague. On his arrival, when negotiation had been fruitlessly tried, all the disposable troops were landed in the night on Sphacteria, and after a severe conflict, in which one hundred and twenty-eight Lacedæmonians were slain, the remainder craved permission to send to consult their friends on the shore. The Athenians refused, but sent a herald themselves, and a Lacedæmonian came, desiring them to consult for themselves, provided they did nothing disgraceful. They then surrendered, being two hundred and ninety-two in number, and Cleôn actually entered the Piræus with them within the twenty days. The captives were placed in confinement, and it was formally declared that they should be put to death if ever the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica.

Nothing ever caused such surprise in Greece as this event, for it was the universal opinion that the Spartans would die sooner than surrender their arms. At Sparta the uneasiness was great; members of some of the chief families were among the captives; and the Messenians, who were now placed at Pylos, plundered the country, and afforded a refuge to the runaway Helots. They were therefore most anxious for peace; but the Athenian people were too much elated to listen to any propositions.

* The Peltasts, or targeteers, so named from the *pelta*, or target, which they bore, were a kind of light troops, originally, it would seem, peculiar to the Thracians. They gradually came into use among the Greeks.

CHAPTER V.*

Second Massacre at Corcyra.—Attempt on Megara.—Battle of Delion.—Brasidas in Thrace.—Battle of Amphipolis, and death of Brasidas and Cleôn.—Peace of Nicias.

OL. 88, 4–89, 4. B.C. 425–421.

EURYMEDON and Sophocles now sailed from Pylos to Corcyra, and debarking their troops, joined in an attack on the exiles. They stormed their fort on Istone: the exiles then fled to a higher position, where they capitulated, giving themselves up to the Athenians, and leaving their auxiliaries to their fate. The Athenian generals set them on the isle of Ptychia till they could take them to Athens, declaring that if any of them attempted to escape all should be held guilty of breach of treaty.

The popular leaders, fearing that their enemies might escape their vengeance, formed a diabolical plan to entrap them. They sent pretended friends into the island to tell some of them that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the people, and advising them to fly in a vessel which was prepared. The exiles fell into the snare, were taken in the act of escaping, and all were then given up by the Athenians to the people. They were shut up in a large building, and taken out in parties of twenty, bound together. These passed between two rows of armed men, each of whom as he recognised his enemy struck and wounded him. Sixty had thus perished before the rest learned the fate that awaited them. When they did, they called on the Athenians to come and put them to death, declaring that they would not go out, or suffer any one to come in. The people made no attempt to burst the doors, but getting up and stripping off the roof, shot arrows and threw down the tiles on them. Those within, seeing no means of escape or defence, hastened to put an end to their lives, some with the arrows shot at them, others strangling themselves with the cords of the beds or with their garments, which

* Thuc. iv. 46.–v. 24. Diod. xii. 65–74. Plut. Nicias.

they had torn up. Night came on : next morning all were dead, and their bodies were piled on carts and drawn out of the town. All the women who had been in the fort were made slaves. With this bloody butchery ended the sedition of Coreyra, for the aristocratic party was now extinct. The Athenian commanders, having calmly witnessed this last act of the tragedy, proceeded to Sicily.

In the spring of the following year (Ol. 89, 1.) an Athenian fleet and army under Nicias reduced the island of Cythêra, on the coast of Laconia. Nicias having made some plundering descents on the coast, sailed to Thyrea, where the remnant of the unfortunate Æginetans were dwelling : he attacked, took, and plundered the town, and brought the inhabitants captives to Athens, where they were all put to death by a decree of the people.

The Athenians had two years before taken the island of Minôa, off the port of Megara, and twice every year they sent out a force to plunder the country*. The ravages committed by the Megarian exiles who held Pegæ were still more harassing, and the people began to talk of coming to an accommodation with them. These exiles, we are to observe, were the aristocrats, and Megara forms the rather singular exception of a democracy at enmity with Athens ; but original hatred and Doric descent, perhaps, were stronger than political resemblance. The popular leaders, now fearing that, if the exiles returned, exile, if not worse, might be their own lot, made secret proposals to surrender the city to the Athenian generals. As there was a Peloponnesian garrison in Megara, and another at the port of Nisæa, which was eight stadia distant, it was arranged that the Athenians should be put in possession of the long walls which connected them. Additional troops came secretly from Athens, and the walls being taken and the communication cut off between Nisæa and the city, whence the garrison drew their supplies, the former surrendered ; but the plan for taking the city miscarried.

Brasidas, who was now at Corinth, on his way to Thrace,

* See above, p. 165, note †.

as soon as he heard of the taking of the walls of Megara, sent to summon the Bœotians to join him at the foot of Mount Geraneia, and then set out for that town with his own troops and three thousand seven hundred hoplites from Corinth, Sicyôn, and Phliûs. The Athenian generals, deeming it imprudent to risk an action against a superior force, retired, leaving a garrison in Nisæa. Brasidas was admitted into the city, where the oligarchic party had now gotten the upper hand. After his departure, the principal friends of the Athenians, aware that they were known, quitted the city; the exiles at Pegæ were then recalled on their solemn oath to bear no malice. As they were the chief men of the state, they soon obtained the highest offices; and having ordered a general muster of the people in arms, they selected about one hundred of their enemies, and forcing the people to condemn them on a charge of treason, put them all to death. The government then became a narrow oligarchy.

An opportunity now presented itself to the Athenians of getting a footing in Bœotia also. The democratic exiles and their partizans in the towns planned a rising, and proposed to put Chæroneia and the town of Siphæ, on the Corinthian gulf, into the hands of the Athenians, who were also to enter the Tanagraïc territory, and raise a fort at a temple of Apollo named Delion. The two expeditions were to be simultaneous, and Bœotia was thus to be invaded east and west on the same day. Demosthenes therefore sailed with forty triremes to Naupactus; Hippocrates, who was to command the other expedition, remained at Athens.

The whole plan, however, proved a failure: the Bœotian governments had gotten information; and when in the autumn Demosthenes appeared before Siphæ, he found it so strongly garrisoned that he feared to make any attempt on it. Hippocrates, who should have invaded Tanagra at the same time, and thus divided the force of the Bœotians, did not leave Athens till some days later. On coming to Delion he threw up in all haste a ditch and wall round the temple, secured with wooden towers. The work was begun on the third and finished

on the fifth day from their setting out from Athens. He then prepared to lead his army home, leaving a garrison in the place. Meantime the Bœotians had arrived at Tanagra from Siphæ. A council of the Bœotarchs was held. As the Athenians were now ten stadia from Delion, and, consequently, off Bœotian ground, the other Bœotarchs refused to attack them; but Pagondas, one of the two Theban Bœotarchs, addressing the soldiers, engaged them to pursue and assail the retiring enemy. It was now near evening. Hippocrates, who was at Delion, sent word to his men to get ready for action, and he soon joined them himself. The Bœotians formed at the foot of the hill on the other side of which the Athenians were. They had 6000 hoplites, above 10,000 light troops, 1000 horse, and 400 peltasts. The Theban hoplites were drawn up twenty-five deep, the others variously. The Athenians had also 6000 hoplites, which they drew up eight deep; their light troops were more numerous than those of the Bœotians, but worse armed, for as the levy for the expedition had been *en masse* (πανδημεῖ), all kinds, citizens, metœcs, and strangers, were on it.

The Bœotians charged down the hill at a rapid pace; the Athenians advanced at the same pace to meet them; the combat was close and obstinate; the Bœotians at length were beaten on the left, but they had the advantage on the right, where the Thebans were posted. Pagondas then sent a party of horse round the hill to fall on the victorious Athenian wing, and the Athenians taking them for another army, lost courage and gave way. The rout now was general; some fled to Delion, some to Oropus, others to Mount Parnês. The Bœotian horse and the Locrians, who came up at the moment of the rout, pursued the fugitives; but night came on, and the greater part easily escaped. The Athenians lost their general, one thousand hoplites, and a great number of their light troops*.

* On this occasion the philosopher Socrates was saved by his pupil Alcibiades, whom he had saved in like manner some years before, when they were both serving at Potidæa under Phormiôn (above, p. 165). See Plato, Banquet, § 43. Plut. Alcib. 7.

The Bœotians having raised a trophy retired to Tanagra, and on the Athenians sending to demand the bodies of the slain, they refused to restore them, on account, they said, of the profanation of the temple. Being reinforced from Corinth and Megara, they attacked the fortification at Delion, against which they employed a novel kind of machine. They sawed a long piece of timber lengthwise, and having hollowed each piece, put it together again so as to form a tube. At one end they hung a pot, into which an iron pipe went from the wooden tube. This machine was conveyed on waggons to a part of the wall which had been built chiefly of timber and vine-wood. They then applied great bellows to the other end of the tube and blew into the pot, which was filled with sulphur, pitch, and live coal. The flame thus raised caught the wall, from which the defenders were forced to retire. The place was taken: the Athenians, leaving two hundred prisoners in the hands of the victors, made their escape to their ships. When the Athenian herald came again to claim the dead bodies, they were no longer refused.

Brasidas was now in Thrace. Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, seeing the Athenians so successful everywhere, and fearing for their own safety, had sent to Lacedæmôn to implore aid; and the government there, aware of the advantage of creating employment for the Athenians, resolved at once to send their only man of enterprise to Thrace. They were also glad of an opportunity for sending some of the helots out of the country, of whom their apprehensions were such, that they even had had recourse to a most atrocious expedient for their security against them*: for, knowing that the bravest and most high-spirited of them would be the most likely to revolt, they made proclamation for such helots as thought they had shown most desert in arms to come forward and receive their liberty as a reward. About two thousand were selected from those who presented themselves, who, as being set free, went round to the temples crowned with garlands. Shortly afterwards they all disappeared, no one knew

* See Thirlwall, iii. 266.

how. On the present occasion, they sent off seven hundred Helot-hoplites with Brasidas : and one thousand hoplites more were hired for him in the Peloponnese. Having relieved Megara, he went on through Bœotia. In Thessaly he experienced some opposition, which he overcame by address, and he reached Macedonia in safety. He proceeded thence to Chalcidice, and by his vaunts of the power and assurance of the pure views of the Lacedæmonians, he induced the people of Acanthus and Stageirus to revolt from Athens. In the winter, he set out with his own troops, and some of those of his allies, and came to Amphipolis on the Strymôn, which city he induced to surrender ; and he then, without loss of time, hastened down the river to try to gain the port of Eiôn, at its mouth, and thus close it up. But the historian Thucydides, who commanded a fleet in these waters, had secured it. The active Brasidas then sped away to the peninsula of Mount Athôs, and gained over most of its towns. Quitting this, he entered the adjacent peninsula of Sithonia, and by the aid of a party within the walls, gained the town of Torône. He spent the remainder of the winter securing the places he had already acquired and devising measures to acquire more.

The ninth year of the war (Ol. 89, 2.) opened with the conclusion of a truce for a year, for the pride of the Athenians was somewhat lowered by the reverses they had met with, and the Spartans postponed everything to their anxiety for the safety of their friends and kinsmen. It was agreed that each party should remain as they were, and that the Peloponnesians, during the truce, should send to sea no ships of war or any vessels beyond a certain tonnage.

Meantime the town of Sciône, in the third peninsula Palene, revolted ; and Brasidas was devising measures to gain over Mende and Potidæa also when commissioners came to inform him of the truce. The Athenian asserting, as was the truth, that the revolt had not taken place till after the conclusion of the truce, insisted that Scione should not be included in it. Brasidas, however, refused to give it up. Word was sent to Athens : the people were furious that their very island-

subjects, as they esteemed them, should thus revolt, relying on the land-force of Lacedæmôn. The Spartans remonstrated in vain: Cleôn caused a decree to be passed to take the town and slaughter the people of Scione.

Mende now revolted, and Brasidas did not hesitate to receive it into alliance; and knowing that an Athenian force was coming, he made the Mendæans and Scionæans send their wives and children to Olynthus. He sent them four hundred of his hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts to aid them in their defence, and then set out with the rest of his forces to join king Perdiccas in an expedition against Arrhibæus prince of Lyncestis. While he was away, an Athenian fleet of fifty triremes, under Nicias and Nicostratus, and carrying one thousand hoplites, six hundred archers, one thousand Thracian auxiliaries and a good body of peltasts of the allies, arrived at Potidæa. They sailed thence to Mende, and having endeavoured but to no purpose to dislodge the Lacedæmonian commander from the post he had occupied, they proceeded to Scione, where they took the suburbs at the first assault. They then divided their force, Nicostratus leading on half of it against Mende.

It is almost needless to repeat, what the reader must be now well aware of, that in every town there was an Athenian party and an opposite one, *i. e.* a democratic and an aristocratic one. So it was in Mende; and Polydamidas, the Spartan commander, having offended one of the former, a tumult arose, in which the gates were thrown open to the Athenians, and the Lacedæmonians and their friends were forced to take refuge on the Acropolis, whence the Lacedæmonians afterwards forced their way to Scione. On this occasion the Athenians acted more moderately than they were wont; they made no inquiry, and merely put the government on its former footing.

Perdiccas, who was offended with Brasidas, had been in secret negotiation with the Athenian commanders, and he now renewed his alliance with Athens. At his instance the Thesalians refused a passage to a body of troops coming to reinforce Brasidas.

On the expiration of the truce (Ol. 89, 3.), Cleôn, elate with his success at Pylos, caused himself to be chosen one of the generals for the year. Being resolved to measure himself with the renowned Brasidas, he took the command of an expedition to Thrace. He sailed with a fleet of thirty triremes, carrying twelve hundred hoplites*, three hundred horsemen, and a good number of the allies. Coming to Scione, he took away with him some of the hoplites who were blockading that town; and sailed thence to a port near Torone, where learning that Brasidas was not at Torone, and that the garrison was weak, he attacked it suddenly by sea and land. He took the town, sold the women and children for slaves, and sent the men, seven hundred in number, prisoners to Athens, where, contrary to what one might have expected, not only the Peloponnesians but the Toronæans were spared, and the latter were afterwards exchanged by the Olynthians.

Cleôn, without loss of time, sailed to the Strymôn, and having sent to summon Perdiccas to his aid, and to invite Polles, king of the Thracian tribe of the Odomantians, to come with as many Thracians as he could hire, took his post at Eïôn. Brasidas, who had hastened to the defence of Amphipolis, stationed himself on the Cerdylion, a hill on the west bank of the river, a short distance from that town. His whole force consisted of 2000 hoplites and 300 horsemen, 1000 Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts, 1500 Thracian mercenaries, and the men of the Edonians. Having left the greater part to garrison the town, he had with him on the Cerdylion about fifteen hundred men.

Cleôn's soldiers, who despised their leader and served unwillingly under him, soon began to grow turbulent at his inaction. To appease them he led them toward the town, but with no intention whatever of fighting, and took up a position on a strong eminence in front of it. Brasidas seeing this, quitted the Cerdylion and re-entered the town. As his troops, though equal in number, were far inferior in quality to those of Cleôn, he would not risk a general action, hoping to out-general his vain and ignorant opponent. Observing the neg-

* Of whom the philosopher Socrates was one. See Plato, Apolog. § 17.

ligence of the enemy, he selected one hundred and fifty men with whom he resolved to make a sortie at one of the gates and fall on them, while a Spartan officer named Clearidas should lead out the troops at another to support him.

Cleôn, on approaching to take a view of the town, saw plainly within it Brasidas sacrificing at the temple of Athena, and the feet of men and horses ready to issue were visible under the gates. Fearing to engage before his allies came up, he sent orders to his army to fall back to Eïôn, the left wing leading. He then wheeled his right wing, but in so injudicious a manner as to expose the right (that is the unshielded) sides of the men to the enemy. Brasidas, seeing his advantage, rushed out of the town, and fell on the centre of the disordered Athenians. Clearidas issued at the same moment from another gate. The Athenian left wing broke away and fled to Eïôn. Brasidas directed his efforts against the right wing; but here an unknown hand gave him a mortal wound, and his men conveyed him away to the town, the Athenians remaining ignorant of what had befallen. Cleôn, who had resolved not to fight, fled away; but he was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian peltast. The Athenian right wing, having seized an eminence, defended themselves bravely against the hoplites; but when the horse and peltasts came up, and they were assailed by missiles, they turned and fled as best they could to Eïôn. The loss of the Athenians was about seven hundred, that of the victors only seven men.

Brasidas was buried at the public expense in front of the agora in Amphipolis. All the allies followed his corpse in arms. His tomb was fenced in as a Herôön, and annual games and sacrifices in his honour were appointed. All the monuments relating to Hagnôn, the original Athenian founder, were destroyed, and Brasidas, the deliverer from Athenian tyranny, was regarded as the true founder of Amphipolis.

This battle removed the two great obstacles to peace, Cleôn and Brasidas, for the former knew that in a time of repose his evil deeds would be more apparent, and his accusations of others more strictly examined; the latter was aware that his fame depended on war, and that in peace he would be but an

ordinary Spartan. Nicias, who now predominated in Athens, was wealthy and loved peace; the Spartan king Pleistoanax, who after an exile of nineteen years* had been recalled at the command of the oracle, had also reasons to be desirous of repose. The Athenians were humbled by their late reverses, and feared the falling off of more of their subjects. The Lacedæmonians had found that their plan of invading Attica had produced no result; they had not, as they had expected, been able to become formidable at sea; the enemy had even a post in their country and on their coast, whence they committed ravages on their territory, and where they gave refuge to the runaway Helots. They were in hourly apprehension of a rising of the remaining Helots; the thirty years' truce, moreover, with Argos, was near expiring†, and the Argives refused to renew it unless Cynuria was restored; they knew that they were no match for them and the Athenians together, and that many of the Peloponnesian states would join the Argives. Above all, they were anxious to obtain the Spartans who were prisoners at Athens.

With these dispositions on both sides, it was easy to conclude a peace. At the commencement of the following spring (Ol. 89, 4.), the Thebans, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians alone dissenting, a truce for fifty years was agreed on. Both parties were to restore all their conquests, but the Athenians were to retain Nisæa as the Thebans would not give back Plataea; Amphipolis, being an Athenian colony, was to be restored; the other towns which had revolted were to be independent, paying to Athens the tribute laid on by Aristides. Scione was left to its fate, but the safety of its Peloponnesian garrison was stipulated. The prisoners on both sides were to be set at liberty.

The Lacedæmonians, it is evident, had attended only to their own interests, and their allies were justly displeased. Fearing, therefore, a junction of them with the Argives, they proposed to the Athenians not merely a truce, but an alliance for fifty years. The alliance was accepted; and this peace and alliance,

* See above, p. 155, *note*.

† See above, p. 153.

called the Peace of Nicias, terminated the first part of the Peloponnesian War.

Shortly afterwards the Athenians took Scione. They put all the men to death, made slaves of the women and children, and gave the houses and lands to the Plataeans.

CHAPTER VI.*

Politics of Greece.—War in the Peloponnese.—Battle of Mantinea.—
Revolution at Argos.—Barbarity of the Athenians at Melos.

OL. 89, 4-91, 1. B.C. 421-416.

WHEN the alliance was formed between the Spartans and the Athenians, the other Peloponnesian deputies who had been summoned to Sparta returned home; but those of the Corinthians went straight to Argos, and proposed to the leading men there the formation of a new Peloponnesian confederacy, of which Argos should be the head, in opposition to Lacedæmôn. This proposal met with a ready acceptance; the necessary measures were taken; and the alliance was, ere long, joined by the Mantineans, Eleians, and the Chalcidians of Thrace. The Bœotians and Megarians were also rather inclined to it.

The Bœotians still retained their Athenian prisoners, and the fortress of Panacton on Mount Cithærôn in the Attic territory, and the Athenians would not give up Pylos till these were restored. They had, however, at the desire of the Spartans, removed the Messenians and Helots, and garrisoned it with their own troops. The Bœotians would give up their prisoners only on condition of the Lacedæmonians forming an alliance with them exactly similar to that with the Athenians; and this, though contrary to an article of the late treaty, they agreed to. The prisoners were then released, and conducted

* Thuc. v. 25, to the end. Diod. xii. 75-80. Plut. Nicias and Alcibiades.

by them to Athens; but as the Bœotians had razed the fort of Panacton, the Athenians still refused to restore Pylos.

There was a party at Athens eager for war. Its head was Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, a young man of great personal beauty and talent, of immense wealth, of noble birth, tracing his pedigree on the father's side up to Ajax son of Telamôn, and being an Alcæonid by his mother the daughter of Megacles. Pericles was his relative and guardian, the philosopher Socrates his friend and instructor. But his morals were corrupt, and his conduct dissolute.

Alcibiades was piqued that the Spartans had negotiated with Nicias and Laches, neglecting him on account of his youth. He had also a private grudge against them. His family had been originally guest-friends of their state, but his grandfather of the same name, a friend of Cleisthenes, had publicly renounced it. Alcibiades wishing to renew it had been very kind to the prisoners from Sphacteria, but the Lacedæmonians had taken no heed of his advances, and he deemed the present a good occasion for making them feel his resentment.

The Argives, when they heard of the alliance between Lacedæmôn and Bœotia, and of the demolition of Panacton, thinking that this was done with the consent of the Athenians, and fearing that they should have the whole confederacy against them, hastily made a truce for fifty years with the Lacedæmonians. Alcibiades now came forward and asserted that the evident object of the Spartans was to deprive the Athenians of all their allies, and fall upon them when thus left single. He at the same time sent privately to Argos, desiring an embassy to come from thence, and from Elis and Mantinea, to invite the Athenians to join their union. The Argives, finding that there had been no ground for their suspicion of the Athenians having joined the Bœotian league, and preferring an alliance with a naval power whose form of government was the same as their own, became quite indifferent about the truce with Sparta, and an embassy as proposed soon arrived at Athens. The Spartans in alarm sent thither

also. Their envoys when led into the senate declared that they came with full powers. Alcibiades, fearing that if they were to say so to the people his plans would be frustrated, went to them, and pledged himself, if they would say that they had not full powers, to procure the evacuation of Pylos, and settle all matters to their satisfaction. They assented, and on being asked before the assembly, said that they had not full powers to treat. Alcibiades then exclaimed most violently against the Spartan bad faith, and the people were on the point of voting the Argive alliance, when the shock of an earthquake dissolved the assembly.

Next day, Nicias, finding out the trick that had been played, proposed that envoys, he himself to be one, should be sent to Sparta to demand the rebuilding of Panacton and the renunciation of the Boeotian alliance. The embassy was sent accordingly, but to no purpose, and on its return Alcibiades had a league offensive and defensive for one hundred years formed with the Argives, Mantineans, Eleians and their allies. (Ol. 90, 1.)

The Corinthians, though allies of Argos, would not become so with their hereditary foes the Athenians; their enmity to the Lacedæmonians also had begun to cool, and they were soon again their allies. Nothing of consequence however occurred, and the next year (Ol. 90, 2.) Alcibiades being chosen one of the annual generals, passed over to Argos with a few hoplites and archers, and went through the states of the confederacy regulating all matters. At his desire the Patræans in Achaia built long walls from their town to the sea, and he was about to raise a fort on the Achæan Rhion, when the Corinthians and Sicyonians came in arms and prevented him.

As the little state of Epidaurus lay conveniently for a direct intercourse between Athens and Argos, Alcibiades and the Argives resolved to make a conquest of it. Under pretext that the Epidaurians had not sent a victim, as they were bound, to the temple of Apollo Pythæus in Argolis, the Argives invaded their territory. In the winter the Lacedæmonians sent

three hundred men by sea to their aid, and the following summer (Ol. 90, 3.), as the Epidaurians were now hard pressed, it was resolved to do something effectual for their relief, and the allies were directed to send their troops to Phliûs. Thither accordingly came from Bœotia five thousand hoplites, as many light troops, five hundred horse and five hundred horse-footmen*. Corinth sent two thousand hoplites, the others according to their ability; the Phliasians appeared all in arms. The Lacedæmonians, with the whole force of themselves and their Helots (πανδημεῖ), commanded by king Agis, entered the valley-plain of Mantinea and Tegea, where they were joined by the Tegeans and their other Arcadian allies.

The Argives, joined by the Mantineans and three thousand Eleian hoplites, took a position at Methydrion opposite the Lacedæmonians. In the night Agis silently decamped, and led his army to Phliûs; the Argives finding him gone returned home, and then posted themselves on the road to Nemea, the usual route from Phliûs to Argos. But Agis divided his forces; and directing the Bœotians, Megarians and Sicyonians to go the direct way, he led his own troops by a rugged mountain-road to the plain; and by a similar mountain-road the Corinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians also descended into the plain of Argos.

By this skilful movement the Argive army was surrounded, and as the enemies were greatly superior in number, it would probably have been defeated. Aware perhaps of this danger, Thrasyllus, one of the generals, and Alciphron, a guest-friend of Sparta, went to Agis just as the armies were about to engage, and told him that the Argives were willing to submit to equity and to maintain peace; whereupon Agis, of his own sole authority, granted a truce for four months, and led off his army. The allies followed, as they were bound, but they murmured at a certain victory being thus thrown away, and the finest army ever assembled in the Peloponnese being obliged to separate without fighting. The Argives on their side were

* "Ἀμύπποι. These were light troops that were mingled with the horse. They answered to the Roman *Velites*. See Liv. xxvi. 4.

furious against those who, as they thought, had prevented their destroying the Lacedæmonians, who had been caught, as they fancied, between their army and the town. Thrasyllus had a narrow escape of his life, and his property was confiscated.

An Athenian force of one thousand hoplites and three hundred horse, under Laches and Nicostratus, arrived soon afterwards: the Argives were for sending them away, but their allies obliged them to give them a hearing; and Alcibiades, who was with them as an ambassador, maintaining that they had no right to make a truce without their other allies, and showing that now was the time to prosecute the war, excited them to march at once against Orchomenus in Arcadia, where the Lacedæmonians had placed the hostages which they had gotten from other Arcadian towns. His arguments prevailed: the army marched, and Orchomenus surrendered. It was then debated what should next be done. The Eleians wished them to march against Lepreon, a place of which the Lacedæmonians had lately deprived them; and on their refusal they separated from them and went home. It was then decided to proceed to Tegea, where they had a friendly party.

The Spartans had been also incensed with the conduct of king Agis, and were about to punish him, when he entreated and obtained a stay of the sentence till he should try to retrieve his character. He now set forth with the whole force of the state, and, summoning the Arcadian allies to join him at once, sent off to call the Corinthians and the more distant ones. He then entered and began to ravage the lands of Mantinea: the Argive army came and took a strong position opposite to him. He advanced to attack them, and was within a stone's cast of them, when an old Spartan called out to him that he was going to make bad worse: he saw his error and retired. He then set about turning a stream to injure the lands of the Mantineans, hoping thus to draw the enemy from their strong position. The Argives were at first surprised at the retreat of the Lacedæmonians; but when they saw them gone, they began as before to accuse their generals of letting them escape. To appease them, the generals led them down

into the plain to follow the enemy. Next day, as the Lacedæmonians were returning to their former position, they saw the Argive army in order of battle on the plain. Their consternation exceeded any they had ever felt; but owing to their excellent discipline, they formed, though in haste, without confusion. The Scirites* occupied the left wing; next to them were Brasidas' troops†, and the Neodamods; then the Lacedæmonians in the order of their *lochi*, the Arcadians of Heræa and Mænalus, and on the right wing the Tegeans and a few Lacedæmonians; the horse were at either extremity; and the troops moved slowly to the sound of numerous flutes. The Mantineans, as they were on their own soil, had the right wing of the Argive army; the other Arcadians and one thousand select men, who formed the regular army of Argos, were next; then came the remaining Argives; the Athenians were on the left, supported by their horse.

Just as the action was commencing, Agis, seeing that the Mantineans stretched beyond his left wing, sent orders to the Scirites and Brasidians to move so as to front their extremity, and he directed two companies (*lochi*) from the right to occupy the vacant place; but these companies did not stir, and the Mantineans and Argives falling on the troops thus isolated, routed and pursued them to their baggage. In the centre, where Agis himself commanded, the Lacedæmonians were completely victorious. The Athenians on the left were now surrounded, and but for the support of their own horse and that Agis directed his whole army to come to the aid of the defeated left wing, they would have been cut to pieces. The Athenians then retreated, and the Mantineans and select Argives, when they saw the entire strength of the enemy coming against them, turned and fled. The loss was not so great as it would otherwise have been, for it was the Spartan rule not to pursue a flying foe. The Argives left on the field seven

* The people of Sciritis, on the borders of Arcadia.

† These were the helots whom Brasidas had taken with him to Thrace (above, p. 202), and who had received their freedom and been settled at Lepreon on the confines of Laconia and Elis. Thuc. v. 34.

hundred, the Mantineans two hundred, and the Athenians also two hundred men and their two generals. About three hundred of the Lacedæmonians fell: their allies scarcely suffered at all. This battle, the greatest yet fought among the Greeks, completely restored the fame of the Lacedæmonians, which the misfortune in Sphacteria and their usual inertness had somewhat sullied.

A more important result was the complete frustration of Alcibiades' grand plan of a confederacy under Athens. The oligarchic party now got the upper hand at Argos, and when at the end of the year Agis in concert with it led his army to Tegea, and sent thence to Argos proposals for accommodation, though Alcibiades was there and used all his influence to the contrary, they were received, and an alliance offensive and defensive was formed between the two states. The Athenians were obliged to abandon a fort which they had raised at Epidaurus; the Mantineans made peace on the best terms they could; a combined Argive and Lacedæmonian force dissolved the democracy at Sicyôn; and matters were regulated in Achaia to suit Spartan views. An alliance was also secretly formed with Perdiccas and the Chalcidians of Thrace.

Yet this state of things did not continue. Though the democracy was dissolved at Argos, the democratic party was strong, and having recovered courage (Ol. 90, 4.) they took advantage of a festival at Sparta, and after a smart conflict defeated and expelled the oligarchs. The Lacedæmonians, who had put off their feast to go to the aid of their friends, met the fugitives at Tegea, who urged them to proceed, as they might be sure of victory; but they preferred going back to conclude their festival. Deputies then came from Argos; the matter was referred to the allies who were present, and sentence being given against the people, an army was directed to march to Argos to enforce it. The Argives applied to their old friends at Athens; artisans were sent, and the building of walls from the city to the sea—the bulwarks of democracy—commenced. Men, women and slaves wrought at the walls; but before they were completed Agis led in his army, demo-

lished them, took and destroyed the village of Hysiæ, and then retired. The Argives in their turn entered and ravaged the lands of the Phliasians, who had given refuge to the exiles.

The next year (Ol. 91, 1.) Alcibiades came to Argos with twenty ships; and three hundred persons suspected of favouring the Spartan interest being put into his hands, he placed them in safe keeping in the isles under Athenian dominion.

The Athenian government, probably instigated by Alcibiades, next sent a fleet and army against the isle of Melos, whose people, a Lacedæmonian colony, were guilty of the crime, in their eyes, of desiring peace and independence. At the commencement of this war they had joined neither party; in the sixth year, provoked by the wanton invasion of their island by the Athenians*, they had exercised hostilities against them; but they had of course been included in the peace, and they are not charged with having given any offence.

The Athenians, before they commenced operations, held a conference with the leading men at Melos, in which, putting forth no right but that of the stronger, they required them to become their subjects. The Melians, in reliance on Lacedæmôn, refused to submit: their town was then blockaded by sea and land, and after a defence of some months they were obliged to surrender unconditionally. All the grown males were put to death, the women and children made slaves, the lands divided among Athenian colonists.

This is certainly one of the most unprovoked and indefensible pieces of barbarity in Grecian history. Its guilt is enhanced by the recollection that there was no brutal Cleôn now dominant at Athens to urge the people on to blood, but that the soul of the Athenian councils was the ward of Pericles, the pupil of Socrates! We may infer, however, from Isocrates†, that the action was generally condemned, and that the more upright Athenians at least were ashamed of it.

* See above, p. 189.

† Panathen. 245.

CHAPTER VII.*

Affairs of Sicily.—Athenian expedition to Sicily.—Prosecution of Alcibiades for impiety.—Description of Syracuse.—Battle at Syracuse.—Preparations for the war.—Siege of Syracuse.

OL. 91, 1–91, 4. B.C. 416–413.

IT would appear that even in the time of Pericles the Athenians had formed some designs on the island of Sicily, for one of the inducements held out by the Coreyræans when they came to solicit an alliance, was the advantages which their island offered for a passage to Italy and Sicily†. As this island was remarkable for its fertility, it exported a great deal of corn to the Peloponnese; and the wish to deprive their enemies of this supply and to divert it to their own port, joined with the usual lust for extending dominion, first probably led the Athenians to meditate so distant a conquest.

Sicily, it is probable, was originally peopled from Italy. Its inhabitants, named Sicanians and Sikelans, occupied the interior, but Grecian colonies had settled on the coast. Naxos was founded (OL. 11, 1.) by the Chalcidians from Eubœa, and Syracuse the year after by the Corinthians. The Naxians afterwards founded Leontini and Catana; and Acræ, Casmênæ and Camarîna were colonies from Syracuse. Megarians founded the Hyblæan Megara and Selinûs, and Rhodians and Cretans Gela, of which Agragas, called by the Romans Agrigentum, was a colony. We thus see that there was a Dorian and an Ionian‡ party in Sicily also, and that the former was by much the more powerful.

In the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war (OL. 88, 2.) the people of Leontini, being hard-pressed by the Syracusans, sent to Athens imploring aid on the ground of consanguinity. A

* Thuc. vi.—vii. 25. Diod. xii. 82–84; xiii. 1–9. Plut. Nicias and Alcibiades.

† Thuc. i. 36.

‡ The Eubœans were reckoned of the Ionian race.

fleet of twenty triremes was sent under Laches and Charæades, and Leontini was relieved. Charæades having been slain, Laches carried on the war with ability. The Syracusans then increased their marine, and the Athenians prepared to send out a superior fleet. Pythodôrus came immediately with a few triremes and took the chief command, and in the following spring (Ol. 88, 4.) Sophocles and Eurymedôn left Athens with a fleet of triremes; but while they were detained off the Peloponnese, as above related, Pythodorus gained a victory in the strait of Messana. The designs of the Athenians were now seen through, and the good sense and true patriotism of Hermocrates, a Syracusan, prevailed on all the contending states to form a general peace. The Athenian fleet was therefore obliged to return home: and the sovereign people were so incensed at seeing their views of conquest thus balked, that they fined Eurymedôn and banished his colleagues. (Ol. 89, 1.)

Tranquillity did not long prevail in Sicily. Among other events, a quarrel broke out between the towns of Selinûs and Egesta*. The Selinuntians having called the Syracusans to their aid had the advantage; and the Egestæans, despairing of any equal support in Sicily, resolved, though contrary to the terms of the general peace, to call in the Athenians. Their embassy arrived (Ol. 91, 1.) soon after the renewal of the alliance with Argos. They represented the increase of the power of the Syracusans, and showed the probability of their reducing the whole island, if not checked, and then, as they were Dorians by origin, throwing their weight into the scale of the Dorian confederacy against Athens. For themselves, they said, they had money enough for the expenses of the war. They were heard with favour, and deputies were sent to Egesta to see if they had the funds they spoke of, and to examine into the state of the war.

* Called Segesta by the Romans, with whom the Egestæans claimed kindred, as they pretended to be like them descended from the Trojans. Virgil expresses this relation by making Acestes (the personification of Egesta) a Trojan prince.

The following spring (Ol. 91, 2.) the deputies and Egestæan envoys came back to Athens with sixty talents as a month's pay for sixty triremes. The deputies vouched for everything the Egestæans said, and asserted that there was abundance of wealth in the temples and in the treasury of their town. It was decreed at once to send a fleet of sixty triremes, commanded by Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus, to aid the Egestæans, to restore the Leontines, whom the Syracusans had expelled from their town, and who had also sent imploring aid; and to do whatever else the generals should deem to be for the Athenian interest. Another assembly was held five days afterwards, and then Nicias came forward to endeavour to dissuade the people from engaging in this mad enterprise. He pointed out the unsettled state of their relations in Greece; showed that even if the Syracusans should become masters of Sicily, the democratic form of their government would incline them to Athens rather than to Sparta; and hinted that it was the hopes of repairing his dilapidated fortune that made Alcibiades so eager for this war.

Alcibiades, who really did look forward to the conquest of Sicily, and even of Carthage, and to the acquisition of much private wealth, rose to reply. He boasted of his lavish expenditure as tending to reflect glory on the city; acknowledged his love of fame, which he sought to obtain by promoting the interest of Athens; and confessed the merits of his rival, whose prudence he felt would be a useful check on his own impetuosity. The strength of the Sicilians, he said, was greatly exaggerated; the Peloponnesians could only do as they had often done before—invade Attica and then retire. Finally, they had everything to hope, little to fear.

He was heard with applause; the Egestæans and Leontines came forward and implored the people to remember their oaths and to relieve them. Nicias saw that his only chance was to dismay the people by the magnitude of the armament he should demand; but the assembly, nothing daunted by his representations, called on him to state what forces he should require. He then said, not less than one hundred triremes, five thousand

hoplites of themselves and their allies at the very least, and light troops in proportion. It was instantly voted that the generals should have absolute powers respecting the number of the troops and everything concerning the expedition. Catalogues of those able to serve were made out, and orders and invitations sent to the allies.

The Athenians had completely recovered from the effects of the pestilence and the war; there was plenty of money, and an ardent vigorous population. The older sort believed that the expedition would succeed, or that at any rate the loss would not be great; the younger were eager after novelty and confident of success; the inferior people reckoned that they would, for the present, get pay as soldiers and sailors, and that the extent of the Athenian dominion would be in future a source of income to them in the assembly, courts of justice, and elsewhere. All were elate with hope: those who augured ill were silent, lest they should be esteemed bad citizens.

The preparations were nearly complete, when one morning it was discovered that the heads of all the *Hermæ** throughout the city had been mutilated during the preceding night. The superstitious people regarded this as ominous, and also as indicative of a conspiracy to overthrow the constitution. Large rewards were offered to any one who would give information respecting this or any other act of impiety which had been committed. Nothing however transpired touching the *Hermæ*, but witnesses averred that on former occasions some young men, when heated with wine, had defaced other statues, and even profanely celebrated the Mysteries in private houses. Alcibiades was said to have been one of them, and his enemies, magnifying everything, declared that all this only testified his settled design of dissolving the democracy. He denied the charges strenuously, and called for an immediate trial; but this did not suit the purpose of his enemies, who feared that the army would take his part, and that the people also would lean to him, as he had prevailed on the Argives and Manti-neans to share in the expedition. They therefore insisted that

* The statues of the god Hermines.

the fleet should not be delayed, saying that he could return and take his trial another time.

At midsummer all was ready. Corcyra was named as the place where the allies were to assemble. On a given day, the Athenians and such of the allies as were at Athens went down to the Piræus, and with dawn got on board their ships; the whole population, citizens and strangers, poured down to the port to see them depart. Their friends and relatives shed tears at the thoughts of the distance to which they were going, and the perils to which they would be exposed; but their spirits rallied when they viewed the gallant show of the fleet, for this was the finest and most splendidly equipped armament that had ever left a Grecian port. No expense had been spared by the state or by individuals; the trierarchs vied with each other in having their ships well-appointed, the hoplites in the possession of the best armour and weapons; all were anxious to display to Greece the power of Athens. Yet still the more thoughtful, such as Socrates, felt not confident; and to the apprehension of the superstitious, the wailing of the women for Adônîs (this being the time of the Adoneia) and the funereal rites of that festival cast a shade of gloom over all the magnificence of the scene*.

When everything was on board, the trumpets sounded for silence, and a general prayer was offered up, the officers and soldiers pouring libations of wine from gold and silver cups, and the multitude on shore joining in the petitions to the gods. The fleet then got under weigh and passed over to Ægina, whence it made sail for Corcyra.

The news, when it reached Syracuse, was hardly credited; an assembly however being held, Hermocrates took the opportunity of avowing his belief in the reality of the impending danger, and advised to form an alliance with the Barbarians, or original natives of the interior; to apply for aid to Lacedæmôn, Corinth, and even Carthage; to collect as large a fleet as possible, and lie with it in the bay of Taras (Tarentum), and attack the Athenian fleet when fatigued with the rowage across the Ionian sea. The greater part of the assembly laughed out-

* Plutarch, Nicias, 13.

right, and Athenagoras the leading demagogue came forward, and, with the ignorance, disregard of truth, and assumption usual to such persons, described the whole as a fiction of the oligarchs, eager to get military command in order to assail the democracy. The Athenians, he said, had enough to do at home, and they were too wise to venture where they were sure to meet with destruction. The assembly then broke up without having come to any decision.

Meantime the whole Athenian armament had reached Corcyra. It consisted of one hundred and thirty-four triremes, of which a hundred were Athenian : on board were 5100 hoplites ; 480 archers, 80 of whom were Cretans ; 700 Rhodian slingers ; 120 light-armed Megarian exiles ; and thirty horsemen and their horses in one transport. These were attended by thirty merchant-ships with provisions, and carrying bakers, carpenters and other mechanics and tradesmen, followed by one hundred vessels which had been pressed, and a number of others which came voluntarily for the sake of trade. The whole fleet, for convenience, was divided into three squadrons ; and three triremes were sent on before to sound the people of the cities on the coast of Italy and Sicily.

The fleet crossed over to the point of Japygia, and thence coasted Italy to that of Rhegion. Here the ships were drawn ashore, and the army encamped without the town. The generals tried to induce the Rhegians, who were of Chalcidian origin, to join in aiding the Leontines ; but they declared that they would act as they should see the other Italiots* acting. The Syracusans, now convinced that the Athenians were really coming, lost no time in preparing to resist them.

While the fleet was at Rhegion, the three triremes returned from Egesta. It appeared that the Egestæans had boasted falsely of their wealth, and had deceived the Athenian deputies by taking them to the temple on Mount Eryx, and showing them the offerings there, and borrowing from the adjacent towns gold and silver vessels to display at the entertainments they gave them. The real amount of their wealth did not exceed

* The Italiots were the Greeks of Italy, the Siciliots those of Sicily.

thirty talents. This was just as Nicias had expected it would be ; but his colleagues were greatly disappointed and chagrined. In the council which they held, Nicias was of opinion that they should sail to Selinûs, and if then the Egestæans could give pay to the whole army, to act accordingly ; if not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty triremes they had asked for, and by fair means or force to reconcile them and the Selinuntians ; to sail thence along the island, and display the Athenian power to the other towns, and then to return home. Alcibiades thought it would be disgraceful to have done nothing with such an armament. He proposed that they should send deputies to all the towns but Syracuse and Selinûs, and to the Sikelans, and try to form treaties with them. Lamachus advised (and his was perhaps the best plan) to attack the Syracusans at once, while they were in confusion and unprepared ; but finding so bold a course not agreeable to the others, he came over to the opinion of Alcibiades.

Alcibiades went himself to Messana, but all his arguments could only procure a promise of a market without the town. When he came back to Rhegion, he and one of his colleagues sailed with sixty triremes to Naxos, and thence to Catana. They then went to Syracuse, and sent ten ships into the Great Harbour to see if a fleet were there, to proclaim that they were come to restore the Leontines to their country, and to call on all of them who were in that city to join them. When they had done all they proposed, they returned to Catana, and the people there having agreed to an alliance, they went back to Rhegion for the remainder of the fleet. Having been told that the people of Camarina were friendly disposed toward them, they sailed thither, but were not able to effect anything, and on their return to Catana they found the Salaminian trireme* come to recall Alcibiades and some others to stand their trial for the affair of the Hermæ.

For after the departure of the fleet, the inquiry had been prosecuted with eagerness. The people were at the same time

* The Athenians had two triremes for state purposes, the Salaminian and Paralian.

grossly superstitious and absurdly jealous of their liberty. The wildest and most improbable tales, therefore, were listened to with open-mouthed credulity; one man, for instance, asserting that he had seen and recognised the persons who mutilated the Hermæ by moonlight, though every one knew it had been new-moon that night. A great number of persons were cast into prison; some were put to death; others fled; terror seized every one, great and small. The whole city was under arms: the senate even slept one night on the Acropolis: hardly any one ventured to enter the market. The Lacedæmonians happening at this time to march a small force to the Isthmus on its way to Bœotia, it was believed at once that its real object was to aid in overthrowing the democracy. Alcibiades' friends at Argos also fell under suspicion there, and the Athenians delivered up the hostages in their hands to the Argive demos to be put to death.

Among the prisoners was Andocides, one of the sacerdotal family of the Ceryces or Heralds of the Mysteries. Suspicion was strong against him, and one of his fellow-prisoners urged him, if he knew the guilty persons, to tell, and thus to save the innocent. Andocides, therefore, declared that the information given by a Metœc named Teucer had been the truth, and added four names to his list. Andocides and his family were then set at liberty. Such of the accused as could be found were put to death, and rewards were offered for the heads of those who had fled; and as Alcibiades' name was mentioned by every informer, the popular vengeance was directed particularly against him.

The whole affair is involved in impenetrable obscurity*: it is doubtful whether the confession of Andocides was true or false. It was, however, sufficiently in the character of Alcibiades to have had a mock celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries at one of his riotous revels. Similar acts of profaneness have taken place in modern times without any design against the state; and the mutilation of the Hermæ has some resem-

* See Andocides' speech on the Mysteries.

blance to the demolition of the lamps in cities as a frolic of young men of rank and fortune*.

Alcibiades feigned a cheerful obedience to the mandate of the people. He and the other accused persons accompanied the Salaminian in his own trireme as far as Thurii, on the coast of Italy. Here, however, they made their escape; and on the return of the Salaminian, sentence of death was passed against them. Shortly afterwards Alcibiades went over to the Peloponnese.

After the departure of Alcibiades, the generals sailed to Eggesta and Selinûs. On their way they took a Sicanian town named Hyccara, whose inhabitants they sold for one hundred and twenty talents†. The land-force then returned through the interior to Catana; and Nicias, having received the thirty talents from the Eggestæans, brought the fleet back to the same place.

The Syracusans, when they saw that the Athenians had not ventured to lay siege to their city, and had even failed in an attack on the town of Hybla, grew, after the wont of a populace, full of presumption, and insisted on their generals leading them to Catana. Their horsemen even rode up to the camp of the Athenians, and asked in a jeering tone if they were come to settle there themselves, instead of restoring the Leontines to their country. The Athenian generals, finding them in this mood, devised a stratagem to draw their whole force away from Syracuse, while they themselves should safely take up an advantageous position near that city. To understand the following movements a description of Syracuse will be necessary.


The small island of Ortygia, close to a peninsula on the east coast of Sicily, was the original seat of the Corinthian colony. When their numbers increased they also occupied the

* Sievers (*Comment. de Xen. Hell.* P. i. p. 16.) thinks, and not improbably, that it was an ebullition of the joy of Alcibiades' friends at the Sicilian expedition being resolved on.

† Among those taken and sold on this occasion was the celebrated Laïs, then a little girl. Athen. xiii. 588.

PLAN OF SYRACUSE.

p. 224.



A. Island.
B. Acradina.
C. Temenites.
D. Tyca.
E. Epipolæ.
F. Olympieion.

G. Plemmyrion.
H. Great Harbour.
I. Anâpus.
K. Lysimelian Mead.
a. Lesser Harbour.
b. Dascôn.

c. Trogilus.
d. Stone-quarries (Latomiaë).
e. Labdalon.
f. Euryâlus.
1.2.3. Walls of the Syracusans.
4.5. Walls of the Athenians.

peninsula, to which they joined Ortygia by a mole. At this time the city consisted of two parts, the Island and Acradîna, as the nearest part of the peninsula was called: beyond Acradîna lay two suburbs, named Tyca and Temenîtes, parallel to each other. The land rose thence gradually, and was named Epipolæ; the *Latomiaë*, or stone-quarries, were on it, near which was an elevation named Labdalon, and further west another called Euryâlus. Northwards of Acradîna was the harbour of Trogilus; southwards, the Great Harbour; and between Acradîna and the Island, on the north side, the Lesser Harbour. The Great Harbour, eighty stadia in circuit, terminated at Plemmyrion on the south, the entrance between Plemmyrion and Ortygia being eight stadia in width: within the Great Harbour on the south-west was a recess named Dascôn. The river Anâpus entered the Harbour from the west: about ten stadia from its mouth it was crossed by a bridge, and between it and Temenites was the Lysimelian Mead or Marsh. On the south bank of the Anapus was a hill, on which was a village or small town (*πολίχνη*), and close to it a temple of Zeus, whence the hill derived its name of Olympieion.

As the Athenian army was so very deficient in cavalry, it had been proposed by some Syracusan exiles who were in the camp, that they should remove and take up a position at the Olympieion. To effect this with safety it was necessary to draw the whole force of the Syracusans away from the town. They therefore sent a Catanæan, on whom they could depend, to the Syracusan generals, as if from their friends in Catana, to tell them that the Athenians were in the habit of leaving their camp and sleeping in the town, and that if they would on a certain day attack the camp with their entire force, their friends in the town would rise and burn the Athenian fleet, so that all the invaders might thus be destroyed.

The generals fell into the snare: the Syracusans and their allies issued forth with all their forces, and encamped, in the night before the appointed day, on the river Simæthus. When the Athenians heard that they were there, they got on board

their ships and made sail for Syracuse. At dawn they landed unopposed, and encamped under the Olympieion, defended on one side by trees, walls, houses, and a lake; on another by steep banks. They cut down trees and made a paling about the ships, and threw up a rampart on the side whence they were most likely to be attacked; they also broke down the bridge over the Anapus.

When the Syracusans found the Athenians gone, they returned home with all speed. They lay, the evening of their arrival, on the Helorian road. Next day the Athenian generals led their men out to battle: the Syracusans, noways deficient in patriotism or courage, but inferior in skill and discipline, advanced to engage them. The action was vigorously maintained for some time; but a thunder-storm which came on daunted the more inexperienced Syracusans. Their left wing gave way and fled, and the rout soon became general; but their horse, twelve hundred in number, prevented pursuit, and their loss did not exceed two hundred and sixty men; that of the victors amounted only to fifty. Next day, the Athenians, having burnt their own dead and restored those of the enemy, got on board their ships and returned to Catana, for it was now winter, and therefore no season for further operations; they also saw that till they had cavalry they should always fight to disadvantage. Money from home or elsewhere was also required, and it was hoped that this victory would give them consideration in the eyes of the Sicilians, and that they might thus be able to gain over some towns. The troops were quartered at Catana and Naxos, and it was resolved to form the siege of Syracuse in the spring.

In the assembly which the Syracusans held after the battle, Hermocrates desired them not to be dejected, as they had fought far better than was to be expected under the circumstances; all they wanted was experience and discipline. The number of their generals, which was fifteen, was, he said, productive of disorder, and he advised a reduction, and that unlimited power should be entrusted to them, as otherwise their plans could never be kept secret from the enemy. All the

suggestions of Hermocrates were attended to; the supreme unrestricted command was given to himself, with two colleagues; ambassadors were sent to Corinth and Sparta; a wall was built, taking in the Temenîtes, so that in case of defeat the enemy would have a longer space to circumvallate; a fort was raised at Megara, and another on the Olympieion; they also made palings at all the landing-places. Hearing then that the Athenians were all at Naxos, they marched to Catana, where they wasted the lands and burned the camp which the Athenians had left.

The Athenians meantime made a fruitless attempt to gain over Messana; for Alcibiades, now the enemy of his country, had given information to the party in the Syracusan interest. Having spent thirteen days before it, they returned to Naxos, and there secured their camp for the winter.

The Syracusan embassy met with a most cordial reception at Corinth, and Corinthian ministers accompanied it thence to Sparta, where the government was willing enough to send envoys, recommending the Syracusans not to make any terms, but scrupled to give any effective aid. To the misfortune of Athens, Alcibiades was there; he had crossed over from Thurii to Elis in a merchantman, and had afterwards proceeded on invitation to Lacedæmôn. He came forward, and drew an alarming picture of the ambitious projects of the Athenians: they aimed he said at reducing Sicily and Italy; and then turning their arms against Carthage, and having procured large bodies of excellent mercenaries in Spain, to come and assail the Peloponnese by sea and land. This project, he said, was not as wild as it might appear; for if Syracuse fell, all Sicily, and even Italy, would follow. It was therefore necessary to aid the Syracusans by sending them troops, and above all a skilful general. He finally advised to assail the Athenians at home by occupying a fortress in Attica; by which means they would derive no supplies from their lands, and their allies would be emboldened to revolt when they saw this proof of their weakness. The opinion of Alcibiades prevailed; and it was resolved to aid the Syracusans. Gylippus

the son of Cleandridas* was appointed to the command, and the Corinthians were directed to supply what troops they would.

During the winter the Athenian generals gained over to their side the greater part of the Sikelans of the interior, from whom they obtained corn, and in some cases money. They also sent to Carthage and Etruria, to endeavour to form alliances. They collected all the horses they could get, and provided bricks and iron for the circumvallation.

In the spring (Ol. 91, 3.) they opened the campaign by an expedition to Megara, where they gave the Syracusans a slight defeat, and then returned to Catana. On their return thither from another expedition against some Sikelan towns, they found two hundred and fifty horsemen and thirty horse-archers arrived from Athens, with all their accoutrements, but without horses, and three hundred talents in money. The Syracusans, when they heard of the arrival of these horsemen, reckoned that the Athenians would march at once against Syracuse; and knowing that if Epipolæ were pre-occupied it would be difficult for them to circumvallate the town, they resolved to place a garrison there. At daybreak one morning the whole Syracusan force appeared in review on the mead at the Anapus, and seven hundred picked men were appointed to go and occupy a post on the Epipolæ. But that very day the Athenians had sailed, unknown to them, from Catana; and having landed the troops at a place called Leôn, six or seven stadia from Epipolæ, the fleet went and secured itself at the low peninsula of Thapsus; and the troops pressed on and ascended at the Euryalus before they were perceived by the army in review on the mead, which was twenty-five stadia distant. The Syracusans advanced in disorder to attack them, but were driven off with the loss of three hundred men. Next day the Athenians came down and offered battle; but as the Syracusans would not come out to meet them, they retired, and fell to fortifying the Labdalon as a place of arms.

Having now mounted their own horsemen, and being joined

* See above, p. 155, *note*.

by three hundred from Egesta and one hundred Sikelans and Naxians, the Athenians had a body of six hundred and fifty horse. They therefore advanced to Tyca, and commenced their works, intending to circumvallate from the Trogilus to the Great Harbour. The Syracusans were terrified when they saw the rate at which the wall advanced, and they led out their forces; but fearing to risk an engagement, they only sent their horse to impede the Athenian workmen. These, however, were soon put to flight by the Athenian horse and some hoplites, and next day the works advanced as rapidly as ever toward the Trogilus. The Syracusans on their side began to run a cross-wall from the city between the Athenians and the Great Harbour, using the olive-trees of the temple of Apollo for the construction of wooden towers. As the Athenians, fearing to divide their forces, did not disturb them, they ran the wall out as far as they thought necessary, and then, leaving a party to guard it, returned to the city. The Athenians, observing the Syracusans quite negligent and careless at noontide, directed three hundred picked men and some light troops to make a sudden attack on the stockade in advance of the wall: the rest of the army was divided into two parts, the one to keep the forces in the town in check, the other to advance against the stockade in front of the gate of the Temenites. The attack succeeded fully; the guard fled, and they and their pursuers entered the Temenites pell-mell, where some of the latter were slain. The wall was then thrown down, the stakes carried away, and a trophy raised.

Next day the Athenians began to build from the Epipolæ toward the Marsh: the Syracusans set about running a paling and a ditch from the town-wall through the Marsh to cut them off from the Harbour. The Athenian fleet was then ordered round from Thapsus, and at daybreak troops came down from Epipolæ, and laying doors and boards on the soft mud, assailed and took nearly the whole of the new works. The Syracusans who came out to defend them were driven off; their right wing fled to the town, their left to the river. The three hundred picked men made for the bridge to intercept

them ; but the Syracusans, many of whom were horse, fell on and dispersed them, and then charged the right wing. Lamachus, who commanded, hastened from the left with the Argives and some archers, but incautiously crossing a ditch, he and four or five of those who followed him were slain.

Meantime those who had fled to the town turned, and while a part of them engaged the troops opposed to them, another part advanced to destroy the redoubt in front of the wall at the Epipolæ. They took and pulled it down, and were preparing to attack the wall, when Nicias, who was lying sick, sent orders to the workmen to set fire to the wood and machines which were out before it. The flames checked the assailants ; troops came to the defence of the wall ; the fleet was seen entering the Great Harbour ; and the Syracusans retired to the town, giving up all hopes of being able to impede the works. They began to treat with Nicias about peace, and threw, as is usual, all the blame of their late failure on their generals, whom they deprived of their command.

Gylippus, who was now at Leucas, judging from what he heard that all must be nearly over with Sicily, resolved if possible to save the towns of Italy for the Dorian cause. He therefore passed with the four triremes he had with him to Taras, and thence visited the other towns on the coast. Having learned the true state of affairs at Syracuse, he went through the strait, which was unguarded, to Himera ; and engaging the Himeræans, the Gelôans, the Selinuntians and some of the Sikelan tribes to aid him with men and arms, he marched for Syracuse with about five thousand men of all kinds. He ascended the Epipolæ by the Euryalus. The Syracusans came out with all their forces to join him, and advanced to the Athenian works in order of battle ; but Gylippus saw that they were not yet steady enough for action, and having sent a herald offering a truce to the Athenians if they would engage to quit Sicily within five days—which offer was of course despised—he drew off his troops, and bivouacked* for the night on the Temenites.

* This verb, we believe, answers pretty exactly to the Greek ἀνλίζομαι.

It was a mere accident that Gylippus did not find Syracuse in alliance with Athens. An assembly was about to deliberate on this subject, when Gongylus, the commander of one of the Corinthian triremes which he had desired to follow him from Leucas, being left behind the rest of the fleet, and having sailed more directly for Sicily, entered the port, and informed the people that Gylippus and a fleet were coming to their aid. All thoughts of accommodation were then abandoned, and they resolved to march out and meet him.

Next day Gylippus arrayed his forces against the Athenian wall to occupy their troops, while he sent a party up the Epipolæ to attack the post of the Labdalon; and as it was out of sight of the Athenians, they made themselves masters of it with ease. The same day an Athenian trireme was taken in the Great Harbour.

The Athenian works were now nearly carried to the sea on the south side; those on the north were also partly raised; but the part under the Epipolæ was still open, and Gylippus saw that by running a cross-wall thither from the town, he should cut off the communication between the two portions of the forces of the enemy. A wall was therefore instantly commenced. Meantime he attempted a night-attack on the Athenian south wall: but finding the troops on the alert, he drew off his forces.

Nicias saw that he was losing his superiority by land, and must look chiefly to the sea; he therefore resolved to secure the Plemmyrian headland on the other side of the bay, and passing over with his fleet and some troops, he raised on it three forts to hold his stores. He also stationed his fleet there; but as the sailors had to go some distance for wood and water, they were constantly fallen on by the Syracusan horse, who were at the Polichne or village on the Olympieion.

Gylippus soon after led out his troops, and gave the Athenians battle under their wall; but the space being confined, the Syracusan horse could not act, and he was forced to retire with some loss. He called the people together and told them not to be cast down, for the fault had been his, not theirs; and said he was confident that they, who were Dorians, would

quickly show their superiority over Ionians and islanders. He soon led them out again, and having chosen ground where the horse could act, he threw the Athenians into confusion, and forced them to retire behind their works. Next night the cross-wall, which was now far advanced, was carried beyond that of the besiegers, who now could not, even if victorious, succeed in walling-in the town.

Nicias had sent twenty triremes to intercept any ships that might be coming to the relief of Syracuse; but twelve triremes from Corinth, Leucas and Ambracia eluded them and entered the harbour. The new-comers aided the Syracusans to build their wall. Gylippus went in person to solicit aid from the other Sicilian towns; deputies were sent to Sparta and Corinth to urge the sending of more troops; ships of war were got ready, and everything prepared for offensive operations.

Agreeably to the caution and moral timidity of his character, and knowing the capricious masters whom he served, Nicias had now adopted the rather unusual course, as it appears, of writing to the people of Athens, instead of trusting to the memory, judgement and honesty of those whom he sent home*. He therefore wrote a full statement of the posture of affairs, and gave it as his opinion that the army should be recalled, or another armament of equal magnitude sent out to reinforce it. For himself he claimed his removal, as he was suffering severely from a disease of the kidneys.

The people, when they heard this letter read, were not awakened from their dreams of dominion by the difficulties which it presented: they resolved, on the contrary, to prosecute the war with vigour. Aware of the merits and the honesty of Nicias, they would not accept his resignation, but appointed Menander and Euthydêmus, two of the officers under him, to be his temporary colleagues. They voted the force required, nominating Demosthenes and Eurymedôn to the command; and though it was mid-winter, they sent off the latter instantly with ten triremes and a hundred and twenty talents in money.

In the spring (Ol. 91, 4.) Demosthenes set sail from Athens

* See Thirlwall, iii. 419, *note*.

with sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes, carrying twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and a large body of troops of the subject-allies. He was joined by Charicles, who was off the Peloponnese, with thirty triremes, and pursuant to his instructions he landed and ravaged the lands of Epidaurus Limêra, on the coast of Laconia. He then landed on the coast opposite the isle of Cythera, and plundered it. Leaving Charicles to fortify a small peninsula there as a place of refuge for runaway Helots, he steered his course for Corcyra.

At the very time the Athenians were sending out this fleet, there was an enemy in their own country. The Lacedæmonians imputed all the misfortunes they had met with in the preceding part of the war to their refusal to submit their differences with the Athenians to arbitration; and as the Athenians were now in a similar position, having refused, though called on, to abide the judgement of a tribunal for the aggressions with which they were charged, it was resolved to invade Attica once more and execute the plan suggested by Alcibiades. During the winter iron and other things requisite for building were collected, and in the spring king Agis led the troops of the confederacy into Attica, where, having ravaged the plain-country, they set about fortifying Deceleia, a place about one hundred and twenty stadia from Athens and in view of it: it was at the same distance from Bœotia, and commanded all the surrounding country. At the same time troops were sent to Sicily; from Lacedæmôn six hundred Neodamods and select Helots, from Bœotia three hundred, from Corinth five hundred, from Sicyon two hundred; in all sixteen hundred hoplites. They embarked in merchantmen, and these last were convoyed through the gulf by twenty-five Corinthian triremes, to protect them from the Athenian squadron, commanded by Conôn, at Naupactus.

When Gylippus returned to Syracuse, he and Hermocrates joined in urging the people to risk a naval action, for he intended at the same time to try to carry, by a sudden attack, the forts on the Plemmyrion. Accordingly thirty-five triremes were prepared in the Great, and forty-five in the Lesser Har-

bour, in which last the docks were; and at night-fall Gylippus led all his forces toward the Plemmyrion. At a given signal the two squadrons moved out, the former advancing toward the Athenian fleet, the latter making round to the mouth of the Great Harbour to aid the attack on the Plemmyrion. The Athenians got ready in haste sixty triremes, twenty-five of which they opposed to the thirty-five, and thirty-five to the forty-five of the enemy. Gylippus meantime had reached the Plemmyrion: the Athenian soldiers there being mostly down on the beach looking at the sea-fight, he carried with ease the three forts, in which he found much money and stores. The Athenians had the advantage on the water; for the fleet from the Lesser Harbour, though it forced the passage of the Great one, fell into disorder and was defeated, and eleven ships sunk. The remaining triremes took a station at the Plemmyrion; and the Athenians, who drew their supplies mostly from Italy, were now greatly straitened; for as their fleet and army lay in the interior of the harbour, every ship that came had to fight its way.

The old docks of Syracuse were in the Great Harbour, near the city and the Athenian camp; and to have a secure station for their triremes, the Syracusans set about forming a defence by driving stakes down in the sea. To prevent this work the Athenians brought up to it a large merchantman furnished with bulwarks and wooden towers. Men in boats fastened ropes to the stakes, and divers went down and sawed them, while the men on board the ship kept up a fight with the troops at the docks. In this way most of the stakes were destroyed. But the Syracusans had driven other stakes below the water, which were as dangerous as sunken rocks to the Athenian ships: for a good reward, however, divers went down and cut these also. The Syracusans drove down more stakes, and as the two camps were close together, hardly a day passed without a skirmish.

CHAPTER VIII.*

Distress at Athens.—Voyage of Demosthenes.—Sea-fight in the Great Harbour.—Attack on Epipolæ.—Retreat proposed.—Defeat of the Athenian fleet.—Flight of the Athenian army.—Its surrender.

OL. 91, 4. B.C. 413.

WHILE the Athenians were thus beleaguering Syracuse, their own city was in nearly a similar stage of siege. The Peloponnesian garrison in Deceleia wasted the country all round; the cattle were taken; and more than twenty thousand slaves, mostly mechanics, ran away from their masters. The horses were lamed and worn out by constant service on the hard soil, and the men were exhausted by keeping guard day and night on the walls; for Athens was now, says the historian, a fortress instead of a city. The provisions, which used to be brought from Eubœa overland by Oropus and Deceleia, had now to be carried round by sea at a great expense. A plan to enable the state to defray its increased expenditure was at this time put in operation, namely to levy a twentieth† on imported and exported goods in all the ports of the subject-allies, instead of the tribute which they had hitherto paid. It was expected that a larger revenue might thus be raised.

Demosthenes, on coming to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took some hoplites on board. He then sailed to the coast of Acarnania, where he was joined by Eurymedôn, who informed him of the loss of Plemmyrion. Eurymedôn proceeded to Corcyra, and required from the people twenty-five ships, and hoplites in proportion; and Demosthenes meantime collected slingers and dartmen in Acarnania. When all was ready, they crossed over to the point of Japygia, where they engaged one hundred and fifty Messapian dartmen: at Metapontum they obtained three hundred more and two triremes. The Athe-

* Thuc. vii. 26. to the end. Diod. xiii. 10–35. Plut. Nicias.

† That is, five per cent. *ad valorem*.

nian party, who had just gotten the upper hand at Thurii, sent seven hundred hoplites and three hundred dartmen to aid their allies.

The whole of the Siceliots, except the Acragantines, were now in favour of the Syracusans. Camarina sent them five hundred hoplites, three hundred archers, and three hundred dartmen; Gela, two hundred horsemen, four hundred dartmen, and five ships. Some of the more distant towns, as the Acragantines refused a passage to their troops, ventured to march them through the Sikelan country; but at the desire of Nicias, the Sikelans laid an ambush, and killed eight hundred of them; the remainder, fifteen hundred in number, reached Syracuse.

The Syracusans, hearing of the approach of Demosthenes, resolved to hazard another sea-fight. They altered the form of their ships, making them broad and strong in the prows; for as those of the Athenians were narrow and weak, and for want of sea-room in the harbour, would not be able to perform their usual evolutions of sailing round and through, they expected to have the advantage in the direct shock. When all was prepared, Gylippus led out his army and attacked the Athenian wall near the town, while the troops from the Olympieion came and assailed it on the other side. The Syracusans and their allies meantime manned eighty triremes and moved out. The Athenians, who had expected no such combined attack, hauled out seventy-five triremes with all the speed they could, and got on board. The day passed away in slight skirmishes, the Athenians losing one or two ships, and at nightfall both retired. Next day the Syracusans did not stir, and Nicias employed it in mooring merchantmen two plethra (200 feet) asunder in front of a range of stakes, which he had made to form a kind of harbour for his ships. The following day the attack by land and by sea was renewed. A Corinthian named Aristôn advised the Syracusan commanders to send orders into the city for all the venders of provisions to come down and hold a market on the beach, and then to let the men go ashore and take their meal, after which they might renew the engagement. This advice was followed: the Syracusan fleet retired

toward the town; and the Athenians, thinking they would fight no more that day, went back to their camp and dispersed. Suddenly the Syracusan fleet appeared again; for as soon as the men had dined, the officers had made them re-embark. The Athenians got on board in a hurry, most of them fasting. Fearing to be overcome by mere fatigue, they made a general attack, which was undauntedly received: the strong prows of the Syracusan ships, and the dartmen on the decks, did the Athenians much damage, and they suffered still more from a number of small boats, in which the Syracusans sailed about their vessels, casting darts at the sailors. At length the advantage remained with the Syracusans, and the Athenians retired through the intervals in their line of merchantmen. As leaden dolphins were hung from the yards of these vessels, which would sink any ship into which they were let fall, the Syracusans halted when they reached this line. Two of their ships which ventured in were destroyed. The Athenians had seven ships sunk and several disabled. The Syracusans raised trophies for both the sea-fights, and were now quite elate with hope.

But great was their dismay when shortly after they beheld Demosthenes and Eurymedôn enter the harbour with seventy-three triremes, carrying five thousand hoplites, with dartmen, slingers and archers in proportion, and all needful stores. Demosthenes, an officer of great skill, as soon as he saw the state of affairs, became sensible that there was no room for delay. He resolved to make one attempt, and if that should prove a failure, to take home the army, which Athens could not afford to lose. The wall of the Syracusans to Epipolæ he perceived was single, and could easily be carried if Epipolæ were first occupied; he therefore advised an attempt to take that place. He first ravaged the lands about the Anapus, and as the Syracusans did not come out, he ventured to assail the wall; but his troops were driven off, and the machines burnt. Having gained over to his opinion Nicias and the other generals, he now prepared for his attack on Epipolæ. Making the men take provisions with them for five days, and taking the carpenters

and masons, and all things requisite for fortification, and leaving Nicias to guard the works, he himself, Eurymedôn, and Menander, led out the army at the time of first sleep, and began to ascend at Euryalus. They took a post that was there, slaying some of the guards; but the rest fled and gave the alarm. There were three camps on Epipolæ, viz., of the Syracusans, of the other Siceliots, and of the allies, and all came to the relief. The Athenians at first drove them back, and advanced rapidly; at length the Bœotians met and repelled them. The Athenians then turned and fled in confusion. It was bright moonlight; but this only added to the difficulty, for though they could see plainly the forms of the men, they could not tell friend from foe: the pæan, or war-cry, of the Argives and Coreyræans, who were Dorians, being similar to that of the enemies, contributed to augment their terror. Many cast themselves down the precipices and perished. Of those who reached the plain through the pass, such as belonged to the army of Nicias, as they knew the country, made their way to the camp; while the new-comers wandered about, and in the morning were cut to pieces by the Sicilian horse.

When the Athenians had received and buried their dead, Demosthenes urged immediate departure: it was now the sickly season; they were encamped by a marsh; the troops were murmuring; there appeared little chance of success; and they could serve their country far better at home. Nicias opposed this measure: he said he knew the affairs of the enemy to be in a worse condition than their own; there was a party in Syracuse favourable to them, with whom he had intelligence; he knew too well the character of those whom he served, and that many of those who were now most clamorous to depart, would on their return be the first to charge the generals with having taken bribes from the enemy; for his own part, he would rather perish in battle than be judicially murdered at home. Demosthenes then said, that, if they were to stay, it would be better to retire to Thapsus or Catana, whence they might ravage the country, and where they would have sea-room for their fleet to display its superiority in evolutions, instead of being cooped

up in a harbour. Eurymedôn was of the same opinion; but as Nicias seemed resolved to stay, they gave way to him.

Gylippus, who had gone through Sicily collecting troops, now entered Syracuse with an army. The Athenian generals seeing the Syracusans thus reinforced, while their own army was melting away with disease, resolved, Nicias no longer opposing, to retire in secrecy. All things were prepared, when unfortunately an eclipse of the moon took place. Terrified at this phenomenon, the soldiers called on their generals to delay; the soothsayers pronounced that they must now remain twenty-seven days longer, and Nicias, superstitious as the vulgar, declared against all deliberation till that period should have expired.

The Syracusans being resolved if possible not to let them escape, manned seventy-six triremes, and while these came forth in order of battle, the land-forces assailed the Athenian wall. The Athenians advanced with eighty-six triremes. Eurymedôn, who commanded on the right, extended his line near the shore to inclose the Syracusan ships; but these being victorious in the centre, caught him in the recess of the harbour, destroyed him and all his ships, and then turned and chased the rest of the fleet. Gylippus, seeing the rout of the Athenian fleet, led a part of his forces down to the beach to cut off those who might be escaping to shore. As they advanced somewhat disorderly, the Etruscan mercenaries, who were stationed there, put them to flight, and drove them into the Lysimelian Marsh. More troops came to aid on both sides, and the victory finally remained with the Athenians, whose ships now came safely to land. Eighteen triremes, with all on board, had been destroyed by the Syracusans. As the wind was now blowing toward where the Athenian ships lay, an attempt was made to burn them, by filling an old merchant-ship with combustibles, setting fire to them, and letting it drift along. The Athenians, however, contrived to keep it off till it was burnt out.

Elate with their naval victory, the Syracusans now meditated nothing less than the total destruction of the Athenian fleet and army. They therefore closed up the mouth of the harbour,

by mooring triremes and other smaller vessels transversely in it. The Athenian commanders, seeing that they would now be left without provisions,—for they had sent orders to Catana to stop the supply from thence, as they were so soon to proceed thither—held a council, to which they summoned most of the officers of the army. The result of their deliberation was to abandon the upper walls, and to occupy a fort, where the ships were, just large enough to contain the stores and the sick, and for the rest of the army to get aboard all the vessels they had, and try to force a passage to Catana; if this should fail, to burn the ships, and make their way thither if possible by land. They accordingly got ready one hundred and ten vessels; and as the men were dispirited by the late defeat, and at the same time anxious to engage, from want of provisions, Nicias, whose courage and vigour rose in adversity, addressed them generally, and each trierarch in particular, exhorting them to valour and perseverance; they then embarked, and led by Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, rowed for the mouth of the harbour.

The Syracusans got under weigh with an equal number of ships, the Corinthians occupying the centre. A part of their fleet went to the defence of the entrance, the rest stayed about the harbour. The Athenians beat the former at the first shock: they then set about loosing the vessels that blocked up the passage; and while they were thus employed, the rest of the enemy's ships came up, and the engagement became general. It was the most obstinate that had yet been fought. The Athenians, having everything at stake, made desperate efforts; the Syracusans, knowing that if the fleet were destroyed their enemies would be in their power, and stimulated by the desire of fame and vengeance, combated with equal energy. The Athenian troops on shore viewed the conflict with the most intense interest, and as their proximity prevented them from seeing the whole at once, shouts of joy and encouragement arose from those who saw Athenian ships victorious, cries of grief from those who saw them yielding. At length the whole Athenian fleet was beheld in flight for the shore, and that of the enemies

in close pursuit. Then rose to heaven a loud cry of grief, and all rushed to the beach to aid in saving the ships. The Syracusans carried away the wrecks and the bodies of the Athenian dead, and raised a trophy. So utterly were the Athenians dejected with their defeat, that they never sent, as was the inviolable usage, to demand the bodies of the slain for sepulture.

It was resolved to depart that very night, and Demosthenes proposed, as they had sixty triremes left, while those of the enemy were reduced to less than fifty, to get on board and force the passage. Nicias agreed at once to this judicious plan; but the sailors, dismayed by the preceding defeat, positively refused to embark. No course now remained but the hazardous one of a land-march, for which they began to prepare. The judicious Hermocrates, suspecting that the Athenians would attempt to depart that night, proposed to the Syracusan government to march out all their forces, and obstruct the roads and occupy the passes. They saw the wisdom of what he said, but as it was a feast of Hercules, and the people, elate with victory, were drinking and enjoying themselves, they declined proposing to them to resume their arms. Hermocrates then, lest the Athenians should escape, sent as soon as it grew dark some of his friends to their camp, who, when they came within hearing, called out to tell Nicias not to depart that night, as the roads were beset. As Nicias had intelligence with a party in the town, the warning was supposed to come from them, and the stratagem succeeded. It was now resolved to remain the following day also, that the soldiers might be fully prepared.

The next day Gylippus set out, and stopped up the roads and guarded the fords where the Athenians were expected to pass. The Syracusans also got on board their vessels, and came and dragged off some of the Athenian triremes, and burned a few more of them.

When on the following day the retreat commenced, the appearance presented was one of the most deplorable that could be conceived. The dead were left unburied; the sick and wounded abandoned to the barbarity of the justly incensed Syracusans. In vain they implored their friends, relatives or

comrades to take them with them ; compelled by necessity to leave them behind, they could only groan and shed tears as they departed. The appearance of the retreating army, says the historian, was like that of a population flying from a besieged town : the number of the fugitives amounted to forty thousand. The horsemen and hoplites had, contrary to custom, to carry their own provisions, for the slaves had all along been deserting, and now did so more than ever, so that they either had no servants or could not trust them. The quantity of provisions, however, which they had was trifling.

Ere they departed, Nicias addressed an exhortation to the army to raise their spirits. They then set forward in two divisions, Nicias leading the first, Demosthenes the last, the baggage and servants being placed in the centre of each division. Their plan was, instead of marching for Catana, to take an opposite direction, and endeavour to get into the country of the friendly Sikelans. They forced the passage of the Anapus, intending to move up along its valley ; and having marched forty stadia, incessantly harassed by the Syracusan horse and light troops, they bivouacked on an eminence. Early next day they set forth and marched twenty stadia into a plain, where they proposed to take provisions from the houses and to lay in a supply of water, as the country before them for some distance was arid. The road now led over a hill ; it was narrow, with precipices on each side, and the Syracusans had occupied it and walled it across. The Athenians next day were so harassed by the horse and light troops that they were obliged to return to their camp. On the following morning they advanced, and tried to force the pass, but were driven back. A thunder-storm, a usual occurrence at that time of the year (it was autumn), came on and aided to deject them ; and while they halted, Gylippus detached a part of his troops to seize and wall the road behind them. They, however, sent a party who prevented them, and the army then descended and bivouacked in the plain.

The following day they marched in another direction, but they suffered so much from the horse and light troops that they proceeded but five or six stadia. In the night, leaving a great many fires burning to deceive the enemy, they turned

back and made for the sea. As is usual in such cases, terror and anxiety caused much confusion, especially in the division of Demosthenes; but they reached the sea, and then taking the road to Helôrus, went along, intending when they came to the river Cacyparis to march up it into the interior, where they expected to be joined by the Sikelans. They found here a party of Syracusans securing the ford, but they drove them off; and having crossed, marched for another stream, named the Erineüs.

In the morning, when the Syracusans found the Athenians gone, they accused Gylippus of treachery. They then pursued, and about dinner-time came up with the division of Demosthenes, which their horse surrounded. Demosthenes halted, and drew up his men; but as they were in a place which was walled round and filled with olive-trees, with a road running on each side of it, the Syracusans remained without and kept up a constant discharge of missiles. Having harassed them thus all through the day, Gylippus sent in the evening a herald, offering freedom to any of the islanders who would come over; an offer which, to their honour, but few accepted. The whole division of six thousand men at length surrendered, on condition that no one should be put to death in any manner. They were desired to cast their money into shields turned upside down to receive it, four of which it filled: they were then conducted to Syracuse.

Nicias, who, from the rapidity of his march, was at this time fifty stadia* in advance, had crossed the Erineüs, and taken a position on a rising ground. When the Syracusans came up with him next day, they told the fate of the other division, and called on him also to surrender. He demanded to be suffered to send a horseman to ascertain the truth. This was granted, and on the return of his messenger, he offered, on the part of the Athenians, to pay the Syracusans the costs of the war, leaving hostages a man for every talent. These terms were refused, and an attack was kept up on them all through the day. In the night they attempted to retire as before, but they were perceived, and the war-cry was raised: they therefore

* Some MSS. of Thucydides have 150 stadia.

remained quiet, all but three hundred men, who broke through and got off for the present.

Early next day Nicias again set forth. His army was harassed as before by the horse and the light troops ; but they hoped, if they could reach and pass the river Assinarus, they should be more secure. When they came to the river, urged by thirst and the desire to get over, they rushed into it in tumultuous confusion ; and as they were collected in dense masses, the missiles of the enemy proved fatal to numbers : the Syracusans also crossed over, and occupied the steep bank on the other side, and the Peloponnesians went down and killed many of those who were in the water. The river was turbid with mud and gore, and yet thirst impelled them to drink. Nicias, seeing that escape was now hopeless, surrendered unconditionally to Gylippus : for as he had always been the friend of Lacedæmôn, he had reason to expect more favour from the Spartans than the Syracusans. Gylippus then ordered quarter to be given, and the prisoners to be led to Syracuse. The three hundred who had escaped were pursued and brought back ; but as many had been slain, and many were secreted by the soldiers to be sold for slaves, the number led to Syracuse was not considerable.

It was the wish of Gylippus to have the glory of conducting to Sparta the two Athenian generals ; but a party at Syracuse, and the Corinthians among the allies, were bent on their destruction. It is also said that those who had been in intelligence with Nicias urged his execution, lest he might give information. A demagogue named Eurycles* proposed that a festival, to be called the Assinarian, from the name of the river, should be annually held on the day that Nicias was taken ; that the Athenian and Siceliot prisoners should be shut up in the quarries (*λατόμραι*) of Epipolæ, the rest be sold for slaves, and the two generals put to death. Hermocrates in vain advised moderation and humanity : the sentence was passed and executed.

* Diodorus calls him Diocles. This writer gives a long speech of an old man named Nicolâus (who had lost two sons in the war) in favour of mercy, and one of Gylippus against it. His authority was probably Timæus.

The entire of the prisoners, seven thousand in number, were detained for about seventy days in the quarries, exposed without any roof over them to the heat of the day and the chill of the autumnal nights. They were allowed each two cotyls (about a pound) of barley-meal and one (about half a pint) of water a day; and this insufficient diet*, together with the stench in so confined a place from the bodies of those who died and from other causes, and the various evils which they endured, rapidly thinned their numbers. At the end of seventy days all but the Athenians and Siceliots and Italiots were taken out and sold for slaves. What with these, and those who had been secreted by the soldiers and sold, and those who had made their escape, most of the towns in the island were filled with Grecian slaves and fugitives. Such as escaped or were liberated found a friendly reception at Catana.

It is said† that many persons some time after waited on the tragic poet Euripides, and assured him that, by singing in Sicily such of his verses as they recollected, some of them had obtained kind treatment in slavery; others had procured food as they wandered through the country after the battle. If the anecdote be true, as it probably is, this effect of his verses should have given more genuine pleasure to the poet than the most rapturous applauses of the crowded theatre.

CHAPTER IX.‡

Revolt of the Allies.—War on the Coast of Asia.—Intrigues of Alcibiades.—
Revolution at Athens.

Ol. 92, 1-92, 2.

B.C. 412-411.

WHEN intelligence reached Athens of the disaster in Sicily, the people at first refused to give credit to it; but when it could no longer be doubted, forgetting their own share in it, they

* The daily allowance of a slave was a *chænix*, i.e. four cotyls of barley-meal.

† Plut. Nicias, 29.

‡ Thuc. viii. 1-98. Diod. xiii. 36-38. Plut. Alcibiades.

vented their rage on the orators and soothsayers who had deceived them with false promises and expectations. They soon, however, began to reflect seriously on their condition: they were now almost without ships, money, or stores; the flower of their youth was lost in Sicily; they expected every hour to see the Syracusan fleet before the Piræus, their original enemies assailing them on every side, and all their allies in revolt. They however lost not courage: they appointed a council of elders to deliberate on what was to be done; and at their suggestion they provided timber and built ships, raised a fort at Sunion to protect the corn-ships, recalled the garrison left by Demosthenes in Laconia and some others, and did everything to keep the allies in their obedience. All the other Greeks who had dreaded the increasing power of the Athenians, deemed the time to be come for crushing them. Those who had been hitherto neuter now declared themselves: the Lacedæmonians saw, as they thought, the supremacy of Greece within their grasp. They issued directions to their allies to build seventy-five ships, engaging to furnish twenty-five themselves, and made every preparation for a vigorous campaign in the spring*.

Meantime (Ol. 92, 1.), as the Athenians had apprehended, their allies began to meditate revolt. The Eubœans and Lesbians sent deputies to treat with Agis at Deceleia. The Chians and Erythræans sent direct to Sparta. An envoy from Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap† of Lydia, accompanied them, to propose an alliance with Lacedæmôn, on the part of the Great King. At the same time arrived envoys from Pharnabâzus, the satrap of the country about the Hellespont, desiring that a fleet should be sent to aid revolt from Athens in his province. It was debated for some time whither the fleet should first be sent: at length, by the influence of Alcibiades with Endius, one of the ephors, the preference was given to the Chians and Erythræans; and as they had sixty ships of

* This second part of the Peloponnesian war is also called the Deceleian war.

† The Persian *Satrap* answers to the Turkish *Pasha*.

their own, it was voted to send forty to join them, ten of which were to sail immediately.

The Spartans delaying as usual, the Chians, afraid lest their designs might come to the knowledge of the Athenians, sent again to urge them. Directions were therefore given to haul the ships in the Corinthian gulf across the Isthmus. As these, with those collected by Agis to aid the Lesbians, made thirty-nine, it was resolved that one half of them should proceed at once to Chios. But as this happened to be the time of the Isthmian games, the Corinthians would not go till they were ended; and the Athenians coming to the games, got proofs of the designs of the Chians, which they already suspected.

When the games were over, twenty-one ships sailed from the port of Cenchreæ; but on the appearance of an Athenian fleet of equal force, their crews lost courage, and fled to a port named Peiræon, on the verge of the Corinthian territory, toward Epidaurus. The Athenians attacked them, killed their commander, and damaged several of the ships; then leaving a few ships to watch them, they retired, and encamped in a neighbouring islet. The Corinthians came to aid the fleet, and as the country thereabouts was desert, they were at first going to burn the ships; but they finally hauled them up and guarded them.

No ships had yet sailed from Laconia, and but for the influence of Alcibiades with Endius none would have sailed. He urged on him so much the necessity of getting the Chians and others to revolt before they heard of what had just occurred, that five ships under Chalcideus were sent out. Alcibiades accompanied him; they landed at Corycos, on the coast of Asia, and having there consulted with their Chian friends, by their advice sailed at once to the island, and by their vaunts of the great fleet which was coming, induced the people to revolt. The people of Erythræ and Clazomenæ followed their example.

When news reached Athens of the revolt of Chios, the anxiety was extreme; and as the danger was esteemed to be as great as if an enemy were before the Piræus, it was held to

justify an application of the thousand talents which had been set apart in the beginning of the war*. Every effort was made to collect a powerful fleet to prevent a total defection of the allies. Eight ships under Strombichides were sent off forthwith to the coast of Asia; but he was obliged to take refuge at Samos from a superior force under Chalcideus. The Teians now revolted, and Alcibiades soon induced the Milesians to do the same: Lebedos also fell off at the instance of the Chians. The war between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy now assumes a new appearance: it is entirely naval; the scene is transferred to the coast of Asia, and the Persian government takes a deep interest in it.

At this time a treaty of alliance was made by Tissaphernes, in the name of his master, with the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the Demos at Samos, discovering that the upper ranks in the island were planning a change, rose up, killed two hundred and expelled four hundred of them, seized and divided their houses and lands, and even made a decree never to intermarry with them†. This event was of course highly favourable to the Athenian interest in these parts.

Meantime the fleet at the Corinthian Peiræon came out, beat the Athenian fleet of equal force that was watching it, and got into Cenchreæ. Astyochus came from Sparta to take the command, and the ships ran out and sailed at different times to the coast of Asia. The Athenian fleet in that part was also gradually augmented, and soon began to assume its wonted superiority. Lesbos, where the Chians had induced Methymne, the only town faithful to Athens, to revolt, was recovered, and Clazomenæ returned to her former condition. An Athenian fleet of twenty ships lay at the isle of Lade blockading the port of Miletus; and in a landing made from it, a victory was gained over Chalcideus, who fell in the action.

As the Athenians were now so strong at sea, they resolved to attempt the reduction of Chios. The admirals Leôn and

* See above, p. 172.

† This looks like retaliation for a similar act on the part of the aristocrats, when the power was theirs.

Diomedôn occupied the Cænussian islands before it, and made descents from them, from Lesbos and the coast of Erythræ. The Chians, everywhere defeated, were obliged to shut themselves up in their town, leaving their rich lands to be ravaged. Chios was the most wealthy and fertile of all the islands ; since the Medic war it had seen no enemy, and it therefore now presented the greater quantity of plunder. As of course there was an Athenian party in it who were planning a surrender, the principal men sent to call Astyochns, who was at Erythræ, and he came with four ships to their aid.

Toward the end of the summer there came from Athens forty-eight triremes under the generals Phrynichus, Onomacles and Scironides, carrying one thousand Athenian, fifteen hundred Argive, and one thousand other hoplites. Having touched at Samos, they proceeded and landed near Miletus. Eight hundred Milesians, the Peloponnesians of Chalcideus, and some mercenaries in the pay of Tissaphernes advanced to engage them : the satrap himself was at hand with his cavalry. In this action it was remarked, that the Ionians beat the Dorians, for the Milesians defeated the Argives, while the Athenians routed the Peloponnesians. Victory remained with the Athenians, who forthwith began to vallate the isthmus in which Miletus stood.

But that very evening a fleet of twenty-two Sicilian ships under Hermocrates, and thirty-three Peloponnesian under Theramenes, arrived off Miletus. They stopped in the bay at a place named Teichiussa, and Alcibiades, who had been in the battle, hastened down and implored them to aid Miletus without delay, or all Ionia would be lost. They therefore prepared for action in the morning ; but Phrynichus, having seen their superiority in force, would not let his colleagues engage them, and the Athenians had retired in the night to Samos. The Argives were so mortified by their defeat in the late action that they now went home.

It were tedious to enumerate the various transactions which now took place. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and the Athenians in particular became so strong that they were

able to divide their forces, sending thirty triremes with troops to Chios, and retaining seventy-four at Samos for another attempt on Miletus.

The aristocratic party at Lesbos having opened a communication with Astyochus, he had hopes of gaining over that island; but the Corinthians and the other allies were adverse to any attempt on it, on account of the former failure. He then proposed to the Chians to join in it; they however, fearing to diminish their forces at home, declined. Pedaritus, the Lacedæmonian commander at Chios, joined in the refusal; and Astyochus, highly offended, sailed away to Miletus, vowing not to assist them when they should need it. The Athenians now fortified Delphinion, a strong place on the coast not far from the town of Chios. As was usual when an enemy had thus fixed himself in a country, the slaves began to run away in great numbers. The Chians, we are told, had more slaves than any other people except the Lacedæmonians, and owing to their number treated them with great severity; they therefore gladly sought refuge with the Athenians, and being well acquainted with the country, were able to do much mischief to their former masters. Pedaritus and the Lacedæmonian party were afraid to stir, on account of the strength of the opposite party. He sent to Astyochus, praying him to come to his aid before the fortification of Delphinion was completed; and on his refusal, he sent to complain of him at Lacedæmon. In consequence of this complaint, as a fleet of twenty-seven ships under Antisthenes, promised to Pharnabazus, was now about to sail, eleven commissioners were sent out, who were to inquire into the conduct of Astyochus, and, if they saw reason, to take the command from him and give it to Antisthenes.

This fleet, having taken a circuitous route, from dread of the Athenians, arrived at Caunos, on the coast of Caria. Word was then sent to Miletus for the fleet there to come and join it. Astyochus, who was now at length going to the aid of Chios, deemed it his first duty to proceed to Caunos. On coming to Cnidos, he learned that the Athenian admiral Charminus was with twenty ships on the look-out for the fleet at

Caunos. During the night he fell in with the Athenians near the isle of Syme. Charminus in the morning, seeing only the left of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was dispersed, and taking it for the one he was looking for, attacked it, and sunk three ships and disabled some others; but the whole fleet soon appeared and began to surround him, and he fled to Halicarnassus with the loss of six ships. The Peloponnesian fleets joined, and sailed to Cnidos, having raised a trophy on Syme. The Athenian fleet from Samos came and offered battle, but the Peloponnesians would not come out.

While the Peloponnesians were at Cnidos, the aristocratic party in the Dorian island of Rhodes sent to invite them thither; and as they hoped, if they gained to their side this wealthy island, they should be independent of Tissaphernes, with whom they were not on very good terms, they sailed thither with ninety-four ships, and the island forthwith revolted. The Athenian fleet came from Samos too late to prevent the defection.

Alcibiades had been for some time suspected by the Spartans; and orders had even been sent out to Astyochus to put him to death. King Agis was particularly hostile to him, on account it is alleged of his too great intimacy with his queen. He therefore sought refuge with Tissaphernes, over whose mind he acquired great influence, which he immediately began to exercise to the injury of his former friends. He first told him that the pay which, according to treaty, he issued to their seamen was too great; for the Athenians, who knew so much of such matters, did not give more than the half of it, and that out of prudence, not parsimony. By his advice the satrap declared that till he learned the King's pleasure he must reduce the pay from a drachma to half a drachma a day. Against this Hermocrates remonstrated warmly, and Tissaphernes was induced to make a small addition to it. Alcibiades further impressed on the satrap that it was not for the King's interest that the war should end, and either side get a decided superiority, but to keep up a balance of power between them, letting the Lacedæmonians be superior on land, the Athenians at

sea. For this purpose he advised him not to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as he had engaged, but to go on promising, and keep the Peloponnesians from fighting, and supply provision sparingly. Tissaphernes acted according to this advice, and in consequence of it nothing of importance was effected by this great fleet.

But the main object of Alcibiades was to procure his restoration to his country. Secure of his influence with the satrap, he sent to communicate with the principal persons in the army at Samos, and told them that if the democracy at home was replaced by an oligarchy, so that he could return with safety, he would assure them of the friendship of Tissaphernes. This proposal was listened to readily by the trierarchs and other respectable persons, for they were of themselves anxious to dissolve the democracy, in which the rabble, led but too often by unprincipled demagogues, exercised all power, while all the burdens (which were now peculiarly heavy) fell on the men of property. They therefore sent some persons to speak with Alcibiades; and on their making a favourable report, measures were taken to carry the plan into execution. The soldiers and sailors, when the matter was first broached to them, did not relish the idea of parting with their power; but the information that the King would be their paymaster, soon reconciled them to a change. Phrynichus, however, was not to be gained: he treated the arguments in favour of it with contempt: Alcibiades, he said (as was true), cared neither for oligarchy nor democracy; all he wanted was some change which would enable his cronies to recall him. It was idle to suppose that the King would prefer the friendship of the Athenians to that of the Peloponnesians; and they were much mistaken if they thought that an oligarchy would have superior attractions for the allied states, whose only object was to be independent, and who knew well that the gentry (*καλοὶ καγαθοὶ*), as they were called, were to the full as griping and oppressive as the Demos, whose power, moreover, was a refuge to the oppressed, and moderated the severity of the great. He therefore declared that he would have nothing

to do with Alcibiades. His opposition, however, was unheeded, and Peisander and some others were sent to Athens to try to effect the proposed changes.

It will be observed that for many years there had been three real, though not formal, parties in Athens; the aristocratic, the democratic, and the oligarchic. The first, always respectable in a free state, was composed of the descendants of the ancient Eupatrids or nobles, men who really loved their country, and served it faithfully in peace and war. The generals of the republic were almost always of this party *. Its policy was amity with Lacedæmôn and peace in general; Cimôn, and lately Nicias, had been its leaders, but it was now unfortunately without a head. The democratic party had been led by Cleôn, who was succeeded by Hyperbolûs; but he had been ostracised †, and no one had yet taken his place. The oligarchic party, of which Alcibiades had been a distinguished member, was composed of men of talent and ambition, who cared little for the real interests of their country, satisfied if, in any way, they could be at the head of it. Many members of the aristocracy belonged to this party; and some democrats, such as Peisander, also came over to it: in talent and activity it had now a decided superiority.

To return to our narrative: Phrynichus knew that his situation was a perilous one; in hopes, therefore, of destroying Alcibiades, he secretly sent information to Astyochus of what he was about. But Astyochus went straight to Magnesia, and told the whole (with a view, it was said, to his own private interest,) to Alcibiades and the satrap. Alcibiades forthwith

* The Athenians, as long as they had an aristocracy, always had the good sense to choose their chief magistrates and generals out of it. The same was the case in the Italian republics of the Middle Ages.

† In the struggle between Nicias and Alcibiades, they were preparing to try their strength at ostracism. Hyperbolûs exerted himself to have one or other of them banished; but they secretly coalesced, and he himself was ostracised. The people, it is said (Plut. Nicias, 11.), were so vexed at having thus degraded the ostracism, that they abolished it. The real cause of the ostracism's going out of use was more probably the misfortunes and revolutions of Athens, and the consequent extinction of the aristocracy.

sent to inform his friends at Samos of what Phrynichus had done, and to require his death. Phrynichus, reduced to desperation, wrote again to Astyochus, blaming him for not having kept the secret, and offering to enable him to destroy the whole Athenian fleet and army at Samos. Astyochus acted as before, and Phrynichus, on learning that he had done so, called the army together before Alcibiades' letter arrived; and telling them that he had it on good authority that it was the intention of the enemy to attack them, he urged them to set about raising works for the defence of the place. Presently came a letter from Alcibiades, but no credit was given to it, as his only object, it was thought, was to injure Phrynichus.

Peisander had meantime arrived at Athens. At first he met with great opposition from the enemies of Alcibiades and the friends of the democracy; but when he asked them separately what other plan they had for saving the country, now that the Peloponnesians were equal to them at sea, had more allies, and were supplied with money by the King and Tissaphernes, they were obliged to confess that they had none. He added, that they might afterwards change anything they did not like in the new constitution. A decree was finally passed that Peisander and ten others should have full powers to treat with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, and Diomedôn and Leôn were sent out to replace Phrynichus and Scironides in their command.

Peisander and his colleagues proceeded without delay to Asia. Alcibiades, conscious that his influence over the satrap was not so great as he had represented it,—for Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, and wished the two parties to wear each other out,—resolved, in the negotiation which he managed in his presence, to throw if possible the blame of breaking it off on the Athenians, and thus save his own credit. He therefore first demanded that all Ionia and the adjacent islands should be ceded to the King. Contrary to his expectation, no objection was made; and in a third conference, he required that the King should be allowed to build ships of war and to sail with as many as he pleased on his own coast*. On hear-

* See above, p. 139.

ing this demand, the Athenians deeming themselves deceived by him, broke off the conference in anger and returned to Samos.

Tissaphernes forthwith set out for Caunos, and made a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians, by which he engaged to continue the pay to the fleet; for he feared that if he withheld it they might be beaten by the Athenians, or their crews might desert, and in either case the Athenians would get the upper hand without his aid; or they might begin to plunder the country. He also prepared to bring up the Phœnician fleet he had promised.

Early in the next spring (Ol. 92, 2.) a Spartan named Dercyllidas came with a small force by land from Miletus to the Hellespont: Abydos revolted at once, and two days after its example was followed by Lampsacus; but Strombichides came from Chios with twenty-four ships, landed, defeated the Lampsacenes, and took and plundered the town. Having made an ineffectual attempt on Abydos, he crossed over, and put Sestos into a state of defence. The Chians were at this time stronger than they had been of late. In an attack on the Athenian works in the last year, Pedaritus had fallen; but Leôn, an enterprising officer, who commanded twelve triremes at Miletus, sailed to Chios; twenty-four Chian ships joined him, and their combined fleet engaged the Athenian fleet of thirty-two ships. Night separated the combatants, and the Chians and their allies returned to port without having had the worst in the engagement.

The Athenian democracy was now dissolved. When Peisander and his colleagues came to Samos they found their party strong in the army. Some of the Samians themselves were now desirous of oligarchy, and readily hearkened to the arguments of Peisander, and all things looked so favourable that they thought they might venture to effect the desired change without Alcibiades. As the advantages were to be all their own, they agreed to contribute largely from their private funds for all the necessary expenses. It was decided that Peisander and five of his colleagues should proceed to Athens, taking care to establish oligarchies in such places as they came to:

the other five were sent in different quarters with the same design. One of these, Diotrophes, came to the isle of Thasos, on his way to Thrace, and dissolved the democracy there. When he was gone, the Thasians rebuilt their town-wall; such of their citizens as the Athenians had banished, and who were with the Lacedæmonians, returned; ships were procured, and the isle then revolted! The same occurred in several other places; for the oligarchic party everywhere naturally looked up to Lacedæmôn, and they were dubious of the turn things might take at Athens.

Peisander when he was leaving Athens the preceding year had charged the oligarchic clubs or societies (*ξυνωμοσίαι*)*, which had long existed in the city, to exert themselves to the utmost for the overthrow of the democracy. They had been by no means inactive, and had even assassinated a leading demagogue named Androcles and some others, from whom they apprehended opposition. By dint of terror—for no one knew their numbers, or who were of them—they had gained absolute authority over the senate and the assembly; the orators were all of their party; everything that was to be spoken was previously arranged among them; if any one rose to oppose, he was sure before long to die a sudden death.

When Peisander arrived an assembly was held, and ten persons were chosen to draw up a constitution against a certain day. On that day the assembly was held at the temple of Poseidôn at Colônos, about ten stadia from the city. The Ten simply proposed that any Athenian might be free to bring forward what measures he pleased. This being agreed to, and fear thus removed, Peisander urged that the magistracies should be new-modelled, and pay be no longer given to any but those who were engaged on military service; that five presidents

* The members of these clubs were bound to stand by and support each other in all contests for office in the state and in trials in the courts of justice. Like all societies of the kind, they were, as we see, little scrupulous about the means they employed. There were similar aristocratic clubs at Rome (Dion. Hal. iv. 30; xi. 3. Livy, ix. 26.), and also democratic ones (*sodalitates*, Hist. of Rome, pp. 395, 443.). Carthage also had political clubs.

(*πρόεδροι*) should be appointed, who then should select one hundred persons, each of whom should choose three, and that these four hundred should form a council, with unlimited powers; that the Four Hundred, and they alone, might convene the assembly whenever they pleased, which assembly was to contain only five thousand persons, men of property and of bodily vigour.

Though Peisander was thus put forward, he was in reality but an instrument. The person who had planned and arranged the whole was Antiphôn, a man according to Thucydides equal to any of his time in ability*; but his eminent qualities had made him an object of suspicion to the ignorant Demos and its selfish leaders, and he never entered on public affairs, but only aided with his advice those engaged in public or private suits. Another active agent was Theramenes, son of Hagnôn, also a man of ability and eloquence†. Fear and hatred of Alcibiades had now induced Phrynichus to join the cause of oligarchy as a means of preventing his restoration. These and other able men succeeded in inducing the Athenian people to resign the liberty which they had now enjoyed for a century, more than half of which time they had exercised sovereignty over so many states. In any other part of Greece this revolution would probably have been attended with massacre and bloodshed; it is to the honour of Athens that streams of the blood of citizens shed in civil conflict never ran down her streets.

The next step was to dismiss the council of Five Hundred. As all the Athenians were now daily under arms on account of the enemy in Deceleia, on a certain day those who were not of the party were allowed to go about their affairs as usual: the rest were directed to remain under arms, but not to stir unless they saw some opposition attempted. There was also in arms a body of hoplites whom Peisander had brought from the islands. The Four Hundred then, each bearing a concealed dagger, and followed by a body of one hundred and

* He is styled by Wachsmuth the Sieyes of Athens.

† Theramenes was nicknamed Buskin (*κόθορνος*), from his readiness to change sides, as the dramatic buskin was made to fit either foot.

twenty young men, whose arms were always at their service, entered the senate-house*. They offered the Five Hundred the salary due to them, and desired them to depart to their own houses. The latter quietly took the money and obeyed. The Four Hundred then elected Prytanés (presidents), and made the usual prayers and sacrifices to the gods. They ruled of course with rigour, putting a few persons to death, banishing some, and confining others; but, on account of Alcibiades, they would not recall the exiles, as was usual in such cases.

The new government, naturally anxious for amity with Lacedæmôn, sent deputies to Agis; but this prince, thinking that perhaps he might turn the state of affairs to greater advantage, and by a sudden assault take the city, summoned troops from the Peloponnese, and led his army to the very walls of Athens. No tumult however broke out, and the horse and light troops defeated a part of his forces. He then retired to Deceleia, and finding the government stronger than he had expected, agreed to an embassy being sent to Sparta.

A more important object was to gain over the army at Samos. Ten deputies were sent thither, instructed to say that the establishment of the oligarchy was for the general interest, that the direction of affairs would be in the hands of the Five Thousand, and not merely those of the Four Hundred; and to remind them that, owing to war and other circumstances, it had never occurred that five thousand citizens had assembled to deliberate, be the affair of ever such importance.

But affairs had taken an adverse turn in Samos. The democratic Samians whom Peisander had gained to the cause of oligarchy were three hundred in number, and bound together by oath to overthrow the democracy. They now in concert with Charminus and some of the oligarchic Athenians, killed the ex-demagogue Hyperbolûs, and were preparing to attack the popular party, who getting information, applied for protection to Leôn and Diomedôn, and also to Thrasybûlus, a trierarch, and Thrasyllus, a hoplite,—all adverse to oligarchy. These last addressed themselves to the soldiers, particularly

* Just as Cromwell dissolved the Long Parliament.

the Paralians, or crew of the Paralian trireme, who were thorough foes to oligarchy : and when the three hundred assailed the people, the Athenians aided, and they were defeated with the loss of thirty of their number : three were banished, and the rest quietly submitted to democracy. Ignorant of the change which had taken place at Athens, the army at Samos sent home the Paralian and one Chæreas on board of it with word of what had occurred. The Four Hundred cast two or three of the Paralians into prison, and moving the rest into another ship, sent them to keep guard at Eubœa. But Chæreas making his escape came to Samos, and gave the army a false account of the atrocities of the Four Hundred, and of their intention of seizing and putting to death the relatives of such of the soldiers as did not declare for them. The soldiers, moved by these calumnies, were going in their rage to fall at once on the friends of oligarchy ; but the moderate party restrained them, and Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus made the whole army take a solemn oath, in which the Samians also joined, to support the democracy, to continue the war against the Peloponnesians, and to make no terms with the Four Hundred. An assembly was held, the generals and trierarchs who were suspected were deposed, and new ones appointed, among whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus held prominent places.

Having thus, as it were, cast off allegiance, the soldiers began to consider their situation. They reflected that they were the strength of the state ; that as they had the fleet, they could oblige the allies to pay the subsidies to *them* ; that if so minded they could even blockade the Piræus ; that they could have Samos for a home ; that Alcibiades, if assured of safety, and his recall, would gladly procure them the alliance of the King ; that at the worst, with such a fleet, they would soon find cities and lands somewhere or other.

The army next voted the recall of Alcibiades, and Thrasybulus himself went and brought him to Samos. An assembly was convened, and Alcibiades vaunted to it his influence with the satrap, who, he said, had declared to him that he would aid the Athenians though he were to sell his bed for the pur-

pose, and would make the Phœnician fleet join them, provided he could place reliance on them, which he could only do through Alcibiades. The multitude, full of joy and hope, appointed him general on the spot, and insisted on sailing away at once to the Piræus and taking vengeance on the Four Hundred; but Alcibiades restrained them from this rash project. He then returned to Tissaphernes, to show him the power he now possessed, for his object was to awe the satrap with the Athenians, and the Athenians with the satrap, for his own advantage.

The Peloponnesians, owing to the venality and want of vigour of Astyochus, disunion among themselves, and the conduct of the satrap, had not derived the slightest advantage from the dissensions of the Athenians. A new admiral, Mindarus, now came out to replace the inefficient Astyochus.

The embassy from the Four Hundred to Sparta had been sent by sea in a trireme manned by the Paralians; but instead of proceeding to Laconia, they carried the ship to Argos, and delivered the deputies prisoners to the Argives. As there was nothing the Argives more dreaded than the overthrow of the democracy at Athens, they readily joined the party which supported it, and they sent deputies to Samos with the Paralians who were sailing thither. They arrived about the same time with the deputation from the Four Hundred, which had stopped at Delos: Alcibiades was also returned. An assembly was held; the soldiers were with difficulty induced to listen to a defence of the Four Hundred against the false charges of Chæreas; they were eager to sail at once for the Piræus, an act which would have made the Peloponnesians absolute masters of Ionia and the Hellespont. But Alcibiades, who alone had the power, again restrained them, thus rendering a most essential service to his country. To the deputies he replied that he had no objection to the assembly of Five Thousand, but that the council of Four Hundred must be dissolved, and the Five Hundred restored. He recommended œconomy at home, that the soldiers might have sufficient supplies; and he advised to resist the common enemy with vigour. He thanked the Argives, and

prayed them to hold themselves in readiness to aid if required.

The deputies returned to Athens; and Alcibiades set sail with thirteen ships for Aspendos, at which place the Phœnician fleet of one hundred and forty-seven ships was lying, and whither Tissaphernes had gone, accompanied by some of the Spartans. He promised the troops that by his influence with the satrap he would manage so, that if this fleet did not join them, it should not join the Peloponnesians; for he knew right well that it was not the intention of Tissaphernes to send it to the aid of either.

When the deputies arrived at Athens, they found the leaders of their party no longer at unity among themselves. Some of them, such as Theramenes and Aristocrates, whose only object had been private power, now began to think a democracy more for their advantage*; while Antiphôn, Phrynichus, Peisander and others remained firm to their principles. These last, seeing that no time was to be lost, sent Antiphôn, Phrynichus, and ten others to Sparta, to try to effect an alliance; and they urged on the works which they had already commenced at the Eëtionæia, as one of the points at the mouth of the port of Piræus was named, which commanded the entrance. This place they made the general magazine of corn, whither all that was in the city was transported, and where all that arrived was landed.

Theramenes and his party maintained that this fort was designed, not against the army at Samos, but for the reception of the enemy; and asserted that a fleet of forty-two ships which was preparing to sail from Laconia to Eubœa, at the invitation of the people of that island, was in reality destined for the Eëtionæia. It is the opinion of Thucydides that they were not far wrong, for that such was the horror of democracy felt by Peisander and his friends, that they would rather see the city, without walls or ships, at the mercy of the enemy, than the supreme power again in the hands of the people.

Matters were now drawing to a crisis between the two parties. As Phrynichus was coming one day from the senate-

* Lysias against Eratosthenes, 126, 10.

house, at the very time that the market was full of people, he received a mortal wound from an uncertain hand*. The murderer escaped; an Argive, his accomplice, was taken, and put to the torture, but no definite information could be drawn from him. Theramenes and his friends grew bolder, and as the Peloponnesian fleet, after having ravaged Ægina, was lying at Epidaurus, he declared that its object was apparent, and that it was now full time to act. Immediately the hoplites who were fortifying the Eëtioneia, one of whose officers Aristocrates was, seized and confined Alexicles their commander. The Four Hundred, when they heard of it, menaced Theramenes and his friends. Theramenes defended himself, and offered to go and release Alexicles; and he and one of his party set out for the Piræus, while Aristarchus, of the other party, and the younger Horsemen, went the same way. All was confusion; those in the city thought the Piræus was taken, and Alexicles slain; those at the Piræus, that the whole force of the city was coming down against them.

Theramenes, who bore the office of general, affected great indignation when he came to the Piræus; the hoplites however still continued demolishing the fort. They asked him if he thought it was meant for any good purpose, and if it were not better to destroy it. He replied, that if they were pleased he was pleased; and they went on with their work, in which several others now joined. The cry was, "Let him who will have the Five Thousand, and not the Four Hundred, to rule, come to the work!" They cautiously said the Five Thousand, and not the Demos, as this might now be construed into treason. Next day, when the fort was demolished, they released Alexicles, and going to the theatre of Bacchus at Munychia, held an assembly under arms. They thence marched to the city and posted themselves at the Anaceion†. Here they were waited

* Thucydides says (viii. 92.) that the assassin was one of the *Περίπολοι*. These were the young Athenians who were between the ages of seventeen and nineteen years, and were employed doing garrison-duty in the frontier-fortresses.

† The temple of the *Ἄνακες* or Kings, the Athenian name of the Dioscuri. It was close to the Acropolis.

on by deputies from the Four Hundred, who accosted them individually, and besought them not to endanger the state by civil disunion, assuring them that the Five Thousand should be declared, who would then have the power of electing the Four Hundred from among themselves in any manner they pleased. This pacified them greatly, and a day was appointed for an assembly at the Dionysion* to arrange everything.

The appointed day was arrived, the people were repairing to the Dionysion, when word came that the enemy was sailing along Salamis. All hurried down to the Piræus: some launched triremes, others got on board, others manned the walls and the mouth of the harbour. The Peloponnesians however sailed on, doubled Sunion, and steered for Oropus, where they landed. Fearing for Eubœa, which was now everything to them, the Athenians manned what triremes they had and sent them off. These, when joined by those stationed at Eubœa, amounted to thirty-six, while the hostile fleet counted forty-two. The Athenians took their station at Eretria, sixty stadia from Oropus. The Spartan commander, when his crew had dined, crossed the channel at a given signal from his friends in Eretria. The Athenians were dispersed in search of provisions, for the Eretrians had taken care there should be none in the market; they got on board however as fast as they could, and engaged the enemy; but they were speedily routed and driven ashore, with the loss of twenty-two ships. Soon afterwards the whole island, except Oreüs, revolted.

Even the intelligence of the calamity in Sicily had not caused such general dismay in Athens as this defeat; and had the Peloponnesians sailed at once for the Piræus, they might have taken it; the fleet must then have returned from Samos, and the whole Athenian empire have been lost. But on this as on other occasions, observes Thucydides, the slow and timid character of the Spartan policy was of advantage to the Athenians. The case had been far different when they had to do with a people like themselves in the Syracusans.

Twenty triremes, however, were manned; an assembly was

* The theatre of Bacchus in the city.

summoned to the Pnyx, the old democratic place of assemblage; the Four Hundred were deposed, having held their office only four months; power was transferred to the Five Thousand, of whom every one who bore arms (*ὄπλα*) might be a member; no person in office was to have any pay or salary*. Several other assemblies were held, and various measures passed, and Alcibiades and other exiles were recalled. Thucydides gives it as his opinion that the mixture of oligarchy and democracy now established was the best condition of the Athenian constitution that *he* had ever seen: it had soon however—probably the very next year—to give way to the old ochlocracy.

Peisander, Alexicles, and the more violent oligarchs fled to Deceleia. Aristarchus took advantage of his office of general to deceive the garrison of Cēnoë, a fortress on the borders of Bœotia, and made them surrender it to the Bœotians. Antiphôn and Archeptolemus were prosecuted before the people by their late colleague Theramenes, and put to death†.

CHAPTER X.†

Affairs on the coast of Asia.—Return of Alcibiades.—Lysander.—Callicratidas.—Battle of Arginusæ.—Condemnation of the generals.—Battle of Ægos-potami.—Surrender of Athens.—Death of Alcibiades.

Ol. 92, 2-94, 1. B.C. 411-404.

THE Peloponnesians on the coast of Asia were now completely wearied out with the duplicity of Tissaphernes, and Mindarus

* As the pay of the Ecclesiasts and Heliasts was evidently included, this was intended to obviate the pernicious measures of Pericles. See above, p. 159.

† Lysias against Eratosthenes, 126, 15.

‡ Thuc. viii. 99, to the end. Xenophôn, Hellen. i. ii. 1-3. Diodor. xiii. 38-42, 45-53, 64-79, 97-107. Plut. Alcibiades and Lysander.

resolved to accept the invitation of Pharnabazus, and sail for the Hellespont : he had already sent sixteen of his ships thither, and he now secretly put to sea with seventy-three, and got as far as Chios. Thrasyllus, who commanded at Samos, when he heard of his departure, hastened after him with fifty-five ships. He took his station at Lesbos, where the town of Eressos had revolted ; and he was there joined by Thrasybulus. The whole Athenian force was now sixty-seven triremes, and the siege of Eressos was pressed with vigour. Mindarus, anxious to avoid the Athenian fleet, hastily left Chios ; and keeping close to the Asiatic coast, and sailing by night when opposite Lesbos, he reached toward midnight the points of Rhœteion and Sigeion (Sigêum), at the mouth of the Hellespont. Fire-signals gave notice to the Athenian fleet of eighteen ships, at Sestos, of the arrival of an enemy. They set sail immediately along the Chersonese to get into the open sea ; they eluded the ships lying at Abydos, but in the morning they were chased by those of Mindarus, and four of them taken. The ships at Abydos then joined Mindarus, and his whole fleet now counted eighty-six ships.

When the Athenians heard that Mindarus had escaped them, they gave over the siege of Eressos and sailed for the Hellespont. With a fleet of seventy-eight ships they moved in a single line along the Chersonese toward Sestos ; the Peloponnesians drew up their eighty-six ships on the opposite coast from Abydos to Dardanos, the Syracusans on the right, Mindarus with the best sailing ships on the left. They then tried with their left to get beyond the Athenian right, and if possible to drive their centre ashore ; but the Athenians frustrated them by superior rowing. The Athenian left had now gone beyond the point named Cynos-sêma (*Κυνὸς σῆμα*) or the Dog's monument, and was not within view of the centre, which was weak and scattered. The Peloponnesians therefore easily succeeded in driving it ashore ; for the left was out of sight, and moreover engaged with the Syracusans, and the right was now held in check by Mindarus. At length the right bore down and put the Peloponnesians to flight, and the Syracusans then

also fled. Owing to the narrowness of the strait the Athenians took but twenty-one ships, and they had lost fifteen of their own. Their victory was however decisive, and it restored their confidence in themselves, and made them cease to regard the Dorians as worthy rivals on the sea. A trireme was sent home with the joyful news, which greatly raised the spirits of the people, depressed by the loss of Eubœa.

Alcibiades returned to Samos, and assured the Athenians that Tissaphernes was more their friend than ever. But this feeble and treacherous satrap, who was now grown uneasy at the departure of Mindarus, hastened to the Hellespont to hold a conference with him. We are not however informed of the further proceedings of the satrap, for owing to the abrupt termination of Thucydides' history at this point the series of events is left in uncertainty*.

One day at dawn, a few weeks after the battle of Cynossema, a squadron of fourteen ships coming from Rhodes was discerned by the Athenian sentinel as it was entering the Hellespont. Twenty triremes instantly came out of Sestos to engage it. The Peloponnesians fled to land at the Rhœteion, whither the Athenians pursued them; but having assailed them to no purpose, they retired and joined the rest of their fleet. Mindarus, who was at Ilion sacrificing to Athena, seeing what had occurred, came down to the sea and got out his fleet to go and bring them off. The Athenian fleet also came out; and they fought off Abydos from morn till eve without any advantage on either side. At the close of the day Alcibiades arrived with a squadron of eighteen triremes; and the Peloponnesians then fled to Abydos. Pharnabazus came down and even rode into the sea to their aid, and the Athenians retired, carrying with them thirty empty ships which they had taken. Leaving then forty ships at Sestos, the commanders went to collect

* See Thirlwall, iv. 81. We are left for the events of the next forty-eight years to the far inferior guidance of Xenophôn. This writer, though an Athenian, was entirely devoted to the Lacedæmonians. He tells the truth, we believe, but not always the whole truth. Our other guide, Diodorus, drew his materials from Xenophôn, Ephorus, and Theopompus.

money on the coast of Thrace, and Thrasyllus was sent home to ask the people for men and ships,

When Tissaphernes came shortly after to the Hellespont, Alcibiades waited on him with a present, according to Eastern usage; but the faithless satrap seized and sent him prisoner to Sardes, alleging that the King had ordered him to make war on the Athenians. He escaped however in about a month to Clazomenæ, whence he sailed with six ships, and joined the fleet which had retired from Sestos to Cardia on account of the superior force of Mindarus (Ol. 92, 3.). Hearing there that Mindarus had moved to Cyzicus, he went over-land to Sestos, directing the fleet to sail thither. At Sestos it was joined by forty triremes which had been collecting money, and the whole fleet now amounted to eighty-six ships. At Proconnêsus they heard that Pharnabazus and his troops were with Mindarus at Cyzicus. Alcibiades, having denounced capital punishment to any one who should attempt to pass over with intelligence to the enemy, summoned an assembly and told the men to be prepared for every kind of combat, as without a victory they could not hold out against those who were subsidised by the King. They then made for Cyzicus. It was raining hard, but it cleared up as they were coming near it, and they found Mindarus' sixty triremes out exercising at a distance from the port. The Peloponnesians when they saw them made for the land, and there defended themselves. Alcibiades moved off with twenty ships and effected a landing. Mindarus seeing this landed also with some troops, and advanced against him. The Spartan fell; his men fled; and the Athenians dragged in triumph to Proconnesus all the ships but those of the Syracusans, which were burnt by their crews. Cyzicus surrendered the next day; Alcibiades, having levied contributions there, sailed, and did the same at Perinthus and Selymbria, on the Thracian side; thence proceeding to Chrysopolis, on the Bosphorus, he fortified it, and established a custom-house, to levy a toll of a tenth on all vessels coming from the Euxine.

The generous Pharnabazus endeavoured to console his al-

lies; he gave the men clothes and two months' provisions; he also supplied them with money and with timber to build a new fleet at Antandros. While they were thus engaged, the Syracusans found time to aid the Antandrians to raise their walls, for which the freedom of the city was granted to all Syracusans. But meantime the capricious Demos at home had passed a decree of exile on the generals. Hermocrates called the soldiers together, told them what had been done, and desired them to appoint temporary commanders in place of himself and colleagues. The assembly were loud in their indignation, and would not permit them to resign. They therefore held the command till their successors should come out; and most of the captains bound themselves by oath to obtain their recall on their return to Syracuse. Hermocrates retired to Pharnabazus, who voluntarily gave him money, with which he procured ships and men to effect his return to his country*.

The Lacedæmonians, when they heard of the defeat and death of Mindarus†, sent without delay proposals of peace to Athens; but the people, who had regained their full sovereignty, rejected them at the instance of one Cleophôn, a man of low birth, who was now the leading demagogue‡. While Thrasyllus was at Athens, king Agis led his troops, as before, up to the walls of the city; but he retired when he saw the Athenians come out and place themselves in battle array at the Lyceion (Lycæum). The people readily granted to Thrasyllus one thousand hoplites, one hundred horse, and fifty triremes.

* Hermocrates lost his life two years afterwards (Ol. 93, 1.) in a nocturnal attempt on the city of Syracuse. Diod. xiii. 75. His son-in-law Dionysius became the celebrated tyrant of that city (Ol. 93, 3.).

† The Athenians intercepted the despatch of Mindarus' vice-admiral Hippocrates. It was as follows: "Ἐρρει τὰ καλὰ Μίνδαρος ἀπέσσευα πεινῶντι τῶν ἄνδρες ἀπορέομεν τὴν χρεὴν εἶρᾶν" "Our good luck is gone: Mindarus is dead: the men are starving: we know not what to do." Xen. Hell. i. 1, 23.

‡ Philochorus *ap.* Sch. Eur. Orest. 371, 772. Diodor. xiii. 52, 53. It would appear from Aristophanes (Frogs, 679, 1580), that Cleophôn, who was a lyre-maker by trade, was only a half-blood Athenian, his mother being a Thracian.

Agis, seeing that abundance of corn came to Athens by sea from the Euxine, and deeming it vain to hope to effect anything if that were not prevented, resolved to send as many ships as he could to Byzantium, under a Spartan named Clearchus, who had proxeny there. He could collect but fifteen; and with the loss of three of them, Clearchus reached that town, and became its *harmost**.

Early in the next year (Ol. 92, 4.) Thrasyllus sailed for Samos. He had armed five thousand of his sailors as peltasts, and was thus enabled to make descents on various parts of the coast of Asia. Being defeated in an attempt on Ephesus, he sailed for the Hellespont, and joined the other fleet at Ses-tos, whence they crossed over to Lampsacus. Here, as Alcibiades was preparing to form the two bodies of troops into one, the victors at Cyzicus refused to unite with the vanquished at Ephesus; but the latter afterwards behaved so well against Pharnabazus when he came to the relief of Abydos, that all opposition ceased. During the winter several expeditions were made into the King's country.

In the spring (Ol. 93, 1.) the whole fleet made sail for the Bosporus, to attempt the reduction of Chalcedôn and Byzantium, and thus get the complete command of the navigation of the strait. A landing was effected near Chalcedôn, and as the inhabitants had committed most of their property to the care of the Bithynians, Alcibiades, taking with him a part of the forces, went against that people, and made them give it up. On his return, Chalcedôn was shut in by a wall of timber running from sea to sea. Hippocrates, the Lacedæmonian harmost, led out his troops and engaged Thrasyllus between the wall and the town, while Pharnabazus appeared with his cavalry without the wall. Alcibiades having forced the satrap to retire, came to the aid of Thrasyllus; and Hippocrates was slain, and his men driven into the town. Alcibiades then

* *Harmost* (ἁρμοστής), or *regulator*, was the title of the Spartan military commandants in the allied towns. Clearchus was afterwards the principal commander of the Ten Thousand Greeks in the service of Cyrus the younger.

went to the Chersonese to collect money; and his colleagues during his absence came to an arrangement with Pharnabazus, who agreed to give twenty talents to the Athenians, and to convey their ambassadors to Susa, till whose return they were to exercise no hostility against the Chalcedonians, who were meantime to pay them tribute as before, and to liquidate the arrears. Alcibiades, who had reduced Selymbria, and was now pressing Byzantium, passed over to Chrysopolis at the desire of the satrap, and swore to this treaty: he then returned to the siege of Byzantium.

Clearchus, leaving the defence of the town to the commanders of the Bœotian and Megarian troops which were there, crossed over to Pharnabazus, in order to get money from him. He then proposed to collect all the ships he could, and to endeavour to make such a diversion as would call the Athenians from before Byzantium. But he knew not that the city was already betrayed; for scarcely was he gone, when the Thracian gate was opened one night, and Alcibiades and his troops admitted. After a fruitless attempt at resistance, the garrison had been forced to lay down their arms*.

Alcibiades, having destroyed the Peloponnesian fleet and restored the dominion of his country, thought he might now venture to return to Athens, which he had not seen for six years. He proceeded to Samos, and thence with twenty ships to the coast of Caria, where he collected one hundred talents.

* Instances of generosity, and even of justice, are so rare in Grecian history, that we cannot omit the following. Anaxilêus, one of those who betrayed Byzantium to the Athenians, was afterwards tried for it at Lacedæmôn. He pleaded that he had saved, and not betrayed, the city; for being a Byzantine, and seeing the women and children starving, whilst Clearchus reserved all the provisions for his soldiers, he had let the enemies in out of pity, and not for money or through enmity to the Lacedæmonians. The defence was considered valid, and he was acquitted. Xen. Hell. i. 3. About the same time, Dorieus, a Rhodian, who on account of his hostility to the Athenian interests had been outlawed both in his own isle and at Athens, having entered the Lacedæmonian service, happened to be taken by the Athenians. The people however were so far from putting him to death, that they gave him his liberty without ransom. Xen. *ut supra*.

Thrasybulus went at the same time with thirty ships to the coast of Thrace, and reduced Thasos and all the other places that had revolted. Thrasyllus sailed with the rest of the fleet to Athens, where Alcibiades, Thrasybulus and Conôn had been chosen generals for the year. (Ol. 93, 2.)

On his return to Samos, Alcibiades sailed to Paros, and thence to the Laconian port of Gythion, to look after the thirty triremes which the Lacedæmonians were said to be getting ready there. His chief reason however for delay appears to have been his desire to learn how matters stood at home; when, therefore, he heard that he had been chosen general, and his friends sent to encourage him, he sailed at once for the Piræus. He happened to enter it on the day of the Plynteria, a festival during which it was the usage to cover the statue of the patron-goddess of the city; and many deemed this an ill omen for himself and the state. All the people had crowded down to the port to see Alcibiades. Opinions were divided respecting him. Some said that he had always been an excellent citizen, and that he had been deprived of his country by a conspiracy of bad men; that it was not such as he, who were always sure of pre-eminence in the state, that desired revolutions, but those who were his enemies, and who expected, when they had destroyed worthy men, to be looked up to by the people for want of better. Others maintained that he was the cause of all the evils that had befallen the city, and that he would be the cause of still more. He remained for some time on the deck of his ship, and did not venture to quit it till he saw a number of his relations and friends among the people; he then landed, and went up to the city in the midst of them. Before the senate and people he defended himself against the charge of impiety. No one spoke in reply, for no one would have been listened to against him. He was at once appointed commander-in-chief, with unlimited power, as the only person capable of raising the state to its former eminence. To give Greece a public proof of his power, he proposed that the procession of the Mysteries, which, since the occupation of Deceleia, had been obliged to

go from Athens to Eleusis by sea, should proceed, as before, along the Sacred Road. He led out his troops to protect it, and it went and returned unmolested.

Having obtained one hundred ships, fifteen hundred hoplites, and one hundred and fifty horse, he sailed again, three months after his return, to Samos, to carry on the war.

But matters in Asia had meantime taken a turn unfavourable to the interests of Alcibiades. When the Athenian envoys sent from Chalcedôn were setting out for Persia, they met Lacedæmonian envoys, just returning, who said that they had obtained all they had desired, and that king Darius' younger son Cyrus was coming down as ruler of the whole coast. Cyrus soon arrived, and the Athenians then demanded either to be sent on, or to be let go home. The prince wished to detain them; but the upright satrap pleaded his oath, and obtained their dismissal, though not till after a delay of no less than three years.

The Spartans also at this time had transferred the Asiatic command from Cratesippidas, the successor of Mindarus, to Lysander, a man of a different stamp from the officers whom they had hitherto sent out. On his arrival in Asia he collected a fleet of seventy ships, with which he remained quiet at Ephesus till Cyrus came to Sardes, and he then went and waited on him. He complained of the conduct of Tissaphernes. The prince said, it was his father's wish that he should aid the Lacedæmonians effectually; that he had brought five hundred talents, and if these should not suffice, he would add from his own revenues, and even coin the gold and silver throne he sat on. Lysander begged that he would raise the pay of the sailors to a drachma a man, as the Athenian sailors would then desert, and he would in reality have to spend less. The prince pleaded the treaty and his father's commands; but when after supper he drank to Lysander, and bade him ask a gift, he craved that he would add an obole to the seamen's pay. Cyrus no longer refused: it was raised from three to four oboles; the arrears were paid up, and a month's pay was issued in advance.

The Athenians endeavoured in vain, through Tissaphernes, to influence Cyrus in their favour; the prince had probably, as will appear, his own reasons for rejecting the satrap's policy of causing the Greeks mutually to weaken each other.

Lysander, whose fleet now counted ninety ships, remained at Ephesus; and Alcibiades, hearing that Thrasybulus was at Phocæa, sailed thither, leaving strict orders with Antiochus, the master of his ship, not to make any attempt on the enemy. But Antiochus, by way of bravado, went with some ships into the harbour of Ephesus, and sailed along by those of Lysander, who launched a few and pursued them. Ships came to their aid; Lysander launched his whole fleet; the rest of the Athenian ships came into action; a general engagement ensued at the point of Notion, and the Athenians were defeated, with the loss of fifteen ships. Alcibiades on his return offered battle in vain, for Lysander, inferior in force, would not come out. The people at Athens, when they heard of this defeat, threw the whole blame on Alcibiades (who surely was guiltless), and deprived him of his command. He retired to his estates in the Chersonese, and Conôn, who was re-appointed one of the ten generals, came and took the command at Samos.

The following year (Ol. 93, 3.), Lysander's term of command being expired, Callicratidas came out to replace him*. The new commander, a genuine Spartan, resolved to fight at once; and summoning the ships from Rhodes and Chios, he assembled a fleet of one hundred and forty triremes. Finding that Lysander's friends were going about disparaging him as ignorant of naval affairs, he called the Lacedæmonians together, and telling them that he had not sought the command, and that his intention was to obey the orders he had received at home, called on them to say at once whether he should remain

* Lysander, when giving up the fleet to him, told him that it was mistress of the sea; Callicratidas desired him to prove it by sailing with it from Ephesus to Miletus, keeping Samos, where the Athenian fleet was lying, on his left; Lysander declined the test. Xen. Hell. i. 6.

or go home and report the state of things on the coast of Asia. This plain speaking soon brought them to order; and he then went to Cyrus for money, as Lysander, to embarrass him, had sent back to the prince all that was in his hands. Being told to wait for two days, his Spartan pride was roused at the indignity, and he went away, declaring, that when he got home he would do his utmost to reconcile the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and free the Greeks from the disgrace of flattering the Barbarians for money. He proceeded to Miletus, and having obtained a supply from the people of that town, he sailed to Lesbos, and laid siege to Methymne, which he took by assault. When urged to sell the Methymnæans with the other captives, he replied that no Greek should be made a slave whilst *he* had the command; and he set them at liberty.

Conôn, who had reduced his fleet from upwards of one hundred to seventy triremes, with picked crews, was seen one morn at daybreak out at sea; and Callicratidas, who had one hundred and seventy triremes, instantly gave chase, and got between him and Samos. Conôn fled to Mytilene; the enemy entered the harbour with him; and being obliged to fight there, he lost thirty of his ships. Callicratidas then summoned the Methymnæans and troops from Chios, and besieged the town by sea and land. Famine began to press, and there were no hopes of relief from Athens, where their distress was unknown. Conôn, therefore, put his best rowers into two of his swiftest vessels, and in the heat of the day, while the enemy were negligent or on shore preparing their dinner, they rushed out, one making for the Hellespont, the other standing out to sea. Some ships cut their cables and pursued, and the latter was taken: the first however escaped, and intelligence was thus conveyed to Athens.

A decree was passed instantly to get ready one hundred and ten ships, and for all of the proper age, both freemen and slaves, to embark. In thirty days this fleet was on its way for Samos, where it was joined by ten Samian triremes, and by

thirty of those of the other allies. The whole fleet finally amounted to upwards of one hundred and fifty vessels, and it sailed and took a station at the islets named the Arginûsæ (*White-isles*), opposite Lesbos. Callicratidas, when he heard that the Athenians were at Samos, put to sea with one hundred and twenty ships, leaving fifty to blockade Mytilene. He landed his crews, according to custom, to sup at Cape Malêa in Lesbos, on the very evening that the Athenians were at the Arginusæ; and learning by their fires that they were there, he was putting to sea again at midnight in hopes of surprising them, when a storm of rain and thunder came on and prevented him. At day-break he sailed for the Arginusæ; the Athenians came out in order of battle: the master of his ship, seeing their superiority in number, advised him to retreat; but he replied, that Sparta would not be the worse inhabited if he were dead, and that it would be disgraceful to fly. The battle lasted a considerable time; at length Callicratidas, in driving his ship against one of the enemy's, fell overboard and was drowned. The Peloponnesians were defeated on the left: the rout soon became general; some fled to Chios, some to Phocæa*.

The Athenians returned to the Arginusæ: they had lost twenty-five of their own ships, and destroyed upwards of seventy of those of the enemy. It was resolved to leave Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were trierarchs, and some other officers, with forty ships, to try if they could save any of the crews of the sunken ships, and with the rest to go and raise the siege of Mytilene. A violent storm however came on, and they were all forced to take shelter at the Arginusæ, leaving the unfortunate crews to their fate.

Meantime a boat, appointed for the purpose, brought the news of the loss of the battle to Eteonîcus, who was conducting the siege of Mytilene. He instantly directed the crew to go away again, and to return crowned, and shouting out that Callicra-

* After this battle also the Lacedæmonians sent to propose a peace, but Cleophôn would not let the people consent to it. Aristotote *ap. Schol. Aristoph. Frogs*, 1580.

tidas had destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. He offered the customary sacrifices, ordered the soldiers to take their meal, and bade the chapmen embark their goods and sail away with the triremes for Chios. He then set fire to his camp, and marched overland to Methymne. Conôn sailed out and joined the victors coming from the Arginusæ, and the whole fleet returned to Samos.

Of the eight generals who won the victory, two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, remained at Samos: the other six* went home with the fleet. On their arrival, a demagogue named Archidamus accused one of them, Erasinides, of having embezzled public money at the Hellespont, and he was cast into prison. The others then gave the senate an account of the battle and the storm. A person named Timocrates proposed that they also should be imprisoned, and the senate assented. Next day an assembly was held, and Theramenes and some others accused the generals of not having saved the crews of the wrecks. They separately made a brief defence, declaring that they had committed this duty to Theramenes himself, Thrasybulus, and other competent persons, and that it was from *them*, if any, that an account should be demanded; but that in reality no one was to blame, as the storm had come on: this, they said, would be proved by the masters and others who were there. The people were moved; several persons stood up offering to bail them; but as it was too late to discern the show of hands, it was agreed to adjourn the assembly, and that the senate should decide on the form of trial.

The festival named Apaturia, in which parents and relatives were wont to meet together, having come on, Theramenes and his party got several persons, clad in black with their hair cut close, to come to the assembly as the mourning relatives of the dead at Arginusæ; and they induced the orator Callixenus to accuse the generals in the senate. On his motion, the senate decreed, that as the people had already heard the accusation

* Namely, Pericles, Diomedôn, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, Erasinides.

and the defence, they should proceed at once to vote in their tribes by ballot; and that if the generals were thus found guilty, they should be put to death, and their property be confiscated. The party also, to excite the passions of the people, got a man to come into the assembly and say that he had saved himself on a meal-cask, and that the dying men had charged him to tell the people that the generals had left them to perish. Euryptolemus and some other friends of the accused menaced Callixenus with impeachment for violation of the constitution; but the faction stirred up the people, who cried out in the true spirit of ochlocracy, that it was hard if they were not to be suffered to do as they pleased; and one Lyciscus then proposed, if they persisted, to put them on trial along with the generals. As the mob had become violent, they deemed it most prudent to desist. The Prytanes however refused to let the people vote thus illegally; Callixenus got up and accused *them*; the mob bellowed as before: and at length all the Prytanes, except the celebrated Socrates, lost courage and gave way. Euryptolemus then rose to make a last effort for the generals. Affecting to be in some measure their accuser he prayed that they might be tried separately, an entire day being given for the trial of each; and he took this occasion of again stating the real circumstances of the case, and showing that no one had been to blame. The people voted for his proposal; but a second show of hands being demanded by the other party, it was in favour of that of the senate. The ballot then went on; the eight generals were condemned, and the six who were present immediately executed.

A more iniquitous sentence than this is nowhere to be found*. The ignorance and the blind superstition of the people with regard to the importance of sepulture were taken advantage of by Theramenes and the oligarchic party, who wished to establish their own power on the ruin of their country, and therefore sought to deprive it of its best and ablest citizens; for the generals were all either of the original aristocratic party, that was always true to its country, or of the

* It may remind us of our own Byng.

friends of Alcibiades, now a sincere patriot*. It is some slight alleviation of the guilt of the people to learn, that they very soon afterwards saw their injustice and lamented it, and that a decree was passed directing the prosecution of those who had deceived them. Callixenus and four others were cast into prison: they however soon after escaped in a tumult; but Callixenus afterwards perished of hunger, an object of general aversion.

It would appear as if Heaven was resolved to punish this national iniquity, for it was soon followed by the ruin of Athens. The Chians and the other allies of the Lacedæmonians having met at Ephesus, sent deputies to Sparta, praying that Lysander might be sent out to resume the command. Cyrus also sent, expressing the same desire; and the Spartans, not to violate their rule of never giving a supreme naval command twice to the same person, appointed him (Ol. 93, 4.) to be vice-admiral (ἐπιστολεύς) to the admiral, Aracus. He straight repaired to Ephesus, where he collected all the ships he could, and he built others at Antandros. Being well supplied with money by Cyrus, he paid the seamen all their arrears of wages, and prepared everything needful for the war. He first proceeded to Miletus, where his presence encouraged the oligarchic party to make a massacre of their opponents and get the supreme power into their own hands; he then sailed to Rhodes, and thence it is said to the Saronic gulf, where he made descents on Ægina, Salamis, and the coast of Attica; and then to escape the Athenian fleet, which was coming in pursuit of him from Samos, he made all speed to the Hellespont, where he took and plundered Lampsacus. Conôn, and those who had been appointed in the place of the murdered generals†, followed him from Samos, and came with one hundred and eighty ships to Eleüs in the Chersonese. On hearing of the fate of Lampsacus they proceeded to Sestos, and thence to Ægos-potami (Αἰγὸς ποταμοὶ) or the Goat's-river, opposite Lam-

* Pericles was the son of the great Pericles by Aspasia. Diomedôn and Thrasyllus have been already mentioned.

† Namely Philocles, Adeimantus, Tydeus, Menander and Cephisodotus.

psacus, the space between them being about fifteen stadia. Next morning at sunrise they sailed across and offered battle, which was refused, and in the evening they returned to the river. Lysander then sent some of his swiftest vessels after them, to observe and bring him word of what they were doing, and he kept his men on board till they returned. These manœuvres were repeated on both sides for four days.

Alcibiades, who from the summit of his castle could perceive everything on both sides of the strait, observed that while the Athenians had to leave their ships and go as far as Sestos (fifteen stadia) to purchase provisions, their enemies lay in a harbour close to a town whence they drew their supplies. He came to the generals and advised them to remove to Sestos; but they rejected his advice with scorn, telling him that the command was theirs, not his: he therefore left them to their fate.

On the fifth day, Lysander directed those who went after the Athenians, if they saw them scattered over the country in quest of provisions, to raise a shield as they were returning. At the signal he put his whole fleet in motion. Conôn, seeing them approach, made a signal for the Athenians to get on board, but they were too far off to return in time. Perceiving then that all was lost, he put to sea with his own and seven other ships which had their crews on board, and the Paralian. He crossed over to Abarnis, where, to prevent pursuit, he seized the large sails of Lysander's fleet which were there*, and then, despairing of his country, sailed to Cyprus with his eight ships. The Paralian meantime carried the news to Athens.

The entire fleet fell into Lysander's hands: a part of the crews became his captives; the rest escaped to the fortresses in the vicinity. He carried the whole over to Lampsacus, and that very day despatched a Milesian privateer with the tidings to Lacedæmôn; and such was the speed of this vessel, that she reached Laconia on the third day. He then held a council of

* The Greeks always took the large sails out of their ships when preparing to engage.

the allies respecting the prisoners. Most were for severity, as the Athenians had passed a decree directing their generals, if victorious, to cut off the right hands of the captives, and had drowned the crews of an Andrian and a Corinthian ship which they had taken. It was resolved to put all to death except Adeimantus, who had voted against mutilating the captives*. Lysander commenced with Philocles, the general who had drowned the Andrians and Corinthians; the rest, to the number of three thousand, were then slaughtered. He sailed thence to Byzantion and Chalcedôn, which surrendered. All the Athenians whom he found there and elsewhere he dismissed, giving them strict injunctions to proceed to Athens, and nowhere else; for his object was to produce a scarcity as soon as possible, by filling that city with people. In each town he left a Lacedæmonian harmost, and appointed ten governors (ἄρχοντας) out of the *clubs* formed everywhere by himself for his own views†.

It was night when the Paralian entered the Piræus: wailing and lamentation spread thence up the Long Walls to the city. No one slept that night: they mourned their relatives; they deplored their own fate, expecting to suffer the evils they had inflicted on the Melians, the Æginetans, the Scionians, and so many others. In the morning an assembly was held, and it was resolved to fill up all the ports but one, to repair the walls, and to prepare for a siege.

Lysander was now coming from the Hellespont with two hundred ships: every subject and ally of Athens but the Samian Demos had fallen off. Troops from all parts of the Peloponnese, except Argos, entered Attica under king Pausanias; they were joined by those from Deceleia, and they encamped at the Academy close to Athens. Lysander at the same time appeared before the Piræus with one hundred and fifty ships. To raise the character of Sparta, he had on his way collected

* Adeimantus was accused of having betrayed the fleet to Lysander. Xen. Hell. ii. 1, 32. Lys. Alcib. 143, 22. The same charge was made against Tydeus. Paus. iv. 17, 3; x. 9, 11.

† Plut. Lys. 13. Nepos, Lys. 1.

all the Melians, Æginetans, and other exiles whom he could find, and restored them to their country.

The Athenians, though thus blockaded by sea and land, thought not of a surrender till food began to fail and many had actually died of hunger. They then sent to king Agis, offering to become the allies of the Lacedæmonians, on condition of their walls being left standing. He bade them carry their proposals to Lacedæmôn. At Sellasia, on the Laconian frontier, their deputies were met by messengers from the Ephors, telling them to return if they had nothing better to propose. Their return plunged the people into despair, who now expected slavery at the best. The famine increased: but no one ventured to speak of pulling down the walls; for when Archestratus, a senator, had said that it were better to comply with the requisition of the Lacedæmonians and to pull down ten stadia of them, as was required, he had been cast into prison; and on the motion of Cleophôn, a decree was passed forbidding the subject to be again mentioned*. Theramenes then came forward, and proposed to go to Lysander, and ascertain whether it was merely with a view to their own future security, or with a design to make slaves of the people, that the Lacedæmonians insisted on the demolition of the walls. He went, and stayed away three months, probably expecting that hunger would meanwhile have made the people glad to accept any terms. They however endured, for supplies were stolen into the port and over the walls, as the city was not surrounded. Meantime the oligarchic party were not idle; they directed their efforts against Cleophôn, whom they charged with shrinking from his military duty, and having actually forged a law for the purpose, had him found guilty and executed†.

* It was probably on this occasion that Cleophôn, as described by Æschines (False Embassy, 38, 10.), threatened to cut the throat of any one who should even speak of peace. Cleophôn may have been an honest well-intentioned man. He died poor. See Lysias, On the Property of Aristophanes, 651, 1.

† Lysias, Agoratus, 130, 40. As Xenophôn (i. 7, 37.) says that Callixenus escaped out of prison in a tumult (*στᾶσις*), in which Cleophôn lost his life, he was probably liberated by the oligarchs on this occasion.

In the fourth month Theramenes came back, and said that he had been detained by Lysander, who now declared that he must go to Sparta and treat with the Ephors*. He himself and nine others were sent thither with full powers. On their arrival, a congress was held: the Corinthians, Thebans and others were urgent for the total ruin of Athens; but the Lacedæmonians, more generous or more politic, declared that they would not consent to enslave a city which had rendered such services to Greece. They offered the Athenians peace, on the conditions of their throwing down the entire of the Long Walls and those of the Piræus, giving up all their ships but twelve, recalling the exiles, and becoming the offensive and defensive allies of Sparta. With these terms Theramenes and his colleagues returned to Athens. The starving people gathered round them, fearing lest they might have effected nothing. Next day the terms of peace were declared: Theramenes advised to accept them; a few only ventured to oppose. The peace was made; Lysander entered the Piræus: the exiles returned; all the minstrel-women in the city and camp were assembled, and the walls were pulled down to the sound of their music; it being deemed, says Xenophôn†, that this was the first day of liberty to Greece. (Ol. 94, 1.)

Lysander then sailed to Samos, where the people surrendered on condition of being allowed to depart each with a single garment. He gave the city, and all in it, to the aristocrats, who had been expelled, and set his ten governors over it; and having dismissed the ships of the allies, sailed home with the Laconian ships and those he had taken out of the Piræus. He brought with him the beaks of the ships he had taken, the crowns given him by the different cities, and four hundred and seventy talents in money.

* Lysias (as above) says nothing of Theramenes having gone to Lysander and stayed so long with him, a circumstance in itself not very probable. According to him, Theramenes promised the people that if they sent him to Sparta with full powers he would obtain them peace without the demolition of their walls or any other loss, and it was at Sparta that he made the delay.

† The coolness with which this bad citizen relates the ruin of his country is not to be endured.

Thus, after a duration of seventy-three years, terminated the dominion of Athens. It had been exercised tyrannically no doubt, but it had been the means of advancing all the arts that adorn life; and were it not that nothing can justify a departure from the rigid rule of right, we might agree with those who think that the advantages gained for mankind by it were worth the purchase. Our blame of the Athenians must be tempered by justice; the conduct of the Spartans when in power was little less tyrannical than theirs, and perhaps no people of those times would have acted much better.

The author of the ruin of his country did not long survive its independence. Alcibiades died the very year in which Athens surrendered. Of the manner of his death there is no doubt; the causes assigned differ. It appears, that after the ruin of the Athenian power, he feared to remain in the Chersonese, and passed over to Asia with the intention of going up to Susa. While he was in Phrygia, it is said, the Thirty at Athens sought to impress Lysander with the idea that so long as he lived the Spartan power would never be secure; and that, moreover, at the instance of king Agis, instructions were sent to him from home to destroy Alcibiades if possible. Lysander then required Pharnabazus to be the agent, and the satrap sent his uncle and his brother with armed men to the village where Alcibiades was residing with his mistress Timandra. The Persians, fearing to attack him, set fire to the house: Alcibiades rushed through the flames, his sword in one hand, his cloak round the other arm; but he fell by the missiles of the cowardly assassins. Another account says that he had seduced a woman of respectable family, and that it was her brothers, who, to be avenged for the insult offered to their family, set fire to his house and killed him. When we consider the honourable character of the satrap, and the licentious habits of Alcibiades, the latter account may possibly appear the more probable one*.

Alcibiades was a man who would have made a figure in any country, from the brilliancy and variety of his talents. Vanity was the ruling passion of his soul. Pericles aspired to great-

* A similar opinion is expressed in Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, iv. 197.

ness through the greatness of Athens; Alcibiades would be great, he cared not how. He did his country the utmost injury; he sought to repair it, and would have done so, but for the party who drove him a second time into exile, and then, as it is asserted, caused him to be murdered.

CHAPTER XI.*

The Thirty Tyrants.—Death of Theramenes.—Return of the Exiles.—
End of the Tyranny.

OL. 94, 1-94, 2. B.C. 404-403.

THERE can be no doubt that the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens had been previously arranged between Theramenes and Lysander. Soon after the latter had gone to Samos, Theramenes sent to recall him, and he suddenly re-entered the Piræus. An assembly was then held, at which he was present, to determine on the changes to be made in the constitution. Theramenes proposed that thirty persons should be chosen, with unlimited powers, to write out the ancient laws by which the state should be governed†. The people murmured. Theramenes said he did not care for their murmurs, since many Athenians thought as he did, and Lysander and the Lacedæmonians approved of it. Lysander told them, that as they had violated the peace, by not pulling down their walls till after the appointed time, their lives and liberty were at stake if they did not do as Theramenes desired. Some then went away, others abstained from voting; the rest elected ten persons designated by Theramenes himself, ten by the presidents of the oligarchic clubs, and ten out of those present. The government being thus regulated, the Peloponnesians evacuated Attica‡.

* Xen. ii. 3, 4. Diodor. xiv. 1-6, 32, 33.

† Like the Decemvirs at Rome.

‡ Lysias, Eratosth. 126, 127. Diodorus makes quite a patriot-hero of Theramenes on this occasion; so much so, that Lysander, he says, threatened to slay him.

Critias, a man descended from the brother of Solôn, was one of the Thirty. He had been, like Alcibiades, a hearer of Socrates, and, like him too, to learn eloquence and politics, not wisdom. His character was firm and energetic, and he scrupled at no means to accomplish his projects. He hated democracy, and was bent on establishing the firm rule of a few or of one. He was in some sort the Sulla of Athens. Charicles, a man of similar character, aided him in all his measures, and they kept their less strong-minded colleagues in a state of subjection.

To keep up some of the forms of the constitution, the Thirty appointed a senate, most of the members of which had belonged to the Four Hundred. They further appointed ten persons for the Piræus, and eleven for the city, to perform the duties of the former police-magistrates. They then announced that it was requisite to purge the state of evil-doers, and excite the remaining citizens to justice and virtue; and with the approbation of all, they seized and put to death the notorious *sycophants*, the pests of the city.

The Thirty now felt emboldened by the favour they had thus acquired, and they resolved to strengthen and perpetuate their power. They sent to Lysander, and by his influence obtained a Spartan garrison, to aid, they said, in putting down the ill-disposed and establishing the constitution. They undertook to maintain these troops, and paid the greatest court to Calliclus, who came as harmost. They then seized and put to death, not the bad, but those from whom they most apprehended opposition to their projects. These were chiefly the members of the ancient aristocracy, such as Niceratus the son and Eucrates the brother of Nicias; Antiphôn, son of Lysonides; León, of Salamis; Lycophrôn, father of the orator Lycurgus. It is asserted that the whole number of persons put to death by the Thirty during the period of their dominion amounted to fifteen hundred*. To destroy the democratic spirit, they resolved to put an end to its great aliments, sea-

* Æschines, False Embassy, 38, 15. Ctesiphôn, 87, 20. Isocrates, Areop. 151.

faring and oratory. They sold, that they might be destroyed, for three talents, the docks which had cost eleven hundred*; they forbade instruction to be given in oratory, and turned the pulpit ($\beta\eta\mu\alpha$) of the orators in the Pnyx, which had faced the sea, to the land side.

Theramenes had at first co-operated with Critias and his friends; but when he saw them putting to death worthy men, merely on account of their influence with the people, he began to remonstrate against it. Again, observing that people were wondering what the constitution at length was to be, he told them that if they did not contrive to interest a sufficient number in it, they never could maintain the oligarchy. They then chose three thousand to occupy the place of the former Five Thousand. Theramenes objected to this number; they had intended, he said, that the more respectable citizens should share in the government, and did they suppose that the Three Thousand alone, and all of them, were such? so that they were further committing the error of making a government of force, while the superiority rested with the governed. To obviate this objection, all the citizens were ordered to appear in arms, the Three Thousand in the market, the rest elsewhere. The Thirty then sent their partisans and the Lacedæmonian garrison, and took the arms of the last, and carried them up to the Acropolis. Freed now, as they thought, from apprehension, they gave a loose to their evil passions: some were put to death out of private enmity, others for their wealth. To obtain the means of keeping their engagements with the garrison, who were their main support, the Thirty now agreed among themselves that each of them should take one of the metœcs, many of whom were wealthy, by trade and manufacture, and put him to death, and seize his property. Theramenes, on being desired to select his victim, refused. Critias and his party saw plainly that he or they must fall; they therefore began to malign him privately to each of the senators, and then, having given directions to a number of daring youths, their partisans, to come to the senate-house with daggers hid in their sleeves, they called

* Isocrates, as above.

the senate together. Critias rose, and accusing Theramenes as a traitor and enemy to the present order of things, demanded his execution. Theramenes defended himself with eloquence and vigour, and showed that, in opposing the violence and injustice of his colleagues, he had been the true friend of the new constitution. The senate was ready to declare in his favour, when Critias, having spoken a few words with the Thirty, went out and desired the armed men to advance and let themselves be seen. He then came in, and told them it was his duty not to suffer them to be deceived; that those who were standing there without would not allow them to let a man escape who was openly injuring the oligarchy; then (as it was now the law that none in the list of the Three Thousand could be put to death without their vote, but the Thirty might condemn any one not in that list,) “I,” said he, “strike out, with your consent, the name of Theramenes, and *we* sentence him to death!” Theramenes sprang to the altar, and implored them not to suffer the law to be thus violated. He knew, he said, the altar would be no protection to him, but his enemies should be guilty of impiety as well as injustice. The herald of the Thirty called to the Eleven to advance and seize him. These and their servants dragged him from the altar, vainly calling on gods and men. The senators sat mute with terror, seeing themselves encompassed with armed men. Theramenes was led through the market, loudly exclaiming against the iniquity of the Thirty. In the prison he was forced to drink the hemlock-juice*, and when he had finished his draught, he flung out what remained in the cup, saying, “This to the handsome Critias†!”

This constancy and calmness in death, a thing they greatly admired, has gained Theramenes the praises of some eminent

* It speaks well for the Athenian character that they should have adopted this mild mode of taking away life.

† In allusion to the trick named *κότταβος*, an amusement of young men at their drinking-parties, when they either threw or let drop what remained in their cup into a brazen vessel, naming the object of their affection, and from the sound it made they learned their fortune in love.

men among the ancients, and Cicero even classes him with Socrates*. Yet it is difficult to see in what he was superior to Critias. A love of justice and humanity can hardly be ascribed to the murderer of the generals at the Arginusæ, the man who starved his fellow-citizens into submission to their enemies; and perhaps his present opposition may more justly be attributed to jealousy of Critias, whom he felt to be his superior, to want of vigour of character, or it may be to prudence, than to any nobler motive.

The Thirty now deemed that they might exercise their tyranny without restraint. They issued orders for those who were not in the catalogue not to enter the city, and they seized their lands for themselves and their friends. When those thus expelled retired to the Piræus, they drove them thence; and Argos, Megara, and Thebes (now favourable to democracy) were filled with Athenian exiles. The Spartans issued a barbarous edict, ordering them to be surrendered to the Thirty; but none obeyed it. The Thebans even passed a decree ordering every house and town in Bœotia to be open to the exiles, and imposing a fine of a talent on those who did not aid an exile if he was arrested, and directing that no Theban should see or hear (*i. e.* take notice) if any one was going in arms through Bœotia toward Attica.

Among those at Thebes was Thrasybulus. He had been for some time watching his opportunity to attempt the overthrow of the tyranny of the Thirty, and he now set out with not more than seventy companions and seized on Phyle, a strong place on the frontiers of Attica and Bœotia. The Thirty left the city with the Three Thousand and the Horsemen, and came to attack it. Being repulsed, they were preparing to circumvallate it; but in the night there came on a heavy fall of snow (it was mid-winter), and next day they went back to the city. Ap-

* Cicero, Tusc. i. 40. Diodorus too makes him a martyr for liberty. It is strange that Aristotle (Plut. Nicias, 2.) should have ranked him as a sincere patriot with Nicias and with Thucydides the son of Melesias. The suspicion that on points of history Aristotle is not always the very best authority, has more than once crossed our mind.

prehending that the country would be ravaged by those in Phyle, they sent the greater part of the garrison and two troops of horse to occupy a position within fifteen stadia of it. Thrasybulus, who had now seven hundred men with him, set out at night, and halted within three or four stadia of their camp; and when he heard them stirring in the morning, he suddenly fell upon them, killed one hundred and twenty men, and pursued them for six or seven stadia.

The Thirty now grew uneasy, and began to think of securing some place of refuge in case of their being driven from Athens. Eleusis appearing to be the place best adapted, they resolved to make it their own. They set out therefore one day with the Horsemen for that town, and telling the people that they wished to know their numbers and what garrison they might send, desired them to give in their names. As each person's name was set down, he was directed to go out at a small gate leading to the sea. The Horsemen were stationed on the beach, at each side of the gate, and their servants seized and bound every one as he came out. They then passed over to Salamis, where they acted in a similar manner*. The prisoners were all carried to Athens, and next day the Horsemen and the Three Thousand were assembled in the Odeion, or music-theatre, one half of which was occupied by the Lacedæmonian garrison under arms. Critias then told them, that as the present government was as much for their benefit as for that of the Thirty, they must share in the dangers as well as the advantages, and openly vote the death of the prisoners. Some therefore voting from inclination, some from fear, the prisoners, three hundred in number, were condemned and executed.

Thrasybulus soon ventured on bolder measures. He had now a thousand men with him at Phyle, and setting out one night he came and occupied the Piræus. The Thirty collected all their troops to dislodge them; the exiles, too few to defend so large a place, retired to Munychia. Here the two parties encountered. Critias, and Hippomachus, one of his colleagues, and about seventy of their men, were slain: the

* Lys. Eratosth. 125. Agorat. 133.

rest turned and fled to the city. The victors took the arms of the slain, but touched not their clothes. The bodies were restored as usual; and this giving occasion for discourse, Cleocritus, the herald of the Mysteries, addressed the adherents of the Thirty, praying them to lay aside all hostility to their fellow-citizens, and to cease to obey those, who in eight months had put more Athenians to death than had fallen by the hands of the Peloponnesians in ten years of the war*. The Thirty, fearing the effect of speeches like this, led their men back to the city; but what had been said had its effect: being now without the able and daring Critias, they were deposed, having held their power only four months: they retired to Eleusis, and ten persons (one from each phyle) were appointed in their stead to negotiate with those in the Piræus (*οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς*). But the Ten also resolved, if possible, to have absolute power, and they were supported in their projects by the Horsemen, and by a part of the Three Thousand. The guard of the city was maintained by the former, who slept in the Odeion, having their horses always ready-bridled at hand.

Meantime great numbers had joined those at the Piræus, for *isotely*† was offered to any strangers who would share in the danger. They armed themselves in the best way they could; some were hoplites, others light-armed, and about seventy horse, and various slight actions occurred between them and those in the city.

Both the Thirty and those in the city sent to Lacedæmôn to inform the government there of the revolt, as they termed it, of the people. Lysander, fearing that his work would be all undone, exerted himself to the utmost in their favour; he

* Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 21. Isocrates (Panegyr. 60.) says, more in *three* months than the state had condemned during the whole period of its dominion.

† That is, equality of civic rights to a certain extent. The *isotele* paid the same taxes as the genuine citizen (whence his name); he could purchase land, and marry an Athenian; but he could not hold office, vote in the assembly, or sit in a court of justice: he answered to the *municeps* of the Romans. Lysias, the orator, who was a metæc, distinguished himself on this occasion by giving 2000 drachmas, 200 shields, and hiring 300 mercenaries.

procured them a loan of one hundred talents*, caused himself to be appointed harmost by land, and a fleet to be given to his brother Libys, to attack the Piræus by sea. Those in the Piræus would have been thus reduced to extremity, were it not for the state of parties at Sparta, of which they had probably been aware; for king Pausanias, envious of Lysander, gained a majority of the Ephors, and led in person a force to Attica. All the allies sent their required contingents, except the Corinthians and Thebans, who saw that the object of the Lacedæmonians was to make Attica their own dominion. Pausanias, being joined by Lysander and his mercenaries, encamped near the Piræus, and sent to order those who were there to retire and disperse. On their refusal, he made a slight attack, that his inclinations toward them might not be suspected. Next day, as he was retiring with some troops after viewing the place, he directed some of them to drive off those from the Piræus who were following and harassing them: this brought on a smart action, in which the Athenians were worsted. He raised a trophy, and then, without showing any anger, sent privately to advise them to send deputies to him, and the Ephors who were with him; he at the same time directed his party in the city to assemble and express their desire for an accommodation; and both having obeyed, he sent their deputies to Lacedæmôn. The Ten and their friends also sent deputies thither; and fifteen commissioners came from Sparta, charged, in conjunction with Pausanias, to reconcile all parties. Peace was made by their mediation, the only persons excepted being the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten of the Piræus; any of these, however, who chose to abide the *Euthyne* might claim to resume their rights; and any of those in the city who feared to stay might retire in safety to Eleusis. Pausanias then led off his troops: the men of the Piræus marched in arms up to the Acropolis and offered sacrifice to Pallas-Athene. An assembly was then held: Thrasybulus addressed those of the city, reminding them of their injustice to-

* Which loan was honourably recognised and paid by the people after the expulsion of the Thirty.

ward the people and of their present impotence ; and having concluded by recommending good faith and moderation to his own party, he dismissed the assembly. Some time after (Ol. 94, 2.)*, hearing that those in Eleusis were hiring mercenaries, they all (πανδημεῖ) marched out against them ; and having invited their leaders to a conference, treacherously put them to death. A reconciliation was then effected with the remainder, a general amnesty (the first on record, which does honour to the Athenian character and was faithfully kept) was sworn to, and it was resolved to return as far as was possible to the constitution of Solôn. Thrasybulus, by his entire conduct, deserved the fame which he has acquired of an excellent and patriotic citizen. He restored concord to his country, and independence as far as he could ; but the rebuilding of the Long Walls, which alone could make Athens really independent, was reserved for another brave and meritorious citizen. Thrasybulus, however, is not to carry away all the fame of this noble act of patriotism. The civil merits of his coadjutor, Archînus, exceeded his ; most of the beneficial measures which were now adopted were brought forward by the latter : the name of Cephalus, too, is to be held in honour†.

The archon of this year was Eucleides, and it became a common practice to reckon from it as a kind of æra, the preceding year being termed that of the *Anarchy* (ἀναρχία)‡. The Athenians, in the year of Eucleides, among other changes, adopted, on the proposal of Archinus, the more complete alphabet used by the Ionians.

* In this year the Romans laid siege to Veii. The last contemporary event of Roman history which was of sufficient importance to be noticed, was the establishment of the Decemvirate in the time of Pericles (above p. 153). It is curious to observe how small a space in the Roman history is occupied by the events of the intervening period, while it contains the most important portion perhaps of Grecian history.

† See Taylor's *Life of Lysias*, prefixed to that orator's works.

‡ That is, the year without (legal) magistrates.

CHAPTER XII.*

Retreat of the Ten Thousand.—Dercyllidas in Asia.—Conspiracy of Cindaon.—Agésilas in Asia.—Corinthian or First Bœotian War.—Victories of Conôn.—Exploit of Iphicrates.—Progress of the War.—Peace of Antalcidas.

Ol. 93, 4-98, 2. B.C. 405-387.

ON the death of Darius king of Persia (Ol. 93, 4.), his son Cyrus, favoured by his mother Parysatis, prepared to contest the throne with his elder brother Artaxerxes. Having had opportunity to observe the great superiority of the Greek troops, he resolved to engage a large body of them in his pay; and the present peace, which left a number of soldiers without employment, was favourable to his views. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, and some other officers, were furnished by him with money to raise troops, and he was thus enabled to have about thirteen thousand Greeks in the army, which he led (Ol. 94, 4.) from Asia Minor over the Euphrâtes. A battle was fought between the royal brothers at Cunaxa in Babylonia. Cyrus fell in the action, and his Barbarian troops fled; but his Greek auxiliaries defeated those opposed to them. All the arts of treachery were employed against them by the King, acting under the advice of Tissaphernes. Their leaders were enticed to a conference, at which they were treacherously put to death; but the troops appointed new officers, among whom was Xenophôn, the celebrated Athenian, and setting the Persian empire at defiance, accomplished their retreat through the mountains of Carduchia (*Kûrdistân*) and Armenia, and reached the shores of the Euxine with little loss. (Ol. 95, 1.)

This celebrated retreat, known by the name of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand, has been finely narrated in detail by Xenophôn, who conducted it†; and the proof which it afforded

* Xen. iii. iv. v. 1. Diod. xiv. 35-39, 79-86, 94, 97-99, 110. Plut. Agésilas and Lysander.

† See our Elementary History of Greece, p. 160.

of the real weakness of the Persian empire led afterwards to most important results*.

Tissaphernes, on account of the services he had rendered his master, was now rewarded with the government of all the countries which had been ruled by Cyrus. But the Ionian cities, fearing and disliking him, refused their obedience. They implored protection of Sparta, and (Ol. 95, 2.) Thimbrôn came out as harmost with an army of one thousand Neodamods and four thousand Peloponnesians. The Athenians, on being required to furnish cavalry, sent three hundred of those who had supported the Thirty, deeming that their loss would be a gain to the people.

On account of the great superiority of the Persians in cavalry, Thimbrôn did not at first venture to descend into the plain; but when joined by the Cyræan Greeks†, he felt himself strong enough to act on the offensive. Some towns joined him, a few others he took by assault. Having failed in an attempt on a place named the Egyptian Larissa, he was proceeding, by the direction of the Ephors, to Caria, when he was met at Ephesus by Dercyllidas, who was come out to replace him. On his return he had to go into exile, as the allies convicted him of having allowed his army to plunder them. Dercyllidas, who for his craft was named Sisyphus‡, having been in Asia with Lysander, knew the ill feeling which existed between the two satraps; and wishing to gratify an old grudge against Pharnabazus, he proposed a truce, which was readily accepted by Tissaphernes. He then led his army with the greatest order and discipline to Æolis, which province he speedily reduced, taking nine towns by composition, in eight days. As winter was approaching, and he was anxious not to burden the friendly states, like Thimbrôn, he made a peace for them with Pharnabazus, and led his troops into the Thracian Bithynia, which he knew he might plunder with the good-will of the satrap.

In spring (Ol. 95, 3.) he came to Lampsacus, where he was

* Polyb. iii. 6.

† That is, the remains of the Ten Thousand.

‡ Ephorus *ap.* Athen. xi. p. 500.

met by deputies, sent from home to announce to him the satisfaction of the government with the conduct of himself and his troops, and to continue him in his command for another year. They also told him that the people of the Chersonese had sent to request that a wall might be built across their isthmus to protect them from the incursions of the Thracians. Dercyllidas, without telling them what he intended to do, sent them home along the coast, that they might see the happy condition of the Grecian towns; he then renewed the truce with Pharnabazus, and having conveyed his troops over the Hellespont, built in the course of the summer a wall, thirty-seven stadia long, from sea to sea, thus giving security to eleven flourishing towns and a most fertile region. On his return to Asia, learning that the Chian exiles had fixed themselves at Atarneus, whence they plundered Ionia, he besieged their stronghold, which he reduced after a siege of eight months.

The Asiatic Greeks had sent deputies to Sparta, stating that it was in the power of Tissaphernes to acknowledge their independence, and giving it as their opinion, that an invasion of Caria, where his property lay, would force him to it. Orders, therefore, were sent out to Dercyllidas and the admiral, Phrax, to attack that province. On their invading it (Ol. 95, 4.) Tissaphernes, who was now joined by Pharnabazus, marched to its defence, and having placed sufficient garrisons in it, returned to Ionia. When Dercyllidas heard of their having recrossed the Mæander, he set out to the defence of Ionia. He also had passed the river, when some of the Ephesians who were in advance saw scouts standing on the tombs by the way-side; they ascended the adjacent tombs and towers, and then beheld the whole Persian army, which the lofty standing corn had hitherto concealed. Dercyllidas lost no time in drawing up his troops. The Peloponnesians, of course, stood firm; but the Asiatic Greeks and the islanders began to slink away, leaving their arms in the corn; and it was plain that those who stayed would soon follow their example. In the other army, Pharnabazus was for fighting; but Tissaphernes, who had had experience of the Cyrean Greeks, and who

thought that all Greeks were the same, resolved first to try the way of negotiation. Dercyllidas received the envoy surrounded by his most showy officers and men. It was agreed that the Persians should retire to Trales, the Greeks to Leucophrys, for the night, and meet in the morning at an appointed place. Next day Dercyllidas proposed that the independence of the Grecian cities should be acknowledged by the King: the satraps assented, provided the Grecian army evacuated the King's dominions, and the Lacedæmonians withdrew their harmosts from the cities. These terms were agreed on, and a truce was made till the return of the envoys, who were to be sent to procure the ratifications at Sparta and Susa.

While Dercyllidas was thus maintaining the Lacedæmonian name and influence in Asia, king Agis waged a war (Ol. 94, 4.-95, 2.) against the Eleians at home, whom he forced to restore all their Perioecian towns to independence. Agis dying shortly afterwards (Ol. 95, 4.), the succession was disputed by his son Leotychides and his brother Agesilâus. The legitimacy of the former was very dubious: his mother had been strongly suspected of an improper familiarity with Alcibiades, and Agis had frequently said that he was no son of his. Aided, therefore, by the powerful interest of Lysander, Agesilaüs gained the majority of votes in the assembly, and was declared king.

He had not been a year on the throne, when a conspiracy, the first we hear of at Sparta, was discovered. A person came to the Ephors, and told them that a young man named Cinadôn, who though a citizen was not of the Peers or Equals (*οἱ ὅμοιοι*)*, had led him to one end of the market, and bidden him count what Spartans were in it. When he had counted the king, ephors, elders, and others, to the number of about forty, and asked what this meant, he told him to regard these as enemies, and all the rest as friends, and that on the farms in the country he would in like manner find one enemy, the master, and

* That is, according to Müller, of genuine old Dorian descent. The number of these families was now very small. Dr. Thirlwall (iv. 373.) gives a somewhat different account of them.

many friends. He added, that those privy to his design were few, but that they well knew that the Helots, the Neodamods, the inferior Spartans, and the Pericæcians, all of whom hated the Spartans, would join in it; he then led him away to the iron-market, and showed him the great quantity of swords, daggers, axes, hatchets, sickles, and other implements which were there for sale, and which might be employed to arm them. The Ephors were greatly dismayed at this revelation, of the truth of which they could not doubt: they did not venture to call the Little Council*, but having consulted with the senators separately, they resolved to send Cinadôn to Aulôn to fetch some of the Aulonites and the Helots; and the men who were to go with him were to have secret orders to seize him. As Cinadôn had often been similarly employed, he had no suspicion. The plan succeeded; he was seized, and made to give the names of the conspirators: the list was forwarded to Sparta, and those named in it were arrested. Cinadôn was then brought thither and examined: when asked his reason for conspiring, "It was," said he, "that I might be inferior to no one in Lacedæmôn." He and his accomplices were scourged, led round the city, and then put to death.

About this time intelligence was brought to Sparta that the Persians were getting a large fleet ready for sea in Phœnicia; and, as it was thought likely that it was destined to act against Greece, a council of the allies was summoned to deliberate on it. Lysander, considering the naval superiority of the Greeks, and the retreat of the Ten Thousand, urged Agesilaüs to propose an invasion of Asia, if they would give him thirty Spartans to act as his council and assistants, 2000 Neodamods, and 6000 of the allies; he also proposed to accompany him himself, and to restore the decarchies which the Ephors had suppressed. This plan of the campaign was adopted, and Lysander was, as he wished, appointed one of the thirty councillors. (Ol. 96, 1.)

* This consisted of the ephors, senators, and such of the equals as they summoned to it. Müller, Dor. ii. 85.

Agésilaüs*, wishing to emulate the ancient Peloponnesian monarch Agamemnôn, who when about to invade Asia had sacrificed at Aulis in Bœotia, proceeded to that place. But as he was sacrificing, the Bœotarchs, for what reason we are not told, sent down some horsemen, who threw the victims off the altar and forbade him to sacrifice. Agésilaüs, having appealed to the gods, embarked and sailed to Ephesus. On his arrival, Tissaphernes proposed a truce till the King's pleasure should be known. The truce was sworn to; but the faithless satrap, instead of observing it, sent to the King for more troops. Agésilaüs, though aware of what he was doing, remained quiet at Ephesus.

While he was staying there, the Asiatic Greeks paid so much court to Lysander, whom they knew, that the king seemed insignificant in comparison. This mortified Agésilaüs and the other Spartans; but fearing, or not wishing, to offend Lysander openly, he only showed his sense of it by refusing the requests of those whom he recommended. Lysander soon saw through his design, and requested to be sent away from Ephesus. Agésilaüs gladly sent him to the Hellespont, where finding a Persian of rank, named Spithridâtes, offended with Pharnabazus, he persuaded him to desert, and brought him to Agésilaüs, who obtained from him much useful information.

Tissaphernes, in reliance on the army which was on its march to join him, now declared war against Agésilaüs if he did not quit Asia. "I give him thanks," replied the Spartan, "for having by his perjury made the gods his enemies and our allies." He ordered his troops to get ready to march, and directed the towns on the way to Caria to prepare provisions, and those to the north to forward their contingents of troops. The satrap, aware of Agésilaüs' want of cavalry, and of his personal animosity to himself, judged that he would make Caria, where his property lay, and which was a rugged country, the scene of war. He sent therefore all his infantry thi-

* When reading the exploits of this prince, and of the Spartan commanders at this time in general, we must remember that our authority is their panegyrist.

ther, keeping his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander. Agesilaüs, however, suddenly turned into Phrygia, and plundered it; but near Dascylion his cavalry fell in with a Persian body of horse of equal force, and had the worst of it. He therefore fell back to Ephesus, and being now convinced that without horse he never could move in the plains, he proclaimed through the towns that any one who would furnish a horse and horseman should be himself exempt from service. By this means he soon had cavalry, for the wealthy and luxurious Ionians and Æolians gladly avoided the toils and dangers of war.

In the spring (Ol. 96, 2.) he assembled all his troops at Ephesus, and by proposing prizes to those who should excel in the various martial exercises, he greatly increased the skill and raised the confidence of his men. As a means of making them despise the Barbarians, he had such of them as were taken by the privateers sold naked, that the whiteness of their skin might be seen, and their effeminacy be thence inferred by the soldiers.

Their year being now expired, Lysander and his colleagues returned home; and when their successors, of whom a Spartan named Herippidas was the principal, came out, Agesilaüs gave orders to march for Sardes. Tissaphernes, thinking this to be only a feint, and that Caria was the real object of attack, disposed his army as before; but Agesilaüs kept his word, and on the fourth day he engaged and totally defeated the Persian cavalry on the banks of the Pactôlus. Their camp, with property to the amount of more than seventy talents, was taken. The camels found in it were afterwards brought to Greece as curiosities.

Tissaphernes, who had remained at Sardes, was loudly accused by the Persians of having betrayed them, and soon after Tithraustes came down from Susa with orders to behead him and take his satrapy. The crafty and treacherous Tissaphernes being thus removed, his successor made proposals of peace, offering on the part of the King to leave the cities to themselves on their paying the old tribute. Agesilaüs replied that

he must consult his government. Tithraustes then desired that he would meantime remove into the territory of Pharnabâzus. Agesilaüs demanded supplies: the satrap sent him thirty talents, and he immediately entered Pharnabazus' part of Phrygia. While he was there, he learned that he had been invested with the supreme command by land and sea in Asia. He forthwith sent orders to the cities of the coast and isles to equip a hundred and twenty triremes: he also made Peisander, his wife's brother—a brave man, but one who knew nothing of the sea—admiral in the room of Pharax, who appears to have been an officer of some skill; but family interest prevails at all times and with most men.

Tithraustes, perceiving that Agesilaüs had no notion of quitting Asia, and that it was only by making a diversion that he could drive him away, gave a Rhodian named Timocrates fifty talents in money, and sent him to Greece, with directions to distribute them among the leading men in the cities, and engage them to stir up war against the Lacedæmonians. Timocrates disposed of the money at Thebes, Corinth and Argos. The Athenians were, without it, ready enough to go to war on the first opportunity.

The Thebans, aware that the Lacedæmonians would not commence hostilities, urged the Opuntian Locrians to plunder some land which was disputed between them and the Phocians. This, as was expected, produced an invasion of Locris by the Phocians. The Locrians called on the Thebans, who forthwith entered Phocis: the Phocians sent to Lacedæmôn for aid, and, glad of a fair pretext to avenge the former insults and injuries of the Thebans, and elate with the successes of Agesilaüs in Asia, the Spartan government sent Lysander to Phocis, directing him to assemble an army of Phocians, Ceteans, Melians, and others at Haliartus, where he would be joined on a certain day by king Pausanias with a Peloponnesian army. Lysander did as he was directed, and he moreover induced the Orchomenians to revolt from the Thebans.

The Thebans sent forthwith an embassy to Athens apologising for their former conduct toward the people, but remind-

ing them of their late services, and hinting that Athens had now an opportunity of recovering and even extending her supremacy, as the Lacedæmonians had made themselves so many enemies. Thrasybulus and his friends aided them with their influence, and a decree was passed to assist the Thebans if Bœotia should be invaded.

Lysander at the appointed time, without waiting for Pausanias, advanced under the walls of Haliartus and tried to induce the people to revolt. Failing in this, he attacked the town: but the Thebans came with all speed, both horsemen and hoplites, to its relief. Lysander fell in the action which ensued, and his men fled to a hill, closely pursued by the Thebans. Here they turned, and casting darts and rolling down stones, they drove them back, with the loss of upwards of two hundred men. During the night they dispersed, and returned to their homes. When the Thebans in the morning found them gone, they were greatly elated; but the appearance of king Pausanias with his army damped their joy. The Athenians, however, arriving next day, they prepared to give battle; but Pausanias having held a council with his officers, it was deemed more advisable to try to obtain the bodies of Lysander and those who fell with him by a truce. The Thebans would restore the bodies only on condition of their quitting Bœotia, and these terms were accepted. Pausanias, on his return, was capitally prosecuted, both on account of his conduct on this occasion and his former behaviour at Athens. As he did not appear to defend himself sentence of death was passed on him, and he fled to Tegea, where he died.

The Spartan government, perceiving the confederacy that was formed against them, resolved to recall Agesilaüs to the defence of his country. This able prince had been uniformly successful in Asia. Guided by Spithridates he had wasted and plundered Phrygia, and penetrated to Paphlagonia; the prince of which country, Cotys, formed an alliance with him, and gave him one thousand horse and two thousand peltasts. Agesilaüs negotiated a marriage between the son of Cotys and a daughter of Spithridates, and a Lacedæmonian trireme was directed to

convey the maiden from Cyzicus, where she was residing. This affair being concluded, Agesilaüs proceeded to winter at Dascy lion, the hereditary property of Pharnabazus. The satrap's fine parks were destroyed, the trees cut down, and the villages plundered by the soldiery. He was himself reduced to the condition of a wanderer, and Herippidas, by a sudden attack one morning, took his camp and most of his portable property. But Herippidas, in his anxiety to make a great show of booty, forced Spithridates and the Paphlagonians to give up their plunder; and this was in their eyes such injustice, that they went off in the night to Sardes to join Ariæus, who had been in the service of Cyrus and was now again in revolt. This event annoyed Agesilaüs exceedingly, as it was so very likely to derange his plans.

His design in fact was to dismember the Persian empire, by inducing the satraps and subject-princes to assert their independence. In an interview which he had shortly afterwards with Pharnabazus, he sought to excite him to revolt: the satrap was too honourable to do this, but he freely acknowledged his ideas of allegiance to be such, that if the King were to put a satrap over him in his own country, he should consider himself justified in forming an alliance with the Greeks. Agesilaüs, satisfied with this, promised to withdraw his army, and to abstain from Pharnabazus' country as long as there was any other to plunder. He then led his troops to the plain of Thebes, on the coast, and began, it being now spring (Ol. 96, 3.), to make preparations for pushing on for the heart of the Persian empire, reckoning that all the nations in his rear would be lost to the King. It is evident that in forming this bold plan he was guided by the advice of his friend and panegyrist Xenophôn, who had conducted the retreat of the Ten Thousand*.

It was therefore with sincere grief that Agesilaüs received the summons to abandon these brilliant prospects and return to fight against Greeks. He however hesitated not to obey: he called the allies together, and told them of the necessity he

* We have Xenophôn's own testimony (Anab. v. 3.) for the fact of his being in Asia with Agesilaüs.

was under of leaving them, but promised a speedy return. The assembly shed tears, and voted troops to the aid of Lacedæmôn. By offering prizes Agesilaüs obtained select and well-appointed troops, and then leaving Euxenus as harmost, with four thousand men for the protection of the towns, he crossed the Hellespont and pursued the route for Greece formerly trodden by Xerxes.

The confederacy against the Lacedæmonians, created by their own insolence and tyranny, and by the gold of Persia, had now assumed a formidable appearance. It consisted of Bœotia, Athens, Argos, Corinth, Acarnania, most part of Thesaly, Eubœa, and Chalcidice. Deputies from most of these states met at Corinth. The troops of the confederates also assembled there, as it was judged best to make Laconia, or at least its vicinity, the seat of war; for, as Timolaüs the Corinthian said in the council, the Lacedæmonians were like a river, which is small and fordable at its source, but is increased by others as it flows; for they are few when setting out, but become formidable by the accession of auxiliaries. He also likened them to wasps, which are most safely destroyed by putting fire to their nest. The Lacedæmonians were meantime on the advance to engage the confederates. They had 6000 hoplites of their own, and 600 horse. Elis and its vicinity sent them about 3000; Sicyôn, 1500; Epidaurus, Trœzên, Hermione, 3000: they were also joined by the troops of Tegea and Mantinea, but their numbers are not given. They had 300 Cretan archers, and about 400 slingers.

In the confederate army there were 6000 Athenian hoplites, 7000 Argive, 3000 Corinthian, 5000 Bœotian, 3000 Eubœan; there were 800 Bœotian and 600 Athenian horsemen, 100 from Chalcis in Eubœa, and 50 from Opuntian Locris. The light troops were very numerous.

The Lacedæmonian army assembled at Sicyôn. As they advanced through the hilly country they were annoyed by the light troops of the enemy; but when they reached the sea, and got into the plain, they wasted the country at their will. The confederates advanced to engage them. The Bœotians, who

were on the left, fearing, if we may credit Xenophôn, the Lacedæmonians, who were opposite them, declared the sacrifices unfavourable; but when the Athenians had changed places with them, they found the signs propitious, and gave the signal to engage. In the battle, all the Lacedæmonian allies were defeated by those opposed to them; but the Athenians, in consequence of the Thebans causing the whole line to incline too much to the right, found that only six of their ten phyle divisions were opposed to the Lacedæmonians. They were accordingly outflanked and routed. The Lacedæmonians then attacked other bodies of the confederates and drove them off the field. They raised a trophy on the spot, and retired to Sicyôn.

Meantime Agesilaüs was advancing from the Hellespont. Dereyllidas met him at Amphipolis with the news of the late victory, and he sent him on with the tidings to the cities of Asia: he then pursued his march through Macedonia into Thessaly. As he advanced, he was continually harassed by the desultory attacks of the Thessalian cavalry, but near the borders of Phthia the cavalry which he had himself raised and formed in Asia gave an effectual check to the renowned Thessalian horse. His march on to Bœotia now lay through a friendly country; but just as he was entering it, he received tidings of the defeat of his fleet and the death of Peisander. To keep up the spirits of the soldiers, he gave out, that though Peisander had fallen, the fleet had been victorious; and he sacrificed as for a victory. In the neighbourhood of Coroneia he found an army of Bœotians, Argives, Corinthians, Athenians, Eubœans, Ænians and Locrians waiting to receive him. He had been joined by the Phocians and Orchomenians, by a mora from the Peloponnese, and half a mora that had been in garrison at Orchomenus. The forces were about equal on both sides. Agesilaüs advanced from the Cephissus; the confederates from the foot of Helicôn. When they were about a stadion asunder, the confederates shouted, and charged running; the Cyreans, followed by the Asiatic Greeks, ran also, and drove back those opposed to them: the Argives fled to Helicôn before the troops

led by Agesilaüs in person, but the Thebans defeated the Orchomenians, and penetrated to the baggage. Agesilaüs led his phalanx against them; the Thebans, seeing their allies all dispersed, formed in a close body in order to force their way; and Agesilaüs, instead of prudently opening to let them pass, and assailing their flanks and rear, met them face to face. The contest was obstinate: at length a part of the Thebans were slain; and the rest forced their way to Helicôn. Agesilaüs himself being wounded, Gylis the polemarch by his direction drew out the troops next morning, and raised a trophy to the sound of flutes, all the soldiers wearing garlands. Their dead were restored to the Thebans, and Agesilaüs proceeded to Delphi to offer the tithe of his booty in Asia (100 talents) to the god. Gylis led the army through Phocis into Ozolian Locris, which country they plundered. The Locrians harassed them from the hills; and in an attempt to drive them off Gylis himself was slain. Agesilaüs then disbanded his army, and returned home over the gulf.

Sicyôn and Corinth being the head-quarters of the two opposed armies (Ol. 96, 4.)*, the Corinthian territory naturally suffered much. The aristocratic party there, as the richest proprietors, were of course the greatest sufferers; and besides, their inclination was for the Lacedæmonian alliance. The meetings which they held for this purpose did not escape the observation of the democratic leaders, and, with the consent of their allies, they resolved to murder those whom they most dreaded and suspected. Regardless of the sanctity of a religious festival, they sent armed men, on the last day of the festival named the Eucleiæ, into the market, who fell on and slew all those who had been designated. In vain they fled to the altars and statues of the gods; they were dragged from them and massacred. Those thus slain were mostly men in years; the young men were kept together at the place called the Cranion by Pasimêlus, one of their chiefs, who suspected danger; and when they heard of what was going on in the market, they made for the Acro-Corinth, and driving off some

* The year of the taking of Veii by Camillus and the Romans.

Argives and others who attempted to stop them, took possession of it. Here they might have defended themselves, but a capital happening to fall from a column without any assignable cause, the soothsayers, on consulting the entrails, advised them to descend from the fortress. They obeyed, and were about to quit their country; but their friends and relatives entreated them to stay; and as the democratic leaders swore that they should receive no injury, a part of them returned to their houses.

A union, such as we have no other instance of in Grecian history, had been effected between Argos and Corinth. The boundaries between the two states were removed and effaced; the whole was named Argos, and the same political constitution prevailed in both, Argos being, as it would appear, the seat of government*. This state of things was intolerable to the oligarchs of Corinth, who found that, though safe in their persons, they had less influence in their native city than even the metœcs; and they resolved to make Corinth what she had been, or perish in the attempt. To recur to the Lacedæmonians for aid was, of course, their first thought; and two of them, Pasimelus and Aleimenes, stole out along the bed of the stream which passed through the walls, and going to Sicyôn, proposed to Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian polemarch there, to put him in possession of the long walls which connected Corinth with its port of Lechæon. Praxitas, knowing that he might depend on them, agreed to the proposal. They returned home, and on a certain night opened a gate in the walls, the custody of which had been entrusted to them, and admitted Praxitas with his mora and some Sicyonians, and about one hundred and fifty Corinthian exiles. As the walls were far asunder, Praxitas made a ditch and paling across, that he might be able to hold out till relief came. Nothing further was done till the second day, when the Argives, supported by the Corinthians and by the troops of the Athenian Iphicrates, came down upon them, relying on their numbers.

* This union is similar to that proposed by the Latins to the Romans, A. U. 414.

The Argives soon routed the Sicyonians, and plucking up the paling chased them to the sea. The Spartan commander of the few horsemen they had made his men dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then take up the larger shields of the slain or fugitive Sicyonians and advance against the Argives. As these shields had an S (Σ) upon them, the Argives made light of them. "By the twin-gods [$\tau\omega\sigma\iota\omega$], Argives! these SS will deceive you," cried the Spartan, and charged; but he and most of his men were slain.

The Corinthian exiles drove those opposed to them to the town-wall. The Lacedæmonians moved to occupy the place deserted by the Sicyonians; and when the Argives found that they were thus getting into their rear, they made all speed to get outside of the paling. As their right side, which was unprotected by the shield, was exposed, many of them were slain as they passed, and they were then met by the Corinthian exiles returning from the pursuit. They attempted to get over the wall, by means of the ladders that were there; but some of them fell and were killed by the fall, and others were slaughtered by the enemy; and so many were slain, that they lay, says the historian, like heaps of corn, stones, or timber. Praxitas then assailed Lechæon, and slaughtered its Bœotian garrison; and having restored the enemy's dead as usual, and being joined by troops of the allies, he made a breach in the long walls sufficient to admit the passage of an army. He then advanced toward Megara, and took and garrisoned Sidûs and Crommyôn, near Corinth, where he also fortified a place named Epieikia. He finally dismissed his troops and returned to Sparta.

It is time now that we should take a survey of the naval operations at this period, and of affairs on the coast of Asia. For this purpose we must go back a little in our narrative.

When Conôn fled with eight ships from Ægos-potami, he directed his course to the isle of Cyprus. One of the chief places of this isle was Salamis, a colony, it was said, from the Grecian island of the same name. Between it and Athens there had been a friendship of long standing, and its present

tyrant, or ruler, Evagoras, a man of high character and talent, was well known to Conôn. The able Athenian became the chief adviser of the Cyprian prince, and he obtained him, by his negotiations, the favour and friendship of Pharnabazus. As the satrap was justly indignant at the manner in which he had been treated by the Lacedæmonians, he lent a willing ear to Conôn's suggestion of joining a Phœnician fleet with that of Evagoras, and such Grecian ships as Conôn himself might be able to collect, and of attempting to destroy their power by sea; and he even resolved to take the command in person. The combined fleet, greatly superior in number, came up with that of Peisander off Cnidos (Ol. 96, 3.); and the allies, who were on the left, when they saw that the Greek and Cyprian ships alone outnumbered their whole fleet, fled without fighting. Peisander's own ship was driven ashore, and he himself, refusing to quit it, was slain. The loss is said to have been fifty ships.

After this victory, Pharnabazus and Conôn sailed round to the islands and cities of the coasts, expelling the harmosts and restoring the cities to independence: the prudent and generous satrap acted in all things by the advice of Conôn. As his old enemy Dercyllidas still remained at Abydos, Pharnabazus landed at Ephesus to collect an army to lead against it, and he directed Conôn to proceed thither by sea. Dercyllidas, however, had sufficient influence over the Abydenes to keep them from revolt; he also induced the Sestians to stand firm; and the efforts of the satrap were without effect. As winter was approaching, Pharnabazus directed Conôn to remain in the Hellespont and collect ships, for he was determined to retaliate in the spring on the Lacedæmonians by an invasion of Laconia.

In the spring (Ol. 96, 4.) Pharnabazus and Conôn sailed across to Melos; they then directed their course to the coast of Laconia, and landing at Pheræ in Messene ravaged the rich plain of the Pamisus. They made descents on various other parts of the coast, and passing over to the isle of Cythera, took Phœnicos, its chief town, where they left a garrison, with

Nicophêmus an Athenian as governor. They thence proceeded to the Corinthian Isthmus; and the satrap, having exhorted the allies to carry on the war with vigour, and prove themselves faithful to the King, gave them all the money he had, and sailed home elate with the glory he had acquired.

Conôn next represented to the satrap that he could do nothing more galling to the Lacedæmonians than to rebuild the Athenian Long Walls, and thus undo all their work. He said that, if he would allow him to keep the fleet, he would make the islands maintain it, and with its aid raise the Athenian walls. Pharnabazus yielded a cheerful consent, and gave him moreover a supply of money. Conôn sailed home without delay: he employed masons and carpenters, and made his crews assist: the allies came also from Bœotia and elsewhere to contribute their efforts toward raising these bulwarks of democracy; and Conôn had thus the highest fortune a good citizen could desire,—that of securing the independence of his country. The gratitude of the people raised marble statues of him and Evagoras, beside that of Zeus the Preserver.

Agesilaüs, who now (Ol. 97, 1.) conducted the war, led his troops to attack the Peiræon*, where the cattle of the Corinthians were sheltered. He left the Amyclæans at Lechæon; for, be they where they might, it was their practice to return home to celebrate their ancient festival of the Hyacinthia, which was now at hand. The polemarch at Lechæon, leaving the allies to guard that place, escorted the Amyclæans with a mora of horse and another of foot to within twenty or thirty stadia of Sicyôn. Thinking them then safe, he left the horse with them and led back the foot. But the Athenian commanders, Callias and Iphicrates, observing the polemarch returning without horse or light troops, thought they might venture to attack him with the peltasts of Iphicrates. Callias, who commanded the hoplites, led them out, and drew them up not far from the town; while Iphicrates, with his peltasts, advanced and assailed the mora, flinging their darts and then

* This place lay north of the Isthmus, under Mount Geraneia on the Corinthian gulf.

retreating. Many being wounded or slain, the polemarch ordered the younger men to charge and drive them off; but these, with their heavy armour, could not equal in speed the light peltasts, and as they were returning they were assailed in flank and rear by the active foes. The polemarch ordered the men of more advanced age to charge; but these suffered still more than their predecessors. The horse being now returned, they and a part of the foot charged together; but the horse not venturing to advance beyond the foot, both suffered alike. Wearied and exhausted, the remains of the mora halted on an eminence two stadia from the sea and sixteen or seventeen from Lechæon. Their comrades at this place got into boats, to come to their relief, but when they saw the Athenian hoplites beginning to advance they took to flight. Some of the footmen then ran into the sea, and made for the boats. The horsemen and a few of the footmen escaped to Lechæon. The partial historian gives the loss at two hundred and fifty men; but as he says that the mora was six hundred, it was probably far greater. This exploit of Iphicrates and his peltasts, whom he had armed and disciplined after a system of his own, was long the theme of Athenian exultation.

Agesilaüs having led home his troops, Iphicrates attacked and reduced Sidüs and the other garrisons of the Lacedæmonians, who now only retained Lechæon.

Next year (Ol. 97, 2.) Agesilaüs led an army into Acarnania; for the Achæans, who now held Calydôn, being hard pressed by the Acarnanians, had sent to Sparta, threatening to renounce the alliance if they were not assisted. He advanced into Acarnania by short marches of only ten or twelve stadia a day; the Acarnanians, deceived by the slowness of his movements, brought their cattle and slaves down from the mountains, whither they had sent them, and began to till their lands as usual. But Agesilaüs, making a sudden march of one hundred and sixty stadia in one day, came to the lake about which most of the cattle were feeding, and seized the whole of them. He then retreated through Ætolia; and returning the following spring (Ol. 97, 3.), forced the Acarnanians to embrace the

alliance of the Lacedæmonians, instead of that of the Bœotians and Athenians.

The Lacedæmonians, feeling the effects of the enmity of Pharnabazus, resolved to endeavour to gain Tiribazus, the new satrap of Lydia. Antalcidas, a second Lysander, appeared on their part at Sardes, whither the Athenians and their allies without loss of time despatched Conôn and others to attend to their interests. Antalcidas proposed, as the basis of a peace, that all the Grecian cities and islands should be independent. The Athenians saw that they should thus lose Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans would not part with their hegemony over the Bœotian towns; and Argos was unwilling to separate from Corinth. Nothing therefore could be arranged. The satrap was strongly inclined to the Lacedæmonians, but fearing to aid them openly, he gave Antalcidas money in secret to equip a fleet; he cast Conôn into prison as an enemy to the King; and then set out for Susa, to learn the will of the monarch.

On his arrival at court, a nobleman named Struthas was sent down to take charge of his province. This satrap pursued a different policy, for he took the Athenian side so openly that the Lacedæmonians sent Thimbrôn to invade his satrapy. Thimbrôn entered and ravaged the plain of the Mæander; but conducting himself with his usual negligence, he was surprised and slain, and his troops defeated. Diphridas was sent out to succeed him; and as he was a man of capacity and of an amiable temper, he better sustained the credit of the Lacedæmonian name.

The people and the aristocrats in Rhodes being at feud at this time, the latter sent to Lacedæmôn for aid. Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaüs, came with twenty-seven ships to support the oligarchic interest: the Athenians sent out Thrasybulus with forty ships to keep down the naval power of the Lacedæmonians. Knowing that the people in Rhodes were well able to defend themselves, Thrasybulus directed his course to the Hellespont. Here he reconciled two Thracian princes who were at enmity, and made them allies of Athens. The towns

on both coasts returned to the Athenian connexion. At Byzantium he farmed out the toll of ten per cent. charged on vessels from the Pontus, and established there a democracy. He then sailed to Lesbos, where the Mytilenæans adhered to Athens. He landed a part of his troops, and joining them with the Mytilenæans and the exiles from the other towns, advanced against Methymne. The Spartan harmost led out what troops he had; but he was defeated and slain. Thrasybulus, having reduced the greater part of the island, sailed for Rhodes. On his way he collected money from the towns; but having entered the Eurymedôn, near Aspendos, for this purpose, the Aspendians, incensed at some plunder committed by his soldiers, fell on his camp in the night, and he was slain in his tent.

Such was the end of this excellent citizen and truly great man. Conôn, the other restorer of Athens, probably died also about this time. We hear nothing of him after his imprisonment; but it seems likely that Struthas gave him his liberty, and that he died at Cyprus.

Dereyllidas was now (Ol. 97, 4.) superseded in his command at Abydos by Anaxibius, who had more influence with the Ephors than he had, and promised to destroy the Athenian power in the Hellespont. To oppose him, Iphicrates was sent out with a body of his peltasts; and he speedily drew the boastful Spartan into an ambuscade, where he and most of his men were slain.

Hitherto the friendly intercourse between Athens and Ægina had not been interrupted; but now the Spartan government gave permission to the Æginetans to privateer on the coast of Attica. The Athenians sent a force which fixed itself in Ægina, but they were obliged to withdraw in five months afterwards. As the Attic coast still suffered, Chabrias, who was sailing with a force of eight hundred peltasts and ten triremes to the aid of Evagoras of Cyprus, was directed to make on his way an attempt on Ægina. This able officer landed in the night, and placed his peltasts in ambush. The Spartan harmost led forth what troops he could collect, when he heard that the

Athenians were in the island; but he fell into the ambuscade, and he himself and a great number of his men were slain.

The Athenians for some time navigated the gulf in security; for Eteonîcus, who commanded the fleet at Ægina, not having money to pay his crews, they would not embark. But when Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaüs, came and took the command, his influence over the soldiers and sailors was such that they at once declared they would go whithersoever he would lead them. Taking advantage of their ardour, he filled twelve triremes in the evening, and crossed over to the Piræus in the night. At daybreak he boldly entered the harbour, where twenty triremes were lying. As he had anticipated, the captains and crews were all ashore: he seized several merchantmen, and towed them out; the alarm spread to the city: horse and foot came down, as if the Piræus had been taken; but the enemy was gone. Teleutias sent his prizes to Ægina, and then sailed along the coast to Sunion, capturing the fishing-boats and vessels coming from the islands with passengers. At Sunion he took some ships, laden with corn and other commodities, and returning to Ægina sold his booty, and gave a month's pay in advance to his men. He thus continued to injure the Athenian trade, and by this means kept his crews well-paid and contented.

The Lacedæmonians (Ol. 98, 1.)* had sent out Antalcidas as admiral to the coast of Asia. On his arrival at Ephesus, he sent his vice-admiral, Nicolochus, with the fleet, to assist the Abydenes, and he himself repaired to Tiribazus, who was returned from court. Matters were speedily arranged at Sardes, for the satrap was empowered to aid the Lacedæmonians, if the Athenians and their allies refused peace on the terms which had been proposed. When Antalcidas came down to the coast, he heard that Nicolochus was blocked up in Abydos by Iphicrates and Diotimus, the Athenian commanders. He immediately set out overland for that town, resumed the command, got out of the port by night, and being shortly after-

* In this year Rome was taken by the Gauls.

wards joined by twenty ships from Sicily, by others from Ionia, and by some from Æolis, where Ariobarzanes now governed in place of Pharnabazus, who was gone to court to espouse the King's daughter, he had a fleet of upwards of eighty ships, which gave him the full command of the seas.

Various causes making all parties desirous of peace, they sent (Ol. 98, 2.) their deputies to the satrap to learn the King's will. It was as follows: "Artaxerxes the King thinks it just that the cities in Asia should be his, and the islands Clazomenæ and Cyprus; but that the other Grecian cities, great and small, should be independent, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which should, as of old, belong to the Athenians. On those who do not accept this peace I will make war with those who do, by land and by sea, with ships and with money." These terms were brought home by the deputies to their respective cities, and they were sworn to by all. The Thebans wanted to swear in the name of the Bœotians; but Agesilaüs insisted on their acknowledging the independence of all the Bœotian towns, and on their demurring he prepared to march an army against them: they were then forced to submit. The Argives in like manner were obliged to withdraw their garrison from Corinth.

Such was the celebrated Peace of Antalcidas, which concluded the Corinthian war. By it all the advantages she had contended for were secured to Lacedæmôn. Argos and Corinth were again separated, Thebes was reduced to her own single power, and Athens deprived of her supremacy over the Asiatic Greeks; while Lacedæmôn, possessed of more territory and population than any of them, was in a condition to lord it over the whole. There appeared to be something ungenerous in abandoning their Asiatic brethren to the dominion of the Barbarians, but we hear not that they complained; and perhaps their condition was altogether as good, if not better, under the yoke of Persia, where they only paid the tribute which had been laid on by the moderate and equitable Darius I.*, as it had been or could be under that of Athens or Lace-

* See above, p. 86, *note*.

dæmôn. There was also thought to be a loss of national honour in thus virtually acknowledging the Persian monarch's supremacy over Greece; yet it might have saved Greece much bloodshed if a supremacy of that kind had been really established*.

CHAPTER XIII.†

Reduction of Mantinea.—Seizure of the Cadmeia.—Olynthian war.—Reduction of Phliús.—Recovery of the Cadmeia.—Second Bœotian War.—Battle of Leuctra.

Ol. 98, 4–102, 2. B.C. 385–371.

THE Lacedæmonians, assuming the office of executors of this peace, behaved with their usual haughtiness and regard to their own interests alone. They first proposed to punish such of their allies as had leant toward their enemies in the late war. As the Mantineans had sent corn to the Argives and otherwise incurred their displeasure, they issued orders to them to pull down their walls. On their refusal, king Agesipolis led (Ol. 98, 4.) an army into their territory, and ravaged it: he then ran a ditch and wall round the town; but finding that, being well-supplied with corn, it was likely to hold out long, he dammed up the stream which ran through it below the walls. By this means the town was flooded, and the sun-dried bricks, of which the houses and walls were built, being dissolved, and the walls ready to fall, a surrender was proposed. They were forced to throw down their walls, and to separate into the four open villages of which Mantinea had originally consisted. At first, says the historian, the people of substance were annoyed at having to pull down their houses and build new ones; but

* Isocrates (Panegyr. 73, Panathen. 254.) speaks of this peace as being highly disgraceful to Sparta.

† Xen. v. 2.–vi. 4. Diodor. v. 19–56. Plut. Agesilaüs and Pelopidas.

when they felt the advantages of residing near their estates, and found themselves delivered of the pestilent demagogues, and the government in their own hands, they became well-content. The Lacedæmonians next made the Phliasians re-admit their exiles, whose property was to be given back to them, and those who had purchased it be indemnified out of the public revenue.

An embassy came about this time to Sparta from Acanthus and Apollonia in Chalcidice, beseeching aid against the Olynthians: for the Olynthians, wealthy and powerful through commerce, had formed the plan of a federation among the cities of Chalcidice and its vicinity, using the same laws and having one government. Some cities had voluntarily, others forcibly, entered into it. Pella and some other places in Macedonia had been induced to join it; there were ambassadors from Thebes and Athens at Olynthus; the Olynthians would soon have the gold-mines of Pangæus; they had plenty of timber for ship-building they could hire abundance of light troops among the Thracians: it therefore, said the envoys, behoved the Lacedæmonians to check this federation in time.

These representations had such weight in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians and their allies, that it was voted at once to send an army of ten thousand men to Olynthus. Any state might give money instead of men, at the rate of three oboles Æginetan* a man for footmen, three times that sum for horsemen: if any did not give men or money, the Lacedæmonians were authorised to fine them a stater† a day for each man. As it would take some time, however, to collect so large a force, the envoys suggested that a Spartan officer should be sent off immediately with such troops as were at hand, for his appearance would confirm the wavering, and damp the ardour of the hasty. This advice seeming good, an officer named Eudamidas was despatched with about two thousand Neodamods, Scirites and Pericæcians. (Ol. 99, 3.) On his departure, he begged of the Ephors to send the rest of the Lacedæmonian

* Equal to five oboles Attic.

† *i. e.* four drachmas.

troops to him under his brother Phœbidas. When he arrived in Thrace he placed garrisons in some of the towns, and made Potidæa his head-quarters.

Phœbidas set out soon after, and coming to Thebes encamped without the town. The two Theban polemarchs Ismenias and Leontiadas being of opposite parties, the former, who was of that adverse to Sparta, took no notice of Phœbidas. Leontiadas, on the contrary, paid him great court, and when they became intimate he proposed to put the Cadmeia or Acropolis into his hands, and thus place Thebes at the mercy of Sparta. Phœbidas, ambitious of distinction, yielded a ready assent; and in the middle of a sultry day, when the senate was sitting in a portico in the market, as the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria in the Cadmeia, and the streets were mostly empty, Leontiadas mounted his horse, rode out, and bringing in Phœbidas and his troops, led them to the Cadmeia, and gave it up to them. He then went to the senate, and being supported by his faction, seized Ismenias and took him away to the Cadmeia. About four hundred of Ismenias' friends left the city, and retired to Athens. A new polemarch was chosen in his place from the opposite party. Leontiadas then proceeded to Sparta, where he found great real or pretended indignation against Phœbidas for having acted without orders. Agesilaüs said, that if what he had done was injurious to Sparta, he ought to be punished; but if advantageous, the old law authorised a commander to act of himself: it therefore only remained to be inquired whether what he had done was advantageous or otherwise. Leontiadas easily showed that it was for the interest of Sparta to hold the Cadmeia. For the sake of appearance, a fine was imposed on Phœbidas. Commissioners, three from Sparta and one from each of the allies, were sent to try Ismenias, for taking money from the King and being the cause of discord in Greece. He was of course found guilty and executed; the government was committed to Leontiadas and his party, and a Spartan harmost sent to command in the Acropolis.

After this piece of treachery, to which the history of the

Athenians affords no parallel, the Lacedæmonians proceeded in their task of reducing the Olynthian confederacy. The command was given to Teleutias, the allies sent their contingents, and he marched for Thrace. He sent to advise Amyntas of Macedonia to hire troops and form alliances, if he would recover his dominions; he also sent to Derdas, prince of Elimia, to remind him that the Olynthians, if not checked in time, would treat his kingdom like Macedonia. Having assembled his forces at Potidæa, he entered the Olynthian territory. An indecisive action was fought under the walls of Olynthus, in which a body of horse, commanded by Derdas in person, greatly distinguished itself. Teleutias then retired, and dismissed his Macedonian and Elimian allies for the winter.

In the spring (Ol. 99, 4.) Teleutias again advanced to Olynthus. A smart skirmish between his peltasts and the Olynthian horse brought on a general engagement, in which Teleutias himself was slain and his army defeated with considerable loss. When the news of this reverse reached Lacedæmôn, king Agesipolis was ordered to go and take the command. He was attended, as Agesilaüs had been in Asia, by thirty Spartans to act as his council; many Pericæcians and others cheerfully went with him, and volunteers came from the allied states. Thessalian horsemen, ambitious of his acquaintance, joined him on his march, and Amyntas and Derdas showed more zeal than ever.

Without loss of time he advanced (Ol. 100, 1.) to Olynthus, and offered battle, which was refused. He then destroyed the standing corn, and besieged and took the town of Torone. But, owing to the extreme heat of the weather, he was seized with a violent fever: the shady bowers and cool and limpid waters which he had a short time before seen at the temple of Bacchus at Aphytes, came strong on his imagination, and he requested to be carried thither. His desire was complied with, and he died amidst those shades on the seventh day of his illness. His body was, according to usage, put in honey, and conveyed to Sparta for interment with those of his fathers.

In his room, Polybiadas came out as harmost. He invested Olynthus so closely, by land and by sea, that the people were obliged to crave permission to send deputies to Sparta to sue for peace. Peace was granted, on condition of their becoming the allies, offensive and defensive, of the Lacedæmonians ; and thus the Olynthian confederation, which had promised so well, was broken up. (Ol. 100, 2.)

Agésilæus had meantime been besieging Phliûs ; for the exiles, finding or pretending that they could not obtain justice against the persons who held their property, had gone to Lacedæmôn to complain. The party at home, knowing that the Spartans were not likely to let both of their kings be out of the country at the same time, and therefore fearing no hostility, passed a decree fining all who went unsent to Lacedæmôn. They were however mistaken, for the Ephors directed Agésilæus to lead an army against Phliûs. When he was on the frontiers, they sent, tendering money, and offering to do anything he desired, if he would not advance. He required them to deliver up their Acropolis, and on their refusal advanced and circumvallated the town. As he had exact information of the quantity of corn in it, he had calculated on its reduction by famine against a certain time ; but nearly double the period was past, and there were no symptoms of surrender ; for a decree had been made to consume daily but half the usual quantity of food ; and a man named Delphiôn, of a daring and energetic character, and supported by a band of three hundred chosen men, had taken the chief command. He would not permit any one even to speak of peace ; he forced all to mount guard in turn, and he constantly made sorties against the besiegers. At length it was reported to Delphiôn that no more food remained ; he then gave permission to treat, and time for deputies to repair to Sparta was requested. Though indignant at the slight thus put on him, Agésilæus granted it ; but he directed his friends at home to have all things left to him. He watched the town more closely than ever, that none might escape ; but in spite of his vigilance the brave Delphiôn and a faithful slave contrived to get off in the night.

A court of one hundred Phliasians, fifty of each party, was appointed to decide who should be put to death and who not, and then to form a constitution. Meantime a garrison, to be fed and paid by the Phliasians, was left in the town. The siege had lasted a year and eight months.

The Lacedæmonian power was now at its height, and apparently so secure that nothing could shake it, when a revolution took place, which Xenophôn, with all his partiality, can only explain by an interference of the gods to punish perfidy and injustice. Seven men, he declares, delivered Thebes from the Lacedæmonians! The following is his account of the revolution.

Phyllidas, the secretary to Archias, one of the Theban polemarchs, having occasion to go to Athens, met there Mellôn, one of the exiles, with whom he was acquainted. He did not conceal his dissatisfaction at the state of things at home. The mode of a revolution was arranged between them; and some time after, Mellôn, taking with him six of the best-adapted of the exiles, armed only with daggers, entered the Theban territory by night. They spent the day in a by-place, and in the evening went in at the gates along with those who were returning from their daily labours in the fields. That night and the following day they stayed at the house of a man named Charôn.

The two polemarchs Archias and Philippus were men of pleasure. Phyllidas took this occasion of giving them an entertainment previous to their going out of office, and as he had long promised to procure them the society of some of the finest women in Thebes, he assured them that he would now perform his promise. When they had supped and drunk plentifully, they urged him to keep his engagement. He went out and brought Mellôn and his comrades dressed as ladies, and their maids, into an inner room. He then told Archias that the ladies would not come in if any of the attendants remained. These were ordered away, and Phyllidas gave them wine to take with them. He then led in the supposed ladies, one of whom sat down beside each. At the appointed signal (that

of removing their veils) they drew their daggers and slew the two polemarchs.

Taking then three of them with him, Phyllidas proceeded to the house of Leontiadas, who, though not in office, was dangerous from his energy and ability; he knocked at the door, and on saying that he was sent by the polemarchs, was admitted to the room where he was sitting after supper, his wife spinning at his side. They slew him, and with threats of death imposed silence on his wife; then went away, ordering the door to be shut, and vowing to return and put to death every one in the house if it should be opened. Phyllidas next proceeded with two of them to the prison, and called to the keeper that he had brought a prisoner. He opened the door: they slew him, and released the prisoners; and giving them arms out of the portico, stationed them at the Ampheion*. Proclamation was then made for the citizens, both horsemen and hoplites, to come forth, as the tyrants were dead. None however ventured out during the night, but with day all appeared in arms. Some of the horsemen were then sent to the frontiers of Attica to tell of their success to their friends there. The harmost in the Cadmeia, when he heard the proclamation in the night, sent off to Plataea† and Thespiæ for aid. The Plataeans, who were coming, were fallen on by the Theban horse, and twenty of them slain; and the Athenians being now arrived, the Cadmeia was invested. Seeing their vigour and determination, and having but few men with them, the harmost offered to surrender if the garrison were allowed to retire with their arms. These terms were accepted and sworn to; but such of the Thebans as were among them were dragged out and slain; some of them, however, were secreted, and saved by the Athenians. The Thebans, to their disgrace, slew even the children of those whom they had thus put to death‡.

* The temple of Amphion, one of the mythic founders of Thebes.

† The Plataeans had been restored after the peace of Antalcidas.

‡ The narrative in the text is that of Xenophon, who was a contemporary. His partiality for the Spartans, however, detracts from the value of his testimony, and the authors followed by Plutarch related the matter

Such was the Theban revolution, which, though not equal in moral purity to that of Athens, with which it was compared, was doubtless a glorious event. It is not, however, necessary to call, with Xenophôn, the gods to aid in explaining it. It is evident from the preceding narrative that the oligarchs had but few adherents; when therefore they were slain, there only remained the foreign garrison in the Cadmeia; and fortunately for Thebes it was composed of the allies, not of the Lacedæmonians, and the harmost was not a man of vigour and determination. If he had held out for a few days, things might have taken a different turn.

The harmost was put to death on his return to Lacedæmôn; and, though it was now the depth of winter, an army was sent against the Thebans. As Agesilaüs, pleading his advanced age, declined the command, it was given to the young king Cleombrotus, the brother of Agesipolis of the other house. (Ol. 100, 3.) Cleombrotus, learning at the isthmus that the easier road by Eleutheræ was guarded by the Athenian general Chabrias, with a body of peltasts, took that of Plataea. His peltasts met on the heights the Thebans who had been freed from prison by Phyllidas, about one hundred and fifty in number, and killed them all but a few. From Plataea he went to Thespiæ. Having encamped for sixteen days at a place called Cynos-cephalæ (*Dog's-heads*), in the Theban territory, he returned to Thespiæ; and leaving there Sphodrias as harmost, with a third of his troops, and all the money he

somewhat differently. According to them, Pelopidas, and not Mellôn, was the chief of the exiles, who were twelve in number, and when they were joined by their confederates in the town the whole number amounted to forty-eight. Archias, it is added, received while at supper a letter from a friend at Athens giving a full account of the plot; the bearer urged him to read it, saying it was on business of great importance, but he replied, 'Business then tomorrow' (which became a kind of proverb), and placed the letter under his pillow. Plutarch further says, that the garrison of the Cadmeia consisted of 1500 men under three harmosts, and that two of them were put to death and the third heavily fined by the Spartan government. He is silent as to the murders committed by the Thebans in Xenophôn's narrative. See Plut. Pelopidas, and De Genio Socratis.

had with him, and directing him to hire mercenaries, he led his army home.

The Athenians, seeing every prospect of a new war, of which Bœotia, not Corinth, would be the seat, grew terrified; and in their fears were led, probably by the friends of oligarchy, to condemn to death the two generals who had aided the Theban revolution. One was actually executed; sentence of exile was passed on the other, who had escaped.

But the Thebans were resolved that, if possible, the Athenians should share in the war. They bribed (at least so it was suspected) Sphodrias to make a sudden march, and try to seize the Piræus, which had as yet no gates: perhaps it was only the facility of the design that was suggested to him; at all events he set out from Thespiæ early one day, expecting to reach the Piræus before daylight next morning. Day, however, breaking on him at Thriæ, near Eleusis, he turned back, but instead of trying to conceal his intentions, robbed the houses and drove off the cattle. When the news reached Athens, all took arms to defend the city. Three ambassadors from Lacedæmôn, who happened to be present, were taken into custody; but they made it so clear that they could have known nothing of the design of Sphodrias, who, they averred, would be punished for it by the government, that they were at once set at liberty. Sphodrias was certainly capitally prosecuted; but, strange to say, the interest of Agesilaüs, influenced by his son, the friend of the son of Sphodrias, was exerted in his favour, and he was acquitted. This impolitic weakness and injustice had its reward: the Bœotian party convinced the Athenian people that the design on the Piræus was of a piece with the seizure of the Cadmeia; and ships were built, gates put up at the Piræus, and heart and hand it was resolved to stand by the Thebans.

As Agesilaüs had been in a great measure the cause of involving his country in a war with Bœotia and Athens, he could not, without shame, refuse it the benefit of his military experience and talents. He accepted, therefore, the command of the army destined for Bœotia; and knowing that unless he oc-

cupied Cithærôn he should find it difficult to enter it, he looked about for troops fit for that purpose. Just at this time the Orchomenians and Cleitorians in Arcadia were engaged in one of those petty wars which were evermore going on among the numerous independent states of Greece, and the latter had taken a body of mercenaries into their pay. He arranged with the Cleitorians to let him have the use of these troops; and having sent orders to the Orchomenians to suspend hostilities, he despatched them to occupy Cithærôn. He thus reached Thespiæ in safety: but he found the plain of Thebes and the most valuable parts of the country secured by a circular ditch and rampart, which he could not penetrate; and as he led away his troops the Theban horse used to sally out and fall on them. Observing that the enemy did not usually appear till after breakfast-time, Agesilaüs led his troops out one morning at daybreak and penetrated an unguarded part of the rampart. The plain was now at his mercy, and he ravaged it up to the walls of the city. He then returned to Thespiæ; and having fortified it, and left Phœbidas as harmost, he led back his army to the Peloponnese.

Phœbidas harassed the Thebans so much by constantly sending out plundering parties, that they at length marched all their forces to Thespiæ. But he hung on them with his peltasts wherever they went, so that they could not venture to quit their phalanx. Wearied and vexed, they were returning in such haste that their mule-drivers threw the corn they had taken off their beasts that it might not impede them. Phœbidas, confident of giving them a defeat, pressed on with his peltasts, directing the Thespian hoplites to follow. The Theban horse happening to come to a wooded and apparently impassable glen, made a halt and turned round; the few peltasts who were most in advance fled; the Theban horse charged; Phœbidas himself and some others were slain; all the peltasts then fled; the Thespian hoplites caught the panic and fled also, and never stopped till they were within their own walls. The Thebans could now go unopposed whithersoever they pleased, the people in all the towns were in their favour, and

the governing parties (*δυναστεῖαι*) in them stood in the utmost need of aid. A Spartan polemarch and a mora came therefore by sea to garrison Thespiæ.

In the spring (Ol. 100, 4.) Agesilaüs prepared to invade Bæotia again. He sent directions to the polemarch at Thespiæ to occupy Cithærôn; and having thus safely reached Platæa, he made as if he were going direct to Thespiæ, ordering a market to be ready, and the different embassies to meet him there. The Thebans moved all their forces in that direction; but Agesilaüs, setting out at daybreak on the road to Erythræ, and making a two days' march in one, got within their works at that side, and ravaged all the country east of Thebes to the borders of Tanagra. The Thebans hastened to defend their lands: some indecisive skirmishing of the horse and light troops took place; but Agesilaüs made his way good to Thespiæ, and having set matters in order in that town, he returned with his troops to the Peloponnese.

The following spring (Ol. 101, 1.) Agesilaüs having burst a blood-vessel in his leg, the command of the army was entrusted to Cleombrotus; but, unlike his able colleague, he never thought of occupying Cithærôn till he was at its foot. He then sent forward his peltasts; but it was too late: the Thebans and Athenians, who were already there, chased them down. Cleombrotus, thinking a passage now out of the question, retired, and dismissed his army.

In the congress of the allies which met at Lacedæmôn, great complaint was made of the manner in which their means were squandered away. It was asserted that they might get a fleet to sea far superior to that of the Athenians, with which they could blockade Athens and transport troops to any point of Bæotia. Accordingly sixty triremes were sent out under Pollis, which were stationed at Ægina, Ceos, and Andros. The Athenian corn-ships stopped at Geræstos in Eubœa, fearing to advance; and the Athenians, seeing that they must fight or want food, got on board their ships, and, led by Chabrias, gave Pollis a defeat off Naxos, and brought their corn home. The

Thebans, as the Lacedæmonians were preparing to invade their country again, sent to pray that the Athenians would send a fleet round the Peloponnese to create a diversion; and as they were now highly incensed with the Lacedæmonians, they sent out a fleet of sixty ships under Timotheüs, the son of Conôn. Timotheüs directed his course to Corcyra, which he brought over to the Athenian interest; and the historian remarks, as a thing worthy of note, that none were made slaves, none exiled, and no change made in the laws on this occasion. He soon after defeated a Peloponnesian fleet which was sent out against him. The Thebans meantime took advantage of the diversion to bring all the neighbouring Bæotian towns to their former state of subjection; and having accomplished this, they turned their arms against their old enemies the Phocians. Unable to resist single-handed, the Phocians sent to Lacedæmôn for aid, and Cleombrotus crossed the gulf with four moræ and a part of the allies to protect them; the Thebans retired when they saw this accession of force. (Ol. 101, 2.)

The Athenians, seeing that all the advantages of the war were falling to the Thebans, who did not even contribute to the expenses of the navy, while all the losses were theirs, grew weary of it, and sending an embassy to Sparta, concluded a separate peace. (Ol. 101, 3.) Two of the ambassadors then sailed off to recall Timotheüs, who obeyed the summons: but as he was passing Zacynthus, he landed the exiles of that island. The party in power sent off a complaint to Lacedæmôn; and the government there, jealous perhaps of any interference with their allies, declared that the Athenians had violated the peace. The allies accordingly were called on for their contingents, and a fleet of sixty ships under Mnasippus sailed to attack Corcyra. This island, after so many years' tranquillity, was now in a most flourishing condition; it was cultivated like a garden, and was covered with large and handsome buildings of every kind. Mnasippus landed his troops and committed the usual ravages of war; he then encamped on an eminence about five stadia from the town, on the other side of which he

fixed his naval camp, and, when the weather permitted, he placed a part of his fleet before the port, thus shutting in the city on all sides.

The Coreyræans being reduced to great straits sent to Athens, representing how injurious it would be to the Athenian interest if an island so wealthy and so advantageously situated should fall under the power of their enemies. The people saw the force of these arguments, and it was resolved to aid them. An officer named Stesicles was sent off at once with six hundred peltasts overland, and he got into the town by night; a fleet of sixty triremes was decreed, and the command given to Timotheüs; but this general, not deeming such crews as he could get at Athens good enough, went round the island selecting men. The people losing patience, transferred the command to Iphicrates; and this active general having received permission to press any vessels on the Attic coast, exerted himself so effectually, that he was soon able to put to sea with a fleet of seventy ships. (Ol. 101, 4.) Meantime the Coreyræans were suffering from famine; and such numbers of slaves deserted to the enemy in consequence of it, that Mnasippus had proclamation made that he would sell all deserters. This not checking the practice, he flogged them and sent them back: the Coreyræans would not re-admit them, and numbers perished with hunger beneath the walls*. Mnasippus was now so confident of reducing the town, that he dismissed a part of his mercenaries, and kept back two months' pay from those whom he retained, in hopes of being enabled to divert it to his

* It is evident from Xenophôn's narrative that the deserters were none but slaves. Mitsford, although Mnasippus was not the general of a democracy, justly reprehends the barbarous action. He might also have remembered that Marshal Rosen, the general of the monarch Louis XIV., commanding for another monarch, James II., at the siege of Derry, in Ireland, collected the Protestants from the adjoining counties and drove them under the walls of Derry to starve. Is the act of Mnasippus to be compared with this? Has Grecian history, by the way, anything to compete with the wasting of the Palatinate by the troops of that *Grand Monarque*? or does it contain a more barbarous and treacherous massacre than that of Glerco? We are surely no apologists for cruelty, but we would do justice.

own use. The soldiers, therefore, grew negligent and rambled over the country. The Corcyræans, seeing from their towers all that took place, made a sally, and killed some, and made others prisoners. Mnasippus armed himself and his hoplites, and ordered their officers to lead on the mercenaries. Some of them said it would not be easy to get the men to fight, as they did not receive their pay. Mnasippus, with true Spartan insolence, struck one with his stick, another with the butt of his spear. They led out their men, but, as might be expected, with little zeal. The Corcyræans were at first driven back to their gates; but there some of them turned, and mounting the tombs, cast darts and stones; some went in, and coming out at other gates, fell on the enemy's rear; while others, forming in phalanx, stood their ground. The scale of battle was gradually turned; Mnasippus found those about him diminishing every minute. The Corcyræans at length made a charge on him; he fell, and his men all fled. The camp would have been plundered, but that the victors took the crowd of slaves, servants and market-people for a reserve. They raised their trophy, and restored the dead. Hypermenes, the next in command to Mnasippus, learning that Iphicrates was hourly expected, brought round the fleet, and was sending it away with the slaves and plunder, intending to remain with his soldiers; but they would not be left behind, and the whole got on board and went to Leucas. The Corcyræans found in the deserted camp abundance of corn and wine, with numerous slaves and a good many sick soldiers.

Iphicrates meantime was coasting the Peloponnese. As his crews were not select, he resolved to exercise them continually on the voyage. He therefore left the large sails behind, and rarely putting up the others, even when there was a good breeze, made his men row the whole way. Frequently when they came to the place where they were to dine or sup, he took the fleet a little way out to sea, and then made them face the shore, and, at a signal, run for it: those that came in first had first choice of water and everything else that was to be had, and leisure to use them; while the laggards had often not half

done their meal when the signal was made to get aboard. In fine weather he frequently put to sea again after supper: if there was a breeze, the sails were hoisted, and the men took their rest; if not, they rowed and rested by turns. He sometimes led in line, sometimes in phalanx. In fine, by the time he got into the enemy's sea, his ships and crews were well-prepared for action. At the time of Mnasippus' death he was off the coast of Laconia. His last halt in the Peloponnese was in Elis, near the Alphæus: he thence crossed to Cephallenia, which he reduced; and having taken a fleet of ten triremes coming from Dionysius of Syracuse to aid the enemy, he entered the port of Corcyra in triumph. Leaving his seamen there to support themselves by working for the inhabitants who had lost their slaves, he passed over to Acarnania with his soldiers to act for the Athenian interest; then taking with him the Corcyræan ships, which raised his fleet to ninety triremes, he sailed to Cephallenia, where he levied contributions and prepared to act against the Lacedæmonians.

Insolence in prosperity was a vice of the Greeks in general; and the Thebans, rude and brutal by nature, came short of none in the display of it. The Thespians and the Platæans were the only peoples of Bœotia who did not acknowledge their hegemony; and now that they had the power, they resolved to make them feel their vengeance. They took and razed their towns, and expelled the inhabitants, who came as suppliants to Athens. The Athenians, weary of their Theban connexion, resolved to make peace if possible; and they sent to invite the Thebans to join in an embassy for that purpose to Sparta. The Theban leaders did not think it prudent to refuse: their embassy was headed by Epaminondas, one of their most distinguished men; the principal persons on the part of the Athenians were Callias, the torch-bearer of the Mysteries, and Calistratus and Autocles, the ablest orators of the time. (Ol. 102, 2.)

The Athenians showed clearly the advantages of peace; Epaminondas affected the minds of the allies by the picture he drew of the tyranny and oppression of the Lacedæmonians;

envoys from the Great King also, it is said, appeared, recommending peace. The Lacedæmonians agreed to withdraw their harmosts, and leave all states independent; the armies on all sides were to be disbanded; and the peace was sworn to by all, the Lacedæmonians swearing for themselves and their allies. Possibly it was this that suggested to the minds of the Theban deputies that Thebes had as good a right to a similar supremacy in Bœotia, and next day they required to have Bœotians substituted for Thebans in the treaty. Agesilaüs replied, that that could not be, but that if they chose their name might be erased. They declined peace on these terms, and went home in very low spirits. The Lacedæmonians faithfully withdrew their harmosts, and the Athenians recalled Iphicrates.

King Cleombrotus, who was at this time in Phocis, sent to inquire of the Ephors how he should act. In an evil hour they directed him not to disband his army, but to lead it against the Thebans if they did not leave the towns independent. As they showed no inclination to do so, and still kept their army on foot, Cleombrotus put his troops in motion. The Thebans, expecting him to enter Bœotia at the usual passage, guarded a narrow pass; but he took the mountain-road by Thisbæ, came to the port of Creusis, where he captured twelve Theban triremes, and then turning back encamped at Leuctra, in the territory of Thespiæ. The Thebans came and took their station on an opposite eminence.

The Lacedæmonian army contained ten thousand hoplites and one thousand horse; the Theban, it is said, counted only six thousand soldiers, exclusive perhaps of the cavalry. It was commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, at the head of whom was Epaminondas. This man, one of the most distinguished that Greece, fertile as she was of great names, has produced, had spent the early part of his life in the study of philosophy; he was extremely poor, but he was joined in strict friendship with Pelopidas, a young man of wealth, and devoted to war, the chase and the palæstra. At the time of the seizure of the Cadmeia, Pelopidas was among the exiles, while Epaminondas re-

mained undisturbed at Thebes; the former, we are told, was active in the revolution, the latter hailed its success. But henceforth both became equally strenuous in the service of their country. Pelopidas usually commanded the Sacred Band*, the flower of the troops of Thebes; the genius of Epaminondas, more comprehensive, fitted him not only to plan campaigns and conduct armies, but to devise extensive schemes of policy†.

Thebes at this time abounded in able men and true patriots; beside Mellôn, Charôn, and their friends, we may notice Pammenes the friend of Epaminondas, and Gorgidas the organiser of the Sacred Band.

Cleombrotus, urged by his friends and taunted by his enemies in his army, prepared to give battle without delay. The Theban leaders, though their troops were inferior in number, resolved also to fight; for they knew that if they did not the subject towns would revolt, and the city itself be perhaps besieged; and that if the people were to suffer privations, they might change their politics, and they themselves again become exiles, than which they deemed it better far to die in battle. These motives are assigned by the historian, others with which we are unacquainted doubtless operated also. Superstition lent its powerful aid to cheer the troops. A prophecy was quoted, which said, that the Lacedæmonians would be defeated at the tomb of the maidens who slew themselves when they had been violated by Lacedæmonian ambassadors. This tomb was on the spot, and the Thebans adorned it before the battle. News also came from Thebes that the doors of all the temples had opened of themselves, which the priestesses said portended victory; the sacred arms, it was added, had disappeared from the Heracleion, as if Hercules himself was gone forth to battle. In all this we may easily discern the art of the able leaders.

According to their advocate Xenophôn everything was ad-

* A body of three hundred chosen youths, united in the bonds of mutual affection. At home they were the guard of the Cadmeia, where they were maintained at the public charge; in battle they stood first in the phalanx. Plut. Pelopidas, 18.

† Plut. Pelopidas, 3, 4.

verse to the Lacedæmonians. It was after dinner that the council was held in which it was finally resolved to fight, and the king and his officers were heated with wine; when the market-people, baggage-drivers, and those who were not inclined to fight were getting away from the Bœotian camp before the battle, a party of the enemy's horse and light troops drove them back into it, and thus apparently augmented the Theban forces: the Lacedæmonians also, most injudiciously, sent their cavalry down into the plain before their phalanx; for the Theban horse was in excellent order and discipline, whereas theirs was the worst part of their army: finally, their phalanx was drawn up only twelve men deep, while that of the Thebans was fifty men deep: for they judged that if they could defeat the right wing, commanded by the king, the rest would offer no difficulty.

The phalanx of the Lacedæmonians had hardly begun to move, when the horse fell back on it in all the confusion of defeat. The Theban infantry followed close on them. Cleombrotus received a mortal wound; but the Thebans were repelled, and the king removed. The attack was however renewed; Deinôn, the polemarch, and Sphodrias and his son were slain, and that wing driven back. When the left wing, which was composed of the allies, saw the right thus defeated, it also fell back, and having lost a good many men retired over a ditch which was before the camp. The loss on the right had been very considerable; one thousand of the Lacedæmonians had fallen, and of the seven hundred Spartans who were among them, only three hundred remained alive. Nothing could equal their amazement at seeing themselves defeated, a thing which had never before happened, and by an inferior force! Some were for returning to the field, not suffering the Thebans to raise their trophy, and recovering their dead by force of arms; but the polemarchs, considering the loss they had sustained, and seeing the allies dejected, or even rejoiced at the event of the battle, deemed it best to hold a council. It was there resolved to send a herald to demand the bodies of the slain, and thus acknowledge a defeat. The Thebans gave the bodies and raised their trophy.

Such was the battle of Leuctra, the most important ever fought by Greeks against Greeks; less remarkable for the loss of life in it than for its moral effect. It dissolved the spell which so long had bound all Greece: it proved that the Spartan troops were not invincible, as had been fondly imagined: it in effect broke the Lacedæmonian power for ever, and henceforth Lacedæmôn performs but a secondary part in the affairs of Greece*.

CHAPTER XIV.†

Spartan equanimity.—Jason of Pheræ.—Affairs of Arcadia.—Invasion of Laconia.—Affairs of the Peloponnese.—Battle of Mantinea.

OL. 102, 2-104, 3. B.C. 371-362.

THE news of this great defeat reached Sparta on the last day of the festival called the Naked Games, while the chorus of men was performing. The Ephors did not stop the games: they communicated the names of the slain to their relatives, and directed the women to bear the calamity in silence. Next day the relatives of the slain appeared in public joyful and elate, while those of the survivors kept retired, or moved about with downcast looks. It was resolved to send an army to bring off the troops at Leuctra: the elder men of the four moræ which were there, and the two moræ which were remaining at home‡, were despatched under Archidamus the son of Agesilaüs; troops came from Tegea and Mantinea, where the aristocratic interest was now strong; the Corinthians, Phliasians, Sicyonians and Achæans aided cheerfully; other towns also sent troops. A fleet was prepared by the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians to transport the army over if needful.

* Polybius, iv. 81, 12.

† Xen. vi. 4.-vii. Diodor. xv. 62-88. Plut. Agesilaüs and Pelopidas.

‡ See above, p. 142.

The Thebans, on their side, sent off instantly to the Athenians and to Jasôn of Pheræ (the Tagos of Thessaly), to inform them of this great victory, and calling on them to aid now and put down the Lacedæmonians for ever. To the Athenians the news was anything but agreeable, and they gave no answer respecting the proposed alliance. Jasôn, with a great show of zeal, got a fleet to sea; and putting himself at the head of his mercenaries and some cavalry, entered Phocis, with which he was at war, passed all through it with such rapidity as gave no time for measures to impede him, and came and joined the Theban army. A joint attack on the Lacedæmonians was proposed to him; but it did not suit his ulterior views to let the Thebans become too powerful, and he preferred mediating a truce. The Lacedæmonians, taking advantage of the truce, decamped in the night, and after a toilsome march joined Archidamus in the Megaric territory. The whole army returned to Corinth, and there broke up and went home.

Jasôn of Pheræ, who now first appears on the political stage, was one of the most extraordinary men whom Greece had seen, and he had actually formed those plans of conquest and extensive Grecian dominion which we shall afterwards see realised by others. In a conversation with Polydamas, the leading man at Pharsalus, when proposing to him to join in his projects, he thus disclosed his views. By negotiation or force he had brought some, and was resolved to bring the rest, of the Thessalian towns under his supremacy. He should then, he counted, be at the head of six thousand horse and upwards of ten thousand hoplites, beside a body of six thousand mercenaries in the highest state of energy and discipline: a part of the surrounding peoples, such as the Maracans and Dolopians, and Alcetas, prince of the Molossians, obeyed him at present, and it would be easy to bring Macedonia and the others to the same condition, from all of which an immense number of light troops might be obtained. The Bœotians were his allies, and the Athenians would willingly be so: but he looked forward to depriving them of the empire of the sea;

for having Macedonia, whence they drew their timber and such a number of Penests to furnish rowers, and so fertile a country to supply corn, and so much tribute from the peoples of the mainland, it would be easy for him to equip fleets superior to theirs. Finally, the retreat of the Cyreans and the victories of Agesilaüs had shown the real weakness of the Persian empire, and its conquest would probably be a matter of no great difficulty. Polydamas, having vainly applied for aid at Lacedæmôn, had agreed to the proposals of Jasôn, who was now Tagos of Thessaly. He apportioned the number of horse and foot that each town should supply, and he found that he had eight thousand horse, twenty thousand hoplites, and pel-tasts 'enough to face the world in arms*.' He put the tribute of the Pericæcians on the equitable footing on which it had been formerly placed by Scopas†.

But it was not for Thessaly to acquire the supremacy of Greece and to conquer Persia. Jasôn, with all his great talents, was not an hereditary monarch, and he had a proud and jealous nobility to contend with, who regarded him but as their equal; the best part of his troops were mercenaries, and of course little to be depended on; and Greece still possessed great men. His project therefore failed.

After his return to Thessaly (Ol. 102, 3.), Jasôn prepared to offer a great sacrifice at the approaching Pythian games (some suspected that he had thoughts of seizing the treasures at Delphi): he therefore directed that each town should furnish him with oxen, sheep, goats and swine for the purpose; and though the imposition was very light, it produced one thousand oxen and ten thousand of each of the other animals. But as he was reviewing his Pheræan cavalry, previous to setting out, he was fallen on and slain by seven young men. Two of the assassins were cut down on the spot; the others mounted the horses which stood ready, and escaped, and they were re-

* 'Ικανὸν πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀντιταχθῆναι.—Xen.

† Xen. vi. 1. There were two of the Scopads to whom this assessment might be ascribed; the one in the time of Xerxes, the other the friend of the younger Cyrus. It is probably the former that is meant.

ceived with great honour in most Grecian towns,—a proof of the terror with which Jasón was regarded, or perhaps simply of a traditionary hatred of tyrants. He was succeeded by his brothers Polydôrus and Polyphrôn, the latter of whom, it is said, murdered the former, and, after a tyrannic reign of one year, was himself assassinated by Alexander the son of Polydorus*.

A few months after the battle of Leuctra, the Arcadians, who had begun to feel the necessity of a closer political union, influenced by Lycomêdes, a man of rank and opulence in Mantinea, and by other men of patriotic views, founded a common town, named Megalopolis (ἡ Μεγάλη Πόλις), near the confines of Laconia, and the inhabitants of several towns and villages were induced or forced to remove to it. The general council of the Arcadians now formed was named the Myrii (οἱ Μύριοι), or Ten Thousand, probably from the number of fighting-men the league contained. A body of five thousand men, named the Eparits, were kept in pay by the confederacy to act against strangers or any state of the confederacy itself that should prove refractory. The Arcadian people (τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν) now for the first time appears as a political body in the affairs of Greece.

The Mantineans had also set about rebuilding and walling in their town. Agesilaüs came and remonstrated against it, but he did no more. In the neighbouring town of Tegea a sedition arose between the democratic and the oligarchic parties, and the former being defeated sent to Mantinea for aid; the gates were opened to the Mantineans; the principal leaders of the opposite party were taken from the temple, where they had sought refuge, tied on a waggon, brought back, and tried and executed, the Mantineans sitting jointly as judges. About eight hundred fled to Lacedæmôn; and, as the Mantineans had now clearly violated the terms of the peace, Agesilaüs was directed (Ol. 102, 3.) to lead an army against them. The Mantineans were joined by all the Arcadians except the Orchomenians, who were at enmity with them; they were also

* Xen. vi. 4, 29-37.

aided by the Argives and the Eleians, and it was expected that the Thebans would send an army into the Peloponnese.

The other Arcadians assembled their forces at Asea, while the Mantineans advanced to attack Orchomenus; but a body of mercenaries had arrived there from Corinth, and they were repelled and driven home. Agesilaüs had meantime entered and ravaged the lands of Mantinea, and the Arcadians having moved to the borders of Tegea and Mantinea, were consequently now in his rear. Some were for attacking him at once, but the majority preferred waiting till they were joined by the Mantineans. Agesilaüs resolved not to impede the junction, deeming it best to have all his enemies in fair field before him. Next morning at daybreak he was joined by the mercenaries from Orchomenus, and by the Phliasian horse. The allies did not then deem it advisable to attack him, and after remaining there for four days, he led his army home, it being now mid-winter.

The Thebans arrived soon after, and finding no enemy in the country, were preparing to go home again; but the Arcadians, Eleians and Argives, seeing the number and condition of the Theban army, were urgent with them to join in an invasion of Laconia. This army was composed of Bœotians, elate with the victory at Leuctra, of Phocians, Eubœans, both Locrians, Acarnanians, Heracleots and Melians, with horse and peltasts from Thessaly, and was led by Epaminondas. The Theban leader urged that the passes were well-guarded, and that the Lacedæmonians, who could soon collect their forces, would fight with desperation on their own soil, and he hesitated to assent. But when some persons came from Caryæ in Laconia and told how destitute of defence the country was, and offered to be their guides, and some of the Pericæcians sent offering to join them, and telling how they had already refused to take arms at the call of the Spartans, he no longer hesitated.

Laconia was now (Ol. 102, 4.)* invaded for the first time

* It was in this year that the Licinian agrarian law was passed at Rome.

since the Dorian conquest*. The allies entered it in four divisions, the Thebans by the way of Caryæ, the Arcadians through the Scirîtis, the Argives through the Thyriâtis, the Eleians by the vale of the Eurotas, and all rendezvoused at Sellasia, which town they plundered and burned; and next day, moving down the left bank of the Eurotas, came opposite Sparta, wasting and burning the country as they advanced. The Spartans were in arms at the temple of Athena-Alea, and the invaders did not venture to cross the river. The women, who had never seen an enemy, could not endure the sight of the smoke rising from the burnt houses; but the men, aware of the paucity of their numbers, doubted if they could defend their unwallèd city. Liberty was offered to such of the Helots as would take arms in defence of the country. As no less than six thousand offered themselves, their numbers were a new cause of alarm, till auxiliary troops arrived from Phliûs, Corinth, Epidaurus, Pellene and other towns; which, with the mercenaries from Orchomenus, formed a sufficient force to keep them in check.

The invaders crossed the Eurotas opposite Amyclæ, and marched up its right bank toward Sparta. The Thebans every night secured their camp by placing hewn trees before it; the Arcadians kept no order, but ran everywhere in quest of plunder. On the third or fourth day the cavalry appeared on the horse-course close to Sparta. The few Lacedæmonian horse advanced against them, and three hundred young men, who had been placed in ambush in the temple of the Tyndarids, rushing out at the same time, the enemy's horse stood not to receive them; many of the foot also fled when they saw the horse give way. It being deemed too hazardous to risk an attack on the city, the army retraced its steps, and following the course of the river down to the sea-coast, took and burned Helos and such towns as were open. Three days were spent in attacking Gythion, where the naval arsenal was, and some of the Periœcians came and aided in the attack.

* Plutarch (Pelop. 24.) gives the number of the invading army at 70,000 men. Diodorus (xv. 62.) says it was upwards of 50,000.

To obtain the aid of Athens was now of vital importance to the Spartans: accordingly deputies from them and their allies appeared in that city. The senate convoked the assembly without delay. The Lacedæmonians spoke, reminding the Athenians how in time of need their two states had always stood by each other, and that now, if united, they might humble Thebes. There was a murmur in the assembly of "They now speak us fair, but when they had the power they kept us down!" What weighed most in their favour was, that when the Thebans wanted to destroy Athens *they* had prevented it; but it still was a matter of doubt whether they or the Mantineans had been the aggressors, and therefore how far the Athenians could justly interfere. The Corinthian Cleiteles said, that however that might be, there was no doubt of Corinth's having observed the peace, and yet the Thebans, in their passage through its territory, had robbed and plundered, cut the trees, and burnt the houses. This decided the question; aid was voted, and Iphicrates appointed to command. Without a moment's delay the Athenians marched to Corinth, and thence to Arcadia. The Thebans, having spent three months in Laconia, were now in retreat; for their Argive, Eleian and Arcadian allies were gradually leaving them and going home to secure their plunder, and provisions were becoming every day more scarce: moreover, as it was winter, they were themselves anxious to get home. Iphicrates, as they advanced, fell back to the Isthmus; but he made no effort to impede their retreat, and Xenophôn greatly blames his conduct on this occasion.

This historian, the friend and panegyrist of the Spartans, though he has never perhaps wilfully falsified, omits on several occasions matters to their discredit. On the present, he never tells how Messene was once more raised to the rank of an independent state. Other authorities* inform us that Epaminondas led his army into Messene, called the descendants of the

* Plut. Pelop. 24. Diodor. xv. 66. Pausanias (iv. 26, 27.) relates it with his due complement of dreams and wonders, such as the finding of the pledge buried by Aristomenes (see above, p. 50.), which contained the rites of the Great Goddesses, etc.

Messenians to liberty, invited back those who were in Italy, Sicily and elsewhere, built at the foot of Ithome a city named Messene, and left a Theban garrison to protect it. Thus the Lacedæmonians lost one half of their territory for ever, and got instead of serfs inveterate foes,—a just retribution for their original injustice!

In the spring (Ol. 103, 1.) envoys from the Lacedæmonians and their allies again appeared at Athens. An alliance was proposed on the equitable and natural terms of the Athenians commanding by sea and the Lacedæmonians by land. This proposal was at first vehemently approved of; but Cephisodotus, an Athenian orator, argued that in such case the Athenians could only have the command over Helots and mercenaries, as these would compose the principal part of the Lacedæmonian marine, while their own horsemen and hoplites would be commanded by Spartan officers. He proposed that there should be a joint command, and it was decreed that each should hold it for five days alternately.

A combined army, numbering, according to Diodorus, twenty thousand men, was sent soon after to guard the Isthmus; but the Thebans, whose forces did not exceed one-third of that number, assailed one morning at daybreak the Lacedæmonians' part of the lines and forced their way through it, and then joined their allies and attacked Sicyôn and Pellene. They then turned to Epidaurus and ravaged the country, and as they were returning they made a sudden rush for the gate of Corinth leading to Phliûs: but some light troops, commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, came out, and mounting the tombs and other eminences drove them off. The Corinthians dragged the bodies under the walls, and raised a trophy when the Thebans had sent to demand them.

At this very time arrived a fleet of upwards of twenty ships, sent by Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse to aid the Lacedæmonians. On board of this fleet were Celtic and Iberian troops, perhaps the first of these remote nations ever seen in Greece, and about fifty horsemen, probably Iberians. Next day the Thebans and their allies were drawn out, and filled the plain

down to the sea, wasting it everywhere. The Corinthian and Athenian horse feared to engage them; but the new-comers attacked them boldly, and by their desultory mode of fighting did them much mischief. A few days afterwards the Thebans and their allies separated and went home; and the troops of Dionysius, having made an irruption into Sicyôn and defeated the Sicyonians of the Theban party who came out against them, also departed and returned to Syracuse.

Hitherto the Peloponnesians of their party had willingly submitted to the supremacy of the Thebans; but their late successes had elated the Arcadians, and Lycomedes, representing to them that they alone were genuine Peloponnesians, and that in numbers and in strength of body they excelled all the other Greeks, (for without their aid neither the Lacedæmonians nor the Thebans could have achieved what they had done,) told them that if they were wise, they would not follow either the one or the other, but insist on equal command with the Thebans. Language like this inflated the Arcadians; they regarded Lycomedes as the first of men, and followed his directions in all things. Just at this time, the Argives having invaded Epidaurus, a body of Corinthians, Athenians, and Chabrias's mercenaries had cut off their retreat: the Arcadians marched to their aid and liberated them. Again they attacked Asine in Messene, defeated the Lacedæmonian garrison, and killed the polemarch. They were still more successful in an attempt on Pellene in Laconia, where they cut the garrison to pieces and made slaves of the inhabitants. In fine, says Xenophôn, neither night, nor storm, nor length of way, nor mountains checked them, so that they were soon regarded as the best soldiers of the time*. The Thebans gradually became suspicious of their Arcadian confederates, and the Eleians also cooled toward them; for when they asked them to restore the towns in Triphylia, of which the Lacedæmonians had deprived them, they met with a refusal.

The Lacedæmonians always looked to Persia in time of need, for in the present state of Greece the gold of Persia could in

* It is evidently the Eparits that he means.

general turn the political beam. In consequence of their solicitations, an Abydene, named Philiscos, came from Ariobarzanes, satrap of Bithynia, and summoned a congress to Delphi to treat of peace. But as the Thebans insisted on the independence of Messene, the object of Philiscos's coming could not be attained. With the money committed to him by the satrap he therefore raised a large body of mercenaries to aid the Lacedæmonians. A second armament having come from Dionysius (Ol. 103, 2.), Archidamus united it with the Lacedæmonian troops; and he took the revolted town of Caryæ by assault, and put every soul in it to death. He then advanced into Arcadia, and laid waste the lands of Parrhasiæ. When the Arcadians and Argives appeared, he fell back to the heights over Mideia. There however the commander of the Sicilian troops left him, saying that his term of service was expired, and led his men back to Sparta; but finding a narrow pass on the road occupied by the Messenians, he sent to summon Archidamus to his aid. Archidamus made no delay: the Messenians retired before them, but as they were on their way to Laconia, at a turn of the road they found the Argives and Arcadians prepared to dispute their passage. The Spartan prince encouraged his men; favourable signs, it is said, appeared in the sky; the attack was impetuous, the resistance of the enemy brief; the horse and the Celts did great execution on the fugitives; and the Lacedæmonians, without the loss of a single man, gained a most complete victory: hence this is called the Tearless Battle. When the joyous tidings reached Sparta they were received with tears of joy by Agesilaüs, the senators, the ephors, and all the people; and the Thebans and Eleians were hardly less pleased than they at this humiliation of the pride of the Arcadians.

The Thebans did not confine their views to the Peloponnese, they wished also to establish an influence in Thessaly, where there was a strong party hostile to the Tagos, Alexander. Pelopidas and his friend Ismenias had gone thither (Ol. 103, 1.), but by the imprudence of the former they were both made prisoners. An army of eight thousand hoplites and six hun-

dred horse was immediately sent off; but Alexander being assisted from Athens, and the Thessalians not supporting them as expected, and provisions failing, the Bœotarchs resolved to retire. On their retreat they suffered greatly from the Thessalian cavalry; till Epaminondas, who was serving in a private station, was called on by the soldiers to take the command; and by a proper use of the horse and light troops he ensured the safe retreat of the hoplites. The release of Pelopidas was afterwards effected by a negotiation, enforced by the presence of a Theban army under Epaminondas.

The Thebans, aware of the strength which the Lacedæmonians derived from their connexion with Persia, resolved to try if they could divert to themselves the golden stream that flowed from thence. They therefore called together their allies, and stating that a Lacedæmonian agent was at Susa, engaged them to join in sending an embassy thither. Pelopidas accordingly went on the part of the Thebans; and the Athenians, when they heard of it, sent thither also two envoys, Timagoras and Leôn, to attend to their interests.

Pelopidas conducted the negotiation with great ability. He reminded the King of the services of the Thebans in the time of Xerxes, made a merit of their impeding the sacrifice of Agesilaüs, and dwelt on the fame they had acquired by the victory at Leuctra and the invasion of Laconia. Timagoras the Athenian seconded him in all things. The King asked Pelopidas what he desired to be written: he replied, Messene to be independent, the Athenians to lay up their ships, and if they did not, war to be made on them, and any city refusing its aid to be the first attacked. The rescript was made accordingly to that effect. On the return of the ambassadors the Thebans summoned deputies from all the states to hear it read: the Persian who bore it showed the royal seal; the Thebans called on all to swear to it, if they would be friends to them and the King: the deputies replied, that they were sent to hear, not to swear. The Thebans, finding themselves thus foiled, sent deputies to the separate states, menacing them with their wrath and that of the King if they did not swear to the treaty;

but, the Corinthians setting the example, several refused, and the hopes of the Thebans to gain the supremacy in this way were frustrated. Timagoras the Athenian was on his return convicted by his colleague of having taken large bribes, and was put to death by a sentence of the people.

Epaminondas, anxious to extend the Theban influence in the Peloponnese, now directed his views to the Achæans, who had as yet taken no decided part. He therefore (Ol. 103, 3.) desired Peisias, the Argive general, to occupy the Oneian mountains; and as the Athenian and Lacedæmonian troops there guarded it negligently, that officer was able one night to seize the height over Cenchreæ. The Thebans then passed safely, and being joined by their allies, entered Achaia. The constitution of this country had always had a large portion of aristocracy in it, and the persons of highest rank and wealth deemed it now their wisest course to appeal to the justice and magnanimity of Epaminondas for protection against their democratic opponents. They were not deceived; the illustrious Theban, probably judging that the people would not be happier under a pure democracy, made no change whatever in the constitution, and, satisfied with the Achæans joining the Theban alliance, led home his troops. But his conduct was so loudly clamoured at by the Arcadians and the Achæan democrats, as having in effect given Achaia to the Lacedæmonians, that the Thebans sent harmosts to the Achæan towns, expelled the upper ranks, and established pure democracies. The exiles, however, who were numerous, recovered the towns one after the other, and then openly took the Lacedæmonian side; and the Arcadians had thus enemies on the north as well as the south.

The ever-varying political relations of Greece now assume a new form. The town of Oropus on the confines of Attica and Bœotia, which had long been subject to the Athenians, was seized about this time by a party of exiles aided by Themisôn tyrant of Eretria in Eubœa. The Athenians instantly recalled their general Chares, who was at Phliûs, and marched with all their forces to recover it; and at their approach Themisôn

withdrew, having given up the town to the Thebans to keep till it should be legally determined who had a right to it. The Athenians were offended with the Thebans on this account, and with their allies for not having come to their assistance; the able Lycomedes, therefore, observing their dissatisfaction, represented to the Ten Thousand that it might not be difficult now to engage the Athenians in an alliance with Arcadia; and he went himself to Athens to make the proposal. It seemed at first strange to the Athenians, that they, the friends of the Lacedæmonians, should become the allies of their enemies; but, on the other hand, they saw that it was for the interest of both to detach the Arcadians from the Thebans, and they accepted the proposed alliance. Lycomedes, having thus succeeded, got on board a ship to return home; but happening to land at the place where most of the Arcadian exiles dwelt, he was fallen on by them and slain, and with him died Arcadia's chance of supremacy.

Soon afterwards, Corinth made peace with Thebes, with the consent of Lacedæmôn, and a similar peace was made by the Phliasians.

The scene of war now changes (Ol. 103, 4.) to Elis, which was invaded by the Arcadians. The Eleians called on the Lacedæmonians, and Archidamus entered Arcadia; but having sustained a defeat, he was forced to retire.

The Arcadians were masters of Olympia when the time of the games came (Ol. 104, 1.), and they prepared to celebrate them with the people of Pisa, who claimed the right from of old. But as they were in the midst of them, the Eleians came in arms, aided by the Achæans; and they fought with and defeated the Arcadians and Argives hard by the sacred inclosure of the Altis. Next day, finding the town barricaded, they retired, having astonished by their prowess the assembled Greeks, who had hitherto held them in contempt as soldiers.

At Olympia, as at Delphi, there was a large quantity of treasure, votive offerings and the property of states and individuals entrusted to the sanctity of religion. This treasure, now in the power of the Arcadians, was employed by them in

the payment of their Eparits; but the Mantineans, either from religion or from the prevalence of the aristocratic interest, declared that they would have no share in the sacrilege; and collecting among themselves their proportion of the pay of the Eparits, they sent it to the general government. For this their magistrates were summoned before the Ten Thousand, and on their not appearing they were condemned, and a party of the Eparits was sent to seize them. The Mantineans closed their gates, and would not admit them. Many members of the Ten Thousand now took courage and spoke out against the sacrilege. This feeling becoming general, such of the Eparits as could not afford to serve without pay retired, and this force now consisted only of men of some substance. Those who had seized the sacred treasures, fearing to be called to account, sent off to Thebes, and declared that if a force were not sent into Arcadia, its people would all *Laconise*. The other party then made the Arcadian people send an embassy to the Thebans, desiring them not to come in arms to Arcadia unless when called on. They at the same time made peace with the Eleians.

This peace was sworn to in Tegea by all the Arcadians, and by the Theban commander of three hundred Bœotians who were in that town. But in the midst of the festivities in which they were indulging on occasion of it, the gates were closed by the Thebans, and such of the Eparits as adhered to those who dreaded being called to account, and the principal men of most of the towns, were seized and imprisoned. Some escaped over the walls; and the Mantineans, whom they had been most anxious to take, had, on account of the vicinity of their town, already gone home. In the morning the Mantineans sent round to all the towns, telling them what had occurred, and desiring them to be on their guard; and they sent to Tegea demanding the delivery of those who had been seized. The Theban became alarmed, and set them all at liberty, asserting that he had been deceived by an account of a plan to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians. The Mantineans took no notice of what he said, but sent an embassy to Thebes to

accuse him. Epaminondas, it is said, replied, that he had done far better when he seized, than when he let them go; and he assured them they should soon see a Theban army in Arcadia.

The direction of the Theban affairs now lay entirely with Epaminondas, for Pelopidas was no more. The Thessalians, weary of the oppression of the Tagos, had this year sent to Thebes for aid, and Pelopidas gladly seized the occasion of taking vengeance on him. He entered Thessaly with a small force, and being joined by his Thessalian allies, gave battle at the heights of Cynos-cephalæ to the far more numerous troops of the Tagos. Carried away by his impetuous desire of vengeance, Pelopidas fell; but victory remained with his troops, and Alexander was obliged to submit to a peace and alliance.

Epaminondas assembled (Ol. 104, 3.) an army of Boeotians, Eubœans and Thessalians (these last furnished by Alexander as well as his opponents); and prepared to enter the Peloponnese for the fourth time. He expected to be joined there by the Argives, Messenians, and the Arcadians of Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Pallantion. The hostile Arcadians were joined by the Eleians and Achæans; and they sent to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, inviting them to unite in the task of liberating the Peloponnese from the Thebans, and aid was readily promised by both.

As Corinth was at peace with Thebes, Epaminondas reached Nemea unimpeded. He stopped there in hopes of intercepting the Athenians; but learning that they were going by sea to Laconia, he marched on to Tegea, where he quartered his troops within the town, as by this means his plans would be best concealed from the enemy, while he could observe all their motions at his leisure.

The confederates were encamped at Mantinea, waiting for the arrival of Agesilaüs and the Lacedæmonians, who were now on their way. Epaminondas, finding that no town had declared for him, while time was passing and his reputation was endangered, resolved to make a bold effort. Agesilaüs and his forces were now at Pellene, about one hundred stadia

from Sparta, which was nearly destitute of men; that city might be taken, he thought, by a sudden attack, and such an event have the most important results. The Theban general, therefore, after supper, put himself at the head of his troops, and gave the word for Sparta! The city would have been taken, says the historian, like a bird's nest, but that a Cretan deserter* brought word to Agesilaüs, who led back his hoplites without delay, for the horse and mercenaries were at Mantinea. When Epaminondas arrived he feared to enter the open town, where his numbers would give him no advantage, and his men might be slain from the tops of the houses: he therefore halted on an adjacent eminence. Archidamus, at the head of not quite one hundred men, issued suddenly from the town and fell on a part of the Theban forces. Daunted by their impetuosity, the redoubtable Thebans gave way with some loss: the Spartans, pursuing too far, lost a few men in their turn; they however erected their trophy and restored the dead, according to custom. Epaminondas, foiled in his hopes of surprising Sparta, and expecting that the Arcadians would come to the aid of their allies, in which case he would have to fight them and all the Lacedæmonians, returned in haste to Tegea, where he halted his hoplites. He sent the horse off at once toward Mantinea, as he justly reckoned that the Mantineans would be taking advantage of his absence to get in their harvest, and that their cattle and slaves would be out in the fields. They were actually in the midst of their harvest; but a body of Athenian cavalry, who had made a forced march by the Isthmus and Cleonæ, was now arrived. The Mantineans implored them to aid in protecting their property, and the Athenians, though just off a long journey, and themselves and their horses fasting, gallantly sallied forth to engage the Thebans and Thessalians, who were counted the first cavalry in Greece, and on this occasion were far superior in number. The action was smart, and brave men fell on both sides; but the Athenians saved the property of their allies, and the enemies were obliged to receive some of their dead under truce.

* Polyb. ix. 8, 6.

Epaminondas was now pressed with difficulties; he had failed in all his projects, the time of service of his troops was nearly expired, and he must lead them home, in which case his Peloponnesian allies would remain exposed to their enemies: a victory alone could save him, and if he fell, it would be with glory, in the attempt to make his country mistress of the Peloponnese. He therefore ordered his troops to prepare for battle. Every eye grew bright, every heart beat high at the word; shields were cleansed, helmets polished, swords and spears whetted. His influence over his troops was, in fact, surprising; they shunned neither toil nor privation: day and night they were ready to face any danger at his command,—the true indication of a great general.

When his troops were drawn out, instead of advancing direct to the enemy, he led them toward the mountains west of Tegea, and made them ground their arms as if he were about to encamp. The enemies, deceived by this feint, deemed that he had no intention of fighting that day, and they became negligent of their order of battle. Suddenly then forming his left wing of great depth, he gave orders to advance. The sight of the Thebans in motion caused great confusion in the enemies; some might be seen putting on their corselets, others bridling their horses, others hastening to their ranks, others forming. It was, as we have already seen, the Theban tactics to form deep*, and direct their whole force on one point; and Epaminondas, now at the head of the deep phalanx of his best troops, bore down on the enemy's right wing, composed of Lacedæmonians and Mantineans, confident that if he could defeat them the victory was won. His cavalry advanced, similarly formed, with numerous light troops (*ἄμιπποι*) mixed through it, while that of the enemy was only of the same depth with their phalanx, and without light troops. To prevent the Athenians, who were on the left, from coming to their aid, he placed some horse and hoplites on the heights opposite them.

His measures were completely successful. The Lacedæmo-

* See above, pp. 201, 332.

nians and Mantineans gave way after an obstinate resistance ; but in the midst of victory Epaminondas fell, pierced in the breast by a spear : his hoplites paused in dismay, and did not think of pursuing the routed enemy ; the horse, though victorious, halted and retired ; their light troops, passing to the right, fell on the Athenians, by whom they were cut to pieces. Epaminondas died on the extraction of the spear, in the persuasion of having obtained a complete victory. Each side, however, raised its trophy ; each, as defeated, claimed its dead, under truce ; each, as victorious, restored those of the other. The troops on both sides retired to their respective homes, and few of the great results which had been anticipated followed.

It is said* that Epaminondas, finding his wound to be mortal, called for Daïphantus, intending to give him the command of the army. He was told that he was dead. He then called for Iolaïdas, and hearing that he also had fallen, "Make then peace," said he, "for Thebes has no longer a general !" In fact, the importance which Thebes had acquired was entirely owing to a few able men whom she possessed† ; and her greatness, and even that of Greece, was truly said to have been buried in the grave of Epaminondas.

CHAPTER XV.

General Peace.—Last days of Agesilaüs.—Death of Alexander of Pheræ.
—Civil and Military Affairs.—Literature.

THE battle of Mantinea was followed (Ol. 104, 3.) by a general peace, in which the Spartans alone were not included,

* Ælian, V. H. xii. 3. Plut. Apophth. Reg. et Imp. Op. viii. p. 136, Hutten.

† Ephorus, *ap.* Strab. ix. 1. Polybius, iv. 33, 9 ; vi. 43, 4-7.

for they haughtily refused to join in a treaty to which the Messenians were parties. They, however, abstained from hostilities, and Messene was lost to them for ever*.

The western provinces of the Persian empire had been of late years in a state of complete insubordination; and in Egypt, a man named Tachôs had succeeded in withdrawing a great part of the country from its obedience. Tachôs, who had in his pay a considerable number of Grecian mercenaries, sent at this time to propose an alliance with Lacedæmôn. Agesilaüs, though now upwards of eighty years of age, gladly seized the occasion of revenge on the Persian king, whom he regarded as a chief cause of the loss of Messene; and he hoped to have yet the satisfaction of withdrawing the Asiatic Greeks from his dominion. He took the command of one thousand hoplites sent to the aid of Tachôs, and the whole mercenary land-force was put under him on his arrival in Egypt. The fleet was commanded by the Athenian Chabrias, who was also in the pay of the Egyptian prince. Tachôs himself commanded in chief. He invaded Syria; but during the campaign, his nephew Nectanebis, who commanded a division of his troops, rebelled against him and was proclaimed king by the Egyptians. Nectanebis solicited Agesilaüs and Chabrias to join him: the latter refused; but the former, alleging that he was only bound to consider the interests of his country, sent home for instructions, and being directed to act as he deemed most for the advantage of Sparta, he joined the rebel without hesitation†. By his skilful measures he gained for him a complete victory over another competitor for the supreme power, and having been munificently rewarded, and seeing that there was nothing of importance to effect in Asia, sailed homewards, resolving to devote his remaining days, and the wealth he had acquired, to the reduction of Messene. But he

* Diodor. xv. 89. Polybius, iv. 33.

† "Stripping the act of this pretext," says Plutarch, "its proper name was treachery. But the Lacedæmonians, assigning the first place in moral virtue to acting for the good of one's country, understand and esteem that alone to be just by which they think Sparta will be benefited."

fell sick at sea, and putting into a port of the Cyrenean territory, died there. As honey could not be had at the time, his body was inclosed in wax, and thus brought home to be interred with those of his fathers*.

Were Jasôn of Pheræ, with his virtues and talents, now living, the supremacy of Greece might have fallen to Thessaly. But the present Tagos, Alexander, was such an odious tyrant, that the hatred of him was universal. He had reigned eleven years, when his wife, irritated it was said at learning that it was his design to divorce her, as being barren, and to marry the widow of Jasôn, resolved to have him murdered. She, therefore, told her brothers, Tisiphonus and Lycophrôn, that the tyrant had designs against them, and their only safety was in his death. She then concealed them near her chamber during the day. At night Alexander came to her apartment to sleep as usual; he had drunk a good deal, and soon fell asleep: a lamp was burning in the room. She took away his sword, and went to call her brothers. They hesitated; but she threatened to awake the tyrant; they then entered the chamber; and she stood at the door and held the bolt till the deed was done. The assassins were applauded by the enemies of the tyrant, but they had only removed him to tread in his steps: they retained the mercenaries, and by their means continued to exercise dominion over Thessaly†.

Athens was again become the most important state in Greece. The conduct of her best generals, particularly Timotheüs, gained her respect; and the people of the towns and coasts of the Ægæan, to obtain the protection of her navy against piracy, became once more her subject allies, and paid the tribute imposed by Aristides.

After the death of Pericles, the evils of unbridled democracy displayed themselves more and more each day. The demagogues, who were to the sovereign people what their flatterers were to tyrants, heedless of the public weal, and thinking only of their own advantage, urged them into every ex-

* Xen. Agesilaüs, 4. Plut. Agesilaüs, 36-40. Diodor. xv. 92, 93.

† Xen. vi. 4. Plut. Pelop. 35.

cess*. The allies were plundered and oppressed, and the persons of property at home harassed by eternal requisitions to fit out triremes, provide choirs for the festivals, and otherwise spend their money on the people†. Numbers were thus reduced to beggary. They were further exposed to the vexatious persecution of the *Sycophants*, or public informers‡, who lived by taking advantage of the fears of the rich, and the envy and injustice of the paid jurors. Nothing, in fact, could be less enviable than the condition of a man of property at Athens, more especially from the time of the loss of the army in Sicily§. It is probable that things were not much better in other democracies, of which we have not information; while in oligarchies the ruling party thought only of oppressing and keeping down the people||.

One of the chief causes of the ruin of Greece attained its height, though it did not commence, in this period. This was the use of mercenary troops, or *Xeni* (ξένοι 'strangers') as they were named. It would not be easy to point out any period in the history of the world in which men did not sell their blood for pay; but in Greece, before the Peloponnesian war, the practice does not seem to have been common. The Arcadians, the Swiss of Hellas, owing perhaps to the poverty of

* Aristotle more than once (see Pol. iv. 4; v. 7, 8.) makes the comparison between democracy and tyranny; καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννὶς ἐστὶ ('Democracy is the very extreme of tyranny') are his words in one place. That the demagogue is a tyrant, and will allow no freedom of either speech or action to any one, is abundantly proved by experience both in our own country and in the United States.

† Arist. Pol. vi. 3.

‡ To complete the parallel between tyranny and democracy, the Sycophants answer to the Delators under the Roman Emperors.

§ The pay of the Ecclesiasts, which had been re established, was raised (Ol. 96, 3.) by Agyrrhius to three oboles; this of course drew the poorer citizens to the assemblies in great numbers (see Aristoph. Eccles. 302, 380, 392, 543. and the Scholia), and they made what decrees the demagogues pleased.

|| "In some oligarchies," says Aristotle (Pol. v. 7.), "they swear, 'and I will be evil-minded toward the demos, and counsel all the ill I can'."

their mountains, were the most addicted to it; and we read, not without surprise*, that while Xerxes was before Thermopylæ, Arcadians entered his camp looking for service: the Cretan archers, likewise, were at all times to be had for money. It was, however, the civil dissension in the various towns of Greece that chiefly caused the evil. Men driven from their homes, and robbed of their property, had seldom any resource but arms: they usually joined the enemies of their country, in hopes by their aid of defeating the faction at home which had expelled them. Others were allured by pay alone, especially after the Persians began to hire Greek troops: Pissuthnes, the satrap of Ionia, had Arcadians in his pay†; and from the time of the younger Cyrus, the Persian kings and satraps maintained large bodies of Greek mercenaries: they were also employed by the tyrants of Sicily, and even by the Carthaginians. Any one who is acquainted with the history of the Italian republics of the Middle Ages will at once recognise the similarity between their *condottieri* and the leaders of the mercenary bands in Greece; and the history of Charidæmus, given by Demosthenes‡, might well pass for that of a Braccio or a Sforza. The Brabançons, Free Companies, etc. of France and England were also exactly similar to the Greek *Xeni*. In Greece, as in modern Italy, the dislike of all orders of people in the towns to personal service led to the employment of *Xeni*, instead of the old burgher force of hoplite militia. The manners and morals of the mercenary troops of all ages are the same; the camp is their home; they care not for whom they fight; they squander in luxury and sensual pleasure their pay and their plunder, thoughtless of the morrow.

During this period a considerable change was made in the military art by Iphicrates, namely, his forming a new description of the troops called *Peltasts*, which were a mean between the hoplites and the light-armed. Their arms and armour were similar to those of the hoplites; but their armour was all lighter, while their swords and spears were longer: hence they

* Herod. viii. 26.

† Thuc. iii. 34.

‡ Against Aristocrates.

were more active and more efficient. The peltast troops were always composed of mercenaries*.

Though this was a time of incessant war, literature did not cease to be cultivated. Poetry now became almost exclusively dramatic, and its chief seat was Athens. In tragedy, Sophocles was distinguished for a calm and amiable spirit of religion, a love of law and order, and high regard for moral worth and dignity. The consummate skill with which his dramas are constructed can never be enough admired, and the sweetness and elegance of his verses must ever inspire delight. Euripides, inferior in genius, sought to move by presenting his characters in the outward garb of woe and poverty, and by employing the language of sentimentality. The construction of his plays offers a tedious uniformity, and he is accused of having formed his choruses (to us so beautiful) from the popular songs†. He also injured his pieces by the introduction of the sceptical philosophy then in vogue, and by scenes of regular pleading as in a court of law. Many of his dramas are, nevertheless, highly beautiful; but true taste will rank the best of them much below those of Æschylus and Sophocles.

The ancient comedy was of a peculiar nature. In form it resembled the tragedy, and, like it, introduced real characters on the scene; but those of comedy were living persons, who were usually keenly satirised for their public or private vices and follies. The drama at Athens was, in some sort, what the public press is with us, the organ of political parties. To the credit of the comic muse, she seems to have mostly advocated a domestic and foreign policy beneficial to the state. The most distinguished writers of the ancient comedy were Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes.

Eloquence now became an art, taught for hire by Gorgias, Protagoras, and the other *Sophists*, as they were named. In proportion as the characters of citizen and soldier separated,

* Diodor. xv. 44. Nepos, Iphic. 1. According to both these writers, he converted the hoplites into peltasts, but this only proves their ignorance of the subject.

† Aristoph. Frogs, 1301.

the statesman (ῥήτωρ) became divided from the general. Historical writing also was now cultivated; and we have contemporary history for the whole of this period.

Philosophy, mostly of a sceptical character, attracted votaries as the reverence for the old religion decreased. But in the hands of the Sophists, it spent its energies in idle speculation in physics, or in the mischievous hair-splitting of dialectics. The illustrious Socrates stood forth as their declared enemy, and combated them triumphantly with their own weapons. Man and his duties were the subject of *his* philosophy: he taught in no school, nor for hire; his conversation (for he gave no lectures) was free to all; his life adorned his doctrine, and was passed in honourable poverty. But the friend of wisdom and virtue, and the great master of irony, could not be without numerous enemies at Athens. He was publicly accused (Ol. 95, 2.) by Anytus, Melîtus and Lycôn, of impiety and corruption of the youth, and an ignorant, credulous and prejudiced jury passed on him a sentence of death. Means of escape were proposed to him, but rejected. On the appointed day, he received and conversed calmly and cheerfully with his friends, and then drinking the hemlock-juice expired, in the seventieth year of his age*. The people were soon seized with unavailing regret, and they made what atonement they could by punishing those concerned in his death.

* It is a curious coincidence that Socrates was born the year that Aristides died, see p. 136; and Plato the year that Pericles died, see p. 179.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART III. MONARCHIC PERIOD.

Ol. 105, 2-158, 3. B.C. 359-146.

CHAPTER I.*

Kingdom of Macedonia.—Philip of Macedonia.—Confederate War.—Phocian or Sacred War.—Progress of Philip.—Sacred War.—War in the Peloponnese.—Olynthian War.

Ol. 105, 2-108, 2. B.C. 359-347.

WE denominate this last period of Grecian history, the Monarchic†, not because this form of government prevailed in Greece, but because we shall find the influencing and guiding power in its affairs to have been in general a monarchy. Aristocracy is at an end; democracy, after a few struggles, sinks into impotence; and Greece loses the independence of which she is no longer deserving. To narrate her decline is now our task.

Each state of Greece and its vicinity was, as we may have observed, to come forward, at one time or other, as an im-

* The principal authorities for this and the following chapter are Diodorus, xvi. (who copied Theopompus), Plut. Demosthenes, and Phociôn, Justin, and the orators Demosthenes and Æschines.

† It is usually called the Macedonic Period.

portant actor on the political stage. The time for the appearance of Macedonia is now arrived.

This country, lying north of Thessaly, though inhabited by a people akin to the Greeks, was never counted part of Greece. Its kings claimed their descent from the Temenids, or Heraclids of Argos, and as such were admitted to contend at the Olympic games, from which all but Greeks were excluded. Macedonia might be termed a constitutional monarchy: the crown was hereditary in one family; but the king was not absolute; he governed by law and custom: a judge in peace, the leader of the army in war, he strongly resembled the monarchs of the Heroic age; and the form of government which had once prevailed over Greece and the adjacent countries, and which we find in Homer, appears to have been preserved, though somewhat altered and modified, in Macedonia and Epeirus.

The earliest mention we meet of Macedonia is at the time of the Persian war, when we find its kings united in public friendship with the Athenian people. It is probable that the intercourse between it and Athens had been of long standing; for ship-timber, an article indispensable to the Athenians, who had none of their own, grew abundantly in Macedonia, whence, down to the period of which we write, they constantly imported it. The Peloponnesian war brought Macedonia into relations with Sparta; proximity at all times produced much intercourse between it and Thessaly. It was however always looked upon as a power of little consequence, its people were termed Barbarians, and its friendship or enmity was but lightly regarded by the haughty republics.

After the death of Archelaüs (Ol. 95, 2.), an able and enlightened prince, the succession to the throne was disputed, and a civil war terminated in favour of Amyntas, cousin to the late king. Amyntas dying (Ol. 102, 3.) at an advanced age, left three sons, Alexander, who succeeded him, and Perdiccas and Philip, both boys. Alexander, after a short reign, fell by the hand of an assassin. Two competitors for the throne appeared; the queen-mother Eurydice implored the aid of the

Athenian general Iphicrates, then with a fleet on the coast of Thrace, and by his influence Perdiccas was quietly seated on the throne*. On account of his youth, the regency was committed to Ptolemæus, a prince of the blood-royal. During the time of the regency, Pelopidas visited Macedonia as ambassador from Thebes, and he induced the government to change the Athenian for the Theban alliance.

As securities for the good faith of the Macedonian government, and perhaps at the same time with a view to their education, the king's brother Philip, and some youths of the noblest families, were sent to reside at Thebes. Philip was there placed under the care of Pammenes, and the improvement of his mind appears to have been sedulously attended to†.

Perdiccas, after a brief reign, was slain defending his kingdom against an invasion of the Illyrians. (Ol. 105, 2.) The next heir was his brother Philip, now twenty-three years old, and at that time settled in the government of a province which his brother had, according to the usage of the Macedonian kings, given him as an appanage. But the heritage was, to all appearance, one not to be coveted. The Illyrians spread their ravages over the country; the Pæonians invaded it on the north; the two former competitors for the throne, Argæus and Pausanias, appeared again, the one supported by the Athenians, the other by Cotys, king of Thrace.

About four thousand Macedonians had fallen with their king, and the people were in general dejected; but the eloquence of Philip raised their spirits, and his talents inspired them with confidence. The Illyrians, like barbarians in general, hastened home to secure their plunder; presents and promises properly employed induced the Pæonian chiefs to abstain from hostilities; in a similar way Cotys was engaged to abandon the cause of Pausanias; and there only remained Argæus, to whose aid the Athenians had sent Mantias, one of their generals, with a fleet and three thousand hoplites.

Mantias, on coming to Methône, a port of Pieria subject to

* Æschines, *False Embassy*, 31. 30 *et seq.* Nepos, *Iphic.* 3.

† Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 26.

Athens, landed his troops; and Argæus, at the head of these and some troops of his own, set out for Ægæ, or Edessa, the former capital of Macedonia, distant about two hundred and forty stadia. Having vainly essayed to gain the people to declare for him, he was leading back his troops to Methone, when he was met and attacked by Philip. In the engagement which ensued Argæus was defeated with much loss, and according to some accounts, he was himself among the slain; the survivors retired to a hill, where they surrendered. Such Athenians as were among them were treated with great consideration by the victor; all their property was collected and restored to them, and they were set at liberty. He sent ministers to Athens to treat of peace; and, as he knew that the chief cause of enmity had been the aid given to the people of Amphipolis by his brother, he declared that city free, and withdrew its Macedonian garrison. The Athenian people then listened to his proposals, and peace was concluded*.

Fortunately for Philip, Agis the king of the Pæonians died at this time; and it is probable some confusion arose of which he took advantage; for entering Pæonia with his army he overcame the force opposed to him, and reduced the country to a province of his kingdom. He now found himself strong enough to venture on war with the Illyrians; and having, according to Macedonian usage, held an assembly of the people and gained their consent, he invaded Illyria at the head of an army of ten thousand foot and six hundred horse. The Illyrian chief, Bardylis, who was now ninety years of age, sent to propose peace, on the condition of each retaining what they had; but Philip insisted on the Illyrians restoring the towns which they held in Macedonia. These terms were refused. Bardylis met the Macedonians with about an equal force: a sanguinary action ensued; but Philip's superior tactics gained him a complete victory, and the Illyrians fled, with the loss of their aged chief and seven thousand men. Peace was then granted them, on their giving up the Macedonian towns; in consequence of which the dominions of Philip now extended westwards to

* Diodorus, xvi. 3, 4. Demosth. Aristocr. 660.

Lake Lychnitis, and thus perhaps exceeded in magnitude those of his predecessors.

These victories gave Philip great credit in the eyes of his warlike subjects, and now (Ol. 105, 3.), having persuaded the credulous Athenians that, when he had reduced it, he would give it to them in exchange for Pydna*, he led his forces against Amphipolis, in which there was a devoted Macedonian party. The Olynthians and the Athenian party in Amphipolis immediately sent to Athens for aid; but so strongly were the people persuaded that Philip would give them the town, that they would not attend to them. Philip battered the walls till a breach was effected: the town then capitulated; the heads of the adverse party were banished; the rest of the inhabitants were treated with great favour, according to the humane and politic course which Philip had laid down for himself in his pursuit of empire. He then led his troops to Pydna, which opened its gates to him as soon as he appeared before it.

The object nearest to Philip's heart was to drive the Athenians from the north coast of the Ægæan, where their supremacy had been restored by Conôn. For this purpose (Ol. 105, 4.) he formed an alliance with the Olynthians, to whom he resigned all rights to Anthemûs, which had become a member of their confederacy. Potidæa was then invested by their united forces, and after an obstinate defence forced to surrender. The Athenians there were dismissed in safety, and the town was given to the Olynthians. Methone alone now remained to Athens in these parts. The Athenians were in some measure however compensated for their losses at this time by the recovery of the Chersonese, of which Cotys king of Thrace had deprived them. That barbarian being slain by two young men named Pythôn and Heracleides, in revenge for the death of their father†, his dominions were disputed by his son Kersobleptes, and two princes named Amadocus and Berisades, who were probably also his sons by other mothers. The Athenians, taking advantage of the dispute, obtained posses-

* Demosth. Aristocr. 659.

† Aristot. Pol. v. 8.

sion of the Chersonese, to which they sent a large number of colonists*.

The great talents of Philip were at all times seconded by fortune. The Athenians had always held the Macedonians in contempt, and Persia was still the only foreign power of which they had any apprehensions. They were therefore not very likely to view at any time the progress of Philip with apprehension; and luckily for him, they had now other matters on their hands, which gave them abundant occupation.

Just at the time when Philip was attacking Amphipolis, the Thebans sent a force into Eubœa to aid a party there against the tyrants of Eretria and Chalcis. These applied for aid to Athens; and such was the fear of seeing that island alienated, that at the impulse of Timotheüs a sea and land force was prepared within five days, and within thirty days the Thebans were overcome and dismissed under truce. The Athenian orators state with pride that no attempt was made to take advantage of this success, and that the Eubœans were left, as before, to themselves.

Soon afterwards a war, which lasted three years, broke out between Athens and her allies. The Athenians had not used their recovered superiority at sea with all the prudence and moderation which the altered condition of the times demanded, and the diminished state of their revenues and the corruption of their public men led to much oppression and extortion. Mausôlus, king of Caria, who now aspired to influence in the Grecian sea-states, took advantage of the increasing dissatisfaction among the allies to form a confederacy of the most powerful among them, Rhodes, Côs, Chios and Byzantium, to resist the unjust demands of the Athenians, to whom they declared that they would protect their own commerce, and would therefore pay no more tribute.

The Athenians were never a people to submit quietly to the loss of any of their real or even fancied rights. War therefore was at once declared; and after a good deal of delay, a fleet, under Chares, with whom Chabrias was either joined in com-

* Demosth. Aristocr. *ut sup.*

mand or served as a trierarch, appeared at Chios, where a strong fleet of the Confederates had now assembled. The town was invested by sea and land. Chares headed the land-forces, while Chabrias led the fleet into the harbour, where a smart conflict ensued, in which Chabrias himself fell, and the fleet was forced to retire with some loss. The siege of Chios was then abandoned, and nothing of consequence undertaken during the remainder of the year.

The following year (Ol. 106, 1.) the Confederates put to sea a fleet of one hundred ships; and as that of Chares of sixty ships was not able to oppose them, they plundered the isles of Lemnos and Imbros, and then sailing to Samos wasted the country and laid siege to the town. Moved by the danger of Samos, the Athenians sent out another fleet of sixty ships under Timotheüs, Iphicrates, and Menestheus (the son of the latter and son-in-law of the former general), to co-operate with that of Chares*. Instead of sailing to the relief of Samos, the Athenian commanders steered for the Hellespont, rightly judging that the Confederates would not, for the chance of taking Samos, risk the loss of Byzantion, which was now without adequate defence. Accordingly, when they learned whither the Athenians were gone, they abandoned Samos and hastened to the Hellespont, at the entrance of which they met the Athenian fleet. The wind, which was now strong, was adverse to the Athenians; Chares, however, was for fighting, but Iphicrates and Timotheüs refused their consent, and no action took place. Chares wrote home, accusing his colleagues of treachery, and the following year they had to answer the charge before their sovereign, the people. Iphicrates was acquitted, but Timotheüs was fined a hundred talents†.

Chares was now again sole commander (Ol. 106, 2.); but his troops, who were mercenaries, would not serve without regular pay, and no money was sent out to him from home. He must therefore have dismissed them, or have followed the usual

* Nepos, Timoth. 3.

† Id. *ibid.* Isocrates (Permutation, 75.) says it was the largest fine ever imposed.

course of robbing and plundering the allies. But Artabazus, the satrap of Bithynia, who was in rebellion, hearing that a large body of the royal troops was on its march against him, sent to endeavour to induce the army of Chares to come to his aid. Forced by his men, led by his own interest, or deeming it for the advantage of the Athenians to have the army, which they could not or would not pay themselves, kept together for them, he entered the service of the satrap. The Athenians were at first well pleased at what he had done; but when, soon after, Persian envoys came to complain of him, and to inform them that the Phœnician fleet would be ordered to join that of the Confederates, they began to ponder on the consequences. The king of Macedonia had extended his power very considerably, a new war was on the eve of breaking out in Greece, and no one could tell what turn events might take; it would therefore, they thought, be advisable to have peace at the other side of the Ægæan. The Confederates, on their part, were also desirous of peace; their deputies came to Athens; the Athenians renounced their claims of sovereignty; peace was made; and the Confederate War, as it is named, terminated*.

From the time of Solôn down to the present period hardly any mention of the Amphictyonic council occurs in Grecian history. The deputies of the different states had doubtless continued to meet at the vernal and autumnal equinoxes of each year, at Pylæ and Delphi, and make regulations for the support of the temple and public worship at Delphi; but, owing probably to the balance of power among Lacedæmôn, Athens and Thebes, the three great states of Dorian, Ionian, and Æolian race, who were members of it, it had never been employed for political purposes. Now, however, that the Lacedæmonians were depressed, the Thebans deemed the occasion good, as they were sure of the Thessalian votes, for making it the instrument of their vengeance. Deprived of the wisdom of Epaminondas, they raised a conflagration in which their city and their independence were eventually to perish†.

* Diodor. xvi. 7, 21, 22.

† The details of this war are only to be found in Diodorus.

Not content with the ample revenge which they had had for the seizure of the Cadmeia, they charged the Lacedæmonians before the Amphictyons with that offence, and with the destruction of some Bœotian towns. A fine of five hundred talents was imposed on them; and on their neglecting to pay it, it was doubled, according to Amphictyonic law. It still however remained unpaid, as the Amphictyons had no means of enforcing their decree. The Thebans had, therefore, only the satisfaction of having insulted the haughty Spartans.

The Phocians were another people to whom they bore a grudge; they had been generally on ill terms with them: they had refused to take share in the last expedition to the Peloponnese; and their destruction would be likely to give the Thebans the command of the Delphian temple and its treasures. To these public grounds of enmity, we are told a private one, as is so often the case, was added. An heiress in Phocis was sought in marriage by a Theban and a Phocian; the latter was successful, and the disappointed suitor sought to kindle a war. Another account says that the war was caused by a Phocian's abduction of a Theban lady*.

The charge made against the Phocians was that of having cultivated the devoted lands of the Cirrhæans†. An enormous fine was imposed by the obsequious Amphictyons; and this not being paid, all Phocis was declared forfeit to the god. The Spartans were included in this sentence, which was engraved on a pillar at Delphi. As the Amphictyons called on all Greece to aid in carrying their decree into execution, the Phocians, knowing the hostility of the Thebans, Thessalians, and the peoples of Mount Cæta, felt no little alarm (Ol. 105, 4.); but Philomêlus, one of their leading men, urged them not to submit tamely to be deprived of their lands and their independence by an unjust decree, but to seize on Delphi, which by right, and the testimony of Homer, belonged to them, and to stand on their defence. He pledged himself for their ultimate success if they would make him their general.

* Arist. Pol. v. 3. Duris *ap.* Athen. xiii. p. 560.

† That is, the Crissæans. See above, pp. 58, 59.

The arguments of Philomelus were of effect, and he was appointed general with unlimited powers (*αὐτοκράτωρ*). Leaving then his brothers, Onomarchus and Phayllus, to command in Phocis, he repaired in person to Sparta, where he secretly communicated his plans to king Archidamus, showing him that the interests of Sparta were as deeply involved as those of Phocis. Archidamus assented to all that he said, but as he did not deem it prudent for the Lacedæmonians openly to make common cause with the Phocians, he would only aid them underhand for the present. He gave him fifteen talents, to which Philomelus added as many of his own, and with this sum he hired from two to three thousand mercenaries, whom he led direct from the Isthmus to Delphi, and seized the town and temple. The Thracids (a kind of Levites), who attempted resistance, were cut to pieces, and their property was confiscated; but all the other inhabitants were assured of safety. The Ozolian Locrians, who dwelt at hand, hastened with all their forces to the defence of the temple, but they were speedily put to flight. Philomelus then effaced the decrees of the Amphictyons, and declared that he had no intention whatever of plundering the temple, his only objects being to restore to the Phocians the right of precedence, of which they had been unjustly deprived. He immediately set about fortifying Delphi, and augmenting his mercenary force, whose pay he raised; he also selected the best men among the Phocians for military service, and he had soon fifteen thousand men under his command. With the whole or a part of these he invaded and ravaged Locris. In a skirmish with the Locrians (probably in the defiles of the mountains) he lost about twenty of his men, and when he sent a herald to claim their bodies, he was told, that it was the law of Greece to leave unburied the bodies of temple-robbers. Irritated at this insolent reply, he attacked the Locrians, killed some of them, and then forced them to exchange the bodies.

On his return to Delphi, deeming that an oracle in his favour might be turned to good account, he insisted on the Pythia's ascending the sacred tripod. At first she declined;

but when he menaced her, she cried out that he might do whatever he pleased. This seeming to him a sufficient response, he had it written out and exposed in public, to encourage the people. He sent embassies to Athens, Sparta, Thebes and all the chief towns of Greece, to assure them that he had no intention of plundering the temple, and offering to give an account of the treasures, with the number and weight of the offerings, to any who should require it. He called on all to aid, or at least not to act against them. The Athenians, the Lacedæmonians, and some few others became open allies and supporters of the Phocians; the Thebans and their friends prepared for war in the cause of the god.

Philomelus, seeing war inevitable, still further augmented his mercenary force. He still, it is said, abstained from touching the sacred treasures; but he made the wealthy Delphians furnish the sums requisite for the pay of his men. In the spring (Ol. 106, 1.) he invaded Ozolian Locris; the Locrians came boldly out against him, but they met a total defeat at a place named the Phædriad Rocks; and no longer hoping to be able to withstand the Phocians, they sent to the Bœotians, imploring them to come to their aid and that of the god. The Bœotians sent to the Thessalians and the other Amphictyons, and all joined in a declaration of war against the Phocians as temple-robbers. (Ol. 106, 2.)

While the Bœotians and their allies were collecting their forces, Philomelus again led his troops into Locris. A body of Bœotians came to the aid of the Locrians, and a skirmish of cavalry ensued, in which the Phocians had the advantage; and soon after they defeated six thousand Thessalians, who were on their way to Locris. The Bœotians now took the field with a force of thirteen thousand men; that of Philomelus somewhat exceeded ten thousand, and he was joined by fifteen hundred Achæans, so that he felt himself strong enough to offer them battle. No action, however, took place as yet; but the Bœotians happening to make prisoners several of the Phocian mercenaries, as they were out foraging, put them publicly to death, as accomplices in sacrilege. This conduct enraged

the remainder of the mercenaries ; they required of Philomelus to retaliate, and, exerting themselves to the utmost, they took a great many of the enemy prisoners, all of whom were put to death. This made the self-styled army of the god cease from their arrogant cruelty. Soon after, the advance-guards of the two armies, as they were moving their quarters, encountering by accident in a rugged and woody country, an action followed, in which the Phocians, who were much inferior in numbers, were defeated with great slaughter. Philomelus fought with desperation, and received several wounds ; at length, having ascended a precipice, and seeing no chance of escape, he flung himself down, rather than become a captive to his inveterate foes.

The Bœotians appear to have returned home without making any use of their victory, probably in consequence of the near approach of winter. A general council of the Phocians and their allies met at Delphi, to deliberate on the subject of the war: a part of those present were for trying to make peace, but the great majority declared for continuing the contest. Onomarchus was appointed general (Ol. 106, 3.) in the room of his late brother : it was resolved to prosecute the war with vigour, and additional mercenaries were taken into pay.

It is a matter of doubt whether Philomelus had used any part of the sacred treasures or not ; but we are assured that Onomarchus felt no scruples on the subject, and that he employed the stores of brass and iron in the manufacture of arms, and coined a large quantity of the gold and silver to pay his troops and to bribe the leading persons in the various states of Greece. Resuming the war, he invaded Epicnemidian Locris, and took Thronion, its chief town : he reduced Amphissa, in Ozolian Locris, ravaged the lands and villages of Doris, and then making an irruption into Bœotia, took Orchomenus, and laid siege to Chæroneia ; he was there, however, defeated by the Thebans and forced to retire.

It is rather remarkable, that at the very time when the Thebans were thus at war with the Phocians, and even hard pressed by them, they sent an army out to Asia. Artabazus

having lost the aid of Chares and his troops, who had been recalled, applied to the Thebans for a force to support him against the royal army. Service in Asia was now become extremely popular in Greece, and probably the satrap had given money in the proper quarters; aid was therefore voted at once, and Pammenes, the friend of Epaminondas, led five thousand men by sea to Asia. Thus reinforced, Artabazus gave the satraps two great defeats, whence fame and profit accrued to the Bœotian troops and their leader.

We must now return to the enterprising king of Macedonia. After the reduction of Potidæa (Ol. 105, 4.), he led his troops into Thrace, where he made himself master of the gold mines of Pangæus and the adjoining town of Crenidæ. He named the town from himself, Philippi, and he peopled it with Greeks from Pydna and the other conquered towns. He personally inspected the mines, and by an improved mode of working made them produce one thousand talents a year, which when coined into *Philips* (as his gold coins were named), drew mercenaries to his standard and bribed the venal orators of the Grecian republics.

The next year (Ol. 106, 1.) the Illyrians, Pæonians and Thracians simultaneously took up arms against the king of Macedonia. Philip sent a part of his troops, under Parmeniôn, one of his ablest officers, against the Illyrians; he himself engaged and speedily reduced the Pæonians, and the discord which prevailed among the princes of Thrace enabled him to add a large part of that country to his dominions. By those writers who study effect more than accuracy we are told, that he received in one day tidings of a decisive victory gained by Parmeniôn, of a race won by his horse at the Olympic games, and of the birth of his son Alexander the Great.

The Athenians were justly provoked at Philip's encroachments, and in conjunction with the people of Methone they began to exercise hostilities against Macedonia. But Philip suddenly appeared before Methone: the inhabitants made an obstinate defence, but at length were forced to surrender: they were allowed to depart, each with a single garment; the town

was levelled, the lands distributed among the Macedonians. During this siege Philip received a wound from an arrow, which deprived him of the sight of his left eye*. (Ol. 106, 4.)

The power of Lycophrôn and Peitholaüs the tyrants of Phæræ, in consequence probably of the subsidies which they drew from Phocis, having again become formidable to the adverse party in Thessaly, they applied to Philip, who willingly responded to the call. (Ol. 107, 1.) Lycophrôn also called on his allies, and Phaÿllus, the brother of Onomarchus, led seven thousand men to his aid. A battle ensued, in which the Tagos and his allies were defeated. Onomarchus, then aware of the danger of the union of the Thessalian and Macedonian power, marched without delay his entire force into Thessaly. Having the superiority of numbers, he gave Philip two complete defeats, who was with difficulty able to effect a retreat into Macedonia. Having thus re-established the authority of the Tagos, Onomarchus led his troops back to Bœotia, where he defeated the Bœotians and took the town of Coroneia. But Philip, equally aware of the importance of Thessaly, had returned with a new army. Lycophrôn sent to recall the Phocian chief, and Onomarchus passed Thermopylæ with twenty thousand foot and five hundred horse. The united forces of Philip and the Thessalians were upwards of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse. A battle was fought near the bay of Pagasæ, where an Athenian fleet, under Chares, was at that time lying. Owing chiefly to his superiority in cavalry, the victory remained with Philip. The Thessalian horse cutting off retreat, the troops of Onomarchus flung away their armour, and cast themselves into the sea, to swim to the Athenian ships. Some were slain, others drowned; the entire loss was six thousand men, among whom was Onomarchus himself, and three thousand prisoners, whom Philip it is said drowned

* Diodor. xvi. 34. An archer, it is said (Plut. Par. 8.), named Astêr, whose proffered services Philip had rejected with mockery, shot at him an arrow with '*For Philip's right eye*' upon it. Philip had it shot back, with '*If Philip takes the town, he will hang Astêr*' on it as a reply, and he kept his word. The anecdote is utterly unworthy of credit.

as being sacrilegious. It is also said that he hung Onomarchus' body on a gibbet.

The first use which Philip made of his victory was to lead his forces to Pheræ. Lycophrôn and Peitholaüs surrendered the city, and retired to Phocis. Having thus won the hearts of the Thessalians by suppressing the tyranny, he prepared to pass Pylæ, and carry the war into the valleys of Phocis. But an Athenian force, under Diophantus, had been sent off to occupy the pass; and Philip, either fearful of not being able to force it, or deeming the time not to be yet come for his interference in Southern Greece, retired on Diophantus' refusal of a passage. Pheræ, Pagasæ, and other places were now in his possession, and he was become the real head of the Thessalian confederacy.

Phayllus now occupied the place of his brothers; the Delphian treasures were not yet exhausted; new bands of mercenaries were hired: aid came from the allies; the Lacedæmonians sent 1000, the Achæans 2000 soldiers; the Athenians 5000 foot and 400 horse; Lycophrôn had brought with him from Pheræ 2000 mercenaries; several of the smaller states also gave their aid. With this force Phayllus invaded Bœotia, but without success; receiving three successive checks, at Orchomenus, on the Cephissus, and at Coroneia. Quitting Bœotia he then suddenly entered the Epicnemidian Locris, and took several towns. At one, named Aryca, a friendly party admitted his troops by night; but the rest of the people rose and drove them out, with the loss of two hundred men. While he was besieging Abæ, the principal town, the Bœotians came, and falling on him by night killed a good many of his men. They then entered and ravaged Phocis, and returning to Locris attempted to relieve the Arycæans, who were besieged; but Phayllus came up, defeated them, and took and levelled the town. This was his last exploit; he died soon after of a disease with which he had been for some time afflicted,—the punishment of his impiety, according to his enemies,—leaving as his successor Phalæcus, the son of Onomarchus; and as he was but a youth, he appointed Mnaseas, one of his friends, to

be his guardian and general. Mnaseas however fell shortly afterwards in a night-assault of the Bœotians ; and Phalæcus then assuming the command successively took and lost Chæroneia, and the Bœotians entered and ravaged a great part of Phocis.

The loss of Messene had utterly enfeebled Lacedæmôn, and its recovery alone could restore her to her former consequence ; but so long as Megalopolis existed on her northern frontier it was unsafe to attack Messene. The Lacedæmonian government proceeded, therefore, with much art, to represent that it would be expedient for every state to be put into its former condition ; that Triphylia should be restored to the Eleians, Tricaranon to the Phliasians, Oropus to the Athenians ; and those who had been forced to quit their lands and villages to become inhabitants of Megalopolis, be allowed to return to them. The party in power at Megalopolis, seeing themselves menaced with invasion from Laconia, sent to call on their friends for aid ; and as it was of great importance for both sides to gain the Athenians, embassies from both Sparta and Megalopolis arrived at Athens. On this occasion Demosthenes, afterwards so renowned, made one of his earliest speeches, in which he first developed the principle which ever after guided his policy, namely, that it was the interest of Athens, aiming as she did at the supremacy in Greece, to maintain a balance of power among the other states. He therefore advised to aid the Megalopolitans in case the Lacedæmonians should attack them, as if that impediment were removed they might recover their former power and become as formidable as ever.

We are not informed what the resolve of the Athenian people was ; but the Spartan king, Archidamus, at the head of a Lacedæmonian army, and three thousand foot and one hundred and fifty horse of the Phocian mercenaries, entered and ravaged the lands of the Megalopolitans. The Argives, Sicyonians and Messenians hastened to the aid of their allies, and four thousand foot and five hundred horse came from Thebes. The confederates encamped at the sources of the Alpheüs, the Lacedæmonians at Mantinea, whence they went and laid siege

to Orneæ, in the Argive territory, and defeated the Argives, who ventured to engage them. The Thebans now came up, and a severe conflict ensued; but though the confederates were double the number of the Lacedæmonians, the action, owing to their inferiority in discipline, was indecisive. After the battle the Argives and the other Peloponnesians separated, and went home; and Archidamus having made an irruption into Arcadia, and taken and plundered the town of Elissûs, led his troops back to Sparta. When the confederates re-assembled, an action to the disadvantage of the Lacedæmonians, whose general Anaxander was made prisoner, was fought at Telphussa. The confederates were successful in two other engagements; but at length the Lacedæmonians gave them a complete defeat. A truce followed, and the Thebans returned home.

To obtain a footing in Eubœa Philip saw would be of the utmost advantage to him in a contest with Athens. He had, it would appear, at this time contrived to introduce some of his troops into it; and Plutarchus the tyrant of Eretria, fearing to lose his power, sent (Ol. 107, 3.) to call on the Athenians to save the island. The people were always sensitive on this point; Demosthenes alone opposed what he called "an inglorious and expensive war." Aid was voted, and a small force under Phociôn sent thither. But the Eubœans soon grew suspicious of their allies, and Phociôn found treachery everywhere: he advanced, however, and took a station on a hill near Tamynæ. Callias and Taurosthenes the rulers of Chalcis assembled what forces they could, and joining with them the Macedonians and a body of the Phocian mercenaries, came and surrounded them. While the enemy was advancing, Phociôn directed his men to remain steady till he had sacrificed. As he was a long time about this duty, Plutarchus, affecting to ascribe his delay to cowardice, charged with his mercenaries; the Athenian horse followed, without any order: but they were repulsed, and Plutarchus ran away. The enemies then advanced to their rampart, and began to pull it down. Phociôn, directing the phalanx to remain steady and receive the fugitives, attacked the enemy at the head of a body of se-

lect troops : an officer named Cleophanes meantime rallied the horse, and a complete victory was gained. Phociôn then drove Plutarchus from Eretria for his treachery ; and having taken the fortress of Zaretra, he let go those who were in it, lest the orators should excite the people to some act of cruelty *. Having settled the affairs of Eubœa, he returned home. His successor, Molossus, let himself be beaten and made a prisoner : the Macedonian influence was restored, and the predictions of Demosthenes were verified.

The ambitious projects of Philip now began to cause apprehensions to his Olynthian allies, whose commerce also suffered from the Athenian privateers : they therefore proposed a peace to the Athenians, which was accepted. Philip, who was then in Thrace, where he had a severe illness, sent, with his usual policy, to remonstrate and complain ; but as soon as he recovered, he appeared with his army in Chalcidice. (Ol. 107, 4.) The Olynthians immediately sent to Athens to propose an alliance and to solicit aid. The powerful eloquence of Demosthenes was exerted in their favour ; the alliance was accepted, and Chares sent off with two thousand mercenaries. He landed in Pallene, where he met and defeated a body of eight hundred of Philip's mercenaries, led by one Adæus ; and he then returned home to boast of his victory, and, in his usual way, to gain the rabble by banquets†. The Olynthians, growing still more apprehensive of Philip's designs, sent again to Athens ; and Charidêmus of Oreus, a leader of mercenaries, was despatched (Ol. 108, 1.) with four thousand peltasts and other light troops and one hundred and fifty horse. These, united with the Olynthians, invaded and ravaged Pallene and Bottiæa ; but when they retired, Philip entered Chalcidice, where he took and razed the fortress of Zeira, and forced several other

* Plutarch, Phociôn, 13. The reason probably belongs to the biographer, who was thinking of the Cleôns of former days, for the leading orators of both parties now were by no means sanguinary men.

† Theopompus (*ap.* Athen. xii. p. 532) says that he defrayed the expenses of this feast out of the sixty talents which he had from the plunder of the temple of Delphi.

towns to submit. The affairs of Thessaly, where Peitholaüs had recovered his authority in Pheræ, then calling him away, he went thither and expelled him. The Olynthians had meantime again called on their Athenian allies; and the necessity of the case was now so evident, that in spite of their aversion to personal service in war, two thousand hoplites and three hundred horse, all Athenian citizens, embarked for Chalcidice. Philip, who had gained the towns of Micyberna and Torone by treachery, now led his forces against Olynthus itself. When within forty stadia of the city, he sent to the people to say that they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedonia. The Olynthians and their Athenian allies gave him battle twice, but were defeated; and a body of five hundred Olynthian cavalry were betrayed into his hands by their own commanders. Lasthenes and his associates, the hirelings of Philip, got the direction of affairs, and they lost no time in delivering up the city. Philip treated it with unwonted rigour: the town was plundered, and the inhabitants sold into slavery. The same was the fate of Apollonia and thirty-two other towns of Chalcidice and the coast of Thrace (Ol. 108, 2.)*.

Philip testified his joy at the conquest of Olynthus by celebrating with great splendour the Olympia, a national feast of the Macedonians, at Dion. The concourse of strangers was great, and artists of every kind were present from all parts of Greece. Among these was Satyrus, a celebrated comedian. Philip, always liberal, distributed numerous presents at the banquet which he held, and observing that Satyrus asked for nothing, he inquired the cause. He replied, that what he would ask was easy for Philip to grant, but he doubted if he would do so. The king averred that he would refuse him nothing: the noble-minded player then said that he had had a friend at Pydna, named Apollophanes, who was murdered, and whose daughters were removed by their friends for safety to Olynthus, where, on the taking of the city, they were made slaves: they were now in Philip's possession, and he prayed him to give them to him, adding that it was his intention to portion

* Demosth., False Embassy, 426.—Plato died this year.

them and marry them reputably. A tumult of approbation burst forth among the guests; and Philip, though Apollophanes had been one of those who murdered his brother Alexander, moved by the generosity of Satyrus and by regard for those present, granted his request. Very different from the conduct of Satyrus was that of the ambassadors of some Grecian republics, who received as presents from Philip unfortunate Olynthian women and children for slaves*!

CHAPTER II.

Peace between Philip and the Athenians.—End of the Sacred War.—Athenian statesmen.—Siege of Perinthus and Byzantium.—Amphissian or Third Sacred War.—Battle of Chæroneia.—Death of Philip.

Ol. 108, 3–111, 1. B.C. 346–336.

PHILIP and the Athenians were now equally anxious for peace. The commerce of both suffered from each other's privateers, for Philip now had shipping which had made descents on Lemnos and Imbros, taken rich merchantmen from Eubœa, and even landed at Marathôn and carried off the Salaminian trireme. His influence in Thebes, Eubœa, Megara and the Peloponnese caused the Athenians much apprehension, for they found their embassies everywhere defeated by the orators whom his gold had purchased.

Some Eubœan ambassadors coming to Athens to treat of

* Demosth., False Embassy, 401. Æschines, as he was returning from an embassy to Arcadia, met the Arcadian ambassadors with a train of Olynthian women and children whom Philip had given them (Demosth., *ibid.* 439.): Philocrates brought Olynthian women to Athens (*ibid.* 440.). Yet Mitford says, "Support wholly fails among the orators of the day for the report of the annalist of three centuries after, that he plundered the town and sold the inhabitants for slaves."

peace, stated that they were authorised by Philip to say that he also was desirous of peace*. Soon after, an Athenian named Phrynôn, being taken by one of Philip's cruisers during the truce of the Olympic Games, and being ransomed, requested the people to appoint him an ambassador to Philip, that he might try to get back his ransom. The people appointed him and Ctesiphôn (Ol. 108, 3.); and the latter on his return speaking highly of Philip, and his desire of peace, leave was granted, on the motion of Philocrates, for Philip to send heralds and an embassy to treat of peace. As there had been a decree prohibiting all intercourse with Philip, Philocrates was accused of a breach of law; but Demosthenes defended him, and he was triumphantly acquitted.

Several Athenians had been made prisoners at Olynthus, among whom were two persons named Stratocles and Eucrates, whose relatives implored the people to interfere in their favour; and Aristodemus, the player, was sent to Philip, with whom he was a great favourite, for this purpose. Philip released Stratocles at once without ransom, who on his return declared that monarch's anxiety for peace, to which Aristodemus added, that he even wished to become the ally of the city. It was then decreed, on the motion of Philocrates, that an embassy of ten persons should be sent to Philip; and Philocrates, Demosthenes, Æschines and Aristodemus were among those appointed.

The chief objects proposed, beside the security of the Athenian dominions, were to prevent Philip from interfering in Eubœa, to save Kersobleptes, and to have the Phocians included in the peace. The ambassadors were received by Philip with the utmost courtesy; he was particularly attentive to Æschines and Philocrates; and if Demosthenes is to be believed (and there seems to be little reason to doubt him), he secured their co-operation in his projects by bribes†. He then

* All these transactions are related by Æschines, *False Embassy*, 29, 30.

† Demosthenes (*False Embassy*, 386.) specifies the value of the lands in Phocis which Philip gave Æschines and Philocrates. Æschines, it is true,

dismissed them with the heads of a treaty in which the Phocians were not included ; but Æschines assured the people that Philip had told him in private that he was obliged to keep measures with the Thebans, but that his real intentions were to save the Phocians, and to force the Thebans, as having been the real authors of the sacrilege, to make good the deficiency in the sacred treasures. Meantime Philip pursued his conquests in Thrace; and he sent Parmeniôn, Antipater, and Eurylochus as his ministers to Athens to conclude the peace ; his hirelings there being pledged to forward his views as much as possible. Demosthenes himself, for the honour of his country, entertained these ambassadors in a very splendid manner, and showed them every attention while they stayed. Peace and alliance with Philip were concluded ; and Demosthenes immediately had a decree passed, that Proxenus, who commanded a fleet off Eubœa, should convey the ambassadors appointed to receive Philip's ratification of the treaty (two of whom were himself and Æschines) to wherever Philip might be at the time ; for he well knew that any conquests he might make in the interval would be so much clear gain to him, as the Athenians would never renew the war for the sake of them. But the views of Æschines and his friends were different ; they were, to make as much delay as possible ; they therefore would not take any short way ; they spent twenty-three days in going round to Thessaly, and then would stay at Pella to wait for Philip ; thus giving him, in all, nearly three months to prosecute his conquests ; during which time he forced Kersobleptes, who had taken refuge in the peninsula of Mount Athôs, to submit ; so that there could be now no question of *him* in the treaty. He had also reduced Doriscus, Serrion, the Sacred Hill, and other places in Thrace, which were now all resigned to him ; and when the authority of the Athenians was acknow-

retorts the charge ; but what credit can be given to the man who (Ctes. 62, 63.) accuses Demosthenes of having taken bribes from Philip ? Bishop Thirlwall however does not seem to consider the charges to be made out against Æschines. In truth, but little reliance can be placed on the assertions of the ancient orators when attacking others or defending themselves.

ledged over the Chersonese, the Cardians, as allies of Philip, were exempted from their jurisdiction. Philip swore to the peace on these terms ; and as he was now on the eve of marching against the Phocians, he made Æschines and his friends detain the embassy some time longer at Pella, lest the Athenians, being officially informed of his intentions, should send troops to occupy Pylæ. On their return, when they appeared before the senate, Demosthenes told the whole truth, and charged his colleagues with their treachery ; and his representations had such effect, that the senate did not as usual give the embassy their supper in the Prytaneion. But when they came before the assembly, Æschines rose, and very pompously assured the people that he had persuaded Philip to do everything that was for their advantage in the affair of the Amphictyons, and in everything else ; and that if they would only stay quietly at home for two or three days, they would hear of Thebes being besieged, Thespiæ and Plataea rebuilt, and the Thebans, not the Phocians, being made to replace the treasures of the god ; and that Philip would give up Eubœa to them. He had also arranged something further, of which he would not then speak,—meaning Oropus. He ceased : Demosthenes then mounting the *bema*, began by declaring that all these things were unknown to him ; and he was proceeding, when Æschines stood up on one side, and Philocrates on the other, and shouted at and mocked him ; the people then began to laugh, and would not listen to him*.

While the Athenians were thus beguiled through their desire of peace, Philip was on his march against the Phocians. The war between them and the Bœotians had still continued, with the advantage rather on the side of the former, who held the towns of Orchomenus, Coroneia, and Corsiæ in Bœotia. A charge of having made away with several articles of the sacred treasures was brought against Phalæcus, and he was deprived of his command ; three generals, Deinocrates, Callias and Sophanes, were appointed in his stead, and a strict inquiry into the dilapidations was instituted. Philôn, one of those prin-

* Demosth., False Embassy, 346, 347, 389–391.

cipally concerned, being put to the torture, gave information against his accomplices; and after having been made to restore all that remained of their plunder, they were put to death as temple-robbers. It appears that Phalæcus and his friends, not content with what was remaining of the treasures of Cræsus and of the different states, had dug up the floor of the temple, inferring from a passage of Homer* that a treasure was buried there. We are told, that when they began to dig about the tripod, the ground was shaken by earthquakes, and they desisted in terror.

The Thebans, in want of both men and money, implored the aid of the king of Macedonia, who sent them some troops. The Phocians were soon obliged to restore the chief command to Phalæcus, for he remained at the head of the mercenaries, and had also a strong party among the people; but as the designs of Philip were now no secret, they sent to the Athenians, offering to put into their hands the three Locrian towns, Alpônus†, Thronion and Nicæa, which commanded the pass of Pylæ, if they would come to their aid. This was before the conclusion of the peace with Philip; and it was decreed at once that Proxenus should sail with fifty triremes and take possession of these places; and that all the citizens under thirty years of age should march to Locris. But Phalæcus and his officers, who had their own views, prevented this, and they abused and ill-treated the ministers who had concluded the treaty with Athens. As the danger became more imminent, king Archidamus, who had been sent with one thousand hoplites to aid the Phocians, offered to garrison those fortresses; but Phalæcus and his party made an insolent reply, and the Lacedæmonians left Phocis to its fate. Philip then passed the strait at the head of an army: Phalæcus, who lay at Nicæa with eight thousand men, feigned to be preparing to give him battle; but he secretly negotiated, and at length delivered up the fortresses, on condition of himself and his troops being

* Οὐδ' ὅσα λάϊνος οὐδὸς ἀφήτορος ἐντὸς ἔεργει

Φοίβον Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθοῖ ἐνι πετρῆεσσι.—Il. ix. 404.

† Or Alpenus. See above, p. 107.

allowed to pass over to the Peloponnese. The wretched Phocians, who were now entirely at the mercy of Philip, surrendered unconditionally. A council of Amphictyons was assembled, in which of course the deputies of states adverse to them formed the majority. Philip, who was never wantonly cruel, found it necessary to moderate the violence of some of the more zealous, such as the Ceteans, who ferociously proposed that all the grown men should be flung from a rock and killed. He however deemed it prudent to give way to the Thebans and Thessalians, and the following not very gentle decree was passed:—The Phocians were no longer to have any part in the temple or in the Amphictyonic council, their two votes in which were to be given to the king of Macedonia and his posterity; their towns were to be destroyed, and the inhabitants divided into villages of not more than fifty houses each, and not less than a stadion asunder; they were to pay sixty talents a year to the god, till the whole of the treasure should be replaced, and till that was done they were to possess neither horses nor armour: those which they had at present were to be given up; the former to be sold, the latter to be broken and burnt. The Lacedæmonians, as abettors of the sacrilege, were to be excluded from the council; and the presidency of the Pythian games, to be exercised in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians, together with the right of *promanty*, was awarded to the pious king of Macedonia. Philip carried the decree of the Amphictyons into execution, and laid Phocis waste. He offered an asylum in his dominions to the wretched inhabitants, and peopled with them some of the towns which he founded in Thrace.

The Sacred War, excited by the malice and cupidity of the Thebans, thus terminated in the ruin of an innocent people; for surely the Phocians are not chargeable with the guilt of their leaders. It was in every way injurious to Greece: it carried to the height the ruinous practice of mercenary service; and it utterly destroyed the remaining reverence for religion, by scattering the votive offerings of piety, and by inuring men to set at naught the anger of the deities of popular belief.

Historians have endeavoured to show, that all the aiders and abettors of the sacrilege met with due chastisement*: Athens and Sparta, for instance, lost their independence; Archidamus was slain, aiding the Tarentines, in Italy; Phalæcus and several of his men were killed by lightning, as they were making an attempt on the town of Cydonia, in Crete; the remainder were slain, or sold for slaves, by the Arcadians and Eleians; the woman who got the collar of Eriphyle perished in the flames of a house, set fire to by her own son; and she who got that of Helena became a common harlot. Remarks of this kind, however, are little to be heeded; they indicate the weakness of superstition, not the strength of rational religion.

The Athenians alone can now be regarded as the rivals of the king of Macedonia. A glance at the public men at Athens will be therefore of advantage†.

Isocrates, the amiable, the excellent old man, the master of so many statesmen and historians, was still alive. Born five years before the Peloponnesian War, he had been the witness of all the intestine tumults and divisions of Greece, for which he saw no remedy but a general confederacy, headed by the king of Macedonia, against the Persians. But he was a sincere patriot, and never dreamed of sacrificing the independence of Athens.

The *worthy* (χρηστὸς) Phociôn, plain and simple in manners, pure in life, viewed with disgust and contempt the sunken condition of the Athenian character. He was therefore opposed to war, from which he anticipated no substantial advantages to his country; but, like the aristocrats of the preceding period, though he disapproved of her politics, he never refused her his services, and he was chosen general not less than forty-five times by the people, who knew his worth. Had Phociôn been

* Diodor. xvi. 61-64.

† Our views of some of these characters will be found to differ widely from those of Mitford. We are conscious of no prejudice, and that writer's are well known. It is to be observed, that Mitford has not a single follower on the Continent; and, if names are to decide, that of Niebuhr is beyond his. The English historian makes Demosthenes almost worse than Cleôn, the German terms him a (political) saint.

more mild and condescending, his virtues would probably have been more productive of good to the state.

Demosthenes, whose imagination was filled with the glory and power of Athens at the time when Macedonia was as naught in the political scale, could not brook the idea of tamely yielding up the supremacy which she had nearly regained. He was fully aware of the degeneracy of the Athenians; but he relied on his own mighty powers to raise them to a level with himself, and he *did* achieve wonders. The evil, however, was beyond cure; and his policy, therefore, though generous was ill-judged; but the lover of national independence must always view his character with respect and veneration.

Lycurgus, a second Aristeides, felt and thought and acted with Demosthenes. Hypereides, Polyeuctes, Diophantus, Hege-sippus, and others, all men of talent, were on the same side. As political parties never can be altogether pure, this one was disgraced by the unworthy Timarchus.

Against these patriots were arrayed the hirelings of Philip, at the head of whom was Æschines, a man of considerable talent, and, in general, respectable in character. He had been, as he boasted, the first to see through the designs of Philip, and had exerted himself to thwart them*; but, on the occasion of his first embassy to Macedonia, that able prince appears to have found means to purchase his services, and he was to the last the ready agent of his will. Eubûlus, also a man of talent, was said to have been purchased in like manner when on an embassy. Philocrates made no secret of his having sold himself. Demades, originally a boatman, without regular education, but powerful as an extemporary speaker, whose extravagance, it was said, would have wasted even the revenues of Persia, was naturally in the pay of Philip. These were the chief, but several of inferior note actively co-operated with them.

But Philip had a more powerful ally in the character of the Athenian people, who thought only of enjoyment, and shrank from the toils of war. The lower orders were unwilling to

* Demosth., False Embassy, 438.

serve personally, and the rich were adverse to giving their money to hire mercenaries ; and these, when hired, were not to be depended on. Phociôn and Diopëithes were brave and upright officers ; but the swaggering worthless Chares was the favourite of the people, and was but too often preferred to them. The faithless mercenary Charidemus was also frequently employed on expeditions of importance.

With Philip everything was different. He could form his plans in secret, having no popular assembly to persuade ; he had money in abundance ; he had a standing army of mercenaries and of his own subjects, for he had now formed the renowned Macedonian phalanx, a body of greater depth and with longer spears than any that had yet been employed : he had able generals and ministers ; above all, he was himself the first general and statesman of the age. To form and consolidate an empire northwards of Greece, to exercise the hegemony over Greece itself, and to lead a combined army of Greeks and Macedonians to the conquest of Persia, were the objects that guided his policy. There is no reason for supposing that he ever aimed at making Greece a province of his empire.

Having thus shown the policy of Philip and his opponents, we are freed from the necessity of giving the events of the three next years in detail, and shall only briefly point them out. Before, however, we proceed to follow the course of the king of Macedonia, we will notice a collision which took place at Athens, during that period, between the two great rival-orators.

There was a man named Antiphôn, who had been struck out of the list as not being a genuine Athenian citizen ; if we may credit the assertions of Demosthenes, he repaired to Philip, and, for a suitable reward, undertook to serve him, and gratify his own desire of vengeance, by burning the docks at Athens. He then returned secretly, and lurked at the Piræus for that purpose ; but Demosthenes had received information, and he dragged him before the assembly and charged him with his design. Æschines then rose, and crying out against the atrocity of going into private houses without a warrant and insulting

unhappy persons, so moved the people that they let him go. The court of Areiopagus, however, had him taken up again and brought before the people, who, moved by their authority, directed that he should be put to the torture: he then confessed his guilt, and was executed*. This court further testified its opinions of Æschines' character by removing him from the office of *advocate* (σύνδικος), to which the people had nominated him in a dispute between the Athenians and Delians, regarding the custody of the temple of Delos, and appointing Hypereides to plead the cause of Athens in his stead.

The year after the end of the Phocian war (Ol. 108, 4.) Philip spent chiefly in Thrace, founding towns, in which he placed the Phocians and other Greeks. He then turned his arms against the Illyrians, to secure his dominions on that side. Soon afterwards (Ol. 109, 1.), he remodelled Thessaly, so as to put the power there completely into the hands of his own friends: he divided it into its four original provinces, Phthiotis, Histæotis, Pelasgiotis, and Thessaliotis. He also (Ol. 109, 2.) made himself master of Leucas and Ambracia on the Ionian sea, and he formed alliances with the Argives, Messenians, Arcadians and Eleians in the Peloponnese.

Eubœa chiefly attracted his attention, on account of its proximity to Attica. The Eretrians, after the expulsion of Plutarchus, were split into two parties, one for Athens, another for Philip. The latter got the upper hand, and Philip sent thither one thousand mercenaries, and placed the chief power in the hands of Hipparchus, Automedôn and Cleitarchus, who were devoted to him. He acted in the same manner at Oreos, where he set up Philistides, and thus established his influence over the whole island.

Philip again (Ol. 109, 3.) led his troops into Thrace, and extended his conquests as far as the Istêr, where he spent an

* Demosth., Crown, 271. Plutarch (Demosth. 14.) says that Demosthenes' conduct on this occasion was *highly aristocratic*. He observes (as any one must who reads his speeches), that he rebuked and opposed the people with great freedom. Yet Mitford calls him "the favourite and flatterer of the people!" He says also that Demosthenes was no favourite with Plutarch!

entire winter. But the Chersonese and the cities on the Propontis were what he really aimed at. He sent troops to the aid of the Cardians, who were hard-pressed by the Athenians. Diopeithes, whom the Athenians had sent out, took satisfaction for this by an incursion into Thrace; and, when Philip complained, as usual, they, by the advice of Demosthenes, paid no attention to his representations. The orator himself went to the coast of Thrace, on the part of his country, and formed an alliance with the people of Byzantion, Perinthus, Selymbria and some of the petty princes about there; and soon after, the people of Eubœa having solicited aid against their tyrants, an army commanded by Phociôn, who was accompanied by Demosthenes, passed over and restored them to liberty.

Philip, who was now (Ol. 110, 1.)* returned from beyond Mount Hæmus, came and laid siege to Selymbria; and leaving some troops to blockade it, he advanced with thirty thousand men and sat down before Perinthus. He assailed the town incessantly with battering-rams and machines of every kind: but the Perinthians made a gallant defence; the Byzantians sent them supplies of arms; and the Persian satraps of the opposite coast, aware of Philip's ulterior designs, sent them money, corn, arms, and a good body of mercenaries. Philip, having long assailed Perinthus in vain, divided his forces; and leaving one half of them before that town went himself with the remainder and laid siege to Byzantion. But this city being, like Perinthus, built on a peninsula, was easy to defend; and the Athenians, at length fully aware of the designs of Philip, resolved to aid it.

Demosthenes had, with difficulty, gained the advantage over the Macedonian hirelings in the Athenian assembly; and he now showed so plainly the consequences of Philip's becoming master of the Bosphorus, that it was voted (Ol. 110, 2.) that Philip had broken the peace, and a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes was got ready for the relief of Byzantion. But the command was given to the unprincipled Chares, whose character was so notorious that the Byzantians would not ad-

* The wars between the Romans and Samnites commenced this year.

mit him into their harbour. It was then transferred to Phociôn, and him they cheerfully received into their town. The Chians, Coans and Rhodians sent assistance to their ancient allies; and Philip was at length obliged to raise the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantion, the people of which towns decreed all kinds of public honours to the Athenians as their preservers*.

With a view apparently to indemnify his troops for the loss of the plunder of the towns, which he had promised them, Philip took advantage of the alleged treachery of a Scythian prince, and led them once more over Mount Hæmus, and plundered the valley of the Danube. As he was returning, with a large booty of slaves and brood-mares, his army was suddenly fallen on by a tribe named the Triballians, and he himself narrowly escaped being slain in the engagement†.

During Philip's absence in Scythia, accident or design‡ furnished him with a pretext for appearing again in Greece. Æschines being one of the Athenian deputies to the Amphictyonic Council, moved (according to himself) with indignation at the Amphictyons, on the motion of a Locrian of Amphissa, proposing a fine of fifty talents on the Athenians, pointed out to them the Cirrhæan or Crissæan plain, which the Amphissians were cultivating, and the port which they had reopened, and having read to them the ancient oracle and the curses denounced on those who should do so§, left the assembly. An outcry was raised; and next day the Delphians, headed by the Amphictyons, went down into the plain and destroyed the port and burned the houses. The Amphissians came in arms and drove them off. An extraordinary council was held some time after, in which Demosthenes kept the Athenians from sharing, and war was declared against the Amphissians.

* Diodor. xvi. 74-76. Justin, ix. 1, 2. Plut. Phociôn, 14. Demosth., Crown, 252-257.

† Justin, ix. 3.

‡ Demosthenes (Crown, 275, 276) maintained that it had been concerted between Æschines and Philip: Æschines asserted that it was purely accidental, and we are inclined to believe him.

§ See above, p. 59.

But as some states sent no troops, and those which came did nothing, Philip was, at the next meeting (Ol. 110, 3.), chosen general of the Amphictyonic army. He immediately issued his orders to all the members to meet him in arms in Phocis, whither he led his own troops; and having dispersed a body of ten thousand mercenaries, sent by the Athenians to aid the Amphissians, he reduced Amphissa. He then unveiled his designs by suddenly seizing Elateia, the key of Bœotia.

Though the Athenians had been expecting a war with Philip, their dismay was great when they heard of the seizure of Elateia. In the assembly Demosthenes proposed that an embassy should be sent off immediately to Thebes to propose an alliance. This course was adopted, and he himself was named on the embassy; and all the arts and all the eloquence of those sent by Philip to oppose him failed before him, and Thebes joined with Athens. The extraordinary exertions of the same orator had engaged the Corinthians, Megarians and others to unite in the cause of independence; and within six weeks from the seizure of Elateia, a combined army was assembled in Bœotia to oppose the Macedonian monarch*.

The banks of a small stream near Chæroneia witnessed the battle which decided the fate of Greece for ever. The Macedonian army consisted of thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, all veteran troops, and commanded by the ablest generals of the time; that of the confederates was from forty to fifty thousand men, but they were mostly militia, and were led by Chares, and by Lysicles and the Theban Theagenes—men as worthless as Chares himself.

The two armies were drawn out at daybreak. The wing of the Macedonians opposed to the Thebans was led by the young Alexander, aided by experienced officers; Philip himself commanded the other, which stood against the Athenians. The Greeks fought bravely: the Athenians drove back the opposite troops, but incautiously pursuing, they were fallen on and routed by a body of select forces led by Philip in person. The Thebans, in the meantime, were also defeated, and the entire

* Demosth., *Crown*, 284–292. *Plut. Demosth.* 19. *Diodor.* xvi. 85, 86.

Sacred Band cut to pieces. The Athenians had one thousand killed and two thousand taken; the slain of the Thebans exceeded the number of the prisoners, either because they fought more desperately, or were more the objects of the Macedonians' hatred. Philip, with his wonted humanity and wisdom, issued orders when the victory was won to spare the vanquished.

In the evening Philip gave a banquet to his officers, which lasted through the night. At its conclusion, we are told, the whole party went out to view the field of battle. On coming to where the Sacred Band lay united in death as in life, the victor is said to have shed tears, and to have exclaimed, "Perish they who imagine these to have done or endured any disgrace!*" When he came to the part of the field where the Athenians had fought, he gave a loose to his joy, and putting the commencement of Demosthenes' decree into metre sang it aloud†. These anecdotes may be true, or they may be false; but we shall find the subsequent conduct of Philip that of a really great man.

The Athenians, when they heard of the defeat, expected an immediate invasion of Attica. On the motion of Hypereides, it was decreed to place their families and most valuable effects in the Piræus, and to restore the *atimous* to their rights, admit strangers to *isotely*, and give freedom to slaves if they aided in the defence of the city. The inconsiderate people were for giving the command of the troops to Charidemus, when the court of Areiopagus interfered, and Phociôn was appointed to the office‡. But the prisoners taken at Chæroneia now arrived, having been dismissed without ransom; and Antipater, accompanied, it is said§, by the young prince Alexander, came with offers of peace, which were readily accepted. They were required to give up most of their foreign possessions, for which they were to obtain Oropus as a compensation, and to send their deputies to the congress which was to assemble at Corinth. With the Thebans Philip acted more harshly: several of their

* Plut. Pelopidas, 18.

† Plut. Demosth. 20. Just. ix. 4.

‡ Plut. Phociôn, 16.

§ Just. *ut sup.* Plut. Apophth. 30.

leading men were put to death or banished; the exiles were recalled, and a Macedonian garrison was placed in the Cadmeia.

Demosthenes, who was deficient in physical courage, had, we are told, flung away his shield and fled at Chæroneia; but the people, whom he had raised far above their former level, recognising in him the true and unflinching patriot, gave him now one of the strongest proofs they could of their confidence. When the public funeral of those who had fallen at Chæroneia was to be celebrated, he was the person chosen to pronounce the epitaphial oration. This may have been but a piece of Athenian vain-glory and insolence, but we willingly assign it a better motive*.

The following year (Ol. 110, 4.)† a general congress of the Amphietyonic states met at Corinth. Philip had previously, we are informed‡, led his troops into the Peloponnese, exercised hostilities against Lacedæmôn, fixed the boundaries between it and Argos, Arcadia and Messene, and given the chief power in these states to his own friends.

At the congress Philip's orators pictured in glowing colours the evils inflicted by Persia on Greece. No one rose to oppose: war was proclaimed unanimously, and Philip chosen commander-in-chief, with authority to fix the contributions of each state in men and money. The military force of Greece at this time is given§ as 200,000 foot and 15,000 horse, exclusive of the Macedonians. Philip then returned to Macedonia; and his first care was to send a part of his troops, under Parmeniôn and Attalus, over to Asia, to occupy some of the Grecian towns there, and acquire intelligence respecting the strength and the means of the Persian empire.

Though polygamy was not tolerated by the manners of Greece, it appears to have been regarded differently in Macedonia; for Philip was married at the same time to the daugh-

* Demosth., Crown, 320. Plut. Demosth. 21.

† The great war between the Romans and Latins broke out in this year.

‡ Polyb. ix. 28. xvii. 14. Paus. ii. 20, 1. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 9. Tacit. Ann. iv. 43. The orators do not make the slightest allusion to it.

§ Justin, ix. 5.

ters of several of the neighbouring princes*. These however seem to have been merely political matches; but now urged apparently by affection or passion alone, he espoused the niece of Attalus, who was one of his principal officers, a circumstance which was mediately the cause of his death: for Attalus had given the most cruel and degrading insult to a young Macedonian of the body-guard, named Pausanias, who, having already sought justice in vain of the king, resolved to avenge his injuries on him who had refused to redress them.

The nuptials of his daughter Cleopatra with the king of Epeirus taking place at this time (Ol. 111, 1.), Philip, who loved show and splendour, celebrated them at Ægæ with great magnificence. Numbers repaired thither from all parts of Greece, and golden crowns from individuals and states were presented to him in profusion. Games, plays and processions occupied the day, banquets the night; joy and festivity filled the thoughts of all; one spirit alone was gloomy.

To show his confidence in all about him, Philip directed his guards to keep at some distance from him. He approached the entrance of the theatre, and sending his friends in before him, was preparing to follow, when Pausanias, who was lying in wait, rushed on him and plunged his sword into his body. The king fell dead; the murderer ran to where he had a horse at hand for flight; but the bridle being tied to a vine, he stumbled and fell, and Perdiccas, an officer of the guard, came up and killed him on the spot†.

Thus perished, in the noon of his glory and only in the forty-seventh year of his age, the able king of Macedonia. The great abilities of Philip must be acknowledged by every one who reads his history. A consummate statesman, an able general, an accomplished gentleman, he united all the qualities which lead to dominion: his very vices‡ and failings were

* Athen. xiii. 557.

† Diodor. xvi. 91-95. Arist. Pol. v. 8. Mitford and his disciples have endeavoured, in spite of all probability, to make Demosthenes a confederate with Pausanias.

‡ Theopompus (*apud* Athenæum) has left a fearful picture of Philip's

sued to further his views ; by his love of wine and revelry he attached the rude Macedonians and Thessalians, while his excessive passion for the drama and taste for the arts recommended him to the Greeks. The object of his ambition was to be the head of the Greek nation ; but, unlike a vulgar conqueror, he acted with true political wisdom, and did not sacrifice the substance for the show : he would be at the head of a free confederation, he would exercise dominion without constraint, and therefore he left each state to its own constitution and laws, and incorporated none in his empire. Where traitors were to be purchased, he paid for them liberally ; and to what government is *secret service* money unknown ? He also employed the usual artifices of statesmen, and could be false and break engagements when it served his purpose : but the end he proposed would have been beneficial to Greece, were it not that Providence seems to have decreed that she never should know the blessings of concord and unity.

CHAPTER III.*

Alexander the Great.

OL. 111, 1-114, 2. B.C. 336-223.

THE direction of the extensive empire which Philip had created fell now to his son Alexander. The young monarch was only in the twentieth year of his age ; but nature had bestowed on him talents of the highest order, and the wisdom of his father had aided to develope them by placing him under the care of the great Aristotle. It was now to be seen if his abilities were adequate to the consolidating and extending of the dominion which Philip had left.

vices ; but the malignity of that historian is such that we must always make deductions from his statements. See Polybius, viii. 11-13.

* Arrian, Expedition of Alexander. Plut. Alexander, Diodor. xvii. Quintus Curtius.

As soon as he had celebrated his father's obsequies and regulated the affairs of Macedonia, where he won the hearts of the people by reducing the taxes, he placed himself at the head of an army and advanced into Greece; for the Athenians, urged by Demosthenes, who had testified in rather an unbecoming manner his joy at the murder of Philip*, were preparing for war, and the Thebans were about to expel the garrison from the Cadmeia. Aware of the advantage of promptitude and vigour, Alexander appeared suddenly in Bœotia, and came and encamped at the foot of the Theban citadel. The Thebans feared to stir; the Athenians, apprehensive of an invasion, collected all their property into the town, and then sent an embassy to apologise for what they had done. Demosthenes himself was one of those sent; but his courage failing him, he went no further than Mount Cithærôn. Alexander received the embassy with great favour. He invited deputies from all parts of Greece to meet him at Corinth, and he was there unanimously appointed general autocrator of the army to be employed to avenge on the Persians their former invasion of Greece; the only dissidents being the Lacedæmonians, who, thinking more of what they had been than of what they were, said that it had always been their custom to lead, not to follow.

Alexander had hardly returned to Macedonia when (Ol. 111, 2.) his attention was called to the Illyrians, the Triballians, and other rude tribes, who sought to take advantage of the weakness incident to a new reign. The resistance, however, which they could make against the disciplined troops of Macedonia was but feeble. Alexander crossed Mount Hæmus, between which and the Istêr the Triballians dwelt, and having reduced them, passed that river to make war on the Getans, who occupied its further bank. While he was there reports of his defeat and death were spread through Greece. Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Deinarchus, and other orators excited the Athenians to cast off the Macedonian yoke. The Thebans, who had lost everything at Chæroneia, were easily induced to

* Æschines, Ctes. 64. Plutarch, Demosth. 22.

strike once more for freedom: they fell on and slew a part of the Macedonian garrison, which they caught outside of the Cadmeia, and then raised a rampart round that fortress, and sent to summon aid from Argos, Elis and Arcadia. The Athenians voted them succours, but sent none. Demosthenes of himself made them a present of a large quantity of arms.

In seven days from the time that the tidings reached him in Illyria, Alexander was in Thessaly; six more brought him thence to Thebes, with thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. The Peloponnesian allies, hearing of his arrival, halted at the Isthmus: the Thebans, though left alone, would listen to no offers of accommodation; they gave him battle before their gates, and after a most sanguinary conflict were overcome, and the city stormed. To gratify the Thespians, Plateæans, Orchomenians, Phocians, and the other enemies of the Thebans, the city was plundered and destroyed, and the surviving inhabitants sold for slaves.

Alexander sent next to Athens, demanding that the orators and generals* who had shown themselves his constant enemies should be delivered up to him. The people were in great anguish and perplexity: Phociôn called on the orators to imitate the daughters of Leôn and Hyacinthus, who, as the legends told, had sacrificed themselves for their country: the people however hooted, and would not listen to him; and when Demosthenes spoke in behalf of himself and his friends, they evinced the greatest sympathy. Demades (gained, it was said, by a bribe of five talents from those who were in danger,) proposed a decree artfully worded, declaring that if guilty they should be punished according to law, and he was sent with this decree to Alexander. The young king, who now regretted his severity to the Thebans, was easily induced to forgive, and only Ephialtes and the notorious Charidemus were obliged to quit Athens†.

Greece being now reduced to submission, Alexander called

* Namely, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hypercides, Polyæuctes, Ephialtes, Diotimus, Mærocles, and the generals Chares and Charidemus.

† Diodor. xvii. 15. Plut., Demosth. 23.

on the different states for their contingents of troops; and having on his return home celebrated the feast of the Muses for nine days with great magnificence, and left Antipater with twelve thousand men to govern his European dominions, he crossed the Hellespont early in the spring, at the head of thirty thousand foot and four thousand five hundred horse to achieve the conquest of Asia. (Ol. 111, 3.)

It is not our intention to detail minutely the exploits of this greatest of conquerors, which belong not properly to Grecian history, and which would justly require a separate work.* A very brief sketch of them therefore must suffice.

The Persian empire had run the usual course of Asiatic dominion; murder, treason, and their attendant crimes had become frequent in the royal house, and the coherence of the different parts of the huge empire was growing feebler every day. The eunuch Bagôas, who now disposed of the throne, had placed on it Darius Codomannus, of a distant branch of the royal family. This prince, to whom misfortune has given interest, was hardly seated on his throne when the young Macedonian monarch entered Asia to dispute it with him.

When the Persian officers near the Hellespont heard of the approach of Alexander, they collected their forces to oppose him. Memnôn†, the Rhodian, who was in their camp, strongly advised not to give battle, but to retire and lay the country waste behind them; but the haughty Persians spurned this prudent counsel: they engaged with their raw troops, at the little river Granicus, the soldiers whom Philip had trained to conquest, and sustained a total defeat. The Persian army vanished, the Greeks in their pay were put to death as traitors, and Asia

* A more detailed account of the conquests of Alexander will be found in our 'Elementary History of Greece.'

† Mentôr and Memnon were two young Rhodians, whose sister the satrap Artabazus had married. Mentôr engaged in the service of the king (Darius Ochus), and was of great use in putting down the rebellion in Egypt; Memnôn, who shared the fortune of his brother-in-law, had to seek refuge with Philip. Through Mentôr's influence they were both pardoned. We see, therefore, how Memnôn was the fittest person to oppose to the Macedonians and Greeks, with whom he was well acquainted.

Minor became the prize of the conqueror. All the Greek cities of the coast opened their gates to him and he re-established their democracies. Sardes was surrendered by its Persian governor: no resistance was met till he reached Halicarnassus, in Caria, which Memnôn defended obstinately for some time. During the siege, Ephialtes, the exiled Athenian, was slain fighting bravely against those who had driven him from his country. Memnôn at length, finding the town no longer tenable, retired to Côs; and Alexander, advancing down the coast, continued to receive the submissions of the inhabitants.

Darius had now sent Memnôn a large supply of money, and committed to him the conduct of the war. This able commander, well-acquainted with the state of things in Greece, knew that it was there, and not in Asia, that Alexander must be assailed. He collected a fleet of three hundred ships, and made himself master of the Ægæan; he opened a communication with the Greeks who were ill-affected to Alexander, and was on the point of organising a powerful confederacy against him when the conqueror's fortune prevailed. Memnôn was carried off by a disease, and no one remained to take his place.

Alexander was now (Ol. 111, 4.) in Cilicia; and Darius, who had assembled an army of half a million of men at Babylon, was advancing to meet him. In a council of war it had been debated whether the king himself should lead his army and put all on the hazard of a battle, or send a force under his generals. Many of the gallant Persian nobles spoke in favour of the former course; but Charidemus, who was present, asserted that one hundred thousand men, of whom a third should be Greeks, would suffice, and pledged himself with that force to ensure the safety of the empire. This counsel was opposed by the Persians, who hinted that his object was to betray the army to the Macedonians. Charidemus grew warm, and spoke with contempt of the cowardice and effeminacy of the Persians. Darius, unused to such language, in a moment of irritation gave the signal to his attendants to put him to death, and the faithless drunken mercenary perished, the victim of his freedom of speech.

At the pass of Issus, leading from Cilicia into Syria, Darius gave battle to the Macedonians. He was totally defeated; his mother, wife and children fell into the hands of the victor, whose generous treatment of them does him eternal honour. Damascus, where the treasure and baggage of the Persian army lay, opened its gates to Parmeniôn, and no resistance was attempted till the army reached Tyre. (Ol. 112, 1.)

The loss of the Persians at Issus is said to have been 110,000 men, that of the Macedonians only 450. There were in the army of Darius 30,000 Greek mercenaries, 10,000 of whom had belonged to the army of Memnôn, and had come by sea from Lesbos to Phœnicia. After the battle 12,000 of these men marched to Tripolis, and got aboard of the vessels which were lying there; 4000 of them sailed for Egypt, where they nearly made themselves masters of the country; the remainder proceeded to Greece, where Agis king of Lacedæmôn took them into pay.

Tyre stood a siege of seven months; the neighbouring towns and country all submitted; Egypt joyfully received the conqueror. While there, Alexander laid the foundation of the city named from himself, which soon became the great emporium of the trade of the East; he also marched with a select body of troops through the desert to the oasis in which the temple and oracle of Ammon lay, and had himself (probably with a politic view to future events) pronounced by the priests to be the offspring of a god.

Hearing that Darius had assembled another army, he quitted Egypt and led his troops over the Euphrates and Tigris (Ol. 112, 2.), and near a village named Gaugamêla*, at the foot of the Carduchian (*Kûrdish*) mountains, he came up with the host of Darius, estimated at a million of men, while his own army could not at most have exceeded fifty thousand. Victory, as usual, declared for the Europeans: Darius fled to the northern provinces. Alexander first took Babylôn, and then Susa, where he found immense treasures; he next advanced

* Strabo, xvi. p. 737. It is usually called the battle of Arbêla, though that place is forty miles distant from the field of the battle.

to Persepolis, where he remained four months. The following year (Ol. 112, 3.) he directed his course northwards to Ecbatana in Media, expecting to find Darius there. Learning that the unhappy prince was now a captive in the hands of Bessus, satrap of Bactria (*Balkh*), and two other of the Persian nobles, he pursued them so closely, that, unable to convey their captive with them, they mortally wounded and left him on the road, where he was found by Alexander. According to Oriental maxims, Alexander was now the rightful king, and he made it his duty to avenge the death of his predecessor; but before he pursued Bessus, he employed himself in reducing Hyrcania, Parthia, and the rest of the country around the Caspian. All the present Khorassân submitted: he then entered Arachosia (*Affghânistân*), where he founded another Alexandria, in which he left Menôn with four thousand Greeks. Turning northwards, he built another city of the same name (*Candahâr*), and led his army over the snowy Caucasus, or Paropamisus (*Hindû Kû*), into Bactriâna. When Bessus heard of his approach he fled over the Oxus (*Amû*) into Sogdiâna; and there he was seized and delivered to Alexander, who gave him up to the vengeance of the brother and other relatives of Darius. Crossing the Oxus (Ol. 112, 4.), he advanced to Maracanda (*Sa-markand*), where he remounted his cavalry with the excellent horses there to be found, and he then moved on to the fertile country beyond the Jaxartes (*Sihon*, or *Sir*). He spent a year and a half in these regions, where he founded several towns, on account of the great commerce of which they have been at all times the seat. To give security to this province, he reduced most of the strong hill-forts which surrounded it.

The Macedonian prince now prepared to lead his army into India, where he had already, with a view to this expedition, formed an alliance with a rajah who ruled beyond the Indus. He marched (Ol. 113, 2.) from Bactriana to Candahâr in ten days, thence along the Choës (*Urgundâb*) to Arigæon (*Câbûl*), and along the river Cophes (*Câbûl*) to its junction with the Indus at Taxila (*Attock*). In this country the Macedonians met tribes far more valiant than any they had yet encountered, and

in attacking their towns and hill-forts their king had often to expose his own person. This people were the ancestors or predecessors of the Seekhs, who now occupy the country, and whose manners are nearly the same as theirs.

After crossing the Indus (Ol. 113, 3.) the march was easy, as the country thence to the Hydaspes (*Behût*) obeyed Taxiles, the friendly rajah, who now became the vassal of the conqueror. From the Hydaspes to the Acesines (*Chenâb*) reigned a prince named Porus, who had led a large army to oppose the invaders' passage of the former river. The passage, however, was forced, the Indian army totally defeated, and Porus himself made a prisoner; but Alexander, acting with his usual good policy, restored to him his kingdom. He then led his troops over the Acesines and conquered all the country thence to the Hydraôtes (*Râvi*), which river he also passed. The whole of the country thus reduced (the *Punjab*) he placed under the dominion of Porus.

The conqueror at length reached the banks of the Hyphasis, or Hypanis (*Sutlej*); but there his troops, who since their entrance into India had only had toilsome marching and hard fighting, with no plunder to reward them, and who now heard that beyond that river lay a desert of twelve days' journey, with an immense and warlike population on the other side of it, began to murmur. He called a council of his generals, and it was decided to advance no further. The word was given to return, and twelve altars or towers were erected to mark the point which they had reached. On coming to the Hydaspes he collected boats and canoes, and with a part of his army sailed along it to its junction with the Indus, down which river the rest of the army proceeded in the same manner. He then (Ol. 113, 4.) advanced along the Indus, reducing the various nations on its western side. When he reached Sinda, he sent a great part of the army away under Craterus, with directions to proceed through Arachosia and Drangiana, and to meet him in Carmania (*Kermân*); and having reached the sea, he gave a select number of ships to Nearchus, one of his ablest generals, with orders to sail along the coast to the mouth

of the Euphrates. He then, with his army, set forth on his return to Persia through the deserts of Gedrosia (*Mekran*), of the terrors of which he was quite unaware. The sufferings of the army were extreme; a vast number of the men and all the beasts of burden perished; all the baggage and booty were abandoned in the desert. After a march of sixty days they reached Carmania, where an abundant supply of provisions had been prepared for them. Here Alexander assembled all the governors of provinces and other officers, and rewarded or punished them according to their deserts. Having feasted and refreshed his army, he proceeded to Susa (Ol. 114, 1.)*, where he married one of Darius' daughters himself, and gave her sister to his friend Hephæstiôn. It being his design to unite the two nations as much as possible, he encouraged his officers to marry Persian ladies, and gave portions not only to these, but to ten thousand women of inferior rank whom he matched with his soldiers. He also levied large bodies of Persian troops, whom he incorporated with the Macedonians, which caused great discontent among the Europeans, who had reckoned on appropriating to themselves all the advantages of the conquest.

Quitting Susa, Alexander, who meditated great plans of commerce in the Persian gulf, went and personally inspected all the streams, canals, etc. in the country about the Lower Tigris. He then repaired to Babylôn, where he held a review of his entire army. Here a general mutiny broke out; but by his presence of mind and courage he speedily quelled it. At Babylôn, which he intended for the capital of his empire, he made preparations for the conquest of Arabia, and directed the construction of a haven and dockyards on the Persian gulf; but, in the midst of his plans, a fever, the consequence probably of his great exertions of mind and body, carried him off, in the thirty-third year of his age, and all his mighty projects came to naught. (Ol. 114, 2.)

We have somewhere met with these words, "Alexander, *falsely* named the Great;" and did we not know the natural imbecility of some minds, and their utter want of perception of

* The second Samnite war commenced this year.

the grand and the sublime, we might marvel at such language. If ever man was truly great, it was Alexander. All the talents and all the virtues that ennoble human nature were united in him. A statesman and general of the highest order, polished in manners, fond of literature, temperate in pleasure, faithful to his word, humane, just and generous,—what was wanting to complete the truly great man? That he was covetous of fame, is to his praise; that he had the ambition to be a conqueror, will be condemned only by those who expect our nature to be different from what it is; that he could not wholly withstand the intoxication of power, and gave way to fits of anger, redeemed however by speedy and sincere repentance, only showed that he was but a mortal. Ever must the conqueror of Persia be the object of wonder and admiration. His clemency to those he subdued is gratifying to our feelings; but his enlarged and comprehensive plan of forming the greater part of the civilized world into one empire, united by civil and commercial advantages, excites amazement, joined with regret for its impracticability, but with veneration for the mind which had conceived it.

CHAPTER IV.*

War in Greece.—Demosthenes and Æschines.—Harpalus at Athens.—Lamian War.—Death of Demosthenes;—His character.—Death of Demades.

OL. 114, 2–114, 3. B.C. 323–322.

WHILE Alexander was thus achieving the conquest of the East, Greece remained in general tranquil: an effort of the Lacedæmonians to cast off the Macedonian supremacy alone disturbed it.

About the time of the battle of Arbela (Ol. 112, 2.), a war broke out simultaneously in Thrace and in the Peloponnese. In the former, an officer, who is named Memnôn, and who was

* Diodor. xviii. 8–18, 24, 25. Plut. Phocion, 23–29. Demosth. 24–31.

probably a captain of mercenaries, raised the standard of revolt; in the latter, Agis, one of the Spartan kings, having taken into pay eight thousand of the mercenaries who had escaped from Issus, called on the Greeks to resume their independence. His call was attended to by the Eleians, the Achæans and the Arcadians (the Megalopolitans excepted), and many volunteers came from the other states: but no people without the Isthmus shared in the enterprise. The Athenians, in particular, were now so well-affected to Alexander, that even Demosthenes either would not or could not excite them to arms; for with consummate prudence, the Macedonian prince let no occasion pass of testifying his esteem and consideration for the Athenian people. After the battle of the Granicus, he sent them a part of the booty to adorn their temples: at Issus, where he found ambassadors from the Grecian states in the camp of Darius, he carried with him, as prisoners, the Lacedæmonian ministers, while he dismissed the Athenians with honour; at Tyre, when he met there, on his return from Egypt, the Paralian trireme, with envoys sent to request the liberty of the Athenians taken at the Granicus, he granted their request without hesitation; from Susa he sent them the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which Xerxes had carried away from Athens.

The affairs of the Peloponnese being the most formidable, Antipater, having settled those of Thrace as well as he could for the present, proceeded thither with all the forces he could collect. On the way he was joined by the troops of the allied states, and he entered the Peloponnese at the head of forty thousand men. Agis, who was besieging Megalopolis with twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, gave him battle near that town; and after an obstinate conflict, in which the gallant Spartan king and five thousand of his troops fell on the one side, and three thousand five hundred men on the other, victory remained with Antipater. As he had yet to arrange the affairs of Thrace, and could not keep his army long together, he used his victory with moderation, only requiring of the Spartans to send a humble embassy to the East to sue for pardon.

The year in which Alexander became monarch of the East (Ol. 112, 3.) witnessed the most remarkable combat of oratory that has ever occurred. Shortly after the battle of Chæroneia, Ctesiphôn, a friend of Demosthenes, had moved that the orator should be crowned with a golden crown on account of his public services. Æschines immediately accused him of violation of law (*παράνομων*), as Demosthenes held public offices* and had not yet stood the Euthyne, as he proposed that it should be proclaimed in the theatre of Bacchus, instead of the Pnyx, and as the reason which he assigned was untrue. Various causes delayed the trial for some years; at length it came on, and numbers resorted from all parts of Greece to witness it. Æschines put forth his entire strength; he quoted the laws, he arraigned the whole political life of Demosthenes, and defended his own: the Macedonian party were naturally in his favour. Demosthenes, for whom the attack was really intended, in a speech of unrivalled energy and power, justified his own, and impugned his opponent's political conduct; and, in the eyes of assembled Greece, his fellow-citizens declared so unanimously their conviction of the purity of his patriotism, that the prosecutor, though the letter of the law was with him, did not get a fifth of the votes, and consequently became liable to a pecuniary penalty. The fine imposed by law was small, but he could not bear to remain in a place where he had met with so signal a defeat. He therefore quitted Athens and retired to Rhodes, where he opened a school of rhetoric and eloquence.

How little is the favour of a democracy to be relied on! Six years afterwards (Ol. 114, 1.) Demosthenes was himself an exile: the following was the occasion. Among those who in the time of Philip supported the cause of Alexander and his mother so strenuously as to be obliged to quit Macedonia, was a man named Harpalus. The grateful prince, on coming to the throne, promoted them all, and Harpalus became his treasurer. He was at Ecbatana when Alexander set out for India; and probably expecting that he would never return,

* He was treasurer of the theatric fund, and he had the charge of repairing a part of the city-walls.

he gave a loose to his appetites, and squandered the royal treasure with the most reckless profusion. But when he heard of the rigid justice his sovereign was exercising in Gedrosia, he deemed his only safety to be in flight; and taking with him five thousand talents and a corps of six thousand mercenaries, he came down to the coast, and sailing to cape Tænaron, left his troops there, and proceeding with his treasure to Athens became a suppliant to the people. Some advised to receive him; Demosthenes urged to drive him away, and not to plunge the state into a war. It was said, however, that Harpalus persuaded the orator to accept twenty talents and be silent in the assembly, and that Demosthenes appeared next day with his throat muffled up as if he had the quinsy. Harpalus was, however, forced to depart: the people kept his treasure for the king, as they said to Antipater when he demanded it. On the motion of Demosthenes, the Areiopagus instituted an inquiry respecting the bribery; and Demosthenes himself being found guilty, was fined fifty talents, and, as his property amounted only to twenty, he was cast into prison till he should pay the remainder. His escape, however, was connived at, and he took up his abode at Trœzên and Ægina, whence with tears in his eyes he used to regard the opposite coast of Attica.

Demosthenes himself, we are assured, constantly denied having taken money from Harpalus, and strong evidence was given in disproof of the charge*. Those who are disposed to think favourably of him will therefore see in the whole affair only an instance of the influence of the Macedonian party.

When the news of the death of Alexander arrived in Europe, a war—the last struggle of Greece for independence—broke out. This war had been, however, already in preparation from the following cause. Alexander, wishing to obviate

* Pausanias, ii. 33, 3. "Providence," says Niebuhr, "which permitted the honour of the most magnanimous of all statesmen to be long degraded in the judgement of the credulous, has caused all the circumstances of the transaction to be so well preserved, that the vileness of the calumny is as apparent as if we were his contemporaries." See the Philological Museum, vol. i. p. 497, and Thirlwall's Hist of Greece, vii. 154 *seq.*

any disturbance in Greece which might interfere with the plans he meditated*, and desirous for this purpose to have a party in each state bound to him by the ties of gratitude and interest, resolved to restore all political exiles to their country. For this purpose he sent a letter, addressed to the exiles, which was read aloud by the herald at the Olympic games. (Ol. 114, 1.) The exiles, of whom more than twenty thousand were present, received the announcement with delight, and most states willingly re-admitted them. But the Athenians and the Ætolians heard the letter read with dislike and apprehension; for the former saw that by its tenor they would be called on to restore to the Samians the lands which they had seized forty years before, and divided among their colonists; the Ætolians had similar fears respecting the tribe of the Cœniades, whom they had expelled and seized their lands.

The Athenians secretly directed Leosthenes, an able officer, to take into pay, as it were on his own account, the mercenaries left by Harpalus at Tænaron, who with those that had joined them there, amounted to eight thousand men, all experienced soldiers. He did as directed, and Antipater's suspicions were not awakened. As soon, however, as the death of Alexander was known for certain, the Athenians sent Leosthenes a part of Harpalus' treasure and several suits of armour, and desired him to act openly for the advantage of the state. He accordingly passed over with his troops to Ætolia, where he was joyfully received, and joined by six thousand men: he then sent to invite the Locrians, Phocians, and neighbouring peoples, to rise in the cause of independence. (Ol. 114, 2.)

At Athens, the wealthy part of the people, who enjoyed the advantages of peace, and whose property was increasing every day, were strongly adverse to the idea of a war, the expenses of which they knew would fall on them; but they were far outnumbered in the assembly by those who looked for gain from war, or who had been animated by Demosthenes with the old Athenian spirit. A decree was made to get ready forty

* This explains why every effort should be made to remove Demosthenes from Athens.

triremes and two hundred quatriremes, and directing that all Athenians under forty years of age should serve ; seven phyles to take the field, three to remain and guard the country ; and that embassies should be sent to all Grecian states, to inform them that the Athenians were, as of old, prepared to risk everything for the independence of Greece. The embassies were in general favourably received ; but prudent people thought that the Athenians were acting with more zeal than discretion.

The Lacedæmonians (who with their usual pride would not serve under the Athenians), the Arcadians, and the Achæans, remained neuter ; the Corinthians were kept from joining by the garrison in their citadel, and the Bœotians by their self-interest. All the other states shared in the war.

The Athenians sent a force of five thousand foot and five hundred horse of their own citizens, and two thousand mercenaries, to join Leosthenes in Ætolia. The Bœotians, to whom Alexander had given the Theban territory, knowing that if the Athenians were successful, one of their first acts would be the restoration of Thebes, and whom self-interest therefore attached to the Macedonian cause, posted themselves at Plataea to oppose their progress : but Leosthenes hastened with a division of his troops to join the Athenians, and their united forces defeated the Bœotians. He then advanced to Pylæ, and awaited the approach of the Macedonians on the Thessalian side of the pass.

As Macedonia had been greatly drained of men by the constant demand for them in Asia, Antipater, when the war broke out, sent to Craterus, who was in Cilicia with the discharged Macedonians, whom he was leading home, begging of him to hasten to his aid. He also applied to Leonnâtus, who commanded in Phrygia, offering him his daughter in marriage : then, placing himself at the head of thirteen thousand foot and six hundred horse, he entered Thessaly. A fine body of Thessalian cavalry joined his standard, but at the solicitation of the Athenians they went over to Leosthenes. The Macedonians were in consequence totally defeated, and Antipater, unable

to effect his return through Thessaly, was obliged to shut himself up in the town of Lamia. Leosthenes came and encamped before the town : he drew out his forces and offered battle to no purpose, and his assaults were repelled, for the town was strongly fortified : he therefore converted the siege into a blockade, relying on the aid of famine. The Ætolians, having obtained his permission, took the opportunity of returning home for some time to arrange their national affairs.

Leosthenes, it is evident, was a man of ability ; but fortune, who would have the Greeks humbled, soon deprived them of his services. Antipater one day sallied out and fell on the party who were sinking the ditch round the town : Leosthenes hurried to the aid of his men ; a stone struck him on the head and he was carried senseless to the camp, where he expired on the third day. The Athenian people buried him with heroic honours ; and as Demosthenes was in exile, the task of pronouncing his funeral oration was committed to Hypereides, the orator next in repute. Antiphilus, a man also of ability, succeeded Leosthenes in his command.

Leonnatus lost no time in coming to the aid of Antipater : he passed over to Europe, and having collected what troops he could in Macedonia, entered Thessaly with upwards of twenty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse. The Greeks, when they heard of his approach, set fire to their camp before Lamia ; and having placed their baggage and useless persons in the town of Meliteia, advanced to give him battle before he should be joined by Antipater. They had now but twenty-two thousand foot, as the Ætolians and several others were absent ; but their horse amounted to upwards of three thousand five hundred, of which two thousand were Thessalians, led by their gallant chief Menôn. When the armies met, the horse on both sides engaged : Leonnatus, fighting gallantly, received several wounds, of which he died when carried to the rear. The advantage was decisive on the part of the Greeks ; and the Macedonian phalanx, fearing the charges of their cavalry, retired to the neighbouring heights, where next day they were joined by Antipater, who took the command ; but on ac-

count of the superiority of the Greeks in cavalry he kept to the heights, not venturing to descend into the plain.

Craterus was meantime (Ol. 111, 3.) on his way to relieve Antipater. He set out with six thousand of the veterans, and on his march he picked up four thousand more ; he had one thousand Persian archers and slingers and fifteen hundred horse. On reaching Thessaly he placed his troops under the command of Antipater, who now encamped on the banks of the Peneius with forty thousand hoplites, three thousand light troops, and five thousand horse. The Greeks, whose numbers were greatly reduced by the absence of the Ætolians and others who had not returned, and who at best were, with the exception of the mercenaries, nothing but militia, carefully avoided a general action, more especially as their numbers were not one half of those of the enemy. At length, however, Antipater succeeded in bringing them to an engagement near the town of Crannôn. The Athenians and Thessalians fought worthy of their fame ; the victory was undecided, but this battle ended the independence of Greece. The leaders of the allied army saw that it was useless to struggle against the might of Macedonia, while the greater part of the Greeks contented themselves with being mere spectators of the conflict ; they therefore sent proposals of peace to Antipater. He required however that each state should treat separately : the Greeks hesitated : he and Craterus attacked and reduced the Thessalian towns one after another. The Thessalians were thus obliged to make a separate peace ; other states followed their example ; and at length the Athenians and Ætolians were left alone.

Antipater was about to lead his forces into Attica, and the people seeing no hopes of being able to resist him, sent an embassy to sue for peace. The deputies sent were, Demades, who had been thrice made *atimous*, and who was now restored to his civic rights that he might use his influence in behalf of his country ; the noble Phociôn, who was on the most intimate terms with Antipater ; the Platonic philosopher Xenocrates, and some others. Phociôn and Demades met with a friendly

reception; but the terms granted were the hardest that Antipater, under present circumstances, could impose. He required that the Athenian constitution should be altered; that the government should be placed in the hands of those who had above 20 minas of property, and who alone should have a right to vote in the assemblies; to those under that class he offered to give lands in Thrace: he insisted that Demosthenes, Hypereides and some other orators should be given up to his vengeance, and a Macedonian garrison be received into the Munychia.

Upwards of twelve thousand citizens were thus disfranchised, a part of whom migrated to Thrace: those who had the requisite property and remained amounted to nine thousand. Fortunately for Athens, Phociôn, whose virtues (whatever might have been thought of his politics) no one could dispute, was placed at the head of the new government; and by his wise regulations and the enjoyment of peace, though the independence of the state was gone, the fortunes of the individual citizens rapidly increased. It is, however, a remarkable fact, that Athens never again raised her head, and she is henceforth one of the most insignificant states in Greece; chiefly distinguished by the baseness of her adulation of the Græco-Macedonic kings of Europe and Asia*, and of the senate and generals of the Roman republic.

The fate of the mighty orator, of him who had roused his country to her expiring efforts for her lost supremacy, must claim the sympathy of every generous mind.

When the Athenians sent ambassadors, calling on the Greeks to unite against Antipater, Demosthenes, though an exile, joined them, and as usual rose superior to the advocates of Macedonia. The Athenian people, now free to act, joyfully passed a decree for his recall; a trireme was sent to fetch him from Ægina: magistrates, priests and people poured forth to meet him as he came from the Piræus. He stretched forth his hands and blessed the day, pronouncing his return more glorious than that of Alcibiades, for his fellow-citizens received

him through persuasion, not by force. As the fine still hung over him, the people, to elude the law, appointed him to adorn the altar of Zeus the Saviour, and assigned him thirty talents for the purpose.

Demosthenes, Hypereides, and some others, as soon as they heard of the battle of Crannôn, knowing that all was over, withdrew secretly from the city. A sentence of death was passed on them by the people, at the proposal of Demades, in order to propitiate Antipater; and a man named Archias, who had earned for himself the opprobrious title of Exile-hunter (*φυγαδοθήρας*), was sent with soldiers, by Antipater, to seize them. He dragged Hypereides and two others from the Æa-ceion in Ægina, where they had taken refuge, and sent them to Antipater at Cleonæ, by whom they were put to death. Hearing that Demosthenes had taken sanctuary at the temple of Poseidôn, in the little isle of Calauria, the Exile-hunter proceeded thither. After vainly seeking to induce him to quit the temple and go with him to Antipater, assuring him he would sustain no injury, he began to threaten: Demosthenes replied, "Wait a little, till I write a few words home," and went into the temple; and taking a book, as if to write, he put the top of the pen into his mouth, as in the act of thought; having held it there some time, he wrapped his head in his cloak and reclined. The guards at the door mocked him as a coward: Archias came, and desiring him to rise, repeated his former promises. Feeling the poison he had taken now beginning to operate, he uncovered his head, and repelling Archias, said, "O beloved Poseidôn, I rise from thy fane while I am yet alive; even thy temple is not left unprofaned by Antipater and the Macedonians." He desired them to support him, then tottered on, and dropped dead as he was passing the altar. His death, it was observed, took place during the festival of the Thesmophoria, on the day on which the women fasted sitting on the ground, in commemoration of the grief of the goddess.

The philosopher Panætius remarked, that the speeches of Demosthenes were distinguished by the preference which they

evinced of the morally beautiful (τὸ καλὸν) to the agreeable, the easy and the advantageous. We have observed above that he rated the Athenian people too high ; but who can avoid admiring the steadfastness and consistency of his whole political life ? “ His politics,” says Heeren, “ came forth from the very recesses of his soul : he remained true to his feelings and his conviction, spite of all change of relations, of all menacing dangers. Hence was he the most powerful of orators, since no compromise with his conviction, no half yielding, no symptom of weakness in general is visible in him. This is the true kernel of his art ; all the rest is only the shell. In this how high does he tower above Cicero ! But who has ever suffered more severely for this greatness than he ? Among all political characters Demosthenes is the most highly and purely tragic that history is acquainted with. When, still penetrated by the tremendous power of his words, we peruse his life in Plutarch, when we transfer ourselves to his times, to his position, we are carried away by a sympathy such as the hero of an epic or a tragedy could hardly excite. From his first appearance to the moment when he takes the poison in the temple, we behold him in conflict with a destiny that seems almost cruelly to mock him : it flings him down repeatedly, but never conquers him. What a flood of feelings must have assailed his manly bosom in this change of reviving and cheated hopes ! How naturally did the furrows of melancholy and indignation, which we still perceive on his image, plough themselves into that serious countenance * ! ”

Demosthenes was naturally the object of virulent slander in his own day, and he was, of course, accused of taking bribes. Space does not allow of our examining the several charges, but we will ask what credit can be given to the assertion of Æschines, who describes him as bribed by Philip ? As to his having received money from the court of Persia, we may allow

* Would it not have augmented the orator's melancholy to have known that two thousand years after his death every disingenuous art would be employed to defame him ?

the charge to be true, and yet see little reason to condemn him. Different times have different modes of viewing the same acts: the name of Algernon Sydney is, in general, by ourselves regarded as synonymous with patriotism, yet he received presents from Louis XIV. of France to aid him in pursuing a policy which he conscientiously followed*, and which the monarch deemed to be for *his* advantage also. May not the same have been the case with the Athenian? May he not have thought the interests of Athens and Persia to be the same, and himself justified in supporting the common cause with Persian gold? We believe that the more closely the history of Demosthenes is viewed the greater and purer will he appear; the charges made against him will fade to nothing, and little remain but want of physical courage, too steadfast a continuance in a line of policy whose success had become hopeless, and an occasional employment of the artifices common to political leaders.

Should we tell the end of the vile Demades? He was sent some time after to Antipater to request him to withdraw the garrison from the Munychia: but among the papers of Perdiccas had been found a letter from Demades to him, inviting him to come and deliver Greece from Antipater. The Macedonian had heard of that letter, and Demades and his son were put to death by his orders.

* Hallam, Const. Hist. of England, vol. ii. p. 549, 8vo edit.

CHAPTER V*.

Polysperchôn and Cassander.—Death of Phociôn.—Siege of Megalopolis.—Contests in Greece.—Demetrius Poliorcêtes in Greece and in Asia.—Irruption of the Gauls.—Pyrrhus in the Peloponnese;—his death.—Ætolian and Achæan Leagues.—Arâtus.

THE early death of Alexander, and the want of an heir to his crown capable of assuming the government, inspired his generals with the ambition of becoming independent sovereigns in various parts of his enormous empire†. The sword was speedily drawn, and numerous battles by land and by sea were fought. These wars, however, and the establishment of the kingdoms to which they gave rise, belong not strictly to Grecian history; we will therefore only touch on such points as immediately relate to Greece.

Antipater, after the termination of the Lamian war, passed over to Asia, and took part in the affairs there. Being appointed guardian to the Kings, as the children and relatives of Alexander were called, he returned to Macedonia, leading them with him.

During his absence in Asia, the Ætolians, at the instigation it is said of Perdiccas‡, resumed arms and entered Thessaly, where they were joined by numbers, and their united forces amounted to twenty-five thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse. It is probable that the troops of Polysperchôn, whom Antipater had left in his place in Macedonia, would not have been able to meet this army; but luckily for him the Acarnanians seized this occasion of invading Ætolia; and the Ætolians hastening home to defend their property, Polysperchôn

* Diodor. xviii. 48, 49, 54–57, 64–75; xix. 35, 36, 49–54, 60–64, 74, 75. Plut. Phociôn, 31–37; Demetrius, 8–14; Pyrrhus, 26–34; Aratus, 1–34.

† They were named the Successors (*διάδοχοι*).

‡ Perdiccas was one of the principal of Alexander's officers. The dying monarch was said to have given him his ring appointing him thereby regent of his kingdom.

defeated the Thessalians, and reduced the country to its previous state of subjection.

Antipater died (Ol. 115, 3.) shortly after his return to Macedonia. He directed that Polysperchôn, his ancient mate in arms, should succeed him in his office, while to his son Cassander he left only the second place. But Cassander, an ambitious, turbulent and ferocious youth, looked upon his father's authority as his inheritance; and relying on the aid of the aristocratic party in the Grecian states, of Ptolemæus who ruled in Egypt, and of Antigonus, the most powerful general in Asia, he resolved to dispute it with Polysperchôn. Under pretext of going a-hunting he escaped out of Macedonia, and passed over to Asia to concert matters with Antigonus.

Polysperchôn, seeing war inevitable, resolved to detach Greece, if possible, from Cassander. Knowing that the oligarchies established in the different states by Antipater would be likely to espouse the cause of his son, he issued a pompous edict, in the name of the Kings, restoring the democracies. He also wrote to Argos, and other towns, directing the people to put to death and banish those who had been most attached to Antipater, that they might not be in a condition to aid Cassander.

At Athens (Ol. 115, 4.) Nicânôr, who commanded in the Munychia, and had taken the side of Cassander, finding that the people were inclined toward Polysperchôn, secretly collected troops and seized the Piræus. The people sent to him Phociôn, Conôn the son of Timotheüs, and Clearchus, men of distinction, and his friends; but to no purpose. A letter also came to him from Olympias, Alexander's mother, whom Polysperchôn had recalled from Epeirus and given the charge of her infant grandson, ordering him to surrender both the Munychia and the Piræus; but to as little effect. Finally, Polysperchôn's son Alexander entered Attica with an army, and encamped before the Piræus. Phociôn and other chiefs of the aristocracy went to Alexander, and advised him not to give these places up to the people when he should have recovered them, but to hold them himself till the contest with Cassander should be terminated. They feared, it is evident, for their own

safety, and not without reason : for the people, ferocious with the recovery of power, soon after held an assembly, in which they deposed all the former magistrates, appointed the most furious democrats in their room, and passed sentences of death, banishment, and confiscation of goods on those who had governed under the oligarchy.

Phociön and his friends fled to Alexander, who received them kindly, and sent them with letters in their favour to his father, who was now in Phocis. The Athenians also despatched an embassy, and yielding to motives of interest, Polysperchön sent his suppliants prisoners to Athens, to stand a trial for their lives before the tribunal of an anarchic mob. Neither slaves nor strangers were excluded from the assembly convened for the judicial murder. Many of those who had been banished by Antipater and other political enemies of the prisoners, came forward and accused them of being the cause of the enslavement of their country and the dissolution of the democracy after the Lamian war. Phociön rose to reply : his voice was drowned by the yells of the rabble. Silence being restored, he rose again ; again his voice was drowned by clamour. He continued to speak, but could only be heard by those who were close to him : at length, despairing of safety, he cried out to them to condemn *him* to death, but to spare the rest. Still the uproar continued ; some of his friends rose to speak, but the yells and cries were redoubled. The prisoners were condemned and led off to prison, followed by the tears of their friends and the triumphant execrations of their mean-spirited enemies. They drank the fatal hemlock-juice, and their bodies were cast unburied beyond the confines of Attica.

Four days after the death of Phociön, Cassander arrived at the Piræus with thirty-five ships, carrying four thousand men, given him by Antigonus. Polysperchön immediately entered Attica with twenty thousand Macedonian foot and four thousand of those of the allies, one thousand horse, and sixty-five elephants, which he had brought from Asia, and encamped near the Piræus. But as the siege was likely to be tedious, and sufficient provisions for so large an army could not be had,

he left a force such as the country could support with his son Alexander, and passed with the remainder into the Peloponnese, to force the Megalopolitans to submit to the Kings; for they alone sided with Cassander, all the rest having obeyed the directions to put to death or banish his adherents. The whole serviceable population of Megalopolis, slaves included, amounted to fifteen thousand men; and under the directions of one Damis, who had served in Asia under Alexander, they prepared for a vigorous defence. Polysperchôn sat down before the town, and his miners in a short time succeeded in throwing down three towers and a part of the wall. He attempted a storm, but was obliged to draw off his men, after an obstinate conflict. He then thought to send his elephants in through the breach; but Damis had caused doors set with sharp spikes to be laid on the ground, and sunk so as not to be visible. The weight of the elephants caused the spikes to run far up into their feet; the light troops, which Damis had placed on the flanks, showered missiles upon them, wounding and killing the drivers; the elephants rushed back on their own men, trampling them to death, and Polysperchôn was obliged to raise the siege with loss of fame.

The Athenians meantime saw themselves excluded from the sea and from all their sources of profit and enjoyment, while little aid was to be expected from Polysperchôn, who had been forced to raise the siege of Megalopolis, and whose fleet had just now been destroyed by Antigonus in the Hellespont. A citizen of some consideration ventured at length to propose in the assembly an arrangement with Cassander. The ordinary tumult at first was raised, but the sense of interest finally prevailed. Peace was procured, on the conditions of the Munychia remaining in Cassander's hands till the end of the present contest; political privileges being restricted to those possessed of ten minas and upwards of property, and a person appointed by Cassander being at the head of the government. The person selected for this office was Demetrius of Phaleron, a distinguished Athenian citizen; and under his mild and equitable rule the people were far happier than they could have

been under a democracy, for which they had proved themselves no longer fit.

Cassander then passed over into the Peloponnese, and laid siege to Tegea. While there he heard that Olympias had put to death several of his friends in Macedonia; among the rest Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydice, members of the royal family. He at once (Ol. 116, 1.) set out for Macedonia; and as the pass of Pylæ was occupied by the Ætolians, he embarked his troops in Locris, and landed them in Thessaly. He besieged Olympias in Pydna, forced her to surrender, and put her to death. (Ol. 116, 2.) Macedonia submitted to him, and he then set forth for the Peloponnese, where Polysperchôn's son Alexander was at the head of an army. He forced a passage through Pylæ, and coming into Bœotia, announced his intention of restoring Thebes, which had now lain desolate for twenty years. The scattered Thebans were collected: the towns of Bœotia and other parts of Greece (Athens in particular), and even of Italy and Sicily, aided to raise the walls and to supply the wants of the returning exiles, and Thebes was once more numbered among the cities of Greece.

As Alexander guarded the Isthmus, Cassander passed to Megara, where he embarked his troops and elephants, and crossed over to Epidaurus. He made Argos and Messene come over to his side, and then returned to Macedonia.

In the conflict of interests which prevailed in this anarchic period, Antigonus was ere long among the enemies of Cassander. He sent one of his generals to Laconia, who having obtained permission from the Spartans to recruit in the Peloponnese, raised eight thousand men. The command in the Peloponnese was given to Polysperchôn, whose son Alexander was summoned over to Asia to accuse Cassander of treason before the assembly of the Macedonian soldiers. Cassander was proclaimed a public enemy unless he submitted to Antigonus; at the same time the Greeks were declared independent, Antigonus hoping thus to gain them over to his side. He then sent Alexander back with five hundred talents; and when Ptolemæus of Egypt heard what Antigonus had done, he also

hastened to declare the independence of the Greeks; for all the contending generals were anxious to stand well with the people of Greece, from which country, exclusive of other advantages, they drew their best soldiers.

The rival parties of Antigonus and Cassander in the Peloponnese now contended with an acrimony hardly to be equalled in the days of independent Greece. Apollonides, who commanded for Cassander at Argos, made an expedition into Arcadia, and reduced the town of Stymphalus. During his absence, the democratic party in Argos sent to invite Alexander, the son of Polysperchôn; but while he delayed, Apollonides returned, and finding five hundred of them sitting in council in the Prytaneion, he closed the entrances, and setting fire to the place, burned them all alive. He put some more to death, and banished a good number. Cassander himself soon after came to the Peloponnese, where he invested Orchomenus, and, being admitted into the town by his partisans, gave up to them Alexander's friends, who had taken refuge in the temple of Artemis, and they put them all to death without mercy.

On his return to Macedonia, Cassander sent to Alexander, offering him the chief command in the Peloponnese if he would desert Antigonus and join him. As this was the great object of Alexander's ambition, he accepted the offer, and thus became the enemy of his own father. He did not, however, long enjoy his command; for he was fallen on and slain by some Sicyonians, who had feigned a friendship for him. His wife Cratesipolis, a woman of masculine spirit, took the command of the troops and defeated the Sicyonians, killing a good number of them: thirty who were made prisoners she crucified, for that Eastern barbarity was now known in Greece; and she governed with despotic power in Sicyôn.

To effect a counterpoise to the power of the Ætolians, who were hostile to him, Cassander persuaded their hereditary enemies, the Acarnanians, to renounce their ancient mode of dwelling in scattered villages, and to settle in a few large towns. As soon as he was gone from Acarnania, three thousand Ætolians came and laid siege to Agrinion, one of these towns. The

people surrendered on condition of a free passage: they departed on the faith of the treaty; but the perfidious Ætolians pursued and massacred them.

Antigonus, to show the Greeks that he was in earnest in his promise to restore them to independence, sent one of his generals, named Telesphorus, with a fleet and army to the Peloponnese, who expelled Cassander's garrisons from most of the towns. The following year (Ol. 117, 1.) he sent an officer, named Ptolemæus, with another fleet and army to Greece. Ptolemæus landed in Bœotia, and being joined by two thousand two hundred foot and thirteen hundred horse of the Bœotians, he passed over to Eubœa; where having expelled the Macedonian garrison from Chalcis (the only town there which Cassander held), he left it without any foreign garrison, as a proof that Antigonus meant fairly. He then took Oropus, and gave it to the Bœotians; he entered Attica, and the people forced Demetrius Phalereus to make a truce with him, and to send to Antigonus to treat of an alliance. Ptolemæus returned to Bœotia, expelled the garrison from the Cadmeia and liberated Thebes: he thence proceeded to Phocis, and did the same in its towns, and entering the Opuntian Locris laid siege to the town of Opûs, which favoured Cassander.

But Telesphorus now grew jealous of Ptolemæus, and renouncing the service of Antigonus he went to Elis, where he occupied the Acropolis and reduced the town to obedience; he also plundered the temple of fifty talents, with which he hired mercenaries. Ptolemæus immediately led his army into the Peloponnese, took and demolished the Acropolis of Elis, and restored their liberty to the people and the money to the temple: he also gave back to the Eleians the port of Cyllene, which Telesphorus had surrendered to him on composition.

Of the course of events for more than a year in Greece we are not informed; but we afterwards (Ol. 117, 3.) find Ptolemæus himself, under pretext of his merits not being sufficiently estimated, renouncing the service of Antigonus for that of Cassander. Polysperchôn too, who had set up a son of the great Alexander by a Persian lady named Barsîne, against

Cassander, was induced, by the offer of the command in the Peloponnese and other rewards, to stain his hands with the blood of the innocent prince.

Antigonus, still bent on gaining over Greece, sent thither (Ol. 118, 2.) his son Demetrius, surnamed Polyorcêtes (*Town-taker*) from his successful employment of military engines. This prince landed in Attica, and took the Piræus and the Munychia by assault. Demetrius Phalereus was obliged to leave the city, which he had governed for ten years: he retired to Thebes, and thence to Egypt, where he met a most flattering reception from the reigning monarch Ptolemæus Evergetes. The conqueror demolished the strong castle at the Munychia, and restored democracy and independence to the Athenian people, with whom he formed a treaty of friendship and alliance. In an assembly of the people a decree was made that golden figures of Antigonus and Demetrius on a chariot should be set up by those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; that they should be presented with crowns of the value of two hundred talents, and an altar be erected to them under the title of Saviours; that two tribes, to be named the Demetriad and Antigonid, should be added to the original ten; that a festival and sacrifice in their honour should be held every year, and their figures be woven into the robe made annually for Pallas-Athene, the protecting deity of the city. The invention of the demagogues of the day exhausted itself in devising modes of setting the new deities on a par with those of Olympus. When deputies bearing this decree came to Antigonus, he presented the people with 150,000 medimns of wheat, and with timber sufficient to build a hundred ships.

Demetrius was shortly afterwards called away by his father to aid him in Asia. He defeated (Ol. 118, 3.) Ptolemæus of Egypt in a sea-fight, the greatest in antiquity, and conquered the isle of Cyprus*. An attack by sea and land on Egypt failed, with great loss of men and money. The Rhodians were the next objects of hostility. In consequence of their situation

* After this victory Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the regal titles, and their example was immediately followed by their rivals.

and of the wisdom of the aristocracy, in whose hands the government was, they enjoyed an extensive trade and possessed great wealth: they wished to maintain a neutrality with the present disputants for empire; but Antigonus insisted on their breaking off all connection with Egypt; and on their refusal, Demetrius came (Ol. 119, 1.) with a great fleet and army, and with his huge machines, and laid siege to the city of Rhodes*. During an entire year he exerted all his powers to no purpose; no internal feud aided him, and all his attacks were repelled. At length, when he saw Ptolemæus and the other princes preparing to send aid to the Rhodians, and embassies from Athens and other parts of Greece came in their favour, he gladly seized the pretext of his presence being required in Greece, and granted them an honourable peace. (Ol. 119, 2.) He repaired to Greece to oppose Cassander and Polysperchôn, who had made themselves masters of nearly all parts of it except Attica and Ætolia. He landed at Aulis, and speedily drove their troops out of Bœotia, and then came to spend the winter at Athens. The flattery of the people assigned their deity the back part (*ὀπισθόδομος*) of the Parthenôn for his abode, and the temple of the virgin-goddess was daily polluted by the licentious orgies of himself and his harlots.

After a luxurious abode at Athens Demetrius at length (Ol. 119, 3.) entered the Peloponnese, where he drove away all the foreign garrisons, and restored the cities to a nominal independence; and at a congress convened to Corinth he was chosen, like Philip and Alexander, head of the Greek confederacy. He returned to Athens (Ol. 119, 4.), where the people complaisantly, by making one month become two others in turn, celebrated the whole of the Mysteries at once, that their licentious divinity might be fully initiated. He then, at his father's call, repaired to Asia, where Ptolemæus, Cassander and Lysimachus had united their forces against him. The battle of Ipsus in Phrygia terminated the life and reign of An-

* At the instance of Lysander (Ol. 92, 2.) the three Rhodian states had coalesced and built a common capital of the same name with the island. Diodor. xiii. 75; Strabo, xiv. 2.

tigonus. Demetrius was repairing to Athens, where he had left his wife, his money and his ships; but an embassy met him at the Cyclades to say that the people had passed a decree not to admit any of the kings into their city. Having gently reproached them with what he termed their ingratitude, and obtained his ships, he went away; and fortune was so favourable to him that two years afterwards (Ol. 120, 2.) he was able to come with a fleet and army, and taking Eleusis and Rhamnûs, to ravage the country round. Having captured a ship bound with corn for Athens, he hung the owner and the master; and no ship would in future venture to approach its port. The distress then became so great that a medimn (bushel) of salt cost forty drachmas, and a modius (peck) of wheat three hundred. Lachares, who ruled the city as tyrant, fled away, and the gates were opened to Demetrius. He forgave the people, and presented them with 100,000 medimns of wheat; but he placed a garrison on the eminence named the Museion (Musêum) to keep them in their allegiance*.

Demetrius some time after led his army against the Lacedæmonians: they engaged him, under their king Archidamus, at Mantinea, but were defeated. He entered Laconia, and routed them again close to Sparta, which was now walled; and he would have taken it, but that the news of the successes of his enemies in Asia called him away.

On the death of Cassander (Ol. 121, 3.) Demetrius made himself master of Macedonia also. After seven years he was driven out of it (Ol. 123, 2.) by Pyrrhus the Epeirot, who within seven months lost it to Lysimachus of Thrace. It was at this time that nearly the last effort of Athenian heroism displayed itself. The people assembled, old and young, and setting a man named Olympiodôrus at their head, defeated the garrison at the Museum: they then attacked and took that fortress, and also the Piræus and Munychia. When the Macedonians made an incursion into Eleusis, the brave Olympio-

* During this time (Ol. 120, 3.) the third and last war between Rome and Samnium commenced. It terminated (Ol. 122, 1.) in the complete subjugation of Samnium.

dorus put himself at the head of the Eleusinians and defeated them, and Athens remained now independent*.

Pyrrhus, at the call of the Tarentines (Ol. 125, 1.), passed over to Italy to aid them against the Romans†. Antigonus Gonnâtas‡, the son of Demetrius (who was now dead), was master of most of the Peloponnese, and Ptolemæus Ceraunus, son of Ptolemæus Sotêr of Egypt, ruled Macedonia, when a host of barbarians poured into Macedonia and Greece.

The Gauls or Celts, whose original seats were France and the British Isles, had felt the desire of change and lust of acquiring new abodes, to which barbarians are subject. It was now more than a century since they had occupied the plain of the Po in Italy, and had reached and sacked Rome: they had also advanced and seized the countries along the Danube, and they now held the plains of Thrace. They proceeded to invade Macedonia. Ptolemæus fell in battle against them, and they ravaged the whole country. The next year (Ol. 125, 2.) they were joined by numbers of their countrymen from about the Danube; and an army, we are told of fifteen myriads of foot and six myriads of horse, led by Brennus and Acichorius, entered Thessaly. The Greeks, alarmed at their approach, united to oppose them; and an army, in which were ten thousand Boeotian hoplites and troops from all Greece, without the Isthmus, guarded Thermopylæ, while an Athenian fleet lay close to the shore. The Gauls failed in an attempt to ascend Mount Ceta at Heracleia. The Ænians and Heracleots, however, in order to get rid of them, showed them the path by which the Persians had ascended. Brennus led up it forty thousand men: a mist concealed them from the Phocians, who guarded it, till they were close to them. The Phocians fought for some time, then turned and fled; and the army at the pass dispersed and went to guard their homes. Brennus pushed on without delay for Delphi to plunder the temple, to whose defence the neighbouring peoples repaired. The god, as usual,

* Pausanias, i. 26.

† For his actions in Italy, see Hist. of Rome, Part II. chap. viii.

‡ So named as being born at the town of Gonni.

gave his aid*; the earth rocked beneath the feet of the Gauls as they fought; the thunder roared and the lightning flew the entire day, and with the night came on a piercing frost and heavy snow, while huge rocks rolled down from Parnassus. In the morning the Greeks assailed them on all sides, and they fled, having previously put their sick and wounded to death. Next night a panic terror seized them: they took one another for Greeks, and fell by mutual slaughter. The Ætolians hung on them everywhere, the Melians and Thessalians assailed them beyond the pass, and but a few of them quitted Greece alive†.

After an absence of some years, Pyrrhus returned from Italy (Ol. 126, 3.), and, ever restless, made war on Antigonus Gonatas, and chased him out of Macedonia. Urged by Cleonymus, uncle of the Spartan king Areus, he then invaded Laconia (Ol. 127, 1.) with an army of twenty-five thousand foot, two thousand horse, and twenty-four elephants. He reached Sparta in the evening, but fearing that his troops would plunder it if he took it in the night, he deferred the attack till morning; of success he had no doubt, as king Areus was away in Crete with the best troops. But in the night the Spartans, urged by the women, who declared that they would not survive the fall of Sparta, dug a deep trench, eight hundred feet long, before his camp, the women all aiding in the work, and at each end of it they placed waggons with their wheels half-buried in the earth to impede the elephants.

In the morning Pyrrhus led his hoplites against the trench; the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by their mothers and wives, defended it gallantly. His son Ptolemæus, and a body of Gauls and Chaonians, assailed the waggons, which they endeavoured to pull up and fling into the river; but Areus' son Acrotatus fell on them and drove them off: night ended the conflict.

* The response of the oracle when consulted was, it is said,

Ἑμοὶ μελήσει ταῦτα καὶ λευκαῖς κόραις.

Tzetz. Chil. xi. 394. Cic. Div. i. 37.

By the *White Maids* was probably meant the snow.

† Pausanias, x. 19-23. Justin, xxiv. Diodor. Frag. xxii.

Next morning it was renewed, and Pyrrhus forced his way into the town; but his horse was killed under him, and his troops were driven back. Most of the Spartans were now wounded or slain, and the town must have surrendered, but that the Messenians came to its aid. Antigonus' general at Corinth led thither a corps of mercenaries, and Areus landed with two thousand men. Pyrrhus retired and wasted the country, intending to winter there; but just then there chanced to be a feud in Argos, where two persons named Aristetas and Aristippus were contending for the tyranny: the former being supported by Antigonus, the latter called in Pyrrhus, who repaired to him at once. King Areus impeded his march as much as possible, and the young Ptolemæus was slain in a skirmish; but Pyrrhus, enraged at the loss of his son, charged the foes, and they were scattered like dust before the whirlwind. Finding Antigonus encamped on the heights over Argos, he halted at Nauplia: the Argives sent to pray them both to retire and leave the city to itself: Antigonus consented, and gave his son as a hostage: Pyrrhus also promised, but gave no pledge; and that very night Aristetas opened one of the gates to him, and he reached the market with his Gauls; but the gate not admitting the elephants with their towers, the Argives had time to assemble. Antigonus at their desire sent them troops, and Areus also arrived. In the morning one of Pyrrhus' elephants was killed, and fell and blocked up the gate; another ran wild; his orders to his son, who commanded outside, were misunderstood; and in the conflict which ensued, as the king was engaged with one of the Argives, the mother of the latter flung a tile from the roof of a house at him, which stunned him, and one of Antigonus' officers cut off his head while he was senseless. Antigonus dismissed the son of the slain prince and the Epeirots with honour.

The power of Antigonus was now supreme throughout Greece. He made himself master of the Acro-Corinth by stratagem, and tyrants, upheld by him, ruled in most of the towns of the Peloponnese. Exiles were numerous, and they and the discharged mercenaries formed bands of robbers, and plundered the country.

In this wretched state of things two confederations appeared which displayed the last glimmer of Hellenic freedom and independence: these were the Ætolian and Achæan Leagues.

The Ætolians had probably always had a loose kind of union among their clans, but they were known to Greece only as robbers and mercenaries till they aided in their national capacity the Thebans against Alexander the Great. In the Lamian and Celtic wars they were, as we have seen, actors of importance. They had forced Heracleia, in Trachis, to join their league, which they also extended into Thessaly and Lamia, and other towns there were held by them. They took Naupactus from the Locrians and Stratus from the Acarnanians, and eventually some places in the Peloponnese formed alliances with them. The Panætolon, or general assembly, was regularly held at the autumnal equinox, at Thermon: it was of a thoroughly democratic character; and was presided over by the Stratêgus or general, the chief magistrate or head of the state, who was chosen by it every year. The Ætolian character always remained the same, rude, quarrelsome and rapacious.

The Achæan League was of a much higher character, in consequence of that of the people composing it, who were always reckoned the most just and moderate among the Greeks*. The twelve towns of Achaia had, from the most remote times, had a federal union; but the Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese, and other causes, had nearly broken it up, when (in the 124th Olympiad) Dyme, Patræ, Tritæa and Pharæ agreed to renew it. Gradually all the towns, except Olenos, joined it; but still thirty years elapsed before it became of importance. Its Synods (Σύνοδοι) or general assemblies, which were held twice a year at Ægion, were of a genuine democratic character†. They were presided over by the strategus‡, who was annually elected. No federal union in Greece had ever been so close as the Achæan League.

What first gave importance to the Achæan League was the

* Polyb. ii. 39.

† Polyb. ii. 38, 7.

‡ During the first twenty-five years of the league there were two strategi. Polyb. *ut sup.*

addition to it of the Doric state of Sicyôn, which took place on the following occasion.

The town of Sicyôn, when its original Dorian aristocracy had been broken up, was continually afflicted by the scourge of tyrants and demagogues. At length the government was placed in the hands of Timocleidas and Cleinias, two of the leading citizens; but the former died, and the latter was killed by a man named Abantidas, who aspired to the tyranny. As usual, he put to death or banished the principal friends and adherents of Cleinias; and he sought to destroy his son Arâtus, a child of but seven years, but the tyrant's own sister saved him and conveyed him to his friends at Argos.

Aratus when he grew up devoted himself to athletic exercises; but he cherished an inveterate hatred to the tyrants, and meditated the liberation of his country, where, after the murder of Abantidas and his father, a man named Nicocles now ruled. He sought aid from the kings of Macedonia and Egypt, and he proposed to the other exiles to seize a post in the territory of Sicyôn, and make war at once on the tyrant. But just then came to Argos a man who had made his escape from Sicyôn, and he told them of a part of the walls which might easily be scaled, if the dogs of a gardener who lived close to it were kept quiet. It was at once resolved to make the attempt: arms and ladders were prepared; five of the party were despatched to go as travellers to the gardener's house at nightfall, and having obtained lodging to secure himself and his dogs; the rest set out at the appointed time, and so arranged their route as to reach Sicyôn toward midnight. Their friends, they found, had secured the gardener, but not his dogs, which set up a tremendous barking. The men who carried the ladders went on notwithstanding, and placed them against the wall; but just as they were mounting, the officer who was setting the morning watch passed along with a bell and several lights: they clung to their ladders and escaped observation; the guard which had been relieved also passed without noticing them; they then mounted the wall and sent to summon Aratus. A large dog in one of the towers now replied to those of the

gardener; the whole place rang with the baying and barking; the cocks began to crow; the hour when the country-people would come to market was at hand; and when Aratus came to the wall the ladders proved weak, and they had to mount with great caution. When about forty were up, they proceeded to the guard-house near the tyrant's residence, where they seized and secured his mercenaries. It being now day, they sent to the houses of their friends to call them forth; the theatre was filled with people anxious to know what had occurred, and a herald came forward and announced that Aratus, the son of Cleinias, invited the people to liberty. Instantly a rush was made to the tyrant's house; fire was set to it, and a flame sprang up which was visible at Corinth; but the soldiers and people extinguished it for the sake of the plunder. Nicocles made his escape from the town by an underground passage, and not a single person was slain, or even wounded, in this bloodless revolution. (Ol. 132, 2.)

All who had been exiled during the last fifty years, five hundred in number, were recalled, and they naturally reclaimed their houses and lands, a thing which caused Aratus much perplexity; moreover, king Antigonus did not like to see the establishment of liberty in Sicyôn, and was watching for an opportunity to suppress it. Against this last danger Aratus provided a remedy by uniting Sicyôn to the Achæan League, and he did not himself disdain to serve in the horse under the Achæan strategus. To obviate the internal dissensions, he made in person a voyage to Egypt; and having obtained from the king a gift of one hundred and fifty talents, he returned and adjusted all the contending claims among the citizens.

At length (Ol. 133, 3.) Aratus was chosen strategus of the League. He crossed the gulf and plundered Locris and Calydôn at the head of ten thousand men; but by not advancing in time, he let his Bœotian allies sustain a complete defeat from the Ætolians at Chæroneia. In his second strategy (Ol. 134, 2.) Aratus took Acro-Corinth by a nocturnal assault; and he induced the Corinthians, Megarians, Epidaurians and Trœzenians to become members of the League. He made various

attempts to liberate Argos from its tyrants, but without success. Lydiades, the tyrant of Megalopolis, who was a man of noble mind, voluntarily laid down the tyranny, and united his native town to the League, of which he was more than once chosen strategus.

By skilfully taking advantage of circumstances, Aratus eventually succeeded in uniting not only Argos but Athens to the League, which had also gradually embraced Cleonæ, Phliûs, Hermione, and most part of Arcadia. His great object was to deliver the whole Peloponnese from its tyrants and from Macedonian influence, and to form it into one firm compact body, enjoying freedom and independence*.

CHAPTER VI.†

King Agis of Sparta.—Cleomenes of Sparta.—Cleomenian War.—Battle of Sellasia.—Death of Cleomenes.

THE whole course of history shows that no attempt is more certain to miscarry than that of bringing back a state to its condition at some former period : it is a vain effort to make the stream of time roll back : it is like requiring an aged man to return to the vigour and animation of his youth. Yet as virtue and nobleness of soul, even when aiming at impossibility, justly demand esteem, we cannot refuse our applause to those who have sought, though in vain, to restore their country to its former condition ; or withhold our pity when they have perished, the victims of their generous enthusiasm.

An attempt of this nature was now made at Sparta. The

* While the preceding events were taking place in Greece, the Romans were occupied by the first Punic war, which began Ol. 129, 1, and ended Ol. 134, 4.

† Plut., Agis and Cleomenes, Aratus, 35-46. Polyb. ii. 45, to the end ; v. 35-39.

Lycurgean constitution, though to outward appearance unaltered, and the lifeless form still preserved, had in reality been greatly departed from, more especially since the time of the overthrow of the Athenian power; and luxury of every kind prevailed in Sparta, when wealth had been introduced. The original division of the land into lots might have operated in some measure as a check: but a law had been proposed by one of the ephors named Epitadeus (out of enmity toward his son) enabling every person to dispose as he pleased by gift or testament of his house and lot*. This law was greedily adopted, and the consequence was that the land rapidly accumulated in the hands of a small number of persons, many of whom were females. The Spartans too had shared the fate of all close bodies; their number was fearfully diminished, and at this time they only counted seven hundred, but a seventh part of whom were possessed of land.

The kings of Sparta now were Agis IV., of the house of Procles, a family which had given Sparta its ablest and most heroic princes; and Leonidas, of the house of Agis. The latter was a man advanced in years, who had learned luxury and corruption at the court of the kings of Syria, in whose service he had been. Agis was a young man, who, reared according to the ancient system which was still in use, had conceived the utmost aversion for the corruption of manners which prevailed, and the highest veneration for the institutions of Lycurgus, from a return to which alone he looked for the regeneration of Sparta.

Agis commenced by setting an example in his own person of a return to the dress, habits and mode of life of former times. The young listened readily to his exhortations and followed his example; but the elder citizens turned from them with aversion and terror. He gained, however, to his side three persons of importance in the state, namely, Lysander, Mandrocleidas, and Agesilaüs. This last was his mother's brother, a man of talent, but covetous and deeply in debt; he was apparently induced

* Plut. Agis, 5. This was after the time of Lysander and long before that of Aristotle. See Müller, Dor. ii. 206.

to join by the arguments of his son Hippomedôn, but his real motive was the hope of getting rid of his debts in the revolution. Agis next assailed his mother Agesistrata and his grandmother Archidamia, the two wealthiest persons in Sparta. They at first treated his project as visionary, but were at last induced to join cordially in it, and to exert their influence with their female friends, whose power was paramount in Sparta. These, however, would not hear of anything tending to deprive them of luxury and power: they called upon Leonidas, as the elder king, to check the wild designs of Agis, and he readily undertook the task; but fearing the people, did not venture to oppose openly, contenting himself with insinuating that the real object of Agis was the tyranny.

By the influence of Agis, Lysander became an ephor (Ol. 134, 1.), and he immediately proposed a law in the senate, of which the heads are these: All debts should be abolished; the land south of the rivulet of Pellene and Sellasia should be divided into four thousand five hundred lots, the rest into fifteen thousand; this last for the Pericæcians, the former for the Spartans, whose number was to be completed by the admission of Pericæcians and deserving strangers; and they were to be divided into fifteen Phiditia of two hundred and four hundred members, and live after the ancient mode.

The senate not agreeing to it, Lysander brought the matter before the people. Oracles of old and recent date were quoted by him and his friends; and king Agis coming forward, after speaking briefly in favour of it, gave the strongest proof of his sincerity by declaring that himself and his relatives and friends, who were the richest persons in Laconia, gave their property to the public. Leonidas and the wealthy exerted themselves on the other side; and Lysander saw that success was dubious while Leonidas was in power. As there was an old law which forbade a Heracleid to have children by a foreigner, Lysander proved that Leonidas while in Asia had two children by a native woman. His son-in-law Cleombrotus was induced to claim the throne: Leonidas sought refuge at the temple of the Chalcicæcos, whither his daughter Cheilônîs, the wife of Cleom-

brotus, accompanied him, leaving her husband, who was now king.

New ephors now came into office, who restored Leonidas, and were proceeding against Lysander and his friends, when at his suggestion the kings entered the market, drove the ephors from their seats, and appointed new ones, one of whom was Agesilaüs. The young men were armed, the prisons opened ; but no blood was shed, and Leonidas himself was escorted safely to Tegea. The unprincipled Agesilaüs now persuaded Agis that it would not be safe to carry the whole reform at once, and advised to commence by the abolition of debts. The unsuspecting prince assented : creditors were obliged to surrender their securities ; and they were all burnt in the market, Agesilaüs declaring that he had never seen a brighter blaze or a clearer fire. But having gotten rid of his debts, his only thought now was to keep his estate, and he put off Agis and the people with various excuses when they called for a division of lands.

Shortly after, Agis led to Corinth the troops required by Aratus to repel an invasion of the Ætolians ; and, during his absence and after his return, the insolence and tyranny of Agesilaüs passed all bounds. The people were now so irritated by disappointment that the friends of Leonidas ventured openly to bring him back from Tegea. Agesilaüs was enabled to escape by the influence of his son with the people : Agis took sanctuary at the temple of the Chalciæcos, and Cleombrotus at that of Poseidôn, whither Leonidas followed him, and reproached him bitterly with his conduct. But the virtuous Cheilonis now sat a suppliant with her husband, as before with her father : his life was granted to her prayers, and unmoved by her father's entreaties to remain, she became the partner of his exile.

The next measure was to draw Agis from his sanctuary. Leonidas at first invited him to come and resume his reign, as he had been only led astray by Lysander and Agesilaüs. This not succeeding, three persons, Amphares, Demochares and Arcesilaüs, pretended friends of the prince, undertook to betray him. They induced him at various times to leave the temple

for the sake of bathing; and one day, as they were returning from the bath, they suddenly laid hold of him and dragged him to the prison. Amphares, who was an ephor, summoned thither his colleagues and such senators as agreed with them in sentiment. After a mock trial, they condemned him to death. The ministers of death shrank from laying hold of their king; but Demochares himself dragged him into the Decas*, and as the people were assembling with many lights around the prison (for it was now night), and a rescue was apprehended, he was strangled without delay. Agis died as he had lived. (Ol. 135, 1.)

The mothers of the murdered prince were now at the door. Amphares assured them he was safe, and invited Agesistrata to enter and see him. She and her mother entered: the door was closed. Archidamia was first conducted to where Agis lay: the cord was placed round her neck, and the venerable woman stretched a corpse beside him. Agesistrata was then called in. She gazed on the dead, helped to adjust the body of her mother, and kissing Agis, said, "My son, thy mildness and humanity have ruined thee and us." Amphares entered in a rage: "Since you approve of what he did," cried he, "you shall share his fate." "May it only be of advantage to Sparta!" she mildly replied, and resigned her neck to the cord.

Leonidas now reigned alone. As the widow of Agis was young, beautiful, and one of the wealthiest heiresses in Sparta, he forced her to marry his son Cleomenes, though he had scarcely attained the age of puberty. Cleomenes, of a generous disposition, adored his admirable wife, and hung from her lips as she dwelt on the virtues and noble designs of Agis, in whose footprints he resolved to tread. The precepts of the Stoic philosophy also it is said contributed to strengthen the mind of the young prince.

When Cleomenes came to the throne, on the death of his father (Ol. 136, 1.), he saw that the king was a mere cypher, all power being engrossed by the ephors; a conversation on

* This seems to have answered to the Tullianum of the prison at Rome. Sallust, Cat. 55.

the subject of king Agis with one of his most intimate friends also satisfied him that the reforms which he meditated never could be brought about by persuasion. A war he perceived alone, by putting him at the head of a military force, would enable him to overturn the power of the ephors; and for this the Achæans soon furnished the occasion.

Aratus, who had drawn the whole Peloponnese, Elis, Lacedæmôn and some towns of Arcadia excepted, into the Achæan League, was now forcing these Arcadian towns to become members of it. The ephors ordered Cleomenes to march and occupy the Athenæon at Belmina in the territory of Megalopolis. Aratus, having made a vain attempt to surprise it by night, retired, and Cleomenes then overran the lands of Argos. The Achæans sent an army of twenty thousand foot and one thousand horse against him; but Aratus, always timid in the field, advised the strategus not to hazard an action, though Cleomenes had not quite five thousand men.

The next year (Ol. 136, 2.) Aratus, being strategus, invaded Elis. Cleomenes went to the aid of the Eleians, and meeting the Achæans at Mount Lycæon, routed them with great loss. A report was spread that Aratus had fallen, but he appeared before Mantinea and surprised it. Cleomenes, having bribed the ephors to prolong his command, occupied a post in the Megalopolitan territory named Ladoceia. Aratus came to attack him: the Lacedæmonians were driven beyond a gully, which Aratus would not suffer his men to cross; Lydiades, in a rage, dashed on with the horse who were about him; he got engaged in a place full of vines, walls, and ditches; Cleomenes sent his light troops against him, and he fell fighting bravely. The Lacedæmonians then rallied, and defeated the whole Achæan army. The body of Lydiades was sent by the victor to Megalopolis, wrapt in purple and crowned.

Cleomenes now deemed the time for executing his plans to be arrived. He told Megastonoüs, his mother's husband, a man of wealth and influence, that property must be divided, and Sparta aim again at the hegemony of Greece. Megastonoüs and some of his friends promised their aid. Cleomenes

then, with an army in which he took care to have those who were most likely to impede his designs, entered Arcadia, where he took the towns of Alsæa and Heræa, victualled Orchomenus, and sat down before Mantinea. Having harassed the Lacedæmonians by marches up and down, he left them, by their own request, in Arcadia, and set out with the mercenaries for Sparta, intending to reach it when the ephors should be at supper.

When he drew near to the town, he sent Eurycleidas, one of his friends, to the ephors as the bearer of news from the army; others followed with some soldiers, who, while he was speaking, fell on and slew them all, except one, who escaped badly wounded into the adjoining temple of Fear. Early in the morning all the seats of the ephors, but one, were removed from the market. An assembly was called, and Cleomenes, occupying the remaining seat, justified his conduct and explained his designs. He himself, Megastonoüs, his friends, and then all the other citizens, resigned their property. The land was divided into lots, and the best of the Periceians being adopted among the Spartans, they now numbered four thousand hoplites; the original mode of education and of public meals was resumed, and the country began to put on the aspect of old Laconia. The only surviving member of the other house having been assassinated, with Cleomenes' consent, it was said, he joined his brother Eucleidas with him in the royal dignity, that Sparta might, as heretofore, have two kings. (Ol. 138, 3.)

After some time Cleomenes led his troops into Arcadia. Having ravaged the territory of Megalopolis, he took Mantinea by surprise, and then advancing into Achaia gave the Achæan army a complete defeat at Dyme. Negotiations for peace were set on foot, but to no purpose, and Cleomenes again entered Achaia and took Pellene; then learning that the Achæans, fearing for Corinth and Sicyôn, had withdrawn their horse and mercenaries from Argos, he made a rapid march, and reaching that city by night, made himself master of it.

Cleonæ and Phlius now joined him; Corinth sent to invite him; the towns of the Acte were equally in his favour.

The Ætolians had long had an understanding with Cleomenes, and Ptolemæus of Egypt had preferred his alliance to that of the Achæans. Aratus, on the other hand, had opened a negotiation with Antigonus Dôsôn, of Macedonia, who had promised his aid on condition of Corinth being given up to him; and his pride and jealousy of the young Spartan king made him prefer undoing all his work, and bringing the Peloponnese again under the Macedonian yoke, to a cordial union with the Lacedæmonians for the maintenance of independence. He now sent to invite the Macedonian to his aid. Antigonus, whose troops were ready, set out at once, and as the Ætolians refused a passage through Pylæ, he crossed over to Eubœa, and thence advanced to the Isthmus. Cleomenes, who was besieging Sicyôn, hastened to Corinth when he heard of the march of Antigonus, and ran a ditch and rampart across the space between the Acro-Corinth and the Oneian mountains. Antigonus endeavoured in vain to force a passage, and he would probably have been obliged to retire, had not an insurrection against the Spartans broken out at Argos. Aratus hastened thither with some troops; and Cleomenes, fearing to have an enemy in front and rear, quitted his advantageous position and led his troops to Argos. Antigonus followed him, after having secured Corinth; and Cleomenes was fighting within the town when he saw the Macedonian phalanx descending into the plain, and the horse making for the town; he no longer hoped for success, and he returned without delay to Sparta, where his admirable wife Agiatis was now lying dead. Antigonus followed and having reduced Belmina and some other places, and given them to the Megalopolitans, proceeded to Ægion, where the synod of the Achæans sat, by whom he was appointed chief of the whole confederacy. He wintered in Corinth and Sicyôn.

In the spring (Ol. 139, 2.) Antigonus re-entered Arcadia. Tegea surrendered, and he passed the borders of Laconia,

where some skirmishing took place between his troops and those of Cleomenes. Learning then that the garrison of Orchomenus had come to the aid of Cleomenes, he suddenly returned, and took the town by assault. Mantinea capitulated, and Heræa and Telphussæ returned voluntarily to the Achæan alliance. Antigonus then sent his Macedonian troops home for the winter, remaining himself to arrange matters with the Achæans*.

In the beginning of the winter, Cleomenes, knowing that Megalopolis was ill defended for its extent, resolved to attempt taking it by surprise. Three months before a similar attempt had failed; but now, aided by some Messenian exiles who were in it, he entered it by night, and after an obstinate conflict remained master of it. The inhabitants retired to Messene: Cleomenes sent after them, offering to restore the town and their property if they would form an alliance with Sparta. But by the advice of a young man named Philopœmen they refused. He then destroyed the town, gave the plunder to his soldiers, and sent the pictures and statues to Sparta.

With spring Cleomenes led his army into the territory of Argos and began to ravage it; for he knew that Antigonus, who was there, had dismissed his troops, and he hoped in this way to produce ill feeling between him and the Argives. He succeeded so far that they assembled round that prince and reviled him; but he took no heed of what they said. Cleomenes then retired; and when summer came (Ol. 139, 3.) Antigonus assembled his whole army, twenty-eight thousand foot and twelve hundred horse, and advanced toward Laconia. Cleomenes, having secured all the other passes with guards and ditches and ramparts, posted himself with twenty thousand men at that of Sellasia, through which the road runs to Argos. This pass is formed by two hills, named Euas and Olympus, between which flows a stream named CENÛS. He drew a ditch and rampart in front of the hills, and he placed on the Euas

* He kept the mercenaries with him (Polyb. ii. 55. 1.); those whom he sent home were the phalangites, who were only militia. His object of course was to save their pay.

his brother Eucleidas with the Pericæcians, himself with the Lacedæmonians, and some of the mercenaries occupying the other hill: on the banks of the stream stood the horse and the rest of the mercenaries. Antigonus encamped on the banks of a small stream named the Gorgylus. Seeing no hopes of drawing Cleomenes from his advantageous position, he decided on attacking him. A division of Macedonians and Illyrians, supported by Cretans, Acarnanians and two thousand Achæans, advanced against the troops on the hill Euas. The Macedonian horse, supported by two thousand Achæan and Megalopolitan foot, were opposed to the enemies' horse in the valley. Antigonus himself led the Macedonian and mercenary troops against those with Cleomenes on Olympus.

The battle began by the Illyrians advancing rapidly up the front of Mount Euas. Their speed was such that they left far behind the troops which were to support them; the Lacedæmonian light troops in the valley, seeing their rear uncovered, advanced and fell on them: the Illyrians, having thus an enemy in front and rear, fell into confusion. Philopœmen, the gallant young Megalopolitan, urged the Macedonian commanders of cavalry to seize the occasion of falling on the enemies' horse; but despising his youth, they gave no heed to him. He then, at the head of his native troops, charged the Spartan horse; the light troops, quitting the Illyrians, returned to support their horse; the Illyrians gained the summit of the hill unopposed, and but a brief resistance was offered by the troops of Eucleidas. Meantime the cavalry on both sides were warmly engaged; Philopœmen's horse was killed under him, and he himself wounded in both the thighs as he continued to fight among the foot. At length the Lacedæmonian horse were driven off the field. The engagement between the two kings was commenced by the light troops; it had continued for some time, when Cleomenes saw his brother defeated and his horse on the eve of flight. Fearing that he should be surrounded, he broke down the rampart and led out his phalanx. The two phalanges encountered: the Macedonians were now yielding before the steady valour of the Spārtans, now re-

pling them by the density of their mass, when Antigonus, adopting the form of the double phalanx, made a steady charge. The Spartans broke and fled. Cleomenes, seeing that all was over, hastened with some horsemen to Sparta, whence he proceeded without delay to Gythion, where he had ships lying ready for the purpose, and getting on board with his friends made sail for Egypt. Antigonus led his army to Sparta, where he restored the former constitution. He stayed there but a few days, as news of an irruption of the Illyrians called him back to Macedonia. At Tegea he put things on their old footing as at Sparta. Passing thence to Argos, he was present at the Nemean games, where he received every kind of honour from the various states of the League. By rapid marches he soon reached Macedonia: he found the Illyrians in that country, and he overthrew them in a pitched battle; but exerting his voice too much in the action, he burst a blood-vessel, which brought on a disease of which he shortly after died, leaving the kingdom to his nephew and ward Philip, the grandson of Antigonus Gonnatas.

The fate of the gallant Cleomenes is not to be passed over in silence. His reception by Ptolemæus Evergetes was kind and flattering, and aid was promised to restore him to his kingdom. But Ptolemæus dying soon after was succeeded by his son, surnamed Philopatôr, a worthless luxurious prince. Cleomenes, as Antigonus was now dead, and his success in Greece seemed almost certain, was urgent to be let to depart. But those who directed affairs in Egypt were now more apprehensive of him than of Philip and the Achæans; they therefore made one excuse or another for delay, and at length they placed him in confinement. The royal Spartan now gave up all hopes, and only aspired to fall with glory. Taking advantage of the absence of the king, who was gone to Canôpus, he spread a report that he was speedily to be liberated, and took advantage of the occasion to give an entertainment to his servants and to the guards that were over him. When these last were drunk, he issued forth at noon, accompanied by his friends and slaves, armed with drawn daggers, and went through the streets call-

ing the people to liberty. But the call was unheeded; and an attempt to seize the castle failed. Nothing remained now but to die, and with Spartan resolution they ended their lives with their own hands. Ptolemæus on his return, as cowardice is cruel, put to death the mother and children of the Spartan king, and all the women who were with them; and by his order the dead body of Cleomenes was flayed and hung on a cross. (Ol. 139, 4.)

"Thus," says Polybius, "perished Cleomenes, a man ready in conversation and expert in the management of affairs, and in one word a king and a general by nature."

CHAPTER VII.*

The Ætolians in the Peloponnese.—Synod at Corinth.—Confederate War.—Death and Character of Aratus.

Ol. 139, 4–141, 2. B.C. 221–215.

ANTIGONUS had, during the late war, established a league, embracing the Achæans, Epeirots, Phocians, Macedonians, Bœotians, Arcadians and Thessalians, of which he was himself the head. He held the Acro-Corinth and Orchomenus in the Peloponnese, so that its dependence on Macedonia and the continuance of peace seemed secure. The Ætolians, however, soon disturbed this state of tranquillity, and brought eventual ruin on Greece and Macedonia.

This people, whose plundering habits had been kept out of exercise during the lifetime of Antigonus, on his death, despising the youth of Philip, resolved to rest no longer. They began to raise disturbance in the following manner. The town of Phigalea in Arcadia, on the borders of Messene, being in alliance with them, they sent thither a man named Dorimachus, under the pretext of protecting it, but in reality to watch the state of affairs in the Peloponnese. A number of free-

* Polyb. iv.; v. 1–30, 91–106. Plut., Aratus, 47, to the end.

booters resorted to him there, and as he had no employment for them he gave them leave to plunder Messene, though it was then in alliance with Ætolia. As he had himself a share in the plunder he gave no heed to the complaints of the Messenians, but at length he said he would go to Messene and inquire into the truth. While he was there the freebooters had the audacity to come and plunder a house close to the town; the ephors were highly incensed, and one of them declared that he should not quit the place till he had made good all the damage that had been done in Messene, and given up those who had taken away lives. Dorimachus stormed and threatened in vain; he was obliged to consent, and he returned breathing vengeance to Ætolia.

Aristôn, the Ætolian strategus, being in infirm health, left the management of affairs almost entirely to one of his relatives named Scopas. Dorimachus, who was also a relative, now bent all his efforts to gain Scopas to his views. He represented what plunder Messene would afford, as it had been untouched all through the late war, and what little chance the Messenians had of being aided by any other people; as almost all were ill-disposed toward them. Scopas and his friends entered readily into this project. Without consulting the general synod, they secretly sent a party of troops to seize a stronghold named Clarion, in the Megalopolitan territory. This, however, was soon recovered by the Achæan strategus Timoxenus; but they shortly after sent a large force over to Rhion, which marched through Achaia, plundering on the way, and fixing itself at Phigalea, began to ravage Messene. The Messenians called on the Achæans to assist them; and incensed at the ravage of their lands, they readily promised aid. Aratus, who was the next strategus, five days before he entered on his office, ordered all of a fit age to appear in arms at Megalopolis. At the appointed time all were present. Messenian deputies also came praying to be admitted into the League: this, however, they were told could not be done without the consent of king Philip and the other allies; but they were assured of aid if they would place their children at Lacedæmôn as security

for their not making peace without the Achæans. A Lacedæmonian army was also there, but more with the intention of watching the progress of events than anything else.

Orders were sent to the Ætolians to evacuate Messene, and not to enter Achaia; and Dorimachus and Scopas, fearing the power of the confederates, prepared to obey. They sent for ships to carry away their booty, and entered the friendly territory of Elis. Aratus dismissed his forces all but three thousand foot and three hundred horse, and those of Tauriôn, the Macedonian commandant in the Peloponnese, with which he kept within a short distance of the Ætolians. Dorimachus and Scopas, who had resolved to embark at Rhion, deeming that they must fight, thought it best to do so at once. They turned into Arcadia, and encamped at Methydrion in the Megalopolitis. Aratus, who was at Cleitor, advanced and encamped at Caphyæ; and when the Ætolians came by Orchomenus, he drew out his forces to oppose them. The Ætolians, seeing the position and spirit of the Achæans, dropped all thoughts of fighting, and keeping to the high grounds by Oligyrtus, thought to pass them. But just as their horse, which brought up the rear, were leaving the low ground, Aratus, with his usual imprudence in the field, gave orders to attack them. An engagement ensued, and as the advantage of position was now entirely on the side of the Ætolians, it ended in the total rout of the Achæans, who fled to Orchomenus and Caphyæ. The Ætolians, having made an attempt on Pellene, and ravaged the lands of Sicyôn, returned home by the Isthmus.

When the synod of the Achæans met, Aratus was highly and justly blamed for what had occurred; but his excuses proved so satisfactory to the grateful and generous people that they confided in him as before. It was resolved to send to inform Philip and the other allies of the conduct of the Ætolians, and to call on them to aid the Messenians, to admit them into the League, and to assist them if attacked again. The Ætolians, on their side, set forth a declaration of peace with the Lacedæmonians, Messenians and all others; and with the

Achæans also if they renounced the alliance with the Messenians, if not of war,—than which, says the historian, nothing was ever more irrational.

Just at this time, two Illyrians, named Scerdilaïdas and Demetrius the Pharian, set out a-pirating with ninety barks. They parted on the coast of Messene, the latter going on with fifty to plunder the Cyclades, the former returning home. But stopping at Naupactus, he was induced to join in an expedition into the Peloponnese; for the people of Cynætha in Arcadia, being in alliance with the Achæans, had at this time permitted their exiles to return, and even made some of them polemarchs. But heedless of their oaths, the exiles secretly invited the Ætolians; and when they came the polemarchs admitted them in the night. The Ætolians butchered all in the place, beginning with the traitors, and plundered the town. Having then pillaged a temple of Artemis, and made a vain attempt on Cleitôr, they made the best of their way to Rhion, and got across before Demetrius the Pharian, whose services Tauriôn had engaged and whose ships he had hauled over the Isthmus, could intercept them.

When king Philip came to Corinth, he sent to summon deputies thither from all the confederates; and in the meantime, as some troubles had arisen in Sparta, he led his army into Arcadia. Having composed the affairs of Sparta he returned to Corinth, where he found the deputies assembled. The various acts of aggression and injustice of the Ætolians being exposed, a decree was made that they should be compelled to give up all they had unlawfully acquired since the time of king Demetrius. This decree opened the Confederate War. (Ol. 140, 1.)

After a futile effort to induce the Ætolians to accommodate matters in a friendly way, Philip returned home to make preparations for war.

The envoys who were sent to the different states went first to Acarnania, where the people, always upright and lovers of liberty, though most exposed to danger, at once prepared for war. The Epeirots said that they would take the field when

Philip did so ; while they assured the Ætolians that they would maintain the peace. The Messenians, though they were the origin of the war, said that they would not stir till Phigalea was taken from the Ætolians. The Spartans were again in confusion ; the ephors and the elder men were for being faithful to the Macedonian interest, the young men and the party of Cleomenes for joining the Ætolians. The former had prevailed, and the Ætolian envoys had departed, when suddenly some young men fell on and slaughtered the ephors, as they were sacrificing in the temple of the Chalcioecos. They murdered some of the other party, banished others ; then created ephors from among themselves, and formed an alliance with the Ætolians. Intelligence arriving of the death of Cleomenes, they proceeded to appoint kings. Of the house of Agis they chose Agesipolis, the infant grandchild of Cleombrotus ; and though there were many of the other house alive, a man named Lycurgus, no Heracleid, obtained the throne, by giving the ephors a talent each. To show themselves worthy allies of the Ætolians, the ephors sent Lycurgus with an army to ravage the territory of the Argives, with whom they were at peace. The Eleians were also persuaded by the Ætolians to declare war against the Achæans.

King Philip at length (Ol. 140, 2.) set out at the head of 10,000 phalangites, 5000 peltasts and 800 horse. He marched through Thessaly into Epeirus with the intention of invading Ætolia. But instead of entering that country at once, as he should have done, he at the urgent desire of the Epeirots laid siege to Ambracia, which was in the hands of the Ætolians ; and while he was engaged in the siege of this strong town, Scopas, collecting an army, marched rapidly through Thessaly, and entering Macedonia, ravaged Pieria and plundered and destroyed the city of Dion. Philip on hearing of this redoubled his efforts ; he took Ambracia, and gave it to the Epeirots ; he then advanced into Acarnania, whence he entered Ætolia, and ravaged the country and destroyed the towns. He was preparing, at the desire of the Achæans, to cross over and invade Elis, when tidings came that the Dardanians were about to

take advantage of his absence and ravage Macedonia. He returned home without delay, where finding that they had laid aside their intentions, he dismissed his troops to gather in the harvest.

The Ætolians had in the beginning of the year, in their usual way, made a nocturnal attempt on the town of Ægîra, on the coast between Ægion and Sicyôn. They crossed the gulf in the night; traitors opened a gate: they had the town, and were dispersed plundering, when the people rallied and drove them out with great slaughter. Euripidas, the Ætolian commander in Elis, ravaged the lands of Dyme, Pharæ and Tritæa; and the people of these places, having applied in vain to the younger Aratus, now the Achæan strategus, for troops, raised money among themselves and took some mercenaries into pay. Lycurgus, the Spartan king, took the Athenæon in the Megalopolitis, and Euripidas the castle of Gorgos near Telphussa.

Dorimachus was now appointed strategus of Ætolia, and his first act was to collect troops and make an irruption into Epeirus, where he destroyed the votive offerings at Dodona, and burned and razed the ancient hallowed fane of Zeus; for in the eyes of the Ætolians sacred and profane were indifferent. The active young king of Macedonia soon after, though it was winter, took 3000 Chalcaspids*, 2000 peltasts, 300 Cretans and 400 horse, and passed over to Eubœa, whence he proceeded to Corinth, where he arrived about mid-winter. He closed the gates that his arrival might not be known, and sent secretly to Sicyôn for Aratus; he also sent letters to the Confederates, telling them when and where to meet him in arms. He then went and encamped in Phliasia. Just at this time Euripidas had set out from Psophis at the head of two thousand two hundred Eleians, freebooters and mercenaries, on a plundering excursion to Sicyôn. He passed the camp of the king in the night; but learning his proximity in the morning, he retraced his steps in haste, hoping to reach the heights of Stymphalus in time. Philip, who intended to march by Stymphalus to

* So named from their *brazen shields*.

Caphyæ, where he had appointed the Achæans to meet him, also set out in the morning, and the two armies chanced to meet ten stadia this side of Stymphalus. Euripidas fled with the horse to Psophis; and the Eleians, when they saw that the foes were Macedonians, and not Megalopolitans as they had at first supposed, flung away their arms and took to flight; but not more than one hundred escaped, the rest being slain or taken. Having crossed Mount Ligyrgus with great labour, on account of the snow, Philip came on the third day to Caphyæ, where he halted for two days; and being joined by the younger Aratus and some Achæan troops, which raised his force to ten thousand men, he advanced through Cleitoria to Psophis, to which he laid siege; and though it was strong by nature, and had an Eleian garrison, he took the town by storm, and the citadel by capitulation. Having reduced Lasiôn and some other places in Arcadia, he led his army to Olympia, where having sacrificed to the god and given his troops three days' rest, he entered Elis. A castle named Thalamæ, in which a great number of the people had taken refuge with their property, surrendered at his appearance, and he found in it a booty of five thousand slaves and much valuable property. Returning to Olympia he entered Triphylia, which the goodwill of the people toward him enabled him to reduce in six days. Having established order in the towns and divided the booty among his soldiers, he marched by Tegea to Argos, where he remained for the rest of the winter, letting his Macedonians return home.

While Philip was in Triphylia a new revolution was attempted in Sparta. Cheilôn, a man of the royal blood, indignant at Lycurgus being preferred to himself, resolved to tread in the steps of Cleomenes. Having collected about two hundred of his friends, he fell on and slew the ephors at their supper; he then went to the house of Lycurgus, but he had contrived to make his escape. Disappointed of his victim, Cheilôn entered the market and called on the people to join him, holding out a division of lands and other inducements; but no one heeding him, he retired, and stole out of the country to Achaia.

The time for the election of the strategus of the Achæan league was now at hand, and Aratus and his friends were in favour of Timoxenus, who was a man of ability. But Apelles, one of the guardians of the young king, had conceived the design of making Achaia as completely under Macedonian influence as Thessaly. The chief obstacle in the way of this project was Aratus, whose influence with Philip he therefore sought to diminish as much as possible. He joined the party in Achaia opposed to him; and by inducing the king, under pretext of a new invasion of Elis, to be present at Ægion during the election, he caused the choice to fall upon Eperatus of Pharæ, a man of no talent whatever. (Ol. 140, 3.)*

The king led his troops into the district of Dyme and took a strong place, named Teichos, which the Ætolians held there; he then entered and plundered Elis, and brought the booty to Dyme. Apelles now openly accused Aratus of treachery; but he triumphantly repelled the charge, and stood higher than ever in the king's favour. As money and provisions were required for the Macedonian army, a synod was held at Ægion; but it appearing that Eperatus had no influence in it, and that on account of Apelles, Aratus would not exert *his*, Philip proposed its removal to Sicyôn. He there used all his efforts with Aratus, and the necessary supplies were readily voted.

Being resolved to make the war partly naval, Philip set the Macedonians to learn to row at Corinth; and when they were perfect in their exercise, he prepared to put to sea; but Apelles had gone to Chalcis, in Eubœa, where the Macedonian magazines were, and he prevented supplies being sent. Philip, however, pawned his plate; Aratus exerted himself; and the fleet proceeded to the island of Cephallenia, which supplied the Ætolians with ships for their piratic excursions. The king laid siege to Palæa, one of the chief towns in the island. The engines played on the town, and mines were run under the walls. He called on the people to surrender; on their refusal, fire was set to the props in the mines, and two plethra of the walls thrown down. The peltasts were ordered to storm; they ad-

* In this year Hannibal invaded Italy.

vanced gallantly ; but Leontius, their commander, was a friend of Apelles, and he caused the attack to fail. Philip, disheartened at this repulse, was thinking of raising the siege, when the Messenians sent to implore aid against Lycurgus, who had invaded their country ; and the Acarnanians came to inform him that Dorimachus had set out with all his forces for Macedonia. A council was held. The Messenians assured the king that the Etesian winds would carry him to Messene in one day. Leontius, who knew that if the Etesian winds took him thither they would keep him there, strongly advocated this course. Aratus advised an immediate invasion of Ætolia ; his advice was approved by the king ; orders were sent to Epeiratus to collect a force and relieve the Messenians, and Philip sailed with his army to the bay of Ambracia, where he landed. A rapid night-march brought him to the Achelœus, near Stratus, which he reached at daybreak. Leontius now advised to halt and rest the men, Aratus urged expedition ; the river was crossed and the march directed for Thermon, the chief place of Ætolia, which they reached early in the day, and the town and surrounding country were plundered. All the booty which could not be carried away was collected and burned ; and the king, at the instigation of Demetrius the Pharian, who was now in his service, sullied his fame by imitating Scopas and Dorimachus in destroying the temples and votive offerings in Thermon. The army, laden with booty, reached the bay of Ambracia in safety, and having stopped for two days at Leucas, returned to Corinth. Dorimachus, who had only gotten as far as Thessaly, where he had not time or opportunity to do mischief, arrived when too late for the defence of Ætolia.

At Corinth the king learned that Lycurgus was besieging Tegea. He instantly issued orders to the members of the League to repair thither in arms. He set out himself with his own troops ; and on the seventh day from his having left the heart of Ætolia, he appeared, to the dismay of the Spartans, on the banks of the Eurotas. He passed over and encamped at Amyclæ, then wasted the country to Tænaron and along the coast, and returned to Amyclæ. Lycurgus, who had de-

feated a body of Messenians that were coming to join the king, was resolved not to suffer him to quit Laconia without a battle. He took his post, with about two thousand men, on the rugged hills beyond the Eurotas, opposite Sparta, directing the people of the town to be ready to sally forth at a given signal; and he flooded the space between the town and the river, so that the only passage that remained for the invaders was along the foot of the hills on the other side, where for the want of space they would have to march in a long column exposed to the enemy.

Philip saw that his only course was to dislodge Lycurgus from his position. He therefore crossed the river at the head of his mercenaries and peltasts, supported by the Illyrians. The Lacedæmonians drove back the mercenaries; but when the peltasts and Illyrians came up, they dispersed and fled to the city, having had about one hundred slain and one hundred taken. Philip, leaving the Illyrians in charge of the heights, re-crossed the river with the rest to protect the rear of his phalanx, which Aratus was leading from Amyclæ. The phalanx passed over in safety; the horse and light troops, having driven off the cavalry which came out of the town, followed; and the whole army, quitting Laconia unimpeded, returned by Tegea and Argos to Corinth. Lycurgus soon after being unjustly accused to the ephors of revolutionary designs, they went to his house by night to seize him; but he had had timely notice, and had fled to Ætolia. His innocence, however, becoming apparent, he was afterwards recalled.

Philip, having sent some Chian and Rhodian envoys, whom he found in Corinth, to Ætolia to treat of peace, went to Lechæon to embark for Phocis, where he had some affairs of importance to transact. Leontius, and his friends Megaleas and Ptolemæus, seized this opportunity of exciting a mutiny in the Macedonian army. The soldiers committed some excesses, but the return of the king speedily reduced them to obedience. Philip dissembled his knowledge of the authors; Apelles came to Corinth at the desire of Leontius; and the matter finally ended in Megaleas, who had fled to Thebes, putting an end to

himself; Apelles and his son dying (it is not said how), and Leontius and Ptolemæus being executed.

The Ætolians, who were very desirous of peace, had agreed to a conference at Rhion; but to the great joy of Philip, who wished the war to continue, they put it off when they heard of the mutiny. The king, having exhorted the Achæans to prepare for war, returned to Macedonia for the winter.

In the spring (Ol. 140, 4.), the strategy of the worthless Eperatus being expired, the elder Aratus was appointed to that office for the fifteenth time, and he set vigorously to work to repair the faults of his predecessor. Philip, having secured Macedonia against the Dardanians, and taken Meliteia and the Phthiotic Thebes in Thessaly, hastened to the Peloponnese to resume the war against the Ætolians. But while he was assisting at the Nemean games, letters came from Macedonia informing him of the great defeat which Hannibal had given the Romans at the Thrasimene lake. He showed them to Demetrius the Pharian, enjoining him silence; the exiled Illyrian instantly said, that he should without delay make peace with the Ætolians, and think only of Illyria and the passage to Italy; for now that the power of the Romans was broken, he might justly aspire to universal empire. Philip lent a ready ear to these flattering suggestions: he sent an Ætolian prisoner home to inform the Ætolians of his wishes, and he led his troops to Ægion. Lest, however, by remaining in their vicinity, he might appear too anxious for peace, he went to Lasiôn in Arcadia, and made a feint of invading Elis.

After some negotiation, the king, at the desire of the Ætolians, crossed over with his army and encamped near Naupactus, for the sake of more speedy communication. A distinguished Naupactian, named Agelaüs, represented with much eloquence the imperious necessity of strict union among the Greeks under actual circumstances, for that assuredly, whether Romans or Carthaginians came off victors in the present contest, they would turn their views eastwards; whereas united Greece, under the king of Macedonia, might achieve the conquest of the world. Peace was accordingly concluded under

the condition of all parties remaining as they were, and thus terminated the Confederate War.

Philip's eyes were now steadily directed toward Italy. He saw that he must join one side or the other : the Carthaginians, as the more distant, he deemed the safer allies ; and after the decisive battle of Cannæ (Ol. 141, 1.) he formed an offensive and defensive alliance with Hannibal. The following year he prepared a fleet of a hundred and twenty ships, with which (Ol. 141, 3.) he attacked Oricum and Apollonia, towns of Epeirus in alliance with Rome ; but the prætor M. Valerius Lævinus, who was with a fleet on the coast of Calabria, sailed over, and entering Apollonia unobserved, fell by night on the Macedonian camp, slew three thousand men, and took most of the remainder, Philip himself escaping with difficulty*.

The character of Philip was by this time totally changed. He was, to use the strong words of the historian, "not actually become a wolf from a man, according to the Arcadian fable, but from a king a bitter tyrant." We need not therefore wonder that the counsels and the presence of the virtuous Aratus were disagreeable to him. He had even injured his family honour by debauching, in breach of hospitality, the wife of his son. This produced a quarrel ; the king signified to Tauriôn† his desire to be rid of the old strategus ; a slow poison, it is said, soon carried him to his grave (Ol. 141, 4.), in the sixtieth year of his age and his seventeenth strategy, and his son shortly afterwards died mad. Aratus was mourned by the whole League ; his body was interred with solemnity in his native town ; and a Heroön, named from him the Arateion, erected over it, at which sacrifices were duly offered as to a hero.

Aratus is one of those who have attained to eminence without being, properly speaking, great. He was notoriously deficient in physical courage, and hence probably arose the timid caution which distinguished his policy. His ambition was inordinate, and he was jealous of every man of ability. Sooner, therefore, than see Cleomenes at the head of the League, he

* Livy, xxiv. 40.

† Polyb. viii. 14. Plut. Arat. 52.

undid all his work, and reduced the Peloponnese under the Macedonian power; and, as we have just seen, he met with his appropriate reward. The man, however, who could possess the political influence which he did throughout his life, could not have been an ordinary person.

CHAPTER VIII.*

War between Philip and the Ætoliens.—War between Philip and the Romans.—Battle of Cynos-cephalæ.—Peace between Philip and Rome.—Independence proclaimed to Greece.

Ol. 142, 2-146, 1. B.C. 211-196.

GREECE remained at peace for about six years after the conclusion of the Confederate War; but the Romans, whose prospects were brightening now that they had reduced Capua and Syracuse, were resolved to be revenged on Philip for the part he had taken against them. The proprætor M. Valerius Lævinus, who had long been in secret communication with the Ætolian leaders, came therefore in person (Ol. 142, 2.) to the national synod, and by the promise of aiding them in the conquest of Acarnania, engaged them to declare war against Philip in concert with Rome. The Lacedæmonians and Eleians, Attalus king of Pergamus, and some others were, if they wished, to be included in the alliance†.

As Philip was now engaged in Thrace, Scopas, the Ætolian strategus, collected his whole force and invaded Acarnania. But the gallant Acarnanians had sent their wives, children and old men into Epeirus, and binding themselves by a solemn oath never to return unless victorious, advanced to the frontiers.

* Liv. xxvii. 29-33; xxviii. 5-8; xxxi.-xxxiv. (This writer may be here regarded as the translator of Polybius.) Plut. Philopœmen, 8-12. Flaminius, 1-11.

† Liv. xxvi. 24.

The Ætolians, daunted by their resolution and by the tidings of the approach of Philip, retired without venturing a battle.

The following spring (Ol. 142, 3.) Valerius sailed from Corcyra into the Corinthian gulf, and aided the Ætolians to take the town of Anticyra, on the coast of the Ozolian Locris; but letters which came from Rome to inform him of his being chosen consul, put a stop to further operations.

During the time which elapsed before the arrival of Lævinus' successor, the Ætolians employed themselves in gaining allies. The Eleians had already declared for them, and they now sent an embassy, headed by Cleonîcus and Chlæneas, two of their most distinguished men, to Lacedæmôn. The Acarnanians despatched an embassy thither also, headed by Lyciscus. Chlæneas dilated on the injuries of the Macedonians, and the long friendship between Ætolia and Lacedæmôn: Lyciscus eloquently defended the Macedonians, detailed the unjust deeds of the Ætolians, and took a statesmanlike view of the danger of allowing the Romans to meddle in the affairs of Greece*. We are not told what was the immediate effect of these speeches at Sparta, but it appears to have been in favour of the Ætolians. We are also left in the dark as to the state of the government there; all that we can learn is, that Lycurgus was now dead, and that a man named Machanidas, who is called a *tyrant*, had, in what way we know not, possessed himself of the supreme power.

The proconsul P. Sulpicius having come out as successor to Lævinus, the war was renewed. (Ol. 143, 1.) The Achæans, pressed on one side by Machanidas, on the other by the Ætolians, sent to call on Philip. As he was coming to their aid, he found at Lamia an Ætolian army, in which were a thousand Romans and some troops sent by Attalus. He gave them two defeats; and having put Eubœa into a state of defence against Attalus, he came to Argos, and thence proceeded to Rhion to try if peace could be effected, so as to keep the Romans and Attalus out of Greece. But as the Romans were now at Naupectus, and Attalus at Ægina, nothing could be done with the

* Polyb. ix. 28-39.

insolent and faithless Ætolians. He therefore returned to Argos to solemnise the Nemean games, and while he was thus engaged, Sulpicius landed and ravaged the coast between Sicyôn and Corinth ; but Philip with his wonted speed appeared with his cavalry, and drove the Romans to their ships. When the games were over he led his troops to Dyme, and being joined by the Achæans under the strategus Cycliadas, invaded Elis. Sulpicius sailed round to Cyllene, and secretly landed four thousand men to join the Eleians and Ætolians. The sight of the Roman ensigns somewhat daunted the king ; but he gave them battle, and his horse being killed under him, he narrowly escaped being taken or slain. The advantage, however, was on his side, and he advanced plundering the country till tidings of a rebellion called him home. He left two thousand five hundred men with the Achæans, who soon after gave the enemy a complete defeat near Messene.

The next summer (Ol. 143, 2.) Attalus and Sulpicius sailed to Lemnos and Peparêthos. They then came to Eubœa, where the town of Oreos was betrayed to them by the Macedonian governor ; but their attempt on Chalcis failed. Philip hastened to the defence of Eubœa ; he drove off the Ætolians who were guarding Thermopylæ, and chased Attalus, who was plundering Opûs, to his ships. At Elateia he met ambassadors sent by king Ptolemæus of Egypt and the Rhodians to mediate a peace ; but ere he could do more than speak with them, he heard that Machanidas had invaded Elis. He instantly set out for the Peloponnese ; Machanidas retired at his approach ; he gave Heræa and Triphylia to the Achæans, then ravaged Ætolia ; and having on his return home given orders to build a hundred ships for the next campaign, he turned his arms against the Dardanians.

The following year (Ol. 143, 3.) the Ætolians remained quiet, but Machanidas was still in arms against the Achæans. Philopœmen, of Megalopolis, who was the strategus, had by his precepts and example infused great military ardour in the people of the League ; he had greatly improved their arms and their discipline, and now, after eight months' exercise, he led

them out against the Spartan tyrant. He took his position behind a deep ditch, close to Mantinea, placing the phalanx in the centre, the mercenaries and light troops on the left, the cavalry on the right wing. Machanidas directed his attack on the left wing, which he routed and chased off the field. Philopœmen remained quiet till he saw the Lacedæmonian phalanx left alone; he then charged with his phalanx and remaining light troops, and routed it. The tyrant on his return, seeing his phalanx broken, formed the troops which were with him in a close body to force his way through the enemy; but the Achæans occupied the bridge over the ditch, and his men lost courage and dispersed. Machanidas rode with two companions along the ditch, seeking a place to cross. Philopœmen, who recognised the tyrant, rode on the opposite side. At length Machanidas coming to a practicable spot, ran his horse at it; but the spear of Philopœmen received him as he landed, and cast him back dead into the ditch. The loss of the Lacedæmonians was four thousand slain, and a greater number made prisoners. The victors, having taken Tegea and entered and ravaged Laconia, returned to Achaia*.

The war now languished, and at length (Ol. 143, 4.) Philip compelled the Ætolians to make a separate peace. The proconsul P. Sempronius, who landed shortly afterwards at Dyrhachium, was desirous of breaking it; but, by the mediation of the Epeirots, a peace was effected between Philip and the Romans also. During four or five years the tranquillity of Greece was only disturbed by an irruption into Messene by Nabis, who had succeeded Machanidas in the tyranny of Sparta. He took the chief town by surprise: Lysippus, the Achæan strategus, deeming it now too late, refused to send troops to Messene; but Philopœmen, putting himself at the head of his fellow-citizens, went to the relief of their friends and allies, and Nabis retired at his approach. Philopœmen after this action, impatient of repose, went to Crete to command the troops of the Gortynians, and he remained there for some years.

At length the Romans, having vanquished Hannibal, turned

* Polyb. xi. 9-18.

their thoughts to the king of Macedonia, and war, on various pretences, was declared against him. A chief pretext was afforded by Athens, now one of the feeblest states in Greece. Two young Acarnanians who were there, had at the time of the Mysteries unawares entered the temple of Demeter and the Kora, with the crowd of the Initiated. The questions which they asked betraying them, they were seized and put to death. Their countrymen, having obtained permission and troops from Philip, entered and ravaged Attica. The Athenians, in conjunction with Attalus and the Rhodians, declared war against Philip, and sent to Rome and Egypt to implore aid. (Ol. 145, 1.)

In the autumn the consul P. Sulpicius crossed the sea and took up his winter-quarters at Apollonia. A part of the fleet was sent off to the relief of Athens, and soon after their arrival the Romans surprised the strong town of Chalcis in Eubœa; but as they were not able to defend both it and Athens, they plundered and destroyed it. Philip, who was at Demetrias*, hastened with five thousand foot and three hundred horse to Chalcis; but finding the Romans gone, he resolved to make an attempt to surprise Athens. He arrived there before day, but the number of lights in the city told him that his project was discovered. He halted at the Academy; the Athenians came out to engage him; he routed and drove them back into the town; then encamping at the Cynosarges he destroyed it and the Lyceion, and all the monuments and buildings round Athens.

Next day the troops of Attalus came from Ægina and the Romans from the Piræus to the defence of the town. Philip drew off his forces and went to Eleusis, and thence to Argos, where the Achæan synod was met to consult on the best mode of repressing the outrages and excesses of Nabis. He offered to undertake the war against him provided the Achæans would send their troops to garrison Oreos, Chalcis and Corinth. The

* This was a town built by Demetrius Poliorcetes on the bay of Pagasæ. Demetrias, Chalcis in Eubœa, and Corinth were the three strongest places in Greece.

Achæans, suspecting that his design was to get hostages in his hands so as to compel them to join in the war against the Romans, declined the offer, and he returned to Attica, where he met his general Philocles, who had failed in an attempt on the castle of Eleusis. The king renewed the attack, but the Romans came by sea from the Piræus and relieved it. He then advanced to Athens, and directing Philocles to attack the town, he himself assailed the Piræus: but he could effect nothing against it, and he retired to Bœotia, ravaging the country and destroying the temples on his way.

The Romans had meantime made an incursion into a part of Macedonia, and the consul had, in the usual Roman manner, taken most of the petty princes round it into alliance. When the Panætolian met at Naupactus, Macedonian, Roman and Athenian deputies appeared and addressed it. The Ætolians replied that the subject was of too much importance to be decided on suddenly. Their real object was to watch the course of events, for when Philip a little time after was worsted in a cavalry action by the Romans at Octolophon, they declared at once against him and invaded Thessaly. But Philip fell on them as they were plundering, and routed them, and their strength was greatly diminished soon after by Scopas, who came with money from Egypt, and hired six thousand of their youth for the service of king Ptolemæus. The fleets of the Romans and Attalus were at this time triumphant in the Ægæan; they plundered Andros and the peninsula of Pallene, and took Oreos in Eubœa.

The next year (Ol. 145, 2.) the consul P. Villius came out as successor to Sulpicius. It was late in the year when he arrived, and he had to quell a mutiny in the camp as his first task, so that before he could commence operations against the enemy, his successor in the consulship T. Quinctius Flamininus appeared to supersede him. (Ol. 145, 3.)

King Philip now occupied with his army a strong position in Chaonia, where the river Aôûs runs in a narrow glen (like Tempe) between two mountains named Æropus and Asnaûs. This position he had also secured by ditches and ramparts, and

Flaminius, though young and full of ardour, feared to attempt to force it.

During forty days the two armies stood opposite each other. A conference to treat of peace was then held, but ineffectually, by the king and consul. The next day was passed by the troops in active skirmishing. A herdsman sent by Charops, an Epeirot prince, was now brought before the consul, who proffered to lead the Roman troops by a secret path to the top of the mountain, over the heads of the Macedonians. A body of four thousand men was sent with him; and on the third day, when a column of smoke, the appointed signal, told that they were on the summit, the consul led out his forces and attacked the Macedonians. The royal troops were driven back to their defences; the Romans, descending the mountain, fell on them in the rear; and they fled in all directions, owing their safety to the ruggedness of the ground. The Roman legions soon spread over Thessaly, Eubœa was conquered, and the same fate befell Phocis, Elateia alone offering resistance.

The present strategus of the Achæans, Aristænus, being inclined to the Romans, the combined fleet of the Romans, Attalus and the Rhodians came to Cenchreæ, and prepared to besiege Corinth; for it was hoped that by offering to reunite that town to the League, the Achæans might be induced to renounce the alliance with Philip. Envoys were accordingly sent to the synod, which was now sitting at Sicyôn. Aristænus exerted all his eloquence in their behalf: still the feeling in favour of Philip was so strong that but five of the ten deputies could be brought to vote for Rome. At length, Memnôn, the deputy of Pellene, menaced with death by his own father, went over to that side: the Dymæans, Megalopolitans and a part of the Argives quitted the assembly; and Philip's cause was lost. The troops of the League joined in the siege of Corinth, which was gallantly defended; and as Philocles was preparing to relieve it, the siege was abandoned, by the advice of Attalus. Philocles proceeded to Argos, of which Philip's friends put him in possession.

The next year (Ol. 145, 4.) new consuls were elected at

Rome; but, by the influence of his friends, Flaminius was continued in his command, and a reinforcement, under his predecessors Sulpicius and Villius, was sent out to him. He had during the winter entered into negotiations for peace with Philip; but peace was not his object, and though the king was permitted to send ambassadors to Rome, peace he found was not to be had from the haughty republic.

Philip, seeing that the contest was to be for his political existence, resolved to strain every nerve. In Greece the Acarnanians alone remained faithful to him. Nabis, the vile tyrant of Sparta, to whom he had given Argos in trust, broke faith without delay; he robbed the wealthy of their property, promised the poor abolition of debts and a division of lands*, and ended by joining Flaminius against Philip.

By calling out the whole force of his exhausted kingdom Philip assembled an army of 16,000 phalangites, 2000 peltasts, 2000 Thracians and Illyrians, about 1000 mercenaries, and 2000 horse, and having exercised them a sufficient time at Dion, advanced into Thessaly. Flaminius, with a force of Romans and Greeks equal in number of foot but superior in cavalry, having passed Thermopylæ without opposition, came and encamped near Pheræ. The king, who was at Larissa, also approached that town. After a smart cavalry action, in which the king had the worst, as the country was too thick-set with walls and gardens to admit of a pitched battle, the two armies, unknown to each other, moved off toward Scotussa. A range of hills divided them, so that they were not aware of their proximity, till, on the third day, the advance-guard of the Roman army going to occupy some eminences named Cynoscephalæ (*Dog-heads*), from their form, encountered there a Macedonian post. A skirmish between these parties brought on a general engagement; and though Philip displayed his usual skill and valour, and his troops fought with heroism, the phalanx was unable to resist the legions of Rome. The victory was complete, and the might of Macedonia was broken

* *Duas faces novantibus res ad plebem in optimates accendendam* is the just remark of Livy. It is true of modern as of ancient times.

for ever. The bodies of eight thousand soldiers lay on the field; five thousand were made captives. The victors, it is stated, lost but seven hundred men*.

Misfortune assailed Philip on every side, for at this very time the Achæans defeated Androstenes, the Macedonian governor of Corinth, with a loss of fifteen hundred slain and three hundred prisoners. The consul's brother Lucius sailed from Coreyra and took the town of Leucas in Acarnania by storm; and the tidings of the battle of Cynos-cephalæ were followed by the submission of the whole country.

Philip, who had fled into Macedonia, sent deputies to the consul at Larissa to propose terms of peace. The Ætolians, insolent with success, insisted on his being put to death or driven from his kingdom; but Flamininus, who knew that a war with Rome was impending from Syria, affected moderation. An interview was held in the vale of Tempe, and a truce made for four months to enable Philip to send ambassadors to Rome. Peace was granted by the senate on condition that all the Greek states in Europe and Asia should be free and independent, and that Philip should withdraw his garrisons from them; that he should give up all prisoners and deserters, and all his ships of war; that he should keep no more than fifteen thousand men in arms, and have no elephants, and not make war unauthorised by the senate; and finally, pay a thousand talents, half down, half in the course of ten years. This peace gave satisfaction to all the Greeks except the Ætolians†.

It was now the season of the Isthmian games (Ol. 146, 1.), and Flamininus, who was at Athens, repaired to Corinth to be present at them. While all were in anxious expectation the herald of the games advanced, and when the trumpet had given the signal for silence, he proclaimed aloud, "The Roman senate and the general T. Quinctius, having conquered king Philip and the Macedonians, will that the Corinthians, Phocians, all the Locrians, the isle of Eubœa, the Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhæbians and Phthiotic Achæans be free, untaxed, and governed by their own laws." Surprise and joy contended in the

* Polyb. xviii. 1-10.

† *Id. ib.* 17-22.

minds of the auditors, who could scarcely believe their ears ; the herald was recalled, and he repeated the proclamation ; the games were hurried over, as no one gave any attention to them ; all then rushed to the presence of the Roman general ; wreaths and garlands were flung upon him, and but that he was in the vigour of youth (he was now only three and thirty) he would have sunk beneath the demonstrations of their joy.

Such was the celebrated scene of the Romans giving liberty to Greece. Alas ! it was but deceptive, and Greece was to be henceforth as completely a vassal as Etruria or Campania. It was the fear of Antiochus, and not an emotion of generosity, that actuated the senate, and the debt of gratitude due to Rome was slight. Yet the wiser Greeks appear to have seen that the empire of the world was reserved for Rome, and that internal peace could only be secured to Greece by her supremacy.

CHAPTER IX.*

War against Nabis.—Antiochus the Great in Greece.—War between Sparta and the League.—Death of Philopœmen.—Last efforts of the Greeks.—Destruction of Corinth.—Reduction of Greece to a province.—Conclusion.

OL. 146, 2-178, 2. B.C. 195-67.

THE Romans now turned their thoughts to Syria. Antiochus the Great ruled from the Caucasus to the borders of Egypt : he had been the ally of Philip ; and he now made himself master of the Greek cities of Asia and the Chersonese, and took some towns from Ptolemæus, the young king of Egypt. Roman ambassadors were sent to require him to give liberty to the Grecian towns, and to restore those of the king of Egypt. They met with a haughty refusal ; but the senate did not deem it

* Liv. xxxiv.—xxxvi. Plut., Flam. 13-16. Philop. 15, to the end.

prudent to go to war yet, more especially as they were not quite sure of Greece; the Ætolians were known to be discontented; and Nabis had been faithless to Philip, and might be so to them. It was resolved therefore previously to humble the Spartan tyrant, and orders were sent out to Flamininus to act against him as he deemed best for the republic,—in other words, to make war on him.

Flamininus, having called a meeting of the confederates at Corinth (Ol. 146, 2.), asked if it was for the good of Greece that Nabis should hold Argos. All but the Ætolians gave the answer he wished, and war was declared against the tyrant if he did not give up Argos to the Achæans. The Roman army entered the Peloponnese, and was joined by eleven thousand Achæans; they advanced to Argos, and thence by Tegea and Sellasia into Laconia, and encamped at Amyclæ, whence they ravaged the country to the sea; and Gythion being attacked by sea and land was forced to surrender. The tyrant kept his troops close within the walls of Sparta: the Greeks were eager to besiege and destroy him; but Flamininus, who knew that his successor was coming out, and wished therefore to end the war, opposed this measure, alleging the impending danger from Syria. They therefore consented to offers of peace being made to the tyrant. These, however, he rejected; and the city was attacked and nearly taken. Nabis then in terror sued for peace, which was granted on his giving up Argos, his ships, the Roman deserters and prisoners, the families of the exiles, etc. etc. The Greeks murmured, not without reason, that the rightful king Agesipolis, and the noblest of the Spartans, should continue in exile, and a ruthless tyrant be suffered to remain in peace. But Flamininus had consulted the interests of Rome, and not those of Greece or of humanity.

The following spring (Ol. 146, 3.) Flamininus withdrew, according to promise, the Roman garrisons from Acro-Corinth, Chalcis, Demetrias and other towns, and led his army back to Rome, when the senate granted him the well-merited honour of a triumph.

The Ætolians, regarding themselves as hardly treated by the Romans, were resolved, if possible, to rekindle the flames of war, and they sent to solicit Antiochus, Philip and Nabis. This last was easily excited; he murdered all opposed to him in the maritime towns of Laconia, and laid siege to Gythion, which Flamininus had given in charge to the Achæans. Philopœmen, who had returned from Crete and was now the Achæan strategus, attempted to relieve it by sea; but as he knew nothing of naval affairs his little fleet was easily defeated by that of the tyrant. He speedily, however, collected a land-force, and invading Laconia gave Nabis a complete defeat near Sparta (OL. 147, 1.). The tyrant was urgent with the Ætolians to send him aid; and as they were now resolved on war with Rome and were regardless of faith, they sent a thousand men ostensibly to his support. But as they had already by treachery gained Demetrias, and meditated seizing all the strong places of Greece, the commander of these troops was directed to kill the tyrant and seize on Sparta. He accordingly slew Nabis openly at a review, in the presence of his troops, and then hastened and plundered his palace. The Ætolians began to pillage the town; but the people rose and slaughtered them, and Philopœmen, coming to Sparta, induced the Spartans to join the Achæan league. The vile treachery of the Ætolians thus met with its due reward.

The intelligence of the occupation of Demetrias by the Ætolians decided king Antiochus to pass over at once to Greece. Toward the end of the year he sailed from the Troas, with ten thousand foot, five hundred horse and six elephants, and landed at Pteleon in Magnesia. He met the Ætolian chiefs at Lamia, and apologised for the smallness of his force, assuring them that in the spring he would fill all Greece with men and arms and cover the coast with ships. He was heard with applause, and the chief command of the war was conferred on him.

An attempt to gain Chalcis, before which Antiochus appeared in person, having failed, envoys were sent to the king of the Athamans in Epeirus, and to the Achæans to persuade them to abandon the alliance of the Romans. Flamininus, who

was at Ægion when the envoys arrived there, replied so satisfactorily to them that the League at once declared war against Antiochus and the Ætolians. Some troops were sent to the defence of Athens and Chalcis ; but this last opened its gates when Antiochus appeared with his army before it, and all Eubœa speedily submitted.

During the winter Antiochus received embassies from Elis and Epeirus, and he went himself to Thebes and obtained a decree of amity from the assembly of the Bœotians. He then proceeded to Demetrias, where a council was held relative to Thessaly. Hannibal, the great Carthaginian, who was with the king, but owing to the jealousy of Thoas the Ætolian, without a command, advised above all things to try to gain over king Philip, or if that did not succeed, to send orders to Seleucus, the king's son, to cross with his army into Thrace and attack Macedonia. He reiterated the opinion he had always expressed, that the only way to conquer Rome was to invade Italy. This advice was applauded, but not followed. Antiochus reduced several towns in Thessaly, and then returned to Chalcis to celebrate his nuptials with a beautiful maiden of that place, and the remainder of the winter was spent in luxury by himself and his troops.

In the spring (Ol. 147, 2.) Antiochus assembled his army and entered Ætolia. Treachery enabled him to gain over a part of the Acarnanians. He then returned to Chalcis, where tidings soon reached him that the prætor M. Bæbius, joined by king Philip, was victorious in Thessaly, and that the consul M' Acilius Glabrio had landed with ten thousand foot, two thousand horse and fifteen elephants, and was on his way to join them. Antiochus, finding how he had been deceived by Thoas and the Ætolians, now regretted that he had not let himself be guided by the counsels of Hannibal. He resolved, however, to make the best of matters, and having sent to summon the Ætolians to his aid, advanced to occupy the pass of Thermopylæ, which he secured with a wall and a double ditch and rampart. The Ætolian chiefs could get but four thousand men to take arms, one half of whom, at the desire of the king,

occupied the heights of the mountain to prevent the passage of any Roman troops.

The consul on coming to the pass sent the legates M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus with two thousand men to dislodge the Ætolians. At daylight next day he led his forces to the attack of the enemy. Antiochus drew up his phalanx with the light troops on the left, and the elephants and horse on the right, and all the attacks of the Romans were repelled, till Cato, having dislodged the Ætolians, appeared on a hill over the royal army. When they found that these were Romans, and not Ætolians as they had at first thought, they lost all courage and fled; the Romans pursued them, after plundering the camp, as far as Scarphia, and of the whole army not more than five hundred men returned to Asia. Antiochus fled without stopping to Elateia, whence he hastened to Chalcis, and getting aboard a ship passed over to Ephesus.

Chalcis and the towns of Bœotia opened their gates to the Romans, and Heracleia, which the Ætolians held, was taken by assault. Terms of peace (hard ones of course) were offered to the Ætolians; and on their hesitating to accept of them, the consul M. Fulvius Nobilior advanced and laid siege to Nau-pactus. After a siege of two months, by the mediation of Flamininus the consul granted them a truce, in order that they might send envoys to Rome to solicit a peace. (Ol. 147, 4.)

In the winter of this year, the peace of the Peloponnese was disturbed by the Spartans: for the exiles having settled in the towns on the coast of Laconia, which Flamininus had given in charge to the Achæans, and cut them off from all communication with the sea, the Spartans resolved to right themselves, as of old, by the sword; and they fell on by night and took the town of Lâs, to the south of Gythion; but when the day came, the people rose and drove them out. Envoys were sent to the Achæans to complain of the Spartans; and on the motion of Philopœmen, who was then strategus, a decree was passed requiring them to give up the authors of this outrage, or be treated as violators of treaty. The Spartans, in their rage, when these terms were proposed to them, murdered thirty

of those persons who were favourable to the Achæans and the exiles, and then renouncing the League, sent to the consul Fulvius, who was at Cephallenia, inviting him to come and receive their city into subjection to Rome.

War was declared by the League; but as it was now winter, no operations of magnitude could be undertaken, and at the desire of the consul, who came to Elis, both parties sent embassies to Rome. The answer given by the senate was ambiguous; for they respected the Achæans, and did not wish any change to be made in Lacedæmôn.

The next year (Ol. 148, 1.) Philopœmen being re-elected strategus assembled an army, and entering Laconia required the authors of the revolt to be given up. Fear causing a general silence, the persons demanded declared their willingness to go if the deputies pledged their faith that no violence should be offered them till they had pleaded their cause. The security was given, and they went attended by their friends, in all eighty in number. But the exiles met them at the gate of the camp, and began to revile them; many of the Achæans joined the exiles; a tumult arose; and in spite of the efforts of Philopœmen, seventeen of them were stoned on the spot. The remaining sixty-three were confined: and next day they were brought before the multitude, by whom they were condemned, without listening to their defence, and then led to death.

After this act, which is little creditable to his memory, Philopœmen ordered the Lacedæmonians to demolish their walls, dismiss their mercenaries, give up the slaves whom the tyrants had freed, abolish the laws and institutions of Lycurgus, and adopt those of the Achæans. This last condition was the hardest; but Philopœmen saw that his plan of uniting the Peloponnese in one body could never be accomplished while the Spartans were separated by their institutions from all the other Greeks. The Spartans on complying with these terms were re-admitted into the League.

Greece now remained tranquil during four years: the Messenians (Ol. 149, 2.) first disturbed the repose. Deinocrates, their strategus, was a personal enemy to Philopœmen, now stra-

teigus of the Achæans for the eighth time, and he persuaded the Messenians to separate from the League. News came to Argos to Philopœmen, who was there ill of a fever, that the Messenians were about to commence hostilities. He rose from his sick bed, and though now seventy years of age, mounted his horse and rode to Megalopolis (400 stadia) in one day. Having assembled a body of horse of the principal youth of the place, he entered Messene: the troops of Deinocrates were routed, but being reinforced, they rallied, and Philopœmen found it necessary to retreat over some uneven ground. In his anxiety for his gallant young cavalry, he kept in the rear, frequently facing round against the enemy. He thus came to be separated from his friends, and his horse happening to throw him, he was made a prisoner.

When Philopœmen was led to Messene, the people flocked to behold him. But as pity and respect were the feelings most manifested, Deinocrates and his friends had him hurried away to a subterraneous prison named the *Treasury*, the mouth of which was closed with a large stone moved by an engine. Deinocrates, fearing if he delayed that Philopœmen would recover his liberty and exact vengeance, assembled a secret council of his own friends, and by their votes sentenced him to death. At nightfall a servant entered the prison with a cup of poison: Philopœmen, who was lying wrapped in his cloak, raised himself, and taking the cup, asked if Lycortas and his cavalry had escaped. The servant replied in the affirmative. "'T is well," said he, and drinking the contents of the cup, shortly after expired.

The joy of Deinocrates and his friends was short-lived. The troops of the League, led by Lycortas, invaded Messene: resistance was vain; the city of Messene was forced to open its gates. Deinocrates eluded their vengeance by a voluntary death: those who had voted for the death of Philopœmen followed his example; those who had voted for the torture were surrendered to Lycortas.

The remains of Philopœmen were burnt, and put into an urn, to be conveyed in solemn procession to his native town.

The infantry, followed by the Messenian prisoners, led the march. Polybius, the future historian, the son of Lycortas, and the principal Achæans followed, bearing the urn covered with ribbons and garlands; the cavalry closed the procession. The people of all the towns and villages on the way came forth to testify their grief and respect, and touch the hero's urn. At the tomb the Messenian prisoners were stoned to death, to appease the manes of Philopœmen. Statues of him were set up, and public honours decreed to his memory in most of the towns of Greece.

After the death of Philopœmen Greece declined daily. In every town the friends of independence were outweighed by the tools and sycophants of Rome. Lycortas and other men of noble mind strove, but in vain, against Hyperbolus, Calliocrates, and men of a similar character. At length his evil destiny engaged Perseus, the unworthy successor of Philip, in a conflict with the Romans: the battle of Pydna (Ol. 153, 1.) put an end to the independence of Macedonia, and Perseus expired a captive in Italy. Roman commissioners came to inquire into the state of Greece; and at the instigation of Calliocrates, they required of the assembly of the Achæans to pass sentence of death on those who had aided Perseus with money or otherwise, reserving to themselves the power of afterwards naming the persons who should be obnoxious to the sentence. Such an unheard-of proposal was rejected with horror and disdain. The Romans then asserted that all the Achæan leaders had been guilty. Xeno, who had been strategus, denied the charge on the part of his friends and himself, and declared that they were ready to justify themselves either there or at Rome. His offer was eagerly caught at, and upwards of a thousand of the principal Achæans, among whom was the historian Polybius, were carried off to Rome (Ol. 153, 2.), where they were treated as condemned instead of accused persons, and distributed for custody in the towns of Etruria. Such of them as attempted escape were put to death. Embassies were sent in vain, praying for their liberation: it was not till sixteen years afterwards (Ol. 157, 2.) that three hundred of them

(all that were alive) were allowed to return to their enslaved country*.

During the twenty years (Ol. 153-158.) of apparent independence which remained to Greece, nothing occurs of much interest. The Lacedæmonians attempted to separate from the League; Rome was appealed to; an embassy, headed by L. Aurelius Orestes, came (Ol. 158, 2.) and summoned a congress to Corinth. Orestes declared the will of the senate to be, that Sparta, Argos, Corinth, the Arcadian Orchomenus and the Cetean Heracleia should be separated from the League. The strategus, Diæus of Megalopolis, and the other heads of the League would hear no more; they rushed out of the house, called an assembly of the people, and seized all the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. Deputies were sent to Rome, who met Roman envoys coming to Greece, with whom they returned.

Critolaüs, the strategus of the following year (Ol. 158, 3.), was possessed by an insane desire of war with Rome†; and when Sextus Julius Cæsar, the head of the Roman embassy, summoned a congress to Tegea, he sent secret instructions to the members not to appear; then pretending that he could do nothing without them, required the Romans to wait for another synod six months thence. The Romans went home; and Critolaüs, having visited all the places of the League to excite hatred and animosity against them, convened an assembly to Corinth. To this assembly came envoys, sent by Q. Cæcilius Metellus, the governor of Macedonia; but the mob, of which it was chiefly composed, would not listen to them, and drove them away with insult and derision. Critolaüs proposed to make war on Sparta, in reality on the Romans; and added, to gain the common people, that till peace was restored, all social distinctions should cease; debtors be free from their engagements; and every Achæan be lord of any place he might take during the war. War was at once resolved on, and Pytheas, the Bœotarch, induced the Thebans, whom Metellus had fined

* Paus. vii. 10. The succeeding events are related by this writer (11-16), and in part by Polybius, xxxviii. and xl.

† Both he and Diæus had been among the one thousand hostages.

for acts of aggression on their neighbours, to take a share in it. The Roman senate, when they heard of these proceedings, declared war against the Achæan League, and committed the conduct of it to the newly elected consul L. Mummius.

Metellus, anxious to compose the affairs of Greece before Mummius should come out, entered Thessaly with his army; he at the same time sent deputies offering forgiveness of all that was past, but to no purpose. Critolaüs was besieging the Cetean Heracleia when he heard that Metellus had passed the Spercheius. Instead of attempting to defend the pass, he fled in terror into Locris; and Metellus, coming up with the Achæans near the town of Scarphia, gave them a total defeat. Critolaüs disappeared in the action, most probably drowned in the neighbouring morass. At Chæroneia, Metellus met and cut to pieces a body of one thousand Arcadians; he found Thebes deserted, and pardoned the people on Pytheas being given up: he then advanced to the Isthmus.

On the death of Critolaüs, Diæus, the strategus of the preceding year, took as of right the vacant office. He wrote from Argos to the people of all the towns, to give freedom and arms to their household slaves to the number of twelve thousand, and to send them to Corinth, whither he also summoned all the fighting men of the League. He forced all the wealthy, both men and women, to contribute money toward the war*. He was thus enabled to assemble a force of fourteen thousand hoplites and six hundred horse, with which he took his post near Corinth, while four thousand men, the wreck of Critolaüs' army, had the charge of defending Megara. These, however, fell back on the approach of Metellus. Peace was again offered, but in vain: Mummius arrived with twenty-three thousand foot and three thousand five hundred horse, and Metellus returned to his province.

A division of the Italian allies was placed as an advance-post twelve stadia from the Roman camp. The Achæans, observing their haughty negligence, fell on them, and drove them back with the loss of some men and of five hundred shields. Emboldened by this success, Diæus offered the Romans bat-

* Polyb. xl. 2.

tle*: but the Achæan horse fled at the first shock; and the foot, who fought with the valour inspired by despair, were soon overborne by numbers. Diæus, when he saw all lost, sped away to Megalopolis, told of the defeat, put his wife to death with his own hand to save her from disgrace and slavery, and then terminated his life with poison.

During the night after the battle most of the men fled from Corinth. Mummius, fearing an ambush, did not venture to enter the town till the third day. He put to death all the men whom he found in it, sold the women and children, carried away most of the works of art, and then set fire to the city, whose flames ascended to heaven as those of the funeral pyre of Grecian independence.

Ten commissioners came from Rome in the usual manner to aid the consul in regulating the affairs of Greece. The walls of all the towns which had taken part in the war were thrown down, the democracies were everywhere dissolved, and the direction of affairs was committed to the wealthy citizens; no one could acquire landed property out of his own community; all national synods and assemblies were suppressed; and an annual tribute was imposed on Greece, which, under the name of Achaia, was governed by a Roman proconsul.

A shadow of independence remained to Athens, Crete and Rhodes. But sixty years afterwards (Ol. 173, 3.) the lower classes of the people at Athens were induced to declare for Mithridâtes in his war against the Romans; the men of property fled from the devoted town, and the ruthless Sulla massacred the inhabitants without mercy†. Crete remained as contemptible as ever, through internal discord and mercenary service. After a resistance of more than two years to the Roman arms during the Mithridatic war, it was conquered and

* Justin (xxxiv. 2.) adds, that the women and children stood on the heights to view the defeat of the Romans: waggons were at hand to carry off the booty. This circumstance is improbable in itself, and is utterly at variance with the state of dejection which the Greeks were in, according to Polybius. Justin and Florus say that the battle was fought *sub ipsis Isthmi faucibus*; the author of 'De Viris Illustribus' names the place Leucopetra.

† Plut., Sulla, 14. Appian, Mithridat. 38. Pausanias (i. 20.) says he decimated them.

reduced to the form of a province. (Ol. 178, 2.) Rhodes, under its excellent and prudent aristocracy, continued independent and respected till the time of the Roman empire.

During this last period of Grecian history, the adventurous, the needy and the ingenious found ample employment in the civil and military service of the kings of Egypt, Syria, and the other fragments of Alexander's mighty empire. The philosophers and men of letters met a welcome reception at the courts of Egypt and Pergamus, whose kings had collected immense libraries; but the fire of Grecian genius was extinct, and criticism and compilation were now the chief occupation of those who aspired to literary eminence. In this period, however, the physical, mechanical and mathematical sciences made rapid progress, and the names of Eratosthenes, Hipparchus and Archimêdes will ever remain in honour.

THUS have we ventured, in narrow limits, to trace the history of Greece, from the time of its emergence from the mists of mythology, to that of its absorption in the wide ocean of Roman story. Greece had performed the part assigned her by the Ruler of the Universe: she had checked the westward progress of Asiatic dominion; she had developed nearly every form of political existence; she had given the world perfect models in every species of literature and art; she had displayed the evils of civil discord and absence of political unity. Two thousand years have flown since the scene closed on independent Greece, during which period, crouching beneath the despotism of the Roman, the Byzantine and the Turkish empires, she has been as naught among the nations. At length, in our own days, we have beheld her re-appearance on the political stage, and the question naturally arises, what will be her future destiny? Is she to enjoy the blessings of concord and union among the various portions of her population? Is she to emulate ancient Hellas in arts, in arms, and in literature? Is she to escape the influence of the chill withering air of northern despotism? These are questions we venture not to answer: we hope the best, but our hopes are not sanguine, for instances of national rejuvenescence are rare in the annals of the world.

APPENDIX.

A, page 8.

AUTHORITIES.

THE early history of Greece was all poetic, and chiefly mythic. When the intercourse with Egypt had furnished the Greeks with a more abundant writing-material than they had hitherto possessed, they began to form prose-histories from those poetic materials. Such were the works of Hecataeus, Hellanicus and the other predecessors of Herodotus.

*Herodotus** himself cannot be regarded as a contemporary historian, for he was only in the eighth or ninth year of his age when the last events which he records occurred. His work is, properly speaking, the history of the Persian empire from the accession of Cyrus to the termination of Xerxes' invasion of Greece. But he takes the opportunity of introducing episodically all the information that he had been able to collect respecting the various nations and peoples with whom the Persians came into contact during that period, and has thus succeeded in producing one of the most curious and most delightful works that have ever been written.

Thucydides was the contemporary rather than the successor of Herodotus, for he was not quite fourteen years younger than that historian. This greatest of historians has left a narrative of the events of his own times. His work, which was interrupted by his death, ends in the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian war. (Above, p. 266.)

Cratippus, a contemporary of Thucydides, continued the history thence to the restoration of the Long Walls by Conon. (Above, p. 309.)

Cleitodemus, or Cleidemus, who flourished at this time, wrote an *'Αθῆς*, or history of Attica, from the earliest times down to his own days.

Xenophôn also continued the history of Thucydides. His *Ἑλληνικά* ends with the battle of Mantinea (above, p. 350), embracing a period of forty-eight years. The author was contemporary with the events which he records, but his partiality for the Lacedæmonians detracts from the value of his testimony.

Theopompus of Chios, the contemporary of Philip and Demosthenes, also continued the history of Thucydides. His work, named like *Xenophôn's*, *Ἑλληνικά*, consisted of twelve books, and contained the events of seventeen years, ending with the battle of Cnidos (above, p. 308). Theopompus also wrote *Φιλιππικά*, or a history of Philip of Macedonia, in fifty-eight books. It commenced where *Xenophôn's* *Hellenics* ended. This historian is charged by the ancients with malignity of spirit and love of detraction (see Polyb. viii. 11-13); a modern writer (Boeckh. i. 301) terms him "severe but impartial."

Ephorus, the fellow-student of Theopompus, wrote a historic work in thirty books, which extended from the return of the Heracleids to the siege of Perinthus by Philip. (Above, p. 386.)

* The names in Italics are those of the authors whose works are extant.

Callisthenes of Olynthus, who was put to death by Alexander the Great, wrote Hellenics in ten books, extending from the Peace of Antalcidas (p. 314) to the seizure of the temple of Delphi by the Phocians (p. 365).

Philochorus, a contemporary of Demetrius Phalereus, wrote an *Atthis* which extended from the earliest times to his own days.

Diyllus wrote a history in twenty-seven books, which commenced where that of Callisthenes ended, and appears to have ended with the siege of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes (above, p. 422). It was continued by a writer named *Psaôn*.

Duris of Samos, who flourished in the time of king Pyrrhus, wrote Hellenics, Macedonics, and other historic works. His Hellenics commenced with the year after the battle of Leuctra.

Aratus of Sicyôn wrote memoirs of his own life and times.

Phylarchus, a contemporary of Aratus, wrote in twenty books the history of the period from Pyrrhus' invasion of the Peloponnese (p. 424) to the death of Cleomenes (p. 440).

Polybius' notices of Grecian affairs commence where the *Memoirs* of Aratus ended, namely, with the Confederate War, and end with the destruction of Corinth. For an account of *Polybius'* work, see the Appendix to the *History of Rome*.

The preceding works have for the most part perished; but some fragments of them have been preserved by *Athenæus*, *Ælian* and other compilers, and by the Scholiasts or annotators on the Greek Poets. It was chiefly from the materials furnished by them, that *Plutarch* and *Cornelius Nepos* formed their *Lives* of the most distinguished men of Greece, and that *Diodorus Siculus* and *Trogus Pompeius* (abridged by *Justin*) wrote those portions of their works which treat of Grecian affairs.

B, page 106.

EXAGGERATIONS IN NUMBERS.

Every one who is acquainted with history, must be aware how little the numbers of armies and other masses of men can be relied on which are given by writers not contemporary with the events which they record. Even contemporaries, when not statesmen or soldiers, are little to be trusted. The numbers in *Thucydides* and *Xenophon* bear the stamp of truth; so also do those in *Polybius*; and we may observe when *Livy* quits this judicious writer to follow the annalists, how his numbers swell into magnitude, as, for example, in his account of the battle of the Metaurus. The remark which we have made holds true in an especial degree in Oriental and Middle-age history, where the numbers given frequently pass all belief. To no writer, however, is it more applicable than to *Herodotus*, some of whose statements we will here examine.

We will previously lay down the following fact as a beacon to guide us in our inquiries. The largest army that modern times have seen assembled, was that with which the emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in the year 1812. It may be stated at half a million of men, inclusive of baggage-drivers, etc. It was abundantly supplied from the fertile countries in its rear, and marched through districts fruitful in corn and cattle: yet this host could not move in one body, and its front extended for a space of not less than 300 miles. We may therefore perhaps lay it down as a rule, that so large an army can-

not move in one mass; and this will probably hold as true of Asiatic as of European troops.

In an article on the Crusades in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* (vol. v. p. 639 *seq.*), the present writer took occasion to inquire into the number of persons who formed the pilgrim-army on the first Crusade. That number is given by an eye-witness at 100,000 horse and 600,000 foot, exclusive of the priests, old men, women, and children. Though it met with few casualties, we are told that it was reduced to one half when it appeared before the walls of Antioch, and we know that it was little more than 20,000 when it stormed the Holy City. We reasoned there on the difficulty of procuring food, and the want of the means of obtaining accurate information as to the numbers; and showed from the actual numbers of some of the principal divisions of the pilgrims, that there was great exaggeration in the sum-total of the army, which we felt disposed to set down at not more than half the amount at which it was stated.

The host with which sultan Bayazeed, or as he is commonly called Bajazet, encountered Timoor at Angora (*Ancyra*) on the Pterian plain (above, p. 77), is stated at 120,000 men, a number liable to no suspicion, while we are told that that of the Tartar counted 700,000 warriors, evidently an exaggeration of the Turks to extenuate the disgrace of defeat: for though very large masses of men can certainly be assembled in the East, it seems impossible for such a number of men and horses to find food.

To come now to Herodotus. He tells us that the army with which Darius invaded Scythia, or the country north of the Black Sea, counted 70 myriads, *i. e.* 700,000 men. Now we know that even at the present day those countries would find it difficult if not impossible to furnish food to such a host, and perhaps if we set down the host of the Persian monarch at a tenth of its supposed amount, we shall not be very far from the truth.

Herodotus does not give the number of the Persian host at Marathôn. Plato (*Menex.* § 10.) says it contained 500,000 men; the authors followed by Trognus (*Justin*) said 600,000, a third of which perished; Pausanias (*iv.* 25.) and Valerius Maximus (*v.* 3.), 300,000; Nepos (*Milt.* 4.), who is the most moderate, 200,000 foot, and 10,000 horse. That these are all gross exaggerations, is manifest from the small and credible number of the slain in the narrative of Herodotus, who likewise furnishes us with a fact from which we may make a calculation of the probable number. The fleet, he says, consisted of 600 triremes. Now the crew of a trireme was usually about 200 men, inclusive of the marines (above, p. 143), but when merely employed as transports, they sometimes carried a greater number. Let us suppose that on this occasion there were 50 soldiers on board of each trireme, we thus get upwards of 100,000 rowers and sailors, and 30,000 soldiers, and there is no great wonder in 10,000 Greeks defeating 30,000 Asiatics. The barbarian cavalry was probably not numerous, or the historian would have given the number of the transports. The number of horses in a transport was usually thirty.

The five millions of the host of Xerxes (above, p. 105) pass all bounds of credibility. The utmost that the population of ancient Greece ever amounted to, did not exceed three millions and a half (See Clinton, *F. H.* ii. 386), a number far inferior to that of this huge host. Yet the number of Xerxes' army must have been very great to allow of such exaggeration. The length of time devoted to the preparations, the quantity of stores and provisions collected, etc., testify for this fact. We have the authority of the

poet Æschylus, who was present (Pers. 341), for the fact of the Persian fleet at Salamis having contained 1000 triremes, on board of which there must have been more than 200,000 men. We surely cannot suppose the land-army to have much exceeded that number (followers and women included); and if half a million or more of human beings passed from Asia to Europe, and remained there for some time, it is as remarkable a fact as any that history records.

The character of Herodotus' history is semi-epic; and it is difficult to avoid suspecting, that in the catalogue which he gives of the nations composing the host of Xerxes, he had that of the Iliad in view, and that he wished to make a display of his geographic knowledge. The names of nations mentioned by Æschylus are much less numerous. It is the opinion of Heeren (adopted by bishop Thirlwall), that the historian drew his account of the numbers and equipments of the various troops from the lists formed by the royal secretaries at the review at Doriscus. But how was he to get access to those accounts, which were probably preserved in the royal archives at Susa? In justice however to this honest historian, we must observe that he is not to be charged with the exaggeration. The following inscription he tells us (vii. 228.) was cut by the Amphictyons on the pillar which they raised to the memory of those who fell at Thermopylæ, and probably not more than a year or two after the retreat of the Persians:—

*Μυριάσιν ποτὲ τῷδε τριηκοσίαις ἐμάχοντο
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου χιλιάδες τέτορες.*

Here the numbers actually far exceed those given by the historian. *He* says that the entire land-force was 2,100,000, *they* 3,000,000 men, and it seems plain that they meant to include none but the fighting men. It is also to be observed that they likewise exaggerate the number of the Peloponnesians. What a striking instance is this of Grecian vanity and falsehood! Surely no man in his senses can believe that so many millions were congregated in Thessaly, then marched through the *inland* parts of Phocis and Bœotia, and remained for some time in Attica, which at a later period at least could not yield support to an army of 25,000 men (p. 415). Larcher endeavours to obviate this objection by reminding us of the stores of provisions that had been laid up previous to the march of the Persian army. But these were on the coast of Thrace, and there is not even a hint given us of there being a fleet of merchantmen to attend the progress of the army and supply its wants. We further are inclined to think that military men would doubt of the possibility of Mardonius being able to keep an army of 300,000 men, of which a great part was cavalry, and which must have had, like all oriental armies, its women and followers—an entire winter in Macedonia and Thessaly, and then for about two months in Bœotia and Attica. In fine, though the East is the realm of exaggeration, we recollect nothing in oriental history, or even oriental romance, to compare with the muster-roll of the army of Xerxes.

C, page 129.

TESTIMONY OF ÆSCHYLUS.

As the Persians of Æschylus was represented eight years after the flight of Xerxes, and while Herodotus was only a boy, the dramatic poet is the oldest authority on the subject of the invasion of Greece. It may therefore be worth while to note the circumstances which he records.

Speaking of the troops of Xerxes, the poet mentions the Persians and Medes, the Egyptians (34-40), the Lydians, Mardians, and Mysians (41-52), the Babylonians (52-55), the Bactrians (306, 318, 732), the Arabians (318), the Cilicians (327), and he speaks in general of "the sword-bearing people from all Asia" (56). He notices the bridging over of the Hellespont (722, 745-750); he relates the battle of Salamis (353-471), in which he mentions the stratagem of Themistocles to bring on the action (353 *seq.*), though without naming him, merely saying that a Greek came from the Athenian army to Xerxes, and told him of the intended flight of the Greeks; and he describes the slaughter in the isle of Psyttaleia (447 *seq.*). He states the number of the Persian ships in the battle at 1000 (341), that of the Greeks at 300 (339). He describes the flight of the Persian fleet and army after that battle (480 *seq.*), and their sufferings; and he notices (500 *seq.*) the loss occasioned by the breaking of the ice on the river Strymôn. He appears to say (734), that the bridge over the Hellespont was *not* broken when Xerxes reached it. He mentions the leaving of a select body of troops in Greece (803), and he makes the ghost of Darius foretell the issue of the battle of Platæa (805-820).

D, page 139.

PEACE OF CIMÔN.

The actual existence of such a treaty as the peace of Cimôn has been disputed in both ancient and modern times. It is not noticed by either Herodotus or Thucydides, and it was the opinion of Callisthenes that there was no actual treaty made, but that in effect the Persian fleets and armies did keep at those distances. The Persians also, we may observe, aided the revolt at Samos (above, p. 155.), which they would hardly have done had there been a treaty. On the other hand, Plutarch (Cim. 13.) says that it was in a collection of decrees formed by one Craterus; that an altar to Peace was raised on account of it at Athens, and great honours bestowed on Callias, who had headed the embassy to Susa. Isocrates (Panegy. 65. Arcop. 156. Panath. 244.), Demosthenes (Fal. Emb. 428.), and Lycurgus (in Leocr. 17.) speak of the conclusion of the treaty as a matter of certainty; Demosthenes expressly names Callias, whose embassy to Susa is mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 151.), though he does not say what the cause of it was. Again, when Alcibiades (Ol. 92, 1.), treating on the part of the King with the Athenians, required that he should be allowed to sail along his own coast wherever and with as many ships of war as he pleased, the Athenian deputies thought the demand so unreasonable that they broke off the conference. Thuc. viii. 56.

Would it not appear from this that there had been a previous treaty? The chief difficulty seems to lie in the first article, as it is well known that the cities of the coast were not independent and continued to pay tribute to the Persians*; but perhaps all that was covenanted by the treaty, if it really

* See above, p. 86, *note* *. The revenues of Grecian cities of the coast, such as Lampsacus and Magnesia, were given by the Persian kings to Themistocles, Demaratus, and others, and their posterity continued to enjoy them; and when the Athenians (Thuc. v. 1.) expelled the people of Delos from their island, the Persian satrap Pharnaces gave them an asylum at Atramyttium on the coast of Æolis.

was made, was, that they should be governed by their own laws and be free from the presence of Persian troops. At all events, there was peace, or at least a suspension of hostilities with Persia from the death of Cimôn till the time when the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily transferred the Peloponnesian war to the coast of Asia.

There is a long disquisition on the Peace of Cimôn by Dahlmann in his *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte*.

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